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Abstract
Charles Iheagwara, Ph.D., University of Glamorgan, October 2004. The Effectiveness of 
Intrusion Detection Systems. Advisor: Dr. Andrew Blyth.
This study investigates the following hypothesis: "The effectiveness of intrusion 
detection systems can be improved by rethinking the way the IDS is managed and by 
adopting effective and systematic implementation approaches. "
This submission introduces the work done to show the validity of this hypothesis. It 
demonstrates its practicability and discusses how different technical factors; local 
environmental (systems/network) factors; implementation and management factors affect 
intrusion detection systems effectiveness.
We conduct studies on intrusion detection systems to expand our knowledge of their 
basic concepts, designs, approaches and implementation pitfalls. We analyze 
implementations of the major intrusion detection systems approaches/products and their 
inherent limitations in different environments.
We discuss the issues that affect intrusion detection systems effectiveness and explore the 
dependencies on several components, each of which is different and variable in nature. 
Then, we investigate each component as a separate and independent subhypothesis.
To provide evidence in support of the hypothesis, we conduct several studies using 
different approaches: experimental investigations, case studies, and analytical studies 
(with empirically derived arguments).
We develop methodologies for testing intrusion detection systems in switched and gigabit 
environments and perform tests to measure their effectiveness against a wide range of 
tunable parameters and environmentally desirable characteristics for a broad range of 
known intrusions. The experimental results establish the impact of deployment 
techniques on intrusion detection systems effectiveness. The results also establish 
empirical bandwidth limits for selecting appropriate intrusion detection 
technologies/products for highly scalable environments.
Through case studies, we demonstrate how management and implementation methods 
affect intrusion detection systems effectiveness and the Return on Investment.
Finally, in our analytical work we illustrate how systems configuration settings and local 
security policies affect intrusion detection systems effectiveness.
Together, the results provide the evidence in support of the hypothesis and, hence, we 
contribute to the existing body of knowledge by suggesting and demonstrating the ways 
to improve the effectiveness of intrusion detection systems.
Chapter 1. Introduction
1 Introduction
The effectiveness of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is dependent on many factors 
including an organization's implementation strategy; and how well the management of 
the IDS technology helps the organization achieve the tactical and strategic objectives it 
has established.
This assertion is the thrust of this research and in this submission overview, I will 
summarize the work done to show its validity.
Prior to reviewing the studies, the overview presents background information on intrusion 
detection systems (IDSes) in Section 1.1 and review of the problems with IDS 
implementations in Section 1.2. The "hypothesis" will be presented Section 1.3 and the 
research approach in Section 1.4. The organization of the document will be outlined in 
Section 1.5.
1.1 Background
The following background information will help the reader understand the mission, 
historical evolution, techniques, architecture and implementation of IDSes.
1.1.1 The IDS Mission
Intrusion detection system is a security technology that attempts to identify and isolate 
"intrusions" against computer systems, i.e. the IDS monitors computer systems and 
network traffic and analyzes that traffic for possible hostile attacks originating from 
outside the organization and also for system misuse or attacks originating from inside the 
organization. Given the above, the main task of the IDS is to defend the computer system 
by detecting and possibly repelling attacks to it.
Intrusion detection systems evolved due to the lack of intrusion prevention systems (IPS: 
defined as in-line products or systems that focuses on identifying and blocking malicious 
network activity in real time) and the following issues:
  It is impossible to build a completely secure system in today's software 
development environment because the programming languages and operating 
systems used for development and implementation introduce a number of security 
flaws [1]. These security flaws are difficult to detect and intruders can use these 
flaws to bypass existing security mechanisms.
  There is usually a transition period measured in decades (in terms of security)
during the replacement of a large number of operating systems and applications 
with more secure ones.
  Existing cryptographic systems are not completely secure and have exploitable 
weaknesses for a determined and resourceful intruder. The best cryptographic 
system offers no protection against lost or stolen keys or poorly chosen 
passwords.
  There is an inverse relationship between the level of system security and user 
efficiency. As system security increases, user efficiency decreases. A completely 
secure system, with existing security techniques, is practically unusable.
  Finally, a secure system may still be vulnerable to an insider misusing their 
privileges.
1.1.2 Historical Evolution
Historically, the evolution of IDSes followed a systematic and sequential order of events. 
The concept of IDS evolved in 1980, when James Anderson first proposed that audit 
trails should be used to monitor threats [2]. Prior to this, the importance of audit trails 
on data was not evident as all the available system security procedures were focused on 
denying access to sensitive data from an unauthorized source. Following Andersen's 
suggestion was a proposal in 1987 by Dorothy Denning on the development of an 
Intrusion Detection System abstract model [ 3]. In effect, the abstract model was the 
first to propose the concept of intrusion detection as a solution to the problem of 
providing a sense of security in computer systems. Industry watchers saw the model as 
more of a retrofit approach, in comparison to the traditional proactive methods of 
encryption and access control.
Following Denning's proposal were a series of efforts to come up with an enhanced 
model and prototypes. Teresa Lunt et al. in 1988 refined Denning's model by creating 
IDES (Intrusion Detection Expert System) [4] designed to detect intrusion attempts 
against a single host. In 1995 an improved version called NIDES (Next-generation 
Intrusion Detection Expert System) [ 5]was developed. Other systems include the 
Haystack system [ 6] developed in 1988 to assist Air Force Security Officers detect 
misuse of the mainframes used at Air Force Bases, and in 1989 MIDAS (Multics 
Intrusion Detection and Alerting System) [ 7] developed for the same reasons, but for the 
National Computer Security Center's Multics mainframe. Wisdom and Sense [ 8] was 
developed in 1989 from the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Information Security 
Officer's Assistant (ISOA) [ 9] from Planning Research Corporation.
The nineties saw a phenomenal increase in the scope and breadth of research and 
development of IDS technologies. Among these was the introduction in 1990 of a new 
concept - Network Security Monitor (NSM), now called Network Intrusion Detector or 
NID [10]. NID examines suspicious behavior by passively monitoring the network traffic
in a LAN. In the following year (1991) instead of examining the audit trails of a host 
computer system, a different idea was introduced with NADIR (Network Anomaly 
Detection and Intrusion Reporter) [11] and DIDS (Distributed Intrusion Detection 
System) [12]: the audit data from multiple hosts were collected and aggregated in order 
to detect coordinated attacks against a set of hosts. Mark Crosbie and Gene Spafford [13] 
in 1994 suggested the use of autonomous agents in order to improve the scalability, 
maintainability, efficiency and fault tolerance of IDS. With the design and 
implementation of GrIDS [14] in 1996, a new approach to address the scalability 
deficiencies in most contemporary intrusion detection systems was introduced. GrIDS 
facilitates the detection of large-scale automated or coordinated attacks, which may even 
span multiple administrative domains. Ross Anderson and Abida Khattak in 1998 
offered an innovative approach to intrusion detection, by incorporating informational 
retrieval [15] techniques into intrusion detection tools.
1.1.3 Techniques
The techniques for intrusion detection can be divided into two main types.
Anomaly Detection: In anomaly detection techniques it is assumed that all intrusive 
activities are necessarily anomalous. This means that by establishing a "normal activity 
profile" for a system, it is possible, in theory, to flag all system states varying from the 
established profile by statistically significant amounts as intrusion attempts.
The fundamental issues in anomaly detection systems is the selection of threshold levels 
so that anomalous activities that are not intrusive are flagged as intrusive and intrusive 
activities that are not anomalous result in false negatives (i.e. events are not flagged 
intrusive, when they actually are). Anomaly detection systems are also computationally 
expensive because of the overhead of keeping track of, and possibly updating several 
system profile metrics. The block diagram of a typical anomaly detection system is 
shown in Figure 1.
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Figure I: A typical anomaly detection system [16].
Misuse Detection: The idea behind misuse detection schemes is that we can represent 
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attacks in the form of a pattern or a signature such that any variation of the same attack 
can be detected. This means that misuse detection systems try to recognize known "bad" 
behavior or attack patterns.
The difficulties in misuse detection systems include discerning how to write signatures 
that encompass all possible variations of the pertinent attack and signatures that do not 
also match non-intrusive activity. The block diagram of a typical misuse detection system 
is shown in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2: A typical misuse detection system [16]. 
1.1.4 Architecture
The current architecture (Fig.3) of commercially available IDS products is built primarily 
out of the perceived role/tasks of the IDS in information systems assurance.
By design, an IDS is made up of three components:
  Information sources,
  Analysis, and
  Response.
The three components are seamlessly integrated and are structured in a sequential order 
to maintain the functionality of the system.
Three distinct phases: data collection, data analysis and response characterize the system. 
Thus, intrusion detection is conceptually - and in practice - in most cases accomplished 
as follows: the system obtains event information from one or more information sources, 
performs a pre-configured analysis of the event data, and then generates specified 
responses, ranging from reports to active intervention when it detects intrusions. There is 
also a management system that allows a security or network administrator to monitor and 
configure the system and to analyze the data. These components may or may not be 
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Figure 3. The standard IDS architecture [17].
Thus, the IDS is an assembly of different components all of which functionally relate to 
each other singularly or wholly.
At the component level (Fig.4) the IDS always has its core element - a sensor (an analysis 
engine) - that is responsible for detecting intrusions. This sensor contains decision- 
making mechanisms regarding intrusions. Sensors receive raw data from three major 
information sources: own IDS knowledge base, syslog and audit trails. The syslog may 
include, for example, configuration of file system, user authorizations etc. This 










Figure 4: A sample IDS [18].
The component/mechanism responsible for data/information collection is integrated with 
the sensor (Fig.5) [18]  an event generator. The method of collection is determined by 
the event generator (which is usually the operating system, network or application) policy 
that defines the filtering mode of event notification information and produces a policy- 
consistent set of events that may be a log (or audit) of system events, or network packets. 
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Figure 5: IDS components [18].
As for detection, a detection policy database (an information repository) is used for 
analysis by the analyzer. A typical content includes the following: attack signatures, 
normal behavior profiles, and necessary parameters for example, thresholds. 
Additionally, the database holds IDS configuration parameters, including modes of 
communication with the response module. Also, the sensor also has its own database 
containing the dynamic history of potential complex intrusions.
1.1.5 Implementation
The implementation of the IDS can be accomplished in two ways (Network and Host- 
based) depending on specific needs and local system environmental conditions. Thus, the 
IDS is an overlay of two separate and different Network-based (NIDS) and Host-based 
IDS (HIDS) technologies. This means that the whole network or any subsets of the 
network can be monitored with NIDS from one location while the HIDS can be deployed 
to watch specific hosts critical servers such as databases, Web services and essential file 
servers to significantly reduce risk.
Topologically, the IDS can be centrally deployed (for example, physically integrated 
within a firewall) or deployed in a distributed fashion (a distributed IDS consists of 
multiple Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) over a large network, all of which 
communicate with each other). For more sophisticated systems, the agent structure
principle (where small autonomous modules are organized on a per-host basis across the 
protected network [19]) is employed. In this case, the role of the agent is to monitor and 
filter all activities within the protected area and  depending on the approach adopted  
make an initial analysis and even undertake a response action. Also, IDS can employ 
more sophisticated analysis tools to aid with the detection of decisive distributed attacks 
[20] with the agent roaming across multiple physical locations. Thus, agent type factors 
into the implementation scheme when introducing new policies in response to new types 
of attacks [21] and IDS agent-based solutions also use less sophisticated mechanisms for 
response policy updating [22].
1.2 Problems with Existing Intrusion Detection Systems
This brief review serves to inform the reader of the magnitude, scope and nature of the problems 
that diminish the IDS effectiveness.
There are several unique obstacles that limit the performance effectiveness of commercially 
implemented IDS products. Primarily these are:
1. Issues with variant signatures,
2. Excessive number of (false positives and negatives) alerts,
3. Data overload,
4. Scalability issues,
5. Issues in Large-scale deployment,
6. Difficulties in switched environments,
7. Cost-effectiveness issues, and
8. Management Issues.
1. Issues with variant signatures: While the ability to develop and use signatures to 
detect attacks is a useful and viable approach, there are shortfalls to only using this 
approach that should be addressed. The problem is that signatures are developed in 
response to new vulnerabilities or exploits that have been posted or released. Therefore 
between the creation of an attack and the deployment of a signature, a window of 
opportunity exists for an intruder to mount an attack with little to no chance of the attack 
(zero day attack) being detected. If the attack takes place, the IDS will be ineffective in 
detecting it, hence its primary mission is defeated.
2. Excessive number of alerts: A common complaint in IDS deployment is the amount of 
false positives the IDS generates. Developing unique signatures is a difficult task and 
often times the vendors will err on the side of alerting too often rather than not enough. It 
is much more difficult to pick out a valid intrusion attempt if a signature also alerts 
regularly on valid network activity. A difficult problem that arises from this is how much 
information can be filtered out without potentially missing an attack. Overall, this 
problem results into a management overburden, wastage of network resources and 
higher operating cost.
As for false negatives, the issue is not detecting attacks for which there are no known 
signatures when they occur (e.g. zero-day exploits). The result is that the IDS do not 
generate an alert when an intrusion is actually taking place. Hence it is ineffective.
3. Data overload: Another important factor, which could diminish the effectiveness of 
IDS performance, is the volume of data to be analyzed. In effect, how much data an 
analyst can effectively analyze becomes very important. With generation of excessive 
alerts and the large volume of transactions to be analyzed, the amount of data he/she 
needs to look at becomes so large and definitely an overburden. Depending on the
intrusion detection tools employed and its size, there is a possibility for logs to reach 
millions of records per day. This problem results into a management overburden and 
makes the implementation costly (expensive) due to the extra financial expense incurred.
4. Scalability Issues: In the last couple of years, there has been a significant increase in 
network traffic. As a result, the Gigabit Ethernet technology was introduced to 
accommodate this increase in bandwidth - and thus the volume of traffic to be analyzed. 
The problem associated with this is that with Gigabit traffic, the older IDS technologies 
that operate at lOmbps or lOOmbps bandwidths become seriously overloaded. And after 
a certain point, the performance takes a nosedive to the point of the IDS being completely 
ineffectiveness.
5. Issues in Large-scale deployment: Significant differences exist between 
implementation of the IDS in small and large enterprise systems. The most obvious 
difference is that in large enterprise implementations there are more endpoint machines 
(computers, servers, and network segments) that must be protected. This will lead to 
longer installation time and a more complicated set up in terms of systems configuration 
and optimal selection of sensor placement within the network. Also smaller enterprises, 
by definition, have less choices and options about where to strategically install the IDS. 
By contrast, larger enterprises must often spend days or even weeks deciding on the 
optimal placement of IDS agents, managers, and IDS configuration groupings. This 
problem results into improper technical deployment and mismanagement of the 
implementation which diminishes the IDS effectiveness.
6. Difficulties in switched environments. Switched and/or high-speed networks create 
problems for IDSes: many are unreliable at high speeds, dropping a high percentage of 
network packets; and switched networks often prevent IDS network interface cards 
(NICs) that operate in promiscuous modes from seeing passing packets. This problem is 
compounded in large-scale deployments where multiple layers of switches inundate the 
network. The overall concern is the scope and visibility of the IDS which directly affect 
its performance effectiveness.
7. Cost-effectiveness: Given the high cost of IDS deployments especially when multiple 
deployments are involved, organizations must justify implementation expenses by 
proving that the IDS is cost-effective. One possible justification is to establish that the 
deployment of the IDS should lead to a reduction in the annual loss expectancy (ALE) 
and the return on security investment (ROSI).
But as a result of several factors, IDS implementations have not always been cost- 
effective. Improper methods have been used to purchase, deploy and manage the devices 
in some organizations. This results into a more expensive implementation.
8. Management Issues: The manner in which the IDS is implemented will affect its 
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effectiveness. In some organizations, the IDS is implemented without due consideration 
to proper management approach. Also certain implementation management decisions are 
made on ad hoc basis. Typical issues here include inadequate manpower, improper 
selection of implementation technique, lack of training, etc. This often results into poor 
implementations and poor IDS performance.
Together, all of the above problems diminish the ability of the IDS to function effectively 
and possibly resulting in deployments that are unprofitable. Hence there is the need to 
rethink the whole way the IDS is implemented and managed.
10
1. 3 Hypothesis
The effectiveness of intrusion detection systems (IDS) can be improved by rethinking 
the way the IDS is managed and by adopting effective and systematic implementation 
approaches.
Subhypotheses
Six distinct subhypotheses are implicit and not exclusive in the above hypothesis, 
each of them proposing a different or varying aspect (component) of IDS 
effectiveness:
1. Deployment techniques affect the IDS effectiveness.
2. The product/technology used to implement the IDS in different 
environments affect the IDS effectiveness.
3. The manner in which the IDS is managed affects its performance 
effectiveness and Return On Investment.
4. Cost-effective implementation approaches will lead to a positive 
Return On Investment.
5. System configurations settings play a role in IDS effectiveness.
6. Tailoring the IDS function to be more consistent with local security 
policy improves the IDS effectiveness.
These subhypotheses were examined for their independent merits, and each one 
was tested separately and regarded in the context of showing validity of the 
primary hypothesis. Elimination or confirmation of one subhypothesis does not 
imply elimination or confirmation of the others. And the individual weights of the 
subhypothesis may be different depending on implementation.
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1. 4 Approach to Research
The effectiveness of intrusion detection systems depends on so many issues/aspects. For 
the purpose of the research studies, the issues investigated were classified into four (4) 
distinctive factors (Figure 6).




Figure 6: IDS Effectiveness Determining Factors.
As can be seen in Figure 6, each factor consists of selected research issues that are similar 
in nature yet distinctive and at times relate to one another in a collaborative manner. As a 
result, some investigations cover a period spanning many years while the others were 
investigated in a relatively shorter time frame. Consequently, this review will not follow 
a strict chronological order in terms of the date(s) of investigation.
The approach to this research is shown in Figure 7. Essentially, the approach is to prove 
the thesis hypothesis through different study approaches: experiments, case studies, and 
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Figure 7: IDS effectiveness research approach. 
1.4.1 Foundation Research
Because an investigation of the factors affecting IDS effectiveness requires a thorough 
knowledge of IDS design, function and implementation approach, we commenced our 
research with the exploration of IDS concepts and approaches from the perspective of the 
engineering of IDS design; implementation and operational environments. This 
exploration set the stage and provided the context upon which we investigated, discussed 
and derived solutions pertinent to IDS design, operational capabilities, management and 
implementation in enterprise systems.
In the studies, we illustrated the challenges and benefits of designing flexible IDS types, 
rethinking IT security policy pertinent to the design and management of IDS products, 
and adjusting decision-making processes to depend on adaptive technical information.
Drawing on several organizational and technological perspectives, we examined the 
design and dynamics of growth of IDS implementations and evaluated the concepts and 
approaches of the IDS and performed a comparative analysis of each IDS types; and the 
suitability of their use for certain environments.
We also sought to understand the relationship between IT security policies and the 
functionality of IDS products, and explored the use of formal methods to specify, verify
13
and validate secure IDS system properties
Contribution: These studies provided the contexts and analytical frameworks used to 
conduct studies on IDS effectiveness.
These studies are reviewed in Chapter 2. 
1.4.2 Experimental Research
The next stage of the research involved experimentally investigating the relationships 
between underlying technical and implementation factors and the IDS effectiveness. On 
this, two performance evaluation experiments were conducted to:
(i) Establish the effects of different deployment techniques on IDS performance
effectiveness; and 
(ii) Establish the relationship between using different IDS types in different
networking technologies (Mbps vs. Gbps) and their individual and or
collaborative effects on the IDS effectiveness.
These experiments were remarkable for two reasons:
(i) The test beds for the experiments were switched production networks, which
is a marked departure from earlier simulation-based research studies, 
(ii) The second experiment was conducted on a production network with gigabit
throughput that is increasingly becoming the norm in networking architecture.
The impact here is that the empirical values established in the studies, could
on specific basis serve as benchmarks especially for network architectures
similar to those described in the test bed.
Contribution: From these studies:
• We developed methodologies for testing IDSes in switched environments and; to 
evaluate the performance of different IDS products with different design 
architectures in different environments (Mbps vs. Gbps).
  We established the best techniques to deploy the IDS within a switched network 
environment. This could be used for organizations trying to justify and/or 
optimize IDS deployment techniques so as to maximize performance 
effectiveness.
  Finally, we established empirical bandwidth values and limits upon which 
selection decisions can be based on the use of multiple lOOMbps IDS sensors 
instead of a single Gigabit IDS sensor in environments with bandwidths 
exceeding lOOMbps to enhance the performance effectiveness.
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These studies are reviewed in Chapter 3. 
1.4.3 Case Studies
Due to the need to establish the relationship between implementation and management 
methods and IDS effectiveness, we used case studies to investigate the impact of 
implementation and management factors on IDS effectiveness.
In the studies we quantified the IDS effectiveness in risk analysis and financial terms 
(Annual Loss Expectance, Return on Investment). Overall, three studies were conducted:
(i) The tasks for the first study were to derive new formulas and expanding our 
understanding of risk concepts that takes into account the nuances associated 
with IT security environments. This is in realization of the fact that 
modification of risk analysis concepts and the formulas is decisive in 
establishing reliable quantifiable measures (i.e. ROI, ALE) with which to 
gauge the IDS performance effectiveness. This study primarily provided the 
computational formulas and analytical frameworks to (ii) and (iii) below.
(ii) The second study investigated the effects of management methods on IDS 
effectiveness. The challenge is to demonstrate that IDS effectiveness is 
dependent upon an organization's deployment strategy and how well the 
management of the technology helps the organization to achieve the tactical 
and strategic objectives it has established. The ultimate goal is to prove the 
value proposition (re: a benefit in the form of a quantifiable reduction in ALE) 
i.e. the method in which IDS devices are managed can have a serious effect on 
the ALE and the ROI.
(iii) In the third study, we addressed the problem of bridging the gap between the 
technical solutions that the IDS provide and the business need for it. The 
challenge is to formulate cost-effective management frameworks that can be 
used to adjust the usage of different IDS implementation techniques.
Contribution: The following are the results and contributions of the case studies:
  We introduced and demonstrated the application of a new concept - "the 
Critical Threat Multiplier (CTM)".
The idea behind the CTM is that a security compromise incurs two types 
of costs:
a) The direct cost of lost integrity/confidentiality/availability, 
and
b) the indirect cost, of the compromised component serving as
a potential Stepping-stone for future attacks.
The CTM tries to capture the second type of costs, which are typically 
ignored in the classic risk analysis framework.
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• We developed a model that can be used to determine the viability of 
different management approaches and how they affect the IDS ROI; 
and how to accurately calculate the ROI for IDS implementations using 
the CTM concept.
  By applying financial risk calculations to demonstrate the value of 
deploying IDS with different supporting procedures, we opened a new 
way of measuring IDS effectiveness.
  We conceived of strategies and approaches to support effective decision- 
making about which techniques are appropriate for the cost effective 
management of the IDS in a given environment.
  We also developed a scheme that involves first performing a risk
analysis that produces a cost matrix for the assets under attack, and then 
independently calculating damage, response, and operation costs for 
those assets. Then, we developed the frameworks that can be used to 
analyze site-specific cost factors for IDS implementation.
These studies are reviewed in Chapter 4. 
1.4.4 Analytical Studies
The study sets out to provide evidence that IDS effectiveness can be impacted by 
local environmental conditions: network architecture, traffic characteristics, system 
configuration settings, local IT security policy, etc.
Therefore, in the study, we investigated the impact of local systems configuration and 
local policies on the IDS effectiveness in order to establish strategies that tailor the 
IDS function to be more consistent with the local security policy.
Contribution: From the studies:
• We proposed methods that take a security policy as the basis for the 
configuration of the IDS components.
• We conceived of and proposed several effective techniques for optimizing 
system configurations so as to make the IDS more responsive and effective 
to the settings.
This study is reviewed in Chapter 5.
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1.4.5 Research and development studies
To conclude, from the different studies we culled from the likely scenarios sketched 
in various parts of the research studies the list of some of the most pressing issues and 
subject matters to be pursued in future research. The details of these are reviewed in 
Chapters 6.
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1.5 Organization of Document
This submission overview is organized as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the reader to 
background information on the IDS, implementation problems, thesis statement and 
approach to research. Chapter 2 describes the foundation studies on IDS concepts and 
approaches. Chapter presents the experimental and analytical studies and in Chapter 4 is a 
review of the case studies. Chapter 5 describes the analytical work and Chapter 6 
discusses future research and development work. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the 
conclusions and summarizes the contributions of the research studies.
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Chapter 2. Foundation Studies
The following studies are reviewed in this Chapter:
1. A Comparative Analysis of Intrusion Detection Systems. [Appendix 1]
2. Security problems and the interaction of security policies in the design and 
implementation of IDS in enterprise networks. [Appendix 2]
3. The impact of security layering on end-to-end latency and system performance in 
switched and distributed e-business environments. [Appendix 3]
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2.1 A Comparative Analysis of Intrusion Detection Systems
There are a number of classification techniques [23-24] that can be used within intrusion 
detection approaches. These techniques classify events as either intrusive or normal. 
They techniques include statistical analysis, predictive patterns, state transition, expert 
systems, neural networks, machine learning, pattern matching, graph-based and model- 
based approaches.
Based on these techniques, several IDS approaches [25-36] have emerged over the years. 
In this study, we provided a systems-based description of intrusion detection technologies 
and concept-based analytical comparison of the leading implementation approaches and 
techniques. We also summarized the advantages and disadvantages of each intrusion 
detection approach and then analyzed the suitability of use of each approach for different 
environments.
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2.2 Security problems and the interaction of security policies in the 
design and implementation of IDS in enterprise networks
Practical experiences in the implementation of the IDS presents a picture that vividly 
depict the gaps in the application of sound engineering principles to IDS designs and 
implementation. This has created a situation where the IDS operate on somewhat 
different policy settings from the local security policy settings.
Research work abounds on the use of formal methods for the analysis, design and 
verification of security systems and products but none is evident for IDS product 
development. The concern here is the correctness of the design and conformance to 
established security policies.
To make the argument about using formal methods to make the IDS function within 
verifiable security context, we used inferences and analogies to buttress our points. For 
instance, a fair analogy is the verification process of general-purpose computer programs, 
where reliable testing techniques allow many bugs to be detected, but will not provide a 
basis for complete proof of correctness. In this case, specific methods and implement 
tools have been designed, in order to aid the initial correct design of cryptographic 
protocols. This has been achieved by incorporating formal methods into the design 
process.
Also, transport protocols have been verified and validated using formal methods. For 
transport protocols, Meadows [36] proposed a stepwise-layered methodology that can be 
integrated with the Heintze and Tygar's approach [37], which is based on a stack of 
models at different levels of abstraction. As a first step, the protocol designer uses a 
relatively abstract model to construct and verify the security protocol. If this protocol is 
correct at that top layer, the designer focuses on a more detailed model, which refines the 
abstract one. The repeated execution of this process leads to the final production of a 
detailed specification. Much of the existing work on requirements specifications has this 
specific flavor.
Based on the proposition by Meadows [36], Rudolph introduced an approach for 
designing an abstract model for cryptographic protocols that can be used as the top layer 
of a layered design method [38]. The main idea is the usage of Asynchronous Product 
Automata. The whole design process starts with a relatively abstract model at the top 
layer and ends in a refined specification that can be proven to be an implementation of 
the top level. This model reaches a higher level of abstraction than the model presented in 
the work of Heintze and Tygar [37] through the use of logical secure channels, instead of 
encryption.
Buttyan [39] utilized the notion of channels to present a simple logic for authentication 
protocol design. These channels are abstract views of various types of secure 
communication links between principals. The way channels are used is similar to the use
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of Pi calculus channel primitives. The proposed Simple Logic preserves the simplicity of 
the BAN logic and adopts some concepts from the GNY logic. It consists of a language 
and a small number of inference rules. The language is used to describe assumptions, 
events, and the protocol goals. The inference rules are used to derive new statements 
about the system. The goal of the analysis is to construct a witnessing deduction, which is 
a derivation of the goals from the assumptions and the formal protocol description. The 
protocol is correct in the case where such a deduction exists. The lack of a witnessing 
deduction means that the protocol may not be correct.
Gollmann [40] suggested that the design of authentication protocols has proven to be 
error prone partly due to a language problem. The objectives of entity authentication are 
usually given in terms of human encounters while we actually implement message- 
passing protocols. The author proposed various translations of the high-level objectives 
into a language appropriate for communication protocols.
Several researchers believe that in the near future, more effort will be spent on designing 
secure protocols and less on formal verifications. Specifically, Meadows argues [36] that 
design specifications do not guarantee that protocols will meet security goals that were 
not foreseen by the design approach, that the protocols designed are sometimes 
impractical, and that - due to the imprecision of design principles - flawed protocols may 
in any case be designed.
Using the principles enunciated above [36 -41], we visualized instances where the IDS 
could be designed based on making its functions configurable and interoperable with 
security policy specifications. And future development of IDS products will be more 
effective with IDS developers learning from the concepts proposed in formal protocol 
verification techniques.
Finally, we proposed a conceptual designing testing approach that integrates IT security 
validation techniques. This approach is developed from basic security properties that can 
be expected to hold for a variety of design elements. Security policies can be developed 
abstractly and any particular type of IDS that possesses the required property can then be 
used in a concrete implementation.
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2.3 The impact of security layering on end-to-end latency and system 
performance in switched and distributed e-business environments.
The imposition of stringent security regimes in contemporary e-business networks to 
provide a reasonable measure of security for their information systems comes with 
certain collaterals, some of which are undesirable. The implementation of these security 
regimes entails formation of a layered architecture (concentric security layers) using 
packet and application-level filters neither of which provides complimentary functions. 
The layered architecture provides convenient abstractions and increases the end-to-end 
latency that results into sub-optimal system performance. IDSes as part of the multi-layer 
security scheme contribute to the sub-optimality.
The problems associated with stringent security layering must be minimized so that the 
requirements for performance, reliability, speed and operational support of e-business are 
not sacrificed. In other words, the implementation of the security scheme should not 
impede vital system performance indexes such as desirable low values for end-end- 
latency, Web request-response time, network throughput and protection of the privacy of 
data. Thus, there is the need to maintain a balance between system performance such as 
process response time and the security requirements established for the system.
Prior to this research, there were no known studies on the impact of TDS security layering 
on system performance that are reported in scientific literature. Although a few studies 
[43, 44] explored the effects of multiple disk use, low-bandwidth modem client 
connections and throughput on the performance of Proxy Servers that are used to 
implement stringent security for internally protected information systems. The studies 
found that the latency advantage of caching proxies vanishes in front of modem 
connections.
Based on the above, we pioneered this study to investigate the contribution of IDSes 
(when used as part of a security multi-layer) to end-to-end latency and the resulting 
degree of sub-optimality of system performance in a distributed and switched e-business 
network.
The test bed for the experiment was a switched and distributed network. The setup and 
experimental procedure are discussed in Appendix 3.
The results of this research study established empirical values for end-to-end latency; and 
the resulting degree of sub-optimality of system performance attributable to the 
deployment of the IDS in an e-business network.
23
Chapter 3. Experimental Work
The two experimental studies reviewed in this Chapter are:
1. Evaluation of the Performance of ID Systems in a Switched and Distributed 
Environment: The RealSecure Case Study. [Appendix 4]
2. A Comparative Experimental Evaluation Study of Intrusion Detection System 
Performance in a Gigabit Environment. [Appendix 5]
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3.1 Evaluation of the Performance of Intrusion Detection Systems in a 
Switched and Distributed Environment: The RealSecure Case Study.
The performance of IDSes has always been a crucial factor for organizations trying to 
implement intrusion detection technologies due to a number of reasons including the need 
to deploy the right IDS product so as to enhance the return on investment.
One of the most obvious ways to measure or gauge the performance of the IDS is to 
quantify attack detection rates of the IDS. This at times is untenable for a number of 
reasons including the complexities of network architectures in which the IDS operate.
Previous research studies [41, 42] on IDS detection limits and accuracy have been 
conducted using simulation techniques within a narrow span of systems parameters. 
Porras and Valdes [41] discussed IDS failures in terms of deficiencies in accuracy and 
completeness, where accuracy reflects the number of false positives and completeness 
reflects the number of false negatives. Richards [42] evaluated the functional and 
performance capabilities of the industries leading commercial IDS products. In the areas 
tested, the performance of the IDS was rated based on their distinctive features.
None of these or other documented studies was conducted on a switched network 
environment, which is typical of many of today's network architectures. Hence, our 
primary task was to extend the studies to actual switched network environments.
In our research, we leveraged the work of Richards [42] to an actual network built on 
distributed and switched architecture. We explored the relationship between deployment 
techniques and the performance of the IDS in a distributed and switched network 
infrastructure using the RealSecure software suite.
We developed a methodology for testing IDSes that addresses these difficulties faced by 
the IDS in switched environments. The methodology consists of general software-testing 
techniques, which I have adapted for the specific purpose of testing the IDS. We first 
identified a set of desirable characteristics for the IDS such as the ability to detect a broad 
range of known intrusions. Then, we developed strategies for selecting test cases and 
detailed testing procedures.
Finally, we used the methodology to test the IDS detection rates in different locations in 
the switched network. Essentially, this approach helped to establish the relationship 
between the scope of visibility of the IDS at the different locations and the detection 
rates.
The contribution to the body of knowledge is that we extended previous research works 
on IDS performance evaluation to a production network with switched architecture and 
established empirical values for the IDS capability for different visibility scopes. 
Therefore, the results (Figure 8) provided a view into the IDS performance in switched
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production networks of which most contemporary networks are built.
Inside decoy Inside decoy Out side decoy Out side decoy
with "Tap" with "Port with:Tap" with "Port
mirroring" mirroring"
Monitoring technique
Figure 8: Percentage of attacks captured at 40% network utilization.
In specific terms, we established that the detection capability of the IDS diminishes with 
increase in bandwidth utilization and as the topology becomes more switched. The 
implication is that better performance could be achieved with the use of multiple sensors 
and deployment with packet loss-limiting devices. Also, deployment at network or domain 
entry points i.e. outside decoy (where the topology is not switched) produces a better 
performance result. Hence the scope of visibility is an important factor for intrusion 
detection.
The importance of this study is that we are now able to get a better understanding of the 
IDS performance in real enterprise system settings. This could be used to provide the 
justification about which deployment technique will produce a better result and is thus 
preferable for similar environments.
Subhypothesis Supported
This result supports the assertions of subhypothesis (1)) i.e. "Deployment techniques 
affect the IDS effectiveness."
3.2 A Comparative Experimental Evaluation Study of Intrusion 
Detection System Performance in a Gigabit Environment.
The advent of Gigabit network to cope with increased bandwidth demand presents a 
serious challenge for IDSes that were designed with Megabits bandwidth throttling in 
mind. At the heart of this challenge are the performance and the efficacy of the lOOMbps 
IDS sensors in Gigabit environments.
One of the main problems with IDS implementation is the selection of a suitable IDS 
technology/product for highly scalable environments where Gigabit architectures are used. 
This problem is particularly acute when trying to select a particular IDS product (from the large 
number of available IDS devices) for deployment in distributed large networks.
The problem is that currently available commercial IDS products were designed to 
accommodate traffic with bandwidth not exceeding lOOMbps. Deployment of these 
products on Gigabit traffic results in poor performances.
Generally speaking, there are options available:
1. Deploy multiple 100 Mbps sensors;
2. Deploy a single Gigabit (Gbps) sensor.
Which of these two might an IT security manager recommend? The answer is not simple. 
For sure the effectiveness of whichever is selected is the essence. Thus, the challenge is 
to make a proper choice.
As at the time of this research work, guidance on how to make the selection were not 
established. Also, the efficacy or the advantage of any of the two options has not been 
established through an independent investigation/evaluation, although one or two IDS 
products have been introduced as Gigabit sensors and have been touted to dramatically 
increase component performance and functional opportunities, possibly leading to 
dramatically changed system balance and overall performance. But, their operational 
performance has not been established.
Against this background, we conducted an experimental research that examined the 
system benefits of using a single Gigabit IDS sensor instead of multiple Megabit sensors 
in a Gigabit traffic stream for a wide range of defined system attacks, network traffic 
characteristics, and contextual operational elements.
In the experiment, we first developed a probabilistic methodology to be used to determine 
the performance of the IDS in a Gigabit traffic stream. Then, employing the misuse attack 
detection technique we tested the ability of the IDS to detect attacks under varying test 
parameters. Finally, we analyzed the experimental results, quantified the IDS 
performance and compared the different values in the context of network
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architecture/traffic volume: (Gigabit vs. Megabit), and deployment type: multiple mbps 
sensors vs. a single gbps sensor.
The experimental results (Figures 9 and 10) established empirical bandwidth limits for 
IDS effective performance in Gigabit environments. This is a differential marker 
(benchmark) that can be used to determine when multiple lOOMbps IDS sensors can be 
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Figure 9: Probability of detection vs. % Utilization with NetworkICE (Gigabit) sensor.
% Network Utilization (Mbps x 
100)
Figure 10: Probability of detection vs. % utilization with Multiple RealSecure (Megabit) sensors. 
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The contribution of this study to the accumulated body of knowledge is two-fold:
(1) Firstly, we developed a probabilistic methodology that can be used to 
evaluate and compare different implementation with different IDSes 
(products and types) for different environments (Mbps vs. Gbps),
(2) Secondly, we established the performance limits and suitability of use of 
the major IDS approaches (Megabit vs. Gigabit) in high traffic volume 
environment.
This will be invaluable for organizations trying to optimize IDS product 
selection with deployment techniques for the most performance 
effectiveness attainable.
Subhypothesis Supported
The results of this study provide evidence in support of subhypothesis (2) i.e. "The 
product/technology used to implement the IDS for varied conditions of network traffic 
affect the IDS effectiveness."
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Chapter 4. Case Studies
The following studies are reviewed in this Chapter:
1. Towards an Effective Risk Assessment Methodology: Factoring in Novel Concepts For 
Assessing Intrusion Detection Systems in Complex Infrastructures. [Appendix 6]
2. The Impact of IDS Deployment Technique on Threat Mitigation [Appendix 7]
3. The Effect of Intrusion Detection Management Methods on The Return on Investment. 
[Appendix 8]
4. Cost Effective Management Frameworks for Intrusion Detection Systems. [Appendix 
9]
30
4.1 Towards an Effective Risk Assessment Methodology: Factoring in 
Novel Concepts for Assessing Intrusion Detection Systems in Complex 
Infrastructures
Determining the value of the ALE for security products in complex environments using 
conventional cost/benefit (risk) assessment method is quite complex due to the difficulty 
of coming up with accurate asset values or replacement costs within the organization  
variables that are critical to a risk analysis. Asset values are factored into the calculations 
for Single Loss Expectancy and Annual Loss Expectancy. If accurate asset replacement 
values cannot be obtained then the risk analysis will yield incorrect results. Further, the 
determination of the asset value when there is interdependence in networked 
environments could be extremely difficult because the asset value must be taken in up 
and down stream dimensions. And for the IDS, measuring the asset value in so many 
dimensions and in tangible and intangible measures can be challenging.
Devising effective risk analysis techniques for the IDS in complex environments requires 
re-examination of the basic concepts, assessment approaches, and risk analysis formulas.
Until recently, risk assessment of IDS products has received little or no attention from the 
information security community for various reasons including lack of statistical data for 
the asset valuation of IDS products in networked environments and lack of awareness. 
Also the benefits of organizations implementing IDSes have been seen mostly from 
technical and not risk management or financial perspective and available risk assessment 
techniques [45-46] were developed for other purposes as they do not take into account all 
the "tangibles" and "intangibles" necessary to accurately conduct risk assessments for 
networked security products like Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).
Therefore, at this point in time when the market for IDS products is growing, there is the 
need to develop new concepts and formulas for the risk assessments of IDS products.
As a result, in this study, I reviewed risk analysis concepts and formulas, analyzed the 
difficulties associated with using existing concepts and formulas for the assessment of 
IDS products. By examining the complexities of the networked environments in which 
the IDS operates, I illustrated (Figure 11) how the new concept - Cascading Threat 
Multiplier (CTM) can be used to calculate the SLE.
The CTM factors in the importance of other critical assets tied (re: networked) to the 
specific asset being analyzed in the Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) calculation and 
provides the analytical framework to closely scrutinize the assets under an organization's 
control, assign more comprehensive valuations to those assets, and to more accurately 
measure the impact that compromising of these assets could have on the organization.
31
Fig. 11: Cascading threat multiplier Concept.
Therefore, this study contributes to the body of knowledge by illustrating new concepts 
and formulas and providing the analytical framework that can be used to conduct an 
accurate risk analysis of networked security (IDS) products.
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4.2 The Impact of IDS Deployment Technique on Threat Mitigation
Brewer [47] states that the measure of risk can be determined as a product of threat, 
vulnerability and asset values:
Risk = Asset x Threat x Vulnerability. 
Asset f
Counter Values
Threat \ ; ji|Mfa^^J*i Counter Values
HMNHHMHMH
Vulnerability
Fig: 12.Risk as a function of asset value, threat and vulnerability [47].
Further, he contends that the risk elements and their corresponding countermeasures for a 
specified system can best be visualized with a cuboid (Figure 12). In this case, the 
system has an initial level of risk before any countermeasures are applied. And 
countermeasures, assuming that their values are assigned by the same parameters that are 
used for threat, vulnerability and asset valuation, can reduce risk, i.e. by reducing threat 
(e.g. with locked doors, IDSes), reducing vulnerability (e.g. with awareness, patches, hot 
fixes) or reducing asset value (e.g. with encryption). After calculating the results from 
each combination of threat, vulnerability, asset and countermeasure the residual risk is 
determined [45]. Here the impact element is covered in asset value, the likelihood in 
threat and vulnerability values.
From the above, we conclude that threat mitigation depends on how the effectiveness of 
the applied countermeasures.
From a risk analysis perspective, in this study, we investigated the impact of deployment 
techniques on the IDS effectiveness in mitigating threat. This was accomplished by 
applying financial risk calculations to demonstrate the value of deploying IDS with 
different supporting procedures.
Two deployment techniques were considered: proactive vs. reactive. The merits of each 
were considered. By examining the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) in the case study 
scenario, we analyzed how the ALE variables are affected by each technique. Ultimately, 
we established that the proactive technique results into a higher ROI. 
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It needs to be noted that this study differs from a previous study [22] because the 
techniques considered deals with how the IDS is configured. Details of the proactive and 
reactive techniques are discussed in debt in the publication.
The results of this study demonstrate that in a reactive deployment, where personnel must 
be engaged to respond to each event, the risk exposure factors decreases. Equally, there 
will be similar benefit in a proactive deployment and in addition, the Annual Rate of 
Occurrence (ARO) will be reduced.
The contribution of this study to the existing body of knowledge is that we opened a new 
way of using the IDS configurable parameter to improve its performance and the ROI.
Subhypothesis Supported
The results of this study validate subhypothesis (3) i.e. "The manner in which the IDS is 
managed affects its performance effectiveness and ROI."
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4.3 The Effect Of Intrusion Detection Management Methods On The 
Return On Investment
Prior to the procurement and deployment of new technologies, most organizations engage 
in a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the economic or financial benefits of the new 
technologies or products they are implementing.
Thus, many an organizations investment decision will hinge on the ability to demonstrate 
a positive return on investment (ROI). For network security devices, the ROI has 
traditionally been difficult to quantify, in part because it is difficult to calculate risk 
accurately due to the complex issues involved in the analysis of networked environments. 
And also, business-relevant statistics regarding security incidents are not always available 
for consideration in analyzing risk.
For IDS implementations, there are no clearly established guides on effective 
management methods from the ROI perspective. Therefore, the intention behind this 
study is practical and grounded in real world challenges, which include:
1. Developing a risk analysis methodology that can be used as the framework to 
determine cost-effective management decisions of IDS implementations,
2. Establishing the technique that can be used to determine the viability of different 
management approaches and how they affect the IDS ROI.
In this study, I examined how management methods affect the IDS ROI. To do this, I 
used the risk equations introduced in Section 4.1 to performed ROI calculations for IDS 
implementations under different management schemes. For this, three ROI scopes were 
created under two management schemes (Table 1). Three possible scenarios were used to 
develop a possible method of reasoning about IDS ROI.
The result of the study (Table 1) demonstrates the benefits (as reflected in the reductions 
in the values for the ARO) of a better IDS management. The overall effect is visible in the 
increase in the ROI values for the IDS deployment for both the single in-house support 
and MSSP support schemes. Also, the study provided concrete proof that selection of any 
management method affects the implementation costs.
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Scenario ROI Scope AV EF UEA EFS CTM SLE ARO ALEi ALEz ALEl Single Support ROI MSSP Support ROI 
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Table 1: IDS ROI for different management schemes
The contribution to the body of knowledge on IDS management is the development of a 
model that can be used to determine the viability of different management approaches for 
IDS implementation.
Subhypothesis Supported
This result also supports the subhypothesis (3) i.e. "The manner in which the IDS is 
managed affects its performance effectiveness and ROI" and subhypothesis (4) i.e. 
"Cost-effective implementation approaches will lead to a positive ROI."
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4.4 Cost Effective Management Frameworks for Intrusion Detection 
Systems
The decision to deploy a security mechanism such as IDS is often motivated by the needs 
of security risk management. For some organizations, prior to implementation of an IDS 
product, the cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit trade-off both for the procurement and 
management is always a mission critical task. For the IDS to be cost-effective, it should 
cost no more than the expected level of loss from intrusions.
Generally speaking, cost-benefit analysis is conducted with cost models. In the business 
arena, cost benefit analysis incorporate the use of risk-adjusted cash flows in order to 
examine internal rate of return and maximum net present value figured as a percentage of 
information security expenditures. For the IDS, This entails conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis or the trade-offs of the basic cost components, which at the minimum include 
development cost, the cost of damage caused by an intrusion, the cost of manual or 
automatic response to an intrusion, and the operational cost, which measures constraints 
on time and computing resources.
A few theoretical cost models have been developed [48-53] for network intrusion 
detection systems. But, none seem to have been translated into practical usage for various 
reasons including the fact that in the current implementation of intrusion detection 
systems, cost value propositions are rare and the fact that many organizations are not 
educated about the cost-benefits of security systems and for some, analyzing site-specific 
cost factors could be very challenging as a result of the complexities of the networked 
environment in which they are deployed.
In essence, there is the need to move away from theoretical models into 
practicable/implementable models. To do this, we must first formulate the frameworks by 
applying a risk analysis procedure to select sensitive data/assets and create a cost matrix 
for each intrusion. This will then be used to develop implementable models.
Therefore, in this case study, we analyzed the factors that impact IDS implementation 
costs. We then discuss the different cost components including network and 
infrastructure-based costs. Using the two management methods: proactive and reactive 
(Table 2), we proposed the management frameworks that can be used to develop 
practicable models that can be used to calculate the cost-effectiveness of each IDS 
implementation.
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Method System actions L_ Personnel actions ___ h__ . F.°llow " P J|
til IK ^^^BUinformationJHBJ
| Reactive (Log -> Alert -> [Respond -> Analyze ->Eradicate Forensics and Evidence
iRespond - > Log -> Analyze -> Eradicate if ,_ . . _ . , Proact,ve • (necessary ForenslCS and Evidence
Table 2: Proactive and Reactive Management Methods.
Our contributions to the body of knowledge is that we developed the frameworks that can 
be used develop models to support effective decision-making about which techniques are 
appropriate for the cost effective management of the IDS in a given environment.
In the big picture, selections of IDS implementation based on how well a strategy helps a 
company to perform in cost terms are preferable and will assist an IT officer to explain 
security mechanism selections more effectively to CEOs. In this case, the frameworks 
for the cost-benefit model (analysis) are effective in assessing network intrusion detection 
systems and can be used to periodically review the effectiveness of planned and 
implemented security controls to determine if they are doing what they are supposed to 
do, rather than creating additional problems.
38
Chapter 5: Analytical Studies
The studies reviewed in this Chapter are published under the following title:
"Intrusion Detection Systems in Large Organizations: Strategies for Effective 
Deployment and Sustenance." [Appendix 10]
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5.1 Intrusion Detection Systems in Large Organizations: Strategies for 
Effective Deployment and Sustenance.
Acknowledging the need for IDS protection, and subsequently choosing the IDS that best 
fits the company's needs are important steps in the quest for overall information security. 
However, these steps only complete the initial stages of a thorough IDS implementation 
process. After selecting and purchasing the optimal IDS, a company must properly and 
efficiently deploy it throughout the organization.
The first step in a well-planned and thorough deployment should be to design an IDS 
strategy and then express it in the context of an IDS policy. This policy document serves 
as a guide for the implementation process, answering questions such as:
1. Will network traffic restrictions be tight or loose?
2. Who will be authorized to make changes to the IDS policy or configurations?
3. On which machines will an IDS installation be required?
4. How frequently will IDS logs undergo analysis?
The planning and coordination required in creating this policy will reinforce the- 
communication between company management and security officials. At the same time, 
this will allow both organizational units to identify and resolve conflicts before they 
become obstacles to successful IDS deployment.
In the study, we performed a complex analysis of the IDS implementation in large setups 
(as reported in the literature and from the authors field experiences) to derive empirical 
arguments and fact that we used to formulate strategies for IDS implementation and 
performance enhancement. The argument is to use IT security policy and systems 
configurations to make the IDS more effective.
Thus, the strategies address the challenge before an organization about how to deal with 
the issue of setting the IDS to capture relevant data only. And for every organization, 
there are different expectations and, such that the default IDS settings usually need to be 
altered. Finding the perfect balance between a massive amount of data generation, which 
leads to an over-saturation of information, and a small amount of data generation, which 
may cause ineffective monitoring, can complicate a deployment. In general, a 
sophisticated IDS solution will require a sophisticated IDS configuration, so 
organizations must seek optimal strategies for thorough configuration development, 
tuning, and testing.
The propositions we have put forth here are effective lifecycle performance enhancement 
strategies for IDS procurement, implementation, management and maintenance. This 
entails:
(1) Detailing an organization's approach to intrusion detection in general and the 
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implementation policy that determines which strategy to employ, hence determine what 
can be done to help improve IDS performance. This could for instance stipulate the 
methods to monitor attacks. Possible options include:
1. to monitor for all attacks, regardless of what systems are prevalent in an
organization; for example, looking for RFC exploits in a Microsoft environment. 
This option would be more expensive since the volume of work would be large 
and the IDS effectiveness would be reduced.
2. to monitor only for attacks that would be relevant to the network environment, 
such as configuring the NIDS to detect all Microsoft exploits in an all Microsoft 
environment. This will reduce costs on network resources usage, personnel, etc.;
3. to monitor all vulnerabilities for a particular service regardless of the
environment, such as detecting all HTTP exploits in an US-only environment. 
This would lead to a reduction in the IDS workload, the volume of data to be 
analyzed resulting to cost savings on personnel and network resources usage.
(2) By optimizing systems configuration settings in affected operational areas. This 
requires taking a security policy as the basis for the configuration of the IDS components; 
and as the basis to optimize system configurations in order to make the IDS more 
responsive to these settings.
Subhypothesis supported.
This analytical work has provided the reasonable arguments, facts and propositions in 
support of the assertions of subhypothesis (5) that "System configurations settings play a 
role in IDS effectiveness" and subhypothesis (6) that "Tailoring the IDS function to be 
more consistent with local security policy improves the IDS effectiveness."
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Chapter 6. Research and Development Studies
The studies reviewed in this Chapter are:
1. Intrusion Detection Challenges: charting the course for research and development. 
[Appendix 11]
2. Future Directions in the Development of Intrusion Detection Systems. [ Appendix 12 ]
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6.1 Intrusion Detection Challenges: charting the course for research and 
development
As with other security and monitoring products, intrusion detection systems functions as 
one element of a corporate security policy. Successful intrusion detection requires that a 
well-defined policy on IDS development be formulated to ensure that intrusions are 
handled according to corporate security policy guidelines.
Currently available IDS technologies face several technical and implementation 
challenges that threaten the IDS market share. Hence, the intrusion detection system 
technology requires considerable refinements to eliminate the weaknesses in currently 
available products. Some of the weaknesses that are considered short-term i.e. 
scalability, hierarchical reporting, and dynamic remote updates are already being 
addressed by vendors while the long-term weaknesses are being addressed through 
several ongoing research and development efforts worldwide.
In this study, we reviewed the different issues and problems associated with the IDS 
technology; and putting the issues in a research and development context, we proposed a 
roadmap of potential research topics and articulated the issues important to explore 
within each research topic.
The hope is that researchers can use this to navigate their research interests as they work 
to develop the most appropriate remedies to current design problems.
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6.2 Future Directions in the Development of Intrusion Detection 
Systems
Current IDS products bring the ability to view network and system activity in real-time, 
identify unauthorized activity and provide a near-real-time automated response. IDS 
products also provide the ability to analyze today's activity in view of yesterday's activity 
to identify larger trends and problems. It is reasonable to expect IDS technology to 
revolutionize computer security efforts, by allowing real-time operational capability in 
controlling unauthorized activity in corporate cyberspace. IDS technology does not 
directly address other security issues such as identification/authentication, confidentiality, 
etc., though some of these technologies will be integrated with IDS in the near future.
Anticipating the effects of emerging IDS technologies, this research reviewed the pitfalls 
of commercially implemented IDS products and provided detailed technical discussions 
on several aspects embodying several research choices likely to facilitate high-quality 
product design.
We also reviewed the expectations revolving around what future IDS should look like 




In this thesis, I hypothesized that the effectiveness of intrusion detection systems (IDS) 
can be improved by rethinking the way the IDS is managed and by adopting effective and 
systematic implementation approaches. To show the validity of this hypothesis, I have 
(in collaboration with Dr. Andrew Blyth and a few others) conducted research studies 
using different approaches: experimental studies, case studies, and analytical studies.
Results of these studies support the hypothesis.
I will now summarize the work related to each approach, discuss specific contributions 
and consider future work.
7.2 Summary
In the foundation studies on IDS concepts and approaches, we explored different IDS 
designs and implementation techniques, summarized the advantages and disadvantages of 
each intrusion detection approach and then analyzed the suitability of use of each in 
different environments. From empirically derived arguments we proposed effective 
methods that can be used to incorporate established engineering principles and standards 
into IDS design and suggested strategies to make IDS implementation seamlessly integral 
with enterprise security policies and standards.
Regarding the experimental studies, we developed methodologies for testing IDSes in 
switched and gigabit environments. The methodologies consists of general software- 
testing techniques, which we have adapted for the specific purpose of testing the IDS; 
and the misuse detection approach to evaluate the performance of the IDS against 
selected tunable parametric specifications under varying test conditions. With these 
methodologies we preformed tests to measure the IDS effectiveness against a wide range 
of environmentally desirable characteristics for a broad range of known intrusions.
Concerning the case studies, we reviewed current risk assessment concepts, techniques, 
and formulas, proposed new concepts for the risk assessment of IDS products, 
investigated the relationship between implementation techniques and threat mitigation, 
examined how management methods affect the IDS ROI, formulated the frameworks that 
can be used to determine the cost-effectiveness of IDS, and addressed the problems of 
bridging the gap between technical security solutions and the business need for the IDS.
In the analytical study, we analyzed and suggested how to optimize the settings of 
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systems configurations to enhance the IDS effectiveness; and proposed strategies that 
make the IDS function in accordance with local security policy in large-scale 
organizations.
As for future work, we culled from the various parts of our research studies a list of some 
of the most pressing issues and subjects matters pertinent to the IDS effectiveness as 
potential research topics.
7.3 Research Contributions
We made the following specific contributions to the security research community. 
IDS Concepts and Approaches.
  We provided a systems-based description of intrusion detection technologies, 
analyzed the suitability of use of each approach for different environments and 
proposed a conceptual design approach and a technique for designing secure 
IDSes, which are guaranteed to be correct in the sense that a specified security 
criterion will not be violated if proper validation principles act correctly.
IDS Deployment Techniques.
  We developed methodologies for testing IDSes in switched environments and; to 
evaluate the performance of different IDS products with different design 
architectures in different environments (Mbps vs. Gbps).
• We established the best techniques to deploy the IDS within a switched network 
environment. This could be used for organizations trying to justify and/or 
optimize their IDS deployment techniques in order to maximize the IDS 
effectiveness.
• Finally, we established empirical bandwidth limits for the selection of
appropriate IDS technology/product in highly scalable environments where Gigabit 
architectures are used. This could serve as benchmarks to determine when multiple 
lOOMbps IDS sensors can be more effective and thus preferentially used instead 
of a single Gigabit IDS sensor in environments with bandwidths exceeding 
lOOMbps or Gigabit environments.
Implementation/Management Methods.
  We demonstrated the correctness and the application of a new concept in asset valuation 
and risk analysis of IDSes - "the Critical Threat Multiplier (CTM). "
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• We developed a model that can be used to determine the viability of different 
management approaches and how they affect the IDS ROI; and how to accurately 
calculate the ROI for IDS implementations.
• We developed a model that can be used to improve the accuracy value when 
calculating the ROI for IDS implementations.
• We conceived of strategies and approaches to support effective decision-making 
about which techniques are appropriate for the cost effective management of the 
IDS in a given environment.
• We opened a new way of estimating IDS effectiveness by applying financial risk 
calculations to demonstrate the value of deploying IDS with different supporting 
procedures. In this case, we demonstrated the real potential impacts of deploying 
IDS technologies from a business setting, which presents a good balance to the IT 
security community.
• We developed the frameworks that can be used to analyze site-specific cost 
factors for IDS implementation.
Systems Configuration and Security Policy.
• We proposed methods that take a security policy as the basis for the 
configuration of the IDS components; and effectiveness enhancement 
strategies.
• We conceived of and proposed several techniques for optimizing system 
configuration settings to make the IDS more responsive and effective to these 
settings.
Research and Development Studies.
• We presented detailed technical discussions on several aspects embodying several 
research choices likely to facilitate high-quality product design and provided a 
tangible reflection to some of the needs arising from the pitfalls of the current 
designs, and suggested the trends likely to bring radical changes in the meaning 
and modes of IDS implementation in the years ahead.
7.4 Future Work
We have culled from the likely scenarios sketched in various parts of our research studies 
the following list of some of the most pressing issues and subject matters to be pursued in 
future research:
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1. Excessive alerts: The sheer volume of INFOSEC device alerts makes security 
management a time-consuming and therefore expensive effort.
2. Alert Management tool: Among the most pressing problem for active research is 
the development of technologies to manage and interpret security relevant alert 
streams produced from an ever-increasing number of INFOSEC devices.
3. Algorithms: Domain expertise is not widely available that can interpret and 
isolate high threat operations within active and visible Internet-connected 
networks. In an environment where thousands (or tens of thousands) of INFOSEC 
alarms may be produced daily, it is important to understand redundancies in alert 
production that can simplify alert interpretation. Equally important are algorithms 
for prioritizing which security incidents pose the greatest administrative threats.
4. Information management method: In managing INFOSEC devices, it is difficult 
to leverage potentially complementary information produce from heterogeneous 
INFOSEC devices. As a result, security relevant information that, for example, is 
captured in a firewall log, is typically manually analyzed in isolation from 
potentially relevant alert information captured by IDS, Syslog, or other INFOSEC 
alert source.
5. Data sets: Better data sets are necessary for better calculation of metrics in future 
evaluations and to further research. Datasets will need to take on new forms such 
as specifications and tools for created attack and background traffic in ones own 
environment so that IDS developers can explore use of new and different inputs 
for their systems.
6. Anomaly-based detection approach: Generally speaking, there seems to be much 
interest in going back to the anomaly-based approach of years ago without really 
understanding the value of what has been accomplished with the misuse detection 
approach. Thus, the industry is likely to move much faster to address the 
anomaly-based approach because of the successes and lessons learned from the 
misuse approach.
7. Expert-based approaches: A large number of IDS researchers are working on 
expert-based approaches because those are technically more interesting and are 
more likely to really evolve into something useful in the long run. The big gap is 
that the research tends to also ignore the "real security equals network 
management" problem and builds systems that are hard to manage, don't have 
intuitive user interfaces (or documentation) or that are cumbersome to use. It is 
likely that the good ideas from the R&D systems will wind up in commercial 
products. This will be the right research direction since good ideas, not products,
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come from research.
8. Data correlation: It could be successfully argued that the future of IDS lies in 
data correlation research. The IDS of tomorrow will produce results by examining 
input from several different sources.
9. Audit trails: Research to determine what kinds of information should be in audit 
trails, and when such data needs to be collected to optimally drive any intrusion 
detection system will be critical in defining the architecture of data mining 
technologies.
10. Storage for mat: Research to determine the best structure/storage formats for audit 
data so that it can be quickly processed without taking up huge amounts of storage 
will aid data mining architectural designs.
11. Software automation: Exploring how to define policy in a consistent and 
meaningful way such that it can be expressed in software for automated 
comparison and detection of intrusions and internal misuse is a viable research 
field.
12. Reference model: There is a need to develop a reference model for IDS design as 
any meaningful design should take a queue from a standard reference model just 
as the one done by Christopher Schuba on a formal reference model for firewalls.
Research on these issues would enlighten the future development of IDSes, and their role 
in devising improved public policy and planning based on the best available information.
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Abstract
This paper examines intrusion detection systems and provides a system-based analytical 
comparison of the leading implementation approaches, techniques and systems. Intrusion 
detection systems detect attacks that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality, 
or availability of a resource, hi particular, this paper provides a systems-based description 
of intrusion detection technologies.
Keywords: intrusion detection, computer security
1.0 INTRODUCTION
An Intrusion detection system (IDS) is a security system that monitors computer systems 
and network traffic and analyzes that traffic for possible hostile attacks originating from 
outside the organization and also for system misuse or attacks originating from inside the 
organization.
Intrusion detection systems evolved due to the lack of intrusion prevention systems and 
the need to address the following issues:
• It is impossible to build a completely secure system in today's software 
development environment because the programming languages and operating 
systems used for development and implementation introduce a number of security 
flaws. These security flaws are difficult to detect and intruders can use these flaws 
to bypass existing security mechanisms. Figure 1 provides a partial taxonomy of 
these security flaws [1].
• The enormous installed base of operating systems and applications ensure that the 
replacement of existing systems with a secure system will require a transition 
period measured in decades.
• Existing cryptographic systems are not completely secure and have exploitable 
weaknesses for a determined and resourceful intruder. The best cryptographic 
system offers no protection against lost or stolen keys or poorly chosen 
passwords.
• There is an inverse relationship between the level of system security and user 
efficiency. As system security increases, user efficiency decreases. A completely 
secure system, with existing security techniques, is practically unusable.
• Finally, a secure system may still be vulnerable to an insider misusing their 
privileges.
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Figure 1: Partial Taxonomy of Security Flaws
IDS," much like the security industry itself, have grown rapidly over the past few years. 
These tools have become essential security components - as valuable to many 
organizations as a firewall. However, as in any environment, things change. As networks 
and crackers evolve and grow rapidly, demanding that security tools keep up, the IDS 
faces several daunting but exciting challenges in the future and are sure to remain one of 
the best weapons in the arena of network security.
One of the major reasons for the growth of IDS products and technologies is the advent 
of Internet connectivity, threats, and financial incentive for attackers. The advent of the 
World Wide Web has led to increased interconnectivity, increased demands for network 
services, and increased threats.
The recent CSI-FBI survey [2] of 503 American organizations validated the continued 
concerns of business leaders today with doing business in the electronic era. Of the 503 
organizations surveyed, 90% detected a security breach of their information systems and 
80% experienced financial losses as a result of breaches. While internal threats remain a 
top priority, 40% cited breaches from outside their organization. Additionally, 85% 
experienced viruses and 74% stated their Internet connection was most frequently 
targeted. The most signification piece of data from this survey indicates that 90% of these 
respondents have a Web site, 90% have firewalls and antivirus programs and 100% 
conduct business electronically in some fashion.
The statistics in the survey points to a notable trend, not necessarily the percentages, but 
simply that 100% of those surveyed are conducting business electronically and 90% of 
them have firewalls and antivirus, yet 90% reported system breaches. Protecting 
information systems today must be done in a layered process, which includes technology 
and human analysis. As the CSI-FBI survey revealed, most companies have already 
deployed firewalls and antivirus programs, and many are moving aggressively towards 
acquiring Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), a security system that monitors computer 
systems and network traffic and analyzes that traffic for possible hostile attacks 
originating from outside the organization and also for system misuse or attacks 
originating from inside the organization.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the various 
IDS implementation approaches and present a classification of the techniques in Section
3. A descriptive analysis of IDS systems is given in Section 4 and the conclusions are 
given Section 5.
2.0 IDS APPROACHES
There are three broad approaches for intrusion detection: anomaly detection, misuse 
detection, and specification-based detection. In practice, none of the three are sufficient 
for a robust intrusion detection system - a combination of two or all three approaches is 
necessary.
2.1 Anomaly Detection
In the anomaly detection model, this is realized by detecting changes in the patterns of 
utilization or behavior of the system performs detection. Building a model that contains 
metrics derived from normal system operation and flagging as intrusive any observed 
metrics that have a significant statistical deviation from the model perform it. In this 
case, the user profile is a collection of metrics such as average CPU load, number of 
processes, login time, or number of network connections that characterizes user activity. 
Threshold levels are set for these metrics, and activities above these thresholds are 
characterized as intrusions [3].
Because intrusions .are a subset of anomalous activity, it is possible to flag anomalous 
activity as intrusive when it is not (false positive), or to ignore intrusive behavior because 
the anomaly detection system does not consider it abnormal (false negative).
Figure 2a provides a visual explanation of anomaly detection systems and the relationship 
between intrusions, false positives and false negatives in anomaly detection systems. Set 
a represents the event space that the anomaly detection system believes is so anomalous 
that it is intrusive. Set I represents actual intrusions. A n I is the set of activities reported 
as intrusions. I - A is the set of false negative while A - I is the set of false positives. 
Typically, anomaly detection systems generate relatively few false negatives but have the 
potential for generating a large number of false positives (e.g. |A-I[ > |I-A|).
Figure 2: (a) Anomaly Detection and (b) Misuse Detection Event Space
There are a number of compromises involved in building anomaly detection systems. The 
effectiveness of the system is dependent on the number of metrics monitored and the 
frequency at which these metrics are monitored. The accuracy of the anomaly detection 
increases as the number of metrics and frequency of monitoring increases. The system 
requirements of the anomaly detection system likewise increase requiring a compromise 
between system performance and model accuracy.
Anomaly detection systems have a number of advantages and disadvantages. Because 
anomaly detection systems do not attempt to detect or classify specific attacks, new 
attacks can be detected without reprogramming. Furthermore, anomaly detection systems 
can be trained to accurately model users and can adapt to user changes in work practices 
over time. Unfortunately, anomaly detection systems can impose a high overhead on 
system performance. As the user model becomes more complex and hopefully accurate, 
the anomaly detection system must monitor and interrelate more metrics.
2.2 Misuse Detection
Detection is performed in the misuse detection model by looking for specific patterns or 
sequences of events representing previous intrusions (i.e. looking for the "signature" of 
the intrusion. It is a knowledge-based technique and only known intrusions can be 
detected. This is the more traditional ID technique, which is usually applied, in for 
instance the anti-virus tools.
Misuse detection systems can report false positives and negatives like anomaly-based 
systems. If a signature matches normal user activity as well as intrusive behavior, then a 
false positive is reported. If a new attack is developed for which an attack signature does 
not exist, then a false negative will occur.
Figure 2b provides a visual explanation of misuse detection systems and its relationship 
to intrusions, false positives, and false negatives. Misuse detection is based on the 
accuracy of its attack signatures, which must be very specific. If intruders use attacks 
unknown to the misuse detection system, a false positive is generated. A false positive 
occurs only when normal user activity matches an attack signature and is not an attack. 
Typically, misuse detection systems generate very few false positives but have the 
potential for generating a large number of false negatives (e.g. |I-M| > |M-I|).
Misuse detection systems have a number of advantages and disadvantages. Because 
attack signatures can be targeted to specific attacks, the number of false positives can be 
reduced significantly. This unfortunately leads to an increase in the number of false 
negatives, as intrusions must match the attack signature. This also introduces a period of 
vulnerability between when a new attack is developed and when an attack signature is 
generated for the attack. Anomaly detection systems do not have this vulnerability as they 
detect anomalous behavior and do not need a specific attack signature. Misuse detection 
systems also have difficulty handling significant variations of an attack. It is relatively 
easy to add commands or procedures to an attack that do nothing but obscure the actual 
attack [4].
2.3 Specification-based Detection
Specification-based detection focuses on expected system behavior instead of user 
activity. System behavior is formally specified for all circumstances and a profile is 
developed. The system is then monitored and all its actions are compared against the 
profile; system behavior that is not specified as correct is flagged as an intrusion [5].
A possible implementation of specification-based detection system is the use of a special 
policy specification language. This specification language would stipulate security policy 
by assigning access privileges to each file in the system.
Specification-based detection systems can have false negatives but if system behavior is 
specified accurately, there are no false positives. False negatives can occur when the 
system specification does not cover all possible system states. False positives can only 
occur if the system behavior is not specified accurately.
Specification-based detection systems have a number of advantages and disadvantages. 
One advantage of specification-based systems is that the number of false positive and 
negative reports can be minimized through accurate and complete specification of the 
system state. Additionally, like the anomaly-based approach, attacks can be detected 
even if they have not been previously encountered. The principal disadvantage is the 
fundamental requirement to specify explicitly security policy. A complete specification 
of a system would require a great deal of time and expertise. If the system was dynamic, 
maintaining an accurate specification could be very time-consuming.
2.4 Comparison of EDS Approaches
IDS approaches address different types of intruders. Anomaly systems detect marauders 
better than misuse systems under the assumption that the marauder's usage pattern is 
significantly different from the user. Misuse systems can detect misfeasors while 
anomaly systems are generally ineffective. Misfeasors can train the anomaly detection 
system to consider intrusive behavior as "normal" for the user over time. Both anomaly 
and misuse have limited utility against a clandestine attacker. Once an intruder has 
supervisory permission on a system, detection becomes very difficult as the skilled 
clandestine attacker can alter all logging and audit mechanisms to cover his intrusion. No 
single IDS approach is sufficient for detecting all intrusions. Instead, a combination of 
approaches is necessary to protect against different types of attacks.
Patterns of usage also influence the effectiveness of a particular IDS approach. If the 
users are in a production environment where they repeatedly use a limited subset of 
commands in a particular order, anomaly detections work extremely well. If the users use 
the system infrequently or have no set pattern of usage, then misuse detection systems 
tend to outperform anomaly detection systems.
Table 1 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of each intrusion detection 
approach. Most IDS implement a combination of approaches to balance the advantages 
and disadvantages of each approach.
3.0 CLASSIFICATION OF TECHNIQUES
There are a number of classification techniques that can be used within intrusion 
detection approaches. These techniques classify events as either intrusive or normal and 
include statistical analysis, predictive patterns, state transition, expert systems, neural 
networks, machine learning, pattern matching, graph-based, and model-based 










Potentially no false positives
Disadvantages
Potential for many false positives. 
Insiders can train user model to classify 
intrusive behavior as normal.
Potential for many false negatives due to 
vulnerabilities to unknown attacks. 
Easy to obscure attack
Very difficult to specify all system states.
Table 1 : Comparison of IDS Approaches 
3.1 Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis is an anomaly detection technique that uses differences in the volume 
and type of audit data to detect intrusions. This is one of the earliest forms of intrusion 
detection and has been used in a large number of IDS. There are two forms of statistical 
analysis used for intrusion detection: threshold detection and the profile-based approach 
[6].
3.1.1Threshold detection
Threshold detection uses summary statistics on system and user activities to detect 
intrusions. The parameters of a threshold detection system are: what activity should the 
IDS measure and monitor; how often should the IDS perform analysis on this 
measurement; and what level of activity is considered intrusive. As the first two 
parameters are increased, the system resources required of the threshold detection 
increases. The third parameter, the threshold level, depends on the relevance of the 
security event being monitored and directly affects the number of false positives and false 
negatives reported by the system. As the threshold is lowered, the probability of false 
positives increase and false negatives decrease. As the threshold is raised, the converse 
occurs and the probability of false positives decrease and the false negatives increase.
3.1.2 Profile-based Detection
Profile-based detection is based on establishing patterns of normal behavior for a user or 
system and then classifying significantly deviant behavior as intrusive. It differs from 
threshold detection in that it employs patterns of usage instead of summary statistics to 
determine if an intrusion has occurred. The patterns maintained by the IDS are adaptive 
in that they change over time to reflect the usage patterns of each user accurately.
Profile-based detection offers a number of distinct advantages. Profile-based intrusion 
systems require no prior knowledge of the user to detect intrusions. The system will adapt 
over time to reflect the usage patterns of the account holder. An intruder who 
compromises the account would be detectable unless they mimic the account holder's 
usage patterns. Profiles also provide an easily understood summary of activity that 
system administrators can quickly examine and reach decisions on intrusive behavior. 
Finally, compared to audit records, profiles significantly reduce the amount of storage 
space required for maintaining security records from which security decisions can be
made [7]. The principal disadvantage of profile-based detection is that it offers no 
protection against insider attacks as the user can gradually train the system to accept 
intrusive behavior as normal [6].
3.1.3 Keystroke Monitoring
Keystroke monitoring is a misuse detection technique that monitors sequences of 
keystrokes for attack patterns. This is a very simplistic technique that can be easily 
evaded through the use of user-defined aliases or the running of intrusive programs that 
require non-intrusive keystroke entries [8]. While this technique was used in earlier 
systems, it is seldom user in modern IDS.
3.2 Artificial Intelligence Techniques
Artificial intelligence techniques are the most commonly used techniques for classifying 
intrusive behavior. It is also one of the earliest forms of intrusion detection and has been 
used in almost every EDS. There are four principal artificial intelligence techniques used 
for intrusion detection: expert systems, predictive patterns, neural networks, and machine 
learning.
3.2.1 Expert Systems
Expert systems have been and continue to be the most popular intrusion detection 
technique employed. Expert systems use rules in anomaly or misuse systems to detect 
attacks. In anomaly detection systems, the rules specify usage patterns based on selected 
user metrics. In misuse detection systems, the rules specify specific types of known 
attacks. Expert system rules are typically implemented as a series of if-then statements.
The principal advantage of expert systems is the separation of control reasoning (is this 
an attack?) from the formulation of the solution to the problem (system response to the 
attack). The disadvantage of expert systems is that they require a great deal of initial 
training and high maintenance during their lifetime. An expert must generate the initial 
rule-base, which is time-intensive and expensive. Because not every expert knows every 
vulnerability in a system, there is the very real chance that the initial configuration does 
not capture all possible vulnerabilities. As new attacks are developed, the expert system 
must be manually updated to capture the characteristics of the new attack.
3.2.2 Predictive Patterns
Predictive pattern-based detection is an anomaly detection technique that attempts to 
predict future events based on events that have already occurred [9]. Event sequences are 
represented as a statistically weighted set of rules based on the user profile. If user actions 
match n-1 events and the nth event is statistically anomalous, then the system reports an 
intrusion. Predictive pattern systems constantly update user profiles and prune the rule set 
to maintain high quality patterns of user activity.
This approach has a number of advantages. Rule-based sequential patterns can detect 
anomalous behavior that is difficult to detect with other methods. Predictive pattern 
matching is also highly adaptive to changes in user behavior. This adaptively allows the 
system to constantly refine its rule set so that low quality patterns are continually 
eliminated leaving high quality patterns behind. Finally, it is easier to detect users who 
try to train the system during its learning phase [8].
3.2.3 Neural Networks
Neural networks are an anomaly detection technique that trains a neural network to 
predict a user's actions given a window of n previous actions. The network is trained 
through a user profile of representative user commands. If the users actions are 
significantly deviant from the user profile as maintained by the neural network, the 
system reports an intrusion [10].
Neural networks have a number of advantages and disadvantages. They cope with noisy 
data such as command sequences well and are not dependent on any statistical 
assumptions about the user. They are also easy to modify for new users. The 
disadvantage of neural networks is that a small event window will result in false positives 
while a large event window will increase the probability of false negatives. If intruders 
have access to an account during the learning phase, they can train the network to accept 
intrusive behavior as normal. Finally, the network topology is only determined after 
considerable trial and error [8],
3.2.4 Machine Learning
Machine learning is an anomaly detection technique that compares the user-input stream 
with a historical library of user commands to detect anomalous behavior. In one 
approach, the input stream is broken into fixed length sequences (normally 8-12 
command tokens), which are compared through a sliding window against a library of 
500-2000 user sequences. The library is unique for each user. The result of the 
comparison is a similarity measure. If the similarity measure is greater than threshold 
level, then the user activity is characterized as abnormal; otherwise, user activity is 
classified as normal [11].
The selection of several parameters greatly influences the effectiveness a machine 
learning system. The optimal sequence length appears to be 8-12 command tokens. 
Shorter sequences provide low detection rates while longer sequences increase the false 
positive rate and provide lower intrusion detection rates. The sliding window size 
determines the shortest interval in which the system can detect an intruder. Experimental 
results also suggest that: the ideal library size is user dependent; as the size of the library 
increases, the number of false positives also increases; and, the method of pruning the 
library significantly impacts on the effectiveness of the overall system [11].
Machine learning as an intrusion detection technique has a number of advantages and 
disadvantages. Machine learning does not require the selection of measurement metrics, 
which remains an open research issue. Instead, it measures all user actions and builds a 
user profile from the metrics most pertinent to each user. This flexibility in metric 
selection comes at a significant cost. Machine learning is computationally intensive and 
its effectiveness is dependent on differences between users.
3.3 Graph-based Techniques
Graph-based techniques are misuse systems that represent user and system behavior as a 
set of graphs that are then compared to attack signature graphs to detect intrusions. This 
is a relatively intrusion detection technique and has been used in a limited number of 
IDS. There are three graph-based techniques used for intrusion detection: state transition 
analysis; pattern matching, and model-based detection.
3.3.1 State Transition Analysis
State transition detection is a misuse detection technique that models a host as a state 
transition diagram. It was used as the basis for the USTAT system [12]. Known attack 
patterns are encoded as states in the diagram with the final state in a chain being the 
compromised state. The preceding states are known as guard states. The guard states act 
as a filter to separate normal from intrusive activities.
State transition detection has a number of advantages and disadvantages. Because it 
maintains system state over multiple user sessions, it can detect co-operative attacks as 
well as attacks that span across multiple sessions. It can also foresee imminent 
compromise states and take pre-emptive measures to prevent the system from entering a 
compromised state. State transition systems are limited in that the attack patterns can only 
specify a sequence of events rather than more complex forms. This severely limits the 
types of attacks that the system can detect [8].
3.3.2 Pattern Matching
Pattern matching detection is a misuse system that represents known attack signatures as 
patterns that are compared against audit records. Knowledge about attacks is represented 
as a set of specialized graphs. The graphs represent the transition from normal system 
states to compromised states and are an adaptation of colored Petri nets. This technique is 
similar to the state transition technique, but pattern matching associates guards with 
transitions, rather than with states. This technique has been implemented in the Intrusion 
Detection In Our Time (IDIOT) system in which pattern matching is used as the basis for 
a generic misuse detection model [8, 13].
Pattern matching has similar advantages and disadvantages as the state transition model 
with the following additions. Pattern matching can detect some attack signatures that the 
state transition model cannot and priorities can be assigned to signatures, which can be 
used for prioritized evaluation of attack patterns and response to intrusions. Additionally, 
patterns can be dynamically added to the system while maintaining the partial matches 
already present in, the system. Pattern matching requires substantial overhead to track 
partial attacks that may be by different users and distributed in long periods of time. The 
complexity of the model grows exponentially with respect to the size of the colored Petri 
net as the complexity of the attack signature increases. This limits the ability of pattern 
matching systems to respond in real-time to complex attacks [13].
3.3.3 Model-based Detection
Model-based detection is a misuse detection technique that detects attacks through 
observable activities that infer an attack signature. Model-based detection has three 
components: an Anticipator, Planner, and Interpreter. The Anticipator uses two types of 
models, activity models and scenario models, to predict the next expected step in an 
attack scenario. Activity models are representations of current activity while scenario 
models represent intrusion signature specifications. The Planner takes the Anticipator's 
prediction as a hypothesis and translates it into audit log format. The Interpreter then uses 
these predicted audit entries as search strings in the audit records. If the model-based 
detection system accumulates sufficient evidence of an intrusion by crossing a system- 
defined threshold, the system reports an intrusion attempt [14].
Model-based detection has a number of advantages and disadvantages. Model-based 
intrusion detection is based on a mathematically sound theory of reasoning in the 
presence of uncertainty. Because the Planner and Interpreter are looking for very 
specific audit records, they can filter large amounts of the audit files, which leads to 
excellent performance. In addition, because the model is predictive, the system can take 
appropriate countermeasures to thwart the intruder's attacks. Unfortunately, model-based 
detection requires easily recognizable, distinguishing patterns of misuse. If the intruder 
can disguise their attack, this technique can be easily bypassed [8].
3.4 Information Retrieval Techniques
Information retrieval, as used in intrusion detection, is a misuse detection technique that 
searches for attack patterns by building an index of audit logs and then searching this 
index. To be used in a real-time system, the information retrieval system must maintain 
the audit index by periodically rebuilding the index as new audit records are generated. 
There are a variety of techniques for building, searching, and storing indexes that result in 
different tradeoffs in terms of false positives and negatives.
The use of information retrieval techniques for intrusion detection has a number of 
advantages and disadvantages. Information retrieval techniques have a number of 
techniques for finding information in a large amount of data that have been actively 
researched for the last forty years. These techniques have a variety of approaches and 
techniques for processing inexact and partial matches [15]. Index retrieval is both fast and 
the index files require less secondary storage than the original audit files. However, like 
other pattern matching techniques, information retrieval is easy to defeat by aliasing 
commands so that they so that the signatures of misuse are masked. Additionally, the 
building of the index is a processor and memory intensive technique that normally cannot 
be done in real-time.
3.5 Positive Behavior-Based Detection
Positive behavior-based intrusion detection is a specification-based technique that 
specifies intended system behavior and reports activity outside of intended this behavior. 
This is one of the newest approaches to intrusion detection. There are two forms of 
positive behavior-based systems used for intrusion detection: specification-based and 
transaction-based detection.
3.5.1 Specification-Based Detection
Specification-based detection uses a program behavior grammar to enunciate intended 
behavior and then scans audit files for violations of this expected behavior. For example, 
the finger daemon should only execute the finger program and should only read a very 
limited subset of files that can be easily specified. If the finger daemon attempts to read 
the system password file, this violates program specification and an intrusion would be 
reported [16].
This technique has a number of advantages and disadvantages. The program behavior 
grammar describes the behavior of security-critical programs only and only in terms of 
sequences of operations. It does not consider parameter value, which can be used for 
buffer overflow and other types of attacks. The specification of security-critical 
programs is subject to errors of omission and does not address those programs that
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require access to security critical files. This specification process is the main limitation of 
this technique. On the other hand, specification-based detection can detect previously 
unknown attacks without reprogramming and for many types of attacks, is a natural 
mechanism for explicitly stating and enforcing security policy.
3.5.2 Transaction-Based Detection
Transaction-based detection is a specification detection technique that delineates allowed 
actions and sequences of actions through transaction management. User activity is 
modeled as a series of read and writes operations. The transaction-based detection system 
checks to ensure that all transactions are:
• Atomic (all operations are completed).
• Consistent (system remains in a consistent state.
• Isolated (transactions do not interfere with other transactions)
• Durable (transaction results are saved in permanent storage) [17].
By enforcing these four properties, a large subset of intrusive behavior can be detected. 
The main limitation of the transaction-based detection is the specification process. 
Specifying allowed transactions is time-consuming and subject to specification and 
management errors.
As with the intrusion detection approaches, there is no one technique that provides 
complete security. As such, most modern IDS employ two or more techniques to detect 
intrusions.
4. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INTRUSION DECTECTION
In executing the approaches and techniques discussed in Sections 2 and 3, intrusion 
detection is implemented as an overlay of two separate and different technologies: 
Network IDS (NIDS) and Host-based IDS (HIDS) systems. The primary advantage of 
NIDS is that it can watch the whole network or any subsets of the network from one 
location. Therefore, NIDS can detect probes, scans, and malicious and anomalous activity 
across the whole network. These systems can also serve to identify general traffic 
patterns for a network as well as aid in troubleshooting network problems. When 
enlisting auto-response mechanisms, NIDS can protect independent hosts or the whole 
network from intruders. NIDS does, however, have several inherent weaknesses. These 
weaknesses are its susceptibility to generate false alarms, as well as its inability to 
detect certain attacks called false negatives. NIDS also is not able to understand host 
specific processes or protect from unauthorized physical access. HIDS technology 
overcomes many of these problems. However, HIDS technology does not have the 
benefits of watching the whole network to identify patterns like NIDS does. A 
recommended combination of host and network intrusion detection systems, in which a 
NIDS is placed at the network border and an HIDS is deployed on critical servers such as
11
databases, Web services and essential file servers, is the best way to significantly reduce 
risk.
Generally, the commercially available IDS products shown in Table 2 are classified 
according to their approach to intrusion detection with all being either host or network- 
based. None of the products integrate host-based and network-based intrusion detection 
capabilities and a few integrate security assessment capabilities with basic IDS 
functionality, such as audit trail analysis and malicious software protection.
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Table 2. IDS products
A description and comparison of the different systems are presented next in Table 3. To 
this end, some systems will receive a more elaborate description while others will just be 










The AAFID architecture [Figure 3] has three
components: agents, transceivers, and monitors.
Agents are independent software units that monitor a
limited number of aspects of a host. A host can have
a number of agents, each monitoring different
aspects of the host. Agents do not have the authority
to generate directly an alarm or to communicate
directly with each other but instead communicate
through a transceiver. A transceiver coordinates the
activities of host agents. There is one transceiver per
host. The transceiver starts and stops agents as
required, monitors agents, responds to monitor
commands, receives and processes agent reports, and
distributes information to agents or Monitors as
required. Monitors perform the same roles as
transceivers but control several hosts as opposed to
transceivers, which control a single host but multiple
agents [18, 19].
AHRAB [Figure 4] is based on an adaptive,
hierarchical collection of cooperating agents that
Features, Pros and Cons
There have been two prototypes implemented
using the AAFID architecture. The first
prototype was implemented using Perl, TclATk,
and C and was a proof of concept. The second
prototype was written in Perl and is being used
to test the architecture for ease of use,
configurability, and extensibility.
AAFID is novel in a number of ways. The use of
agents provides IDS that is scalable, resilient to
subversion, and provides graceful degradation of
service. Losing one or more agents does not
result in the loss of the entire system but instead
the IDS continue to operate at reduced
efficiency. Agents scale to larger systems with
additional monitors providing a hierarchy of
agents to detect intrusions.
AHRAB provides graduated, risk-based







collectively work to detection intrusions. There are 
three types of software agents: worker agents, 
managers, and directors. Worker agents take the 
output of standard stand-alone security tools, analyze 
the output, and provide aggregated results to 
managers. Managers provide guidance to and 
adaptively control worker agents based on perceived 
risk and resource constraints. They aggregate the 
output of multiple worker agents and make decisions 
to adapt the security of the system. This adaptation 
may be: starting additional worker agents; running 
existing worker agents under a more robust 
configuration; changing the resource constraints 
under which the worker agents run; or adapting 
themselves to use a more robust reasoning 
mechanism. Mangers may be host-based or network- 
based. Directors provide guidance to managers and 
integrate the results of traffic and component-based 
managers to provide a comprehensive view of the 
network and devices functioning under the AHRAB 
system.
AHRAB does not provide a single level of 
intrusion detection. Instead, it increases or 
decreases system intrusion detection efforts 
based on the current situation. If there are 
indications the protected system is under attack, 
it will increase the intrusion detection efforts. If 
the system does not appear to be under attack, it 
will gradually reduce intrusion detection efforts 
until it reaches a base level set by the system 
security manager. The increase or decrease of 
intrusion detection is resource-constrained so 
that the intrusion detection effort is related to the 
probability of an intrusion.
AHRAB also incorporates human feedback into 
its adaptive architecture. As the system detects 
or does not detect an intrusion, a human 
provides feedback to the AHRAB system. 
AHRAB then adjusts the credibility of the 





Cooperating Security Managers (CSM) [Figure 5] is 
a host and network-based detection system based on 
cooperating agents that proactively respond to 
intrusions without using a centralized director. Key 
to this approach is that there are no centralized 
mangers, and a proactive instead of reactive response 
to intrusions is used. With no centralized managers, 
CSMs coordinate among themselves to detect 
intrusions. In a proactive response environment, 
CSMs not only detect intrusions on their monitored 
hosts, but also notify other hosts if they suspect that 
one of their users is attempting to attack another 
host. Having CSMs on all or most of the host 
machines on a network is key to this proactive 
approach [20-22].
If an intrusion is detected by the Local IDS or 
Security Manager, the Intruder Handler reacts 
to the intrusion by taking a preprogrammed 
reaction. At a minimum, the system 
administrator is notified. Depending on the 
intrusion, the intrusive session may perform a 
number of actions including terminating the 
current session or locking the user's account. 
Finally, the User Interface provides the 
capability for the system administrator to query 






The Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) 
[Figure 6] is a host and network-based anomaly and 
misuse detection system that is based on the host- 
based anomaly and misuse IDS and the NSM system. 
DEDS was designed to detect a number of additional 
attacks that NSM had difficulty detecting through 
user tracing. These attacks included low-frequency 
doorknob and network browsing attacks [23]. During 
a low frequency doorknob attack, the intruder attacks 
a number of computers using a limited number of 
common account and password combinations. 
Because the attacker uses only a few combinations, 
the IDS may not detect the failed logins as intrusive. 
Network browsing attacks are detected similarly. 
During a low frequency browsing attack, users scan a 
number of files on several systems within a short 
period of time looking for vulnerabilities. The 
activity on any single host is not anomalous enough
DIDS addressed several shortcomings found in 
NSM. Unlike NSM, DIDS is able to monitor 
users that connect to a system through the 
console or dial-up lines. It is also able to 
perform limited user tracing even if the data 
traffic if encrypted. DIDS assigned a unique 
Network-user Identification (NID) to all users 
and is able to track users as they traverse the 
network through monitored hosts. This prevents 
attackers from hiding their true identity and 
origin by switching accounts as they log into 
different host computers. DIDS is able to trace 
users across multiple hosts by treating the 
network connection between users and hosts as a 
shared resource and examining who is accessing 
that resource.
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for the EDS to flag the activity as intrusive. Because 
DIDS can trace a single user's activity across 
multiple systems, DIDS can detect the intrusive 
behavior while other systems would have difficulty 









Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous 
Live Disturbances (EMERALD) [Figure 7] is a 
highly distributed anomaly and misuse detection 
system that employs signature analysis with 
statistical profiling. EMERALD is built around the 
concept of hierarchical, adaptive monitors that 
provide intrusion detection for thousands of users 
connected in a federation of independent domains. 
Each monitor may consist of up to four components 
depending on their role: a target specific resource 
object, a profiler engine, a signature engine, and a 
resolver. The target specific resource object contains 
the target specific configuration data and methods so 
that the monitor can remain independent of the 
analysis target to which it is deployed. This 
separation of the generic monitor code-base from the 
target specific code and data makes EMERALD an 
extensible system. The profiler engine performs 
statistical profile-based anomaly detection while the 
signature engine performs rule-based misuse 
detection from the event stream being monitored. 
The resolver is an expert system that coordinates the 
analysis reports from the profile and signature 
engines. It may incorporate results from other 
analysis engines outside to the monitor, and it also 
implements the response policy of the monitor. As 
intrusive behavior is detected, the resolver can 
employ countermeasures to limit the damage of the 
intrusive behavior or to provide more detailed 
monitoring.
There are three types of monitors that populate 
the EMERALD hierarchy: Service, Domain and 
Enterprise monitors. Service Monitors are 
dynamically deployed within a domain and 
provide localized real-time analysis. This 
analysis may be of network infrastructure 
components such as routers or gateways or may 
be networked privileged subsystems. The 
analysis may be passive where audit logs are 
read and analyzed or involve active probing of 
the system for additional indications of intrusive 
behavior. Domain Monitors oversee a domain 
and correlate intrusion reports from service 
monitors to detect intrusive behavior across an 
entire domain. Domain Monitors also interface 
with other monitors outside of the domain and 
report domain threats to system administrators. 
Enterprise Monitors correlate intrusion reports 
across multiple domains to provide analysis 






GrIDS is an intrusion detection system designed to 
detect large-scale automated attacks on networked 
systems. GrIDS [Figure 8] collects data on networks 
and hosts. It automatically generates activity graphs 
based on network connections and uses these graphs 
as signatures for automated attacks on systems. As 
these graphs are constructed, they have attributes that 
provide the necessary data to detect intrusions. 
Graphs are segmented into different "graph spaces" 
based on the type of network abuse. These different 
graph spaces have different latencies associated with 
them depending on the latency associated with a type 
of attack [25].
GrIDS uses a threshold-based detection 
mechanism. As the activity graphs are built, 
detection heuristics are applied and the graphs 
are compared against attack signatures. Intrusion 







IDES is a host-based anomaly and misuse detection 
system developed by SRI International in 1985. It 
was one of the first IDS developed and employs user 
profiles and a rule-based system to detect intrusions. 
The user profile is constructed from twenty-five user 
metrics. This profile is updated daily and weighted 
so that the most recent activity has more weight than 
older user activity. In addition to user metrics, IDES 
monitors six remote host metrics and five overall 
target metrics. In measuring these metrics, DDES 
differentiates between discrete and continuous value 
measures. Discrete measures are metrics that have a 
finite range of values and describer user or system 
behavior. Continuous value measures are a function 
of observed behavior such that the function value 
changes over time [26, 27].
IDES combines the output of the anomaly 
detection and expert system to detect intrusions. 
As the Receiver receives audit records, they are 
placed in an Audit Data Database where they are 
examined by both the anomaly detection system 




The Internetwork Security Monitor (ISM) is a 
network-based misuse detection system. ISM is a 
hierarchical architecture, which consists of three 
components: ISMs, Security Domain Name Servers 
(SDNS), and security workbenches [Figure 9]. The 
ISMs work together to combine thumbprint data 
connections into logical connections. SDNS provide 
a mechanism for ISMs to locate other ISMs over the 
Internet so as to exchange thumbprint information. 
Finally, the security workbenches provide the ability 
for system administrators to examine ISM results, 
exchange information with other system 
administrators, and administer security packages 
such as COPS [29] and SPI.
ISM extends the DIDS and NSM systems to 
provide user accountability and support 
arbitrarily large networks. While DIDS can 
provide user tracing across a network, it loses 
this tracing ability if the user passes through an 
unmonitored host. ISM overcomes this 
shortcoming through a thumbprinting technique. 
Thumbprinting assigns a signature to a data 
connection, based on the data flow through that, 
connection over a specified period of time. By 
correlating different connection thumbprints, it 
is possible to detect the same logical connection 
from a set of different physical connections and 
thus trace user activity through both monitored 







MIDAS is an IDS based on rule-based, anomaly 
detection. It is used on the National Computer 
Security Center's DockMaster computer. The 
components of MIDAS are listed in Figure 10. 
MIDAS runs on two machines, a Multics system and 
a Symbolic Lisp machine. On the Multics system, 
the Preprocessor screens audit records and extracts 
pertinent data and transforms it into assertions for the 
Symbolic machine. The Command Monitor on the 
Multics system captures related security data not 
present in the audit records and sends it to the 
Preprocessor for transformation into assertions. The 
assertions are sent to the Fact Base through the 
Network Interface. The assertions may cause a 
binding of the assertion to a rule or a series of rales.
The Statistical Database contains both user and 
system statistics that characterize what the 
system considers normal user activity and 







The Network Anomaly Detection and Intrusion 
Reporter (NADIR) is a profile-based anomaly and 
misuse detection system. It was developed at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory for' use on the 
Integrated Computing Network. NADIR [Figure'11] 
periodically copies audit records from host 
computers to the NADIR system where it examines
In applying these rules, it maintains a level of 
interest metric on users, which provides an 
overall measurement of user behavior. A high 
level of interest is indicative of suspicious 
behavior that warrants future investigation by 
system administrators. NADIR provides weekly 
reports that highlight the most suspicious users
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audit data and generates weekly user and network 
profiles. An expert system compares the audit data 
against the profiles to detect security-related 
activities. The expert system also looks for attack 
signatures among user activity and highlights 
questionable activity.






Network Security Monitor is a network-based 
anomaly and misuse IDS that uses network traffic, 
not audit logs, to detect intrusions. To detect 
intrusions, NSM reconstructs the activities of 
individual users from network traffic. NSM 
accomplished this through a variety of techniques in 
different versions. In its first version, NSM used a 
four-dimensional matrix to measure network traffic 
and detect anomalous traffic. This Access Control 
Matrix mapped source addresses, destination 
addresses, services and connection IDs. Each cell 
within the matrix contained two values: the number 
of packets passed through a connection in a time 
interval and the amount of data passed through the 
connection. This matrix modeling the network is 
compared against matrixes that model "normal" 
behavior" for the hosts involved and anomalies are 
reported. A probabilistic distribution is used to 
determine what is considered anomalous.
NSM was the first system to focus on network 
traffic and not audit logs to detectjntrusion. 
Network-based detection offers a number of 
distinct advantages. Because NSM uses standard 
network protocols, it can monitor heterogeneous 
hosts running different operating systems 
transparently. This transparent monitoring 
eliminates the need to examine and transfer 
audit logs, which are often a high priority target 
for attackers. Network-based detection also 
eliminates the overhead associated with running 
IDS on a number of hosts. Instead, the cost of 
running the IDS is contained to the systems 
running NSM. Finally, NSM found that most 
hosts communicate almost exclusively with a 
very small subset of hosts using the same 
services. This communications signature 
provides an inexpensive means of identifying 
many intrusions. The attacker would have to 
mimic this communications signature to be 
undetected. NSM monitored activity on an 
Ethernet LAN [28].
Table 3: IDS systems description
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined real-time intrusion detection systems by examining EDS 
approaches, techniques, and systems. As the threat and reward associated with intrusions 
continues to increase, research in intrusion detection is closing the gap between the 
intrusion detection tools and hacker attack tools. While there will always be a gap 
between the two, progress in intrusion detection is narrowing this gap.
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Abstract
In this paper, we present the state of research and development pertinent to the design of secure 
systems and relate it to intrusion detection system design. We also review established standards and the 
application of the principles of systems engineering to network security and the methodologies used in 
network security design with emphasis on specifications, testing and verification. We present 
instantiations of the interoperation of IDS design with security policy specifications using IDS design and 
implementation to evaluate if and where formal methods have been used to specify, verify and validate 
secure IDS system properties. We also propose a conceptual design approach that relates the different 
phases of the design process. We then present a systematic methodology specifying validation 
requirements as a necessary informal method to tackle any known transport protocols issues in IDS 
implementation.
Keywords: Intrusion detection systems, network security design, security policies.
1.0 Introduction
Intrusion Detection (ID) systems are classified as mechanisms for parsing and filtering hostile external 
network traffic that could reach internal network services. These systems have become widely accepted 
as prerequisites for limiting the exposure of internal network assets while maintaining interconnectivity 
with external networks. Different ID systems have differing classifications of "intrusion" (see Appendix 1); 
a system attempting to detect attacks against web servers might consider only malicious HTTP requests, 
while a system intended to monitor dynamic routing protocols might only consider RIP spoofing. 
Regardless, all ID systems share a general definition of "intrusion" as an unauthorized usage or misuse 
of a computer system.
Typically, intrusions take advantage of system vulnerabilities attributed to mis-configured systems, poorly 
engineered software, mismanaged systems, user neglect or to basic design flaw in for instance some 
Internet protocols. Commercial IDS tools range from the widely available anti-viruses, to enterprise tools 
(e.g. Cisco/Netranger), to NT centric (e.g. Internet Security Services/RealSecure) and to configurable 
freeware (e.g. Network Flight Recorder).
Intrusion detection as an important component of a security system, complements other security 
technologies. By providing information to site administration, an IDS allows not only for the detection of 
attacks explicitly addressed by other security components (such as firewalls and service wrappers), but 
also attempts to provide notification of new attacks unforeseen by other components. Intrusion detection 
systems also provide forensic information that potentially allows organizations to discover the origins of 
an attack. In this manner, an IDS attempts to make attackers more accountable for their actions, and, to 
some extent, act as a deterrent to future attacks.
The design of IDS is an assembly of different components. At its most fundamental level, the IDS is a 
collection of detection modules also called sensors with unique attack recognition and response 
capabilities. Two classes are discernable:
• Network sensors: These monitor the raw, unfiltered traffic on enterprise networks, looking for 
patterns, protocol violations, and repeated access attempts that indicate malicious intent.
• OS Sensors: These sensors perform real-time intrusion monitoring, detection, and prevention of
malicious activity by analyzing kernel-level events and host logs.
The detection modules are deployed at strategic locations across the enterprise network in order to stop 
attacks, misuse, and security policy violations before damage is done. When an IDS detects unauthorized 
activity, it can respond in a number of ways, automatically recording the date, time, source, and target of 
the event, recording the content of the attack, notifying the network administrator, reconfiguring a firewall 
or router, suspending a user account, or terminating the attack.
Because of its importance, it is critical that intrusion detection systems function flawlessly. In order to be 
useful, site administration needs to be able to rely on the information provided by the system; flawed 
systems not only provide less information, but also a dangerously false sense of security. Moreover, the 
forensic value of information from faulty systems is not only negated, but potentially misleading.
Due to the implications of the failure of an IDS component, it is reasonable to assume that the 
performance of IDS are themselves crucial to an organization's security as they could become logical 
targets for attacks.
The implementation of the IDS in enterprise networks has exposed the design and other pitfalls in the 
current implementation of commercially available intrusion detection systems. The pitfalls include the 
issues of variant signatures, false positives and negatives alerts, data overload, difficulties to function 
effectively in switched environments and scalability issues.
In this paper, we review the state of related research and development pertinent to the design of secure 
systems and relate it to Intrusion Detection System design and its relationship with formal methods and 
standards. This will include a review of established standards and the application of the principles of 
systems engineering to network security and the methodologies used in network security design with 
emphasis on specifications, testing and verification. With such a large base to draw from, some issues will 
obviously receive more attention than other equally as important issues.
Secondly, we present instantiations of the interoperation of IDS design with security policy specifications 
using IDS design and implementation to evaluate if and where formal methods have been used to 
specify, verify and validate secure IDS system properties. Thirdly, we propose a conceptual design 
approach that relates the different phases of the design process. We then devise a systematic 
methodology specifying validation requirements as a necessary informal method to tackle any known 
transport protocols issues in IDS implementation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss design standards and policies. Sections 3 
and 4 discuss research and development of transport protocols and intrusion detection systems. The IDS 
architecture, implementation problems, and problems in routing protocols are discussed in Sections 5, 6, 
and 7, respectively. We define critical design concepts and requirements in Section 8 and present issues 
related to formal and informal specifications and verifications in Section 9. Finally, Section 10 contains 
conclusions.
2.0. Design Standards and the Interaction of Security Policies in 
Enterprise Systems
The enterprise network is a system, which interconnects a multitude of computers and devices for the 
purpose of communications and information/resource sharing. To keep the various interconnected parts 
of the system interoperable, rules and procedures must be established. In a secure processing 
environment, enterprise networks have additional "layers" of rules and procedures imposed, each 
addressing unique security requirements, with no one set of requirements (software or hardware) 
applicable to all security issues for any specific situation.
The design of an enterprise network is often an assembly of very dissimilar components. In enterprise 
networks, problems could occur because there are layers of security, each very narrowly focused for 
specific conditions. For emerging systems with greater capabilities and a multitude of abbreviations and 
operating system names, the potential exists to overlook "old" rules in favor of ever more simplistic ways 
of dealing with security, regardless of the layers involved. This tendency creates both the need for 
increased understanding of the various security layers when using shared resources in multi-secure 
network environments, and the need for continuing industry awareness of network security problems.
The system's security is a shared responsibility among its various subcomponents, although the ultimate 
burden falls on the operating system. Appropriate hardware support can minimize the impact of security 
features on the network performance. Hence, a network system that satisfies the enterprise Multilevel 
Security (MLS) policy must enforce access control: processes have access to objects in accordance with 
the security policy. The network system itself must also not be a channel for communication of 
information that violates the security policy.
The main difficulty in designing systems consisting of independent, interacting components lies in the 
complexity arising from often extremely large number of possible orderings in which actions of the 
individual components can interleave. Subtle bugs can appear in an incorrect design when events take 
place in a certain order.
The ultimate goal in establishing a system security standard is to insure that a level of security, consistent 
with security priorities, is applied to all resources throughout their procurement and deployed life cycle 
process. A system could be said to be secure if the information it stores is protected against release, 
modification, or misuse by unauthorized users.
In quality assurance, security and accessibility disciplines, System Security Engineering Management 
(SSEM) is used to apply systems engineering to the host of possible problems that could affect overall 
security requirements from concept exploration through deployment. In addition, SSEM sets the stage for 
long-term security control over the life cycle of the system. This also includes controlling the injection 
and proliferation of classified information over networks (stand-alone, trusted gateway controlled, or multi­ 
level). Numerous standards exist which define user restrictions, equipment capabilities, network 
management controls, audit trails, etc.
The Orange Book describes the Multilevel Security Policy (MLS) in the context of users and objects, and 
requires that a user get to see the contents of objects at his or her levels but never lower levels. More 
abstract models of security that avoid the need to consider objects were formulated by different 
researchers. In these models, the information a user observes is to be dependent on the actions of users 
at his higher or lower level. That is, lower level users cannot observe the actions of higher-level users.
Ratings for a secure system according to the system's services in support of security and the extent of the 
certification of the system with respect to a security policy has been defined in the Orange Book. A1 and 
beyond -A1 are the highest ratings granted to systems that have been formally verified to the satisfaction 
of a security policy. A1 certification requires that the system design be verified, while beyond -A1 is more 
stringent in that it requires verification of system's implementation.
For a single host system, the design is considered to be specifications of the functional behavior of each 
service provided by the system, e.g., system calls and ordinary instructions accessible to user processes. 
Once the interface specification of a system has been verified, the implementation must also be verified. 
Such verification is deemed satisfactory when the executable code is verified. This approach leads to 
elimination of errors that could render a system insecure through the verification of design decisions that 
can be formulated in stages of development well before the code is produced.
In recent years, different standards specific to applications and processes have been developed. For 
instance, Open systems are often governed by specific applications programming interface standards 
(APIs). APIs address such topics as Operating Systems commands and utilities, Data Base Access 
(Structured Query Language or SQL), programming languages, Graphic User Interfaces (X Window
System). A significant effort has been made by the industry to define and standardize many of these 
system aspects, especially when applied to protected systems.
In the Open System Interconnection (OSI) standards, five distinct areas have been identified for network 
management systems: fault and problem management, performance management, configuration 
management, accounting, and security management. The integration of these functions, on a single 
platform, constitutes integrated network management. The network management function most important 
to SSEM is obviously security management.
The capability to perform classified and/or non-classified processing at will, while at the same time 
allowing open access to other unclassified networks in the open systems is a very difficult problem. This 
is because of the architecture and inter-process relationships between the various business 
units/processes in most open system networks. The dominant layered model for organizing 
communications protocols in open system networks is the one developed by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) shown in Appendix 2. This is a seven-layer protocol model known 
as the Open Systems Interconnect Reference Model (OSI/RM).
Certifications are also inclusive of standard provisioning applicable to network security standards, with 
numerous security certification requirements imposed on individual processing and communication 
equipment used in networks. Because of the fast pace of emerging equipment capabilities, many of these 
requirements are under constant pressure to be streamlined and simplified for the ease of use by those 
who often don't understand all the technology issues behind integration and communication security. 
When those who don't understand are faced with making a decision, often the potential threat issue, 
regardless of technical concern, is relegated to a position of less importance. No area is this more 
important than open systems.
In virtual private networks (VPNs), standards have been established to secure the system. Conformance 
is attained by implementing a public key infrastructure (PKI) that can be either contracted through a 
service or implemented in-house, depending on cost, security policies, and other requirements. Cost per 
connection for a service is weighed against the total equipment, training, maintenance, and management 
costs spread over the number of connections required for an in-house VPN. Another important 
consideration is who will maintain control of the equipment.
A PKI starts with a certificate authority (CA), which is a software package that operates in high-security 
area and issues digital certificates. A certificate (cert) binds a public key value to a set of identifying 
information for the entity associated with the corresponding private key. The party that needs to use and 
rely upon the accuracy of that public key uses the cert for authentication, encryption, or digital signature. 
A PKI also includes a directory service for making the certificate widely available and, at a minimum, an 
X.509v3-compatible database for storing the certificates and information required to authenticate 
certificate owners.
The CA operator issues the digital certificates to the end entity—IPSec endpoints in an IPSec VPN 
implementation—and records the information in the database. When a certificate is compromised or is no 
longer correct for some reason, the CA operator lists it on a certificate revocation list (CRL). Each time an 
IPSec endpoint checks the validity of a certificate presented for authentication, it checks the CRL; if that 
certificate is listed in the CRL, it is invalid and the endpoint rejects it.
A certificate policy (CP) delineates the requirements for receiving a certificate from the CA. For example, 
it could require a certificate to be requested in person, along with two forms of ID. The CP also defines a 
level of authority, such as allowing signature authority for up to one million dollars. For an IPSec endpoint, 
the CP defines what information must be submitted to the CA for certification, and it should also specify 
what security requirements the CA must meet. To successfully implement a CA, the operator must write a 
certificate practice statement (CPS), which spells out how the operation of the CA matches the certificate 
policy requirements.
The application of standards in the design of intrusion detection systems is not clearly established judging 
from practical experiences with their operational performance. This could be due to difficulties in the 
establishment of uniform design standards that have been made worst by the ever-changing nature of 
traffic streams and networking technologies.
In the next section, we take a look at how formal methods have helped to develop standards in transport 
protocols design.
3.0. Research and Development of Standards in Transport Protocols 
Design
Increasingly, formal methods continue to be a suitable alternative approach to ensuring the quality and 
correctness of protocol designs, overcoming some of the limitations of traditional validation techniques 
(e.g., simulation and testing).
Research work abounds on the use of formal methods for the analysis, design and verification of 
transport protocols. The concern here is the correctness of the design and conformance to established 
security policies.
These methods have proved successful at discovering flaws, especially in the areas of correcting existing 
protocols, that were previously unrecognized. Desmedt et al. [1997] criticized formal verification of key 
distribution protocols, claimed to be secure under BAN logic, but which have already been broken. 
Coupled with a flaw in the basic philosophy of BAN-like logics that do not prove that a weakness in the 
protocol implies a violation of the basis of the crypto scheme. This has given doubts to the validity and 
adequacy of existing techniques on their ability to provide a proof about the correctness of a given 
protocol.
A fair analogy is the verification process of general-purpose computer programs, where reliable testing 
techniques allow many bugs to be detected, but will not provide a basis for complete proof of correctness. 
In the light of this, it would be a prudent and mature trend to design specific methods and implement 
tools, in order to aid the initial correct design of cryptographic protocols. In this case, the incorporation of 
formal methods into the design process can be implemented in various ways.
Firstly, Meadows C. [1995] propose that protocol design methodologies should lend themselves to or 
incorporate elements of formal method analysis. This is exemplified by the modular design proposed by 
Heintze et al. [1995]. Using protocol security reasoning tools and a composition theorem, they can state 
sufficient conditions for combining two secure protocols to form a new one with similar properties. Based 
on secret-security and time-security notions, they can provide examples of how unmet conditions result in 
an insecure protocol.
Secondly, Gong et al. [1995] propose that design principles could be used to develop protocols whose 
security is easy to evaluate. Building on an earlier work, the concept of a fail-stop processor, which, when 
failing, stops before any effect is visible to the outside environment and the notion of fail-stop protocols. 
Similarly, a fail-stop protocol halts in response to active attacks interfering with the protocol execution. 
The security analysis of such a protocol involves only the examination of possible passive attacks such as 
eavesdropping. It is therefore much easier to conclude whether the secrecy assumption can be violated.
Three phases of the proposed proof methodology for a fail-stop protocol are as follows:
• Verification that the protocol is fail-stop,
• Validation of the secrecy assumption,
• And the application of BAN-like logic.
According to Nessett [1990] the methodology applies BAN-like logic because the residue from the 
execution of a fail-stop protocol could be useful to an attacker. Another encouraging point for this
methodology is that the specifications of fail-stop protocols satisfy some of the main prudent engineering 
principles from [6]. Accordingly, if the GNY logic is used to analyze a fail-stop protocol, the proof 
complexity can be dramatically reduced. The research investigation shows that many existing protocols 
prove to be fail-stop [Gong et al 1995]; therefore the new notions are not too limiting.
Meadows C. [1995] propose a stepwise-layered methodology that can be integrated with the Heintze et al 
approach [1995], which is based on a stack of models at different levels of abstraction. As a first step, the 
protocol designer uses a relatively abstract model to construct and verify the security protocol. If this 
protocol is correct at that top layer, the designer focuses on a more detailed model, which refines the 
abstract one. The repeated execution of this process leads to the final production of a detailed 
specification. Much of the existing work on requirements specifications has this specific flavor. The 
application of BAN Logic is based on a parser that translates members of a limited class of protocol 
specifications into BAN Logic.
Drawing from the above framework, [Meadows C. [1995], Rudolph C. [1998] introduced an approach for 
designing an abstract model for cryptographic protocols that can be used as the top layer of a layered 
design method. The main idea is the usage of Asynchronous Product Automata. The whole design 
process starts with a relatively abstract model at the top layer and ends in a refined specification that can 
be proven to be an implementation of the top level. This model reaches a higher level of abstraction than 
the model presented by Heintze et al. [1995] through the use of logical secure channels, instead of 
encryption.
The channels technique was used by Buttyan et al. [1998] to present a simple logic for authentication 
protocol design. These channels are abstract views of various types of secure communication links 
between principals. The way channels are used is similar to the use of Pi calculus channel primitives. The 
proposed Simple logic preserves the simplicity of the BAN logic and adopts some concepts from the 
GNY logic. It consists of a language and a small number of inference rules. The language is used to 
describe assumptions, events, and the protocol goals. The inference rules are used to derive new 
statements about the system. The goal of the analysis is to construct a witnessing deduction, which is a 
derivation of the goals from the assumptions and the formal protocol description. The protocol is correct in 
the case where such a deduction exists. The lack of a witnessing deduction means that the protocol may 
not be correct.
Boyd et al. [1994] propose another technique for designing key exchange protocols, which are 
guaranteed to be correct in the sense that a specified security criterion will not be violated if protocol 
principals act correctly. This technique is developed from basic cryptographic properties that can be 
expected to be held by a variety of cryptographic algorithms. Protocols can be developed abstractly and 
any particular type of algorithm that possesses the required property can then be used in a concrete 
implementation.
Gollmann [1996] suggest that the design of authentication protocols has proven to be error prone partly 
due to a language problem. The objectives of entity authentication are usually given in terms of human 
encounters while we actually implement message-passing protocols. The author proposed various 
translations of the high-level objectives into a language appropriate for communication protocols.
Several researchers believe that in the near future, more effort will be spent on designing secure 
protocols and less on formal verifications. Specifically, Meadows [1995] argue that design specifications 
do not guarantee that protocols will meet security goals that were not foreseen by the design approach, 
that the protocols designed are sometimes impractical, and that - due to the imprecision of design 
principles - flawed protocols may in any case be designed.
The existence of formal methods in the development and design of transport protocols by now is well 
established as a safe bet towards ensuring the efficacy of the protocols design process. At the same 
time, experiences in the implementation of the protocols have consistently demonstrated flaws that at 
times have encapsulated or at best negated the very security policies that formed the basis for their 
design.
Consequently, it is becoming increasingly important to complement formal methodologies with informal 
methods, i.e., simulation, testing and validation as a guarantee for the correctness of protocol designs. In 
Section 8.0 we present known issues with the implementation of transport protocols.
4.0. Research and Development of Standards in Intrusion Detection 
Systems Design
The development of intrusion detection systems has been studied under different contexts. The 
following section provides an overview of the studies.
Research into and development of automated Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) has been under way for 
well over 12 years. At present a great number of systems have been deployed in the commercial or 
government arenas, but all are limited in what they can do. This brings to focus all the issues involved in 
the full cycle development of Intrusion Detection Systems.
Research and development studies are identified into three categories:
1. Modeling - Misuse or anomaly detection;
2. Analysis; and
3. Optimization techniques.
In the misuse detection model, detection is by looking for specific patterns or sequences of events 
representing previous intrusions (i.e., looking for the "signature" of the intrusion). It is a knowledge-based 
technique and only known intrusions can be detected by it. This is a more traditional ID technique, which 
is usually applied, for instance, in anti-virus tools.
In the anomaly detection model, intrusion detection is by detecting changes in the patterns of utilization or 
behavior of the system. Building a model that contains metrics derived from normal system operation and 
flagging as intrusive any observed metrics that have a significant statistical deviation from the model 
perform it. The approach is behavior-based and should be able detect previously unknown intrusions. It is 
in the research and development area in which currently innovative modeling paradigms are explored 
which are inspired from biological systems. Pioneers in this area are from the University of New Mexico 
whose work is based on the idea that intrusion detection systems should be designed to function like the 
way the human natural immune systems distinguish between "self from "non-self antibodies.
The main challenge with this approach, like for every behavior-based technique, is to model the "normal" 
behavior of a process. Learning the activity of the process in a real environment can do this. Another 
approach, advocated by IBM research, consists of describing the sequences of audit events (patterns) 
generated by typical UNIX processes. Another method developed by Nokia is based on Kohonen Self 
Organizing Maps (SOM).
Analytical studies of ID systems attempting to address the issue of network surveillance include the 
Network Security Monitor developed at University of California at Davis (UC Davis), and the Network 
Anomaly Detection and Intrusion Reporter developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Both perform 
broadcast LAN packet monitoring to analyze traffic patterns for known hostile or anomalous activity. 
Further, research by UC Davis in the Distributed Intrusion Detection System and later Graph-based 
Intrusion Detection System projects attempted to extend intrusion-monitoring capabilities beyond LAN 
analysis, to provide multi-LAN and very large-scale network coverage.
Morris [1985] investigate network traffic intensity measurement. Intensity measures distinguish whether a 
given volume of traffic appears consistent with historical observations. These measures reflect the 
intensity of the event stream (number of events per unit time) over time intervals that are tunable. 
Alternatively, a sharp increase in events viewed across longer durations may provide insight into a 
consistent effort to limit or prevent successful traffic flows. Morris investigated intensity measures of
transport-layer connection requests, such as a volume analysis of SYN-RST messages, which could 
indicate the occurrence of a SYN-attack against port availability (or possibly for port scanning). Maimon 
[1985] explored intensity measures of TCP/FIN messages as a variant considered to be a more stealthy 
form of port scanning.
Morris [1985] contend that monitoring overall traffic volume and bursty events by using both intensity and 
continuous measures provides some interesting advantages over other monitoring approaches, such as 
user-definable heuristic rules that specify fixed thresholds. In particular, the intensity of events over 
duration is relative in the sense that the term "high volume" may reasonably be considered different at 
midnight than at 11:00 a.m. The notion of high bursts of events might similarly be unique to the role of the 
target system in the intranet (e.g., web server host versus a user workstation).
Mounji et al. [1995] analyze traffic streams using Signature Analysis techniques. Signature analysis is a 
process whereby an event stream is mapped against abstract representations of event sequences known 
to indicate the target activity of interest. Determining whether a given event sequence is indicative of an 
attack may be a function of the preconditions under which the event sequence is performed.
Lunt et al [1989] investigate the use of coding schemes for representing operating system penetrations 
through audit trail analysis. Using basic signature-analysis concepts, the authors demonstrated that 
some detection methods could support a variety of analyses involving packet and transport datagrams as 
event streams. For example, address spoofing, tunneling, source routing, SATAN attack detection, and 
abuse of ICMP messages (Redirect and Destination Unreachable messages) could all be encoded 
and detected by signature engines that guard network gateways.
Lunt et al. [1989] also investigate "Off-line" vs. "Real-time" analysis as another area where more 
conventional classification divides IDS's into systems which operate after the event and rely on analysis 
of logs and audit trails for preventive action and those that attempt real-time monitoring in the hope that 
precursor signs of abnormal activity give indication that corrective action is possible before a damage 
occurs.
Denning et al. [1987] emphasize the different aspects of session activity within host boundaries given the 
fact that the primary input to intrusion-detection tools, audit data, is produced by mechanisms that tend to 
be locally administered within a single host or domain. However, as the importance of network security 
has grown, so has the need to expand intrusion-detection technology to address network infrastructure 
and services.
Jacobson et al. [1993] investigate fault detection and diagnosis in computer network and 
telecommunication environments within the framework of alarm correlation. The high-volume distributed 
event correlation technology promoted in some projects provides an excellent foundation for building truly 
scalable network-aware surveillance technology for misuse. However, these efforts focus primarily on the 
health and status (fault detection and/or diagnosis) or performance of the target network, and do not 
cover the detection of intentionally abusive traffic in distributed and switched environments. Indeed, 
some simplifications in the fault analysis and diagnosis community do not translate well to a malicious 
environment for detecting intrusions. For examples, assumptions of stateless correlation, which 
precludes event ordering; simplistic time-out metrics for resetting the tracking of problems; ignoring 
individuals/sources responsible for exceptional activity.
As the scale of scientific research of IDS systems grows by leaps and bounds, so does the nature of IDS 
interoperation, architecture and implementation.
The advent of large scale commercial intrusion detection systems tend to have given a relative assurance 
to the information technology community that has been very anxious to maximize the use of these highly 
advertised ID systems as added armor to secure network systems. Many IDS products have been 
deployed in commercial and corporate networks. With this has come a shift in research focus in so many 
areas. One of such is in the area of the IDS performance.
IDS evaluation studies treat the relationship between deployment techniques and attack system variables 
and the performance of the IDS.
Richards [1999] evaluate the functional and performance capabilities of the industry's leading commercial 
type IDS. In the areas tested, the performance of the IDS was rated based on their distinctive features, 
which were characterized into different performance indexes. The research work represented a new 
direction for IDS in that it moved the focus away from scientific concepts research to performance 
evaluation of the industry's best products. However, the study was limited to a small proto design 
isolated and non-switched network which did not reveal the impact of packet switching on the accuracy 
and ability to capture attack packets in their entirety.
Iheagwara et al. [2002] investigate optimization of intrusion detection systems deployment techniques in 
switched and distributed systems. They demonstrated that monitoring techniques could play an important 
role in determining the effectiveness of the IDS in a switched and distributed network.
Porras et al. [1198] discuss IDS failures in terms of deficiencies in accuracy and completeness, where 
accuracy reflects the number of false positives and completeness reflects the number of false negatives. 
All of the above research works predated the advent of Gigabit networks. The scalability issues 
associated with IDS deployment in Gigabit environments have opened up a new area of research.
The problem here is that with the advent of Gigabit Ethernet, not only is there a significant increase in the 
bandwidth - and thus a significant increase in the volume of traffic to be analyzed - but also a move into 
the realms of the purely switched network. Because in the promiscuous mode, sensors can only see 
traffic on its own segment, and in a switched environment, every connection to the switch is effectively a 
single segment. In the older technologies of 10mbps or lOOmbps bandwidths, this can be overcome by 
the use of network taps or mirroring all the switch traffic to a span port, to which the IDS sensor is 
attached. But with Gigabit, the result would be a seriously overloaded sensor.
Currently suggested solutions include building an IDS technology into the switch hardware itself that will 
allow the sensor to grab traffic directly from the backplane or in the alternative move to a pure Network 
Node IDS implementation where the agents are concerned only with the traffic directed at the host on 
which they are installed.
Using newly deployed Gigabit technologies, Iheagwara et al. [2002] explored the relationship between 
traffic variables and IDS performance for Gigabit environments. Further, they evaluated the performance 
of the IDS in the context of both Megabit and Gigabit environments.
The creativity of attackers and the ever-changing nature of the overall threat to targeted systems have 
contributed to the difficulty in the effective performance of currently available systems, especially in 
effectively identifying intrusions. While the complexities of host computers are already making intrusion 
detection a difficult task, the increasing prevalence of distributed networked-based systems and insecure 
networks such as the Internet has greatly increased the need for intrusion detection.
Based on what is known on the performance of the systems and the numerous problems, the models, 
policies and design principles have not been very effective not at least at the level of addressing the 
various security issues that earlier designs, i.e., transport protocols, were faced with in the past.
In order to properly analyze the performance issues arising from IDS design, we review the standard IDS 
architecture in the next section.
5.0 The Intrusion Detection Systems Standard Architecture
The current architecture of commercially available IDS products is built primarily out of the perceived role 
of the IDS. It is equallytrue that due to the complexities in evolving a uniform IDS technology, the current
implementation is far from achieving the desired goals. The present IDS architecture shown in figure 1 
can be decomposed into the following components: Quantitative and Qualitative architectures.
Quantitative evaluation architecture: An IDS sensor's job is to watch the network and detect attacks, a 
role that is performed by the packet-processing engine. To do this, the sensor looks at every packet on 
the network it is watching. The busier the network, the more packets there are to watch. If the sensor 
can't keep up, it will start to miss (or drop) packets. In the case an attack spans multiple packets, the 
sensor holds the packets, assembles them and makes a determination on whether there is an attack. 
The extent and scope of accomplishing the above roles is the gauge of the effectiveness of the IDS and 
that is why the IDS performance is evaluated based on the ability of the processing engine effectively 
filter and reassemble packets to any given network throughput.
Equally important is the functionality of the IDS. In this case, the architecture is designed to define the 
operational setup that is used to assess the attack set detection, configuration alert triggering, logging 
and reporting facilities.
Qualitative evaluation architecture: The architecture defines the evaluation criteria of the IDS based on 
certain usability features such as the ease of user interface (ease of use, ease of configuration, ease of 
filter customization); integration and interoperability with operating systems and existing' network 
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Figure 1. The standard IDS architecture
Generally speaking, implementation of the above architecture has produced varying results. On one 
hand, the technologies work and on the other hand, there are a myriad of problems that are largely due to 
the difficulty to match the current technologies with the ever-changing policies in the enterprise network. 
The policies are always driven by changes in the security needs that are occasioned by the rise and spur 
of different information system environments.
In the next section, we review the failures of the present IDS architecture that have given rise to some 
very serious security concerns.
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6.0 Problems with the Current IDS Design
Intrusion detection as an important component of a security system, complements other security 
technologies. By providing information to site administration, ID system allows not only for the detection of 
attacks explicitly addressed by other security components (such as firewalls and service wrappers), but 
also attempts to provide notification of new attacks unforeseen by other components. Intrusion detection 
systems also provide forensic information that potentially allows organizations to discover the origins of 
an attack. In this manner, ID systems attempt to make attackers more accountable for their actions, and, 
to some extent, act as a deterrent to future attacks.
Effective implementation of IDS security facilities requires the ability of the IDS to integrate with existing 
network infrastructure and its interoperation with other security implementations on the protected network. 
At the same time, the requirements should not impose an usual burden on the IDS and thus impair its 
ability to be effective in capturing all traffic that originate from all specified network internally protected 
and Internet traffic or its compliance with specified security policy. In particular, the IDS should be able to 
carefully monitor those units that statistically originated most of the security attacks.
As with any other technology, there are pitfalls in the current implementation of commercially available 
Intrusion detection systems. The pitfalls include the issues of variant signatures, false positives and 
negatives alerts, data overload, difficulties to function effectively in switched environments and scalability 
issues.
Variants. While the ability to develop and use signatures to detect attacks is a useful and viable 
approach, there are shortfalls to only using this approach that should be addressed. Signatures are 
developed in response to new vulnerabilities or exploits that have been posted or released. Integral to the 
success of a signature, it must be unique enough to only alert on malicious traffic and rarely on valid 
network traffic. The difficulty here is that exploit code can often be easily changed. It is not uncommon for 
an exploit tool to be released and then have its defaults changed shortly thereafter by the hacker 
community.
Catch-up. New signatures can only be developed once an attack has been identified. Therefore between 
the creation of an attack and the deployment of a signature to detect the attack, a window of opportunity 
exists for an intruder to mount an attack with little to no chance of the attack being detected.
False positives. A common complaint is the amount of false positives an IDS generates. Developing 
unique signatures is a difficult task and often times the vendors will err on the side of alerting too often 
rather than not enough. This is analogous to the story of the boy who cried wolf. It is much more difficult 
to pick out a valid intrusion attempt if a signature also alerts regularly on valid network activity. A difficult 
problem that arises from this is how much can be filtered out without potentially missing an attack.
False negatives. Detecting attacks for which there are no known signatures. This leads to the other 
concept of false negatives where an IDS does not generate an alert when an intrusion is actually taking 
place. Simply put if a signature has not been written for a particular exploit, there is an extremely good 
chance that the IDS will not detect it.
Data overload. Another aspect, which does not relate directly to misuse detection but is extremely 
important is how much data can an analyst effectively and efficiently analyze. That being said the amount 
of data he/she needs to look at seems to be growing rapidly. Depending on the intrusion detection tools 
employed by a company and its size, there is the possibility for logs to reach millions of records per day.
Difficulties in switched environments. Network capture and analysis in a switched LAN environment 
usually means "tapping" the switch's lines by using a "mirror" port or deployment in other tapping 
configurations. In this approach, traffic is copied from one "source" port to another destination or "mirror" 
port.
It has been known that mirroring a full duplex source port may cause packet loss as traffic on the full 
duplex source port exceeds the available bandwidth of the mirror port.
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ScaWng up: In the last couple of years, there has been a significant increase in network traffic utilization. 
With this has come the introduction of Gigabit Ethernet technology to accommodate this increase in 
bandwidth - and thus the volume of traffic to be analyzed. The problem associated with this is that older 
IDS technologies that operate at 10mbps or 100mbps bandwidths are overwhelmed with the increase in 
traffic volume. With Gigabit, the older IDS technologies become seriously overloaded.
Some of the operational experiences and problems are discussed in depth as follows.
Experience has shown that the IDS performance and its stability (i.e., ability to function within design 
limits without failure) are determined by the following: 
» Design limitations
• Traffic rate (number of packets per second) 
t Traffic type (i.e. HTTP, FTP, SMB, SMTP, etc.)
• Packet size
• Session lengths
• % Of fragmentation
• Number of sessions/Hosts. 
» Number of signatures active
• Workstation hardware
• Half/Full duplex transfer mode
Design limitations
Evaluation of operational results requires a methodical analysis of the many factors that could affect the 
IDS performance in actual network environments. This is because it is possible for the IDS to perform 
differently even under the same parametric specifications but different environmental contexts.
For instance, there could be cases of attaining a 100% detection rate when 100% of the traffic was 
scripted, but when background/normal traffic or encrypted traffic is used or added, the performance goes 
down. Equally, it is possible to toss 40Mbps of traffic at the IDS that won't phase it, and another 40Mbps 
that will phase it. In this regard, experience has been that what breaks an IDS is more often packets per 
second than the Layer 7 content [Iheagwara 1999], although both are relevant.
Generally, there are three bottlenecks that affect the performance of the IDS in real world environments.




Sniffing speed as a measure of how much packets per seconds can be captured is a very important factor 
when evaluating the performance of ID systems. This is due to the fact that this could be used as a 
baseline when determining the maximum packet capture/second in order to quantify the operational 
bandwidth limits after which the performance of the IDS begins to diminish. Thus, it is a valuable measure 
that shows the maximum load at which the IDS will still operate effectively. The figures available from 
some IDS vendors as performance bottlenecks are:
• 200,000 packets/second for Cisco's Secure;
• 70,000 packets/second for Intrusion.com's Gigabit sensor; and
• 700,000 packets/second for ISS's NetworkICE Gigabit sensor.
Of interest here is Networklce's 700,000 packets/second sniffing rate. This means that given optimum 
conditions, the Gigabit sensor's engine should be able to process 700,000 packets per second. The 
RealSecure sensor will not sniff beyond 100,000 packets/second. It is assumed that the packets related 
to the above numbers are true for all (typical) packet sizes.
12
Consequently, what this means is that seven RealSecure sensors will be required to match the 
performance of NetworkICE 's sensor for a 700,000 packets/second capture in any given identical 
context.
In analyzing the operational results, vendor provided data should be used as the baseline reference in 
setting a comparison standard.
Signature degradation issue:
The second bottleneck is that NIDS (network IDS) analysis at high rates comes with signature 
degradation. Most NIDS use "pattern-matching routine" (signature-based), which slows/degrades wtth 
successive addition of signatures. Network ICE uses "state-based protocol-analysis", which means that it 
does not slow down as you add signatures because it follows a decision tree. This means that when 
running in the 1-Gbps ranges, all signatures can be enabled. To solve the problem of false positive alerts, 
filters can be set up on some signatures, thereby making it not necessary to remove signatures in order to 
performance tune.
The RealSecure IDS uses the pattern matching technique that somewhat impairs its functionality because 
the pattern matching technique degrades with an increase in the number of active signatures.
The theory behind interpreting IDS performance, by comparing "state-based protocol-analysis" vs. 
"pattern-matching" techniques could be explained from the perspective of the two fundamental 
advantages that state-based protocol-analysis has over pattern-matching in regards to the performance:
1. More efficient processing of traffic.
2. Scales better as you add more signatures.
A good example would be to compare how an IDS looks for RPC exploits. A pattern-matching system 
looks for patterns on ranges of ports where RPC programs typically run. For example, it might look on 
ports in the range 634 through 1400 for the AMD exploit. In contrast, a state-based system can remember 
which ports the AMD service is running on, and only test the AMD signatures on those ports that are 
actually running AMD. If no system on the network is running AMD, then a state-based system will never 
test network traffic for those signatures.
The theory behind this is that a pattern-matching system doesn't know the contents of the packets, and 
must match that packet for many different patterns. In contrast, a protocol-analysis system knows the 
contents of the packet, and only tests signatures that apply to those contents.
Given an average packet, a pattern-matching system might have to match for 10 different patterns within 
that packet. In contrast, on average, a state-based protocol-analysis system tests less than 0.1 signatures 
per packet.
This doesn't come for free: the state-based protocol-analysis that knows whether or not it should test for 
signatures itself costs the same as testing for a couple of signatures. Thus, the per-packet cost for pattern 
matching might be 10 signatures, and the per-packet cost for state-based protocol analysis might be 2 
signatures.
The second part of the theory is that for pattern-matching systems, the more signatures you add to the 
system, the slower the system becomes. If you look in the documentation for an average sensor, it will 
have a comprehensive discussion on how to remove signatures in order to improve performance. This 
isn't applicable to a state-based protocol-analysis system.
A good example is to consider looking for Telnet login strings. There are many well-known login names 
(hat rootkits will leave behind on the system. A pattern-matching system must scan all Telnet traffic for all 
these patterns - the more patterns you add, the slower it becomes.
In contrast, a protocol-analysis system will decode Telnet and extract the login name. It can then lookup 
the name in a binary-matching tree or a hash table. The difference is that a pattern-matching system must
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match for patterns within network traffic, which scales poorly. In contrast, a protocol-analysis system pulls 
out a field from network traffic, and matches for that field within an internal table, which scales very well.
Again, not in the Telnet example that a username signature is only tested against the username field - 
another demonstration of the first point that a packet is only tested for a signature when needed, and not 
when it isn't needed.
This is the theory behind the comparison. In practice, there are a lot of issues that can become more 
important. For example, CPU speed is doubling every year.
Given the above, the development of design standards should draw from the practical experiences. 
Considering the newness of the protocol - analysis technology, it will take another three to four years 
before its performance in the enterprise network is evaluated. And only until then will it be realistic to set 
a standard on which way to go.
Memory.
All currently available network intrusion detection system (NIDS) track TCP connections because they 
have to reassemble them, or risk being evaded. The problem here is that Gigabit networks in most cases 
have millions of outstanding TCP connections. This causes most boxes to fail over. For example, the 
architecture of the NetworkICE sensor incorporates memory- saving techniques that optimize memory 
consumption in preference to speed. So also does the ReakSecure architecture hold well with memory 
consumption.
Typical traffic
When evaluating the performance of the IDS, network throughput is important. This is commonly 
expressed in either Megabits (Megabytes) or Gigabits (Gigabytes). A crucial question is how many 
megabits (Mb) can the IDS handle before its performance nosedives?
Gauging the performance of the IDS is a function of many variables. For instance, if a packet of 1500 byte 
that is invalid or contains no interesting information is loaded on the network at a high rate, it will not be 
effective in testing the IDS. To characterize the true bandwidth limits within which the IDS is effective, the 
processing power of the IDS must be tested using properly configured packets. It is not just enough to 
send lOOMbits of 512 byte packets with a traffic generator. There is the need for a traffic that is close or 
identical to real traffic from real machines that is repeatable; yet still random enough that one does not 
end up with the vendors catering to bandwidth benchmark. That is why it is necessary to use traffic that is 
identical to real traffic from real machines in a performance evaluation.
Another dimension here is the variable nature of traffics on most networks. Traffic varies greatly from 
network to network. Internal enterprise networks might see a lot of SMB, NFS, SNA, and SQL network 
traffic. For example, while external/DMZ networks might see mostly HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and the 
occasional SSH session, a university network will see a lot of HTTP, FTP, SSH, SMTP, (MAP, POP, 
Napster, IRC, and a myriad of other protocols that you won't see in the average corporate space and in a 
carrier network will see everything from HTTP traffic to BGP updates, and every other protocol that goes 
across the network.
The point is that there isn't really an easy way to say "typical traffic." One might be able to craft some 
baseline assumptions on what university traffic looks like, what internal corporate traffic looks like, what 
DMZ/external corporate traffic looks like, what ISP traffic might look like, etc., but environments are so 
wide and varied that there is no "one size fits all" approach to traffic modeling. For example, sending 
lOOMbits of a typically used protocol (like HTTP) could crush an IDS that wouldn't produce the same 
result with for instance, SOOMbits of UDP traffic on a non-standard port.
Defining a uniform standard for all vendors will serve as a useful benchmark.
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Packet size
Instances exist when the attainment of maximum (%100) utilization will have different meaning depending 
on the context. For instance, in analyzing an output such as the one depicted in table 1 (chart) [Iheagwara 
et al. 2000], 100% utilization could be 64 byte frames at 14,880 pps, or 1,518 byte frames at 812 pps. 
There is a big difference here because processing-wise, the two are not equal. This cannot be related the 
above to capacity utilization, because less than 50% of the information required to simply say that 








Table 1 Data Field Size Max Frames/sec Max Data Field Bits/sec.
Number of sessions
The complexity of analyzing IDS performance increases with another variable - number of sessions. This is 
because many ID systems have to track state and to a certain extent; the number of sessions is a huge factor. 
In this regard, 4,880 pps between two hosts is very different from 14,880pps between 5,000 hosts. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that there have been instances when ID systems starts degrading in performance at 
6,500pps under 35Mbps network load with little chance of recovering based on the number of sessions 
observed by the IDS.
7.0 Interoperation Problems
There are very serious interoperation issues that affect the performance of Intrusion detection systems. 
Network ID systems work by predicting the behavior of networked machines based on the packets they 
exchange. The problem with this is that a network monitor that is not active cannot accurately predict 
whether a given machine on the network is even going to see a packet, let alone process it in the 
expected manner. The existence of a number of factors could make the actual meaning of a packet 
captured by IDS ambiguous. These can be considered as follows:
Network Inconsistencies: A network IDS is typically on an entirely different machine from the systems 
it's watching. Often, the Intrusion detection systems are at a completely different point on the network. 
The basic problem facing a network IDS is that these differences cause inconsistencies between the ID 
system and the machines it watches. Some of these discrepancies are the results of basic physical 
differences, others stem from different network driver implementations. For example, consider an IDS 
and an end-system located at different places on a network. The two systems will receive any given 
packet at different points in time. This difference in time is important; during the lag, something can 
happen on the end-system that might prevent it from accepting the packet. The IDS, however, has 
already processed the packet thinking that it will be dealt with normally at the end-system.
Protocol design problems: An IP packet with a bad UDP checksum will not be accepted by most 
operating systems. Some older systems might. The IDS needs to know whether every system it watches 
will accept such a packet, or it can end up with an inaccurate reconstruction of what happened on those 
machines. Some operating systems might accept a packet that is obviously bad. A poor implementation 
might, for example, allow an IP packet to have an incorrect checksum. If the IDS don't know this, it will 
discard packets that the end system accepts, again reducing the accuracy of the system.
Denial of service problems: Even if the IDS knows what operating system every machine on the 
network runs, it still might not be able to tell just by looking at a packet whether a given machine will 
accept it. A machine that runs out of memory will discard incoming packets. The IDS has no easy way to
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determine whether this is the case on the end-system, and thus will assume that the end-system has 
accepted the packet. CPU exhaustion and network saturation at the end-system can cause the same 
problem.
Together, all these problems result in a situation where the IDS often simply can't determine the exact 
nature of a packet or implications of a packet merely by examining it; it needs to know a great deal about 
the networking behavior of the end-systems that it's watching, as well as the traffic conditions of their 
network segments. Unfortunately, the current IDS architecture is short on this and a network IDS doesn't 
have any simple way of informing itself about this; it obtains all its information from the packets it captures 
during attack detection.
8.0 Security Problems in Routing Protocols
The effectiveness of IDS operation and functional performance is closely tied to the performance of 
routing protocols. This is because the Intrusion detection systems rely routing protocols as a transport 
mechanism. Thus, designing effective IDS entails defining interoperability issues with routing protocols.
The present weaknesses in the implementation of the TCP/IP stack, a major transport mechanism in 
enterprise network systems, manifests in different attack forms (see table 2). These essentially are 
attacks using ICMP messages which includes: Denial of Service (DoS) (Figure 2) via ICMP messages, 
Re-routing with ICMP Route Redirect, ICMP Router Discovery messages, and ICMP informal messages 
such as those used in Ping of Death and Smurf attacks.
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Table 2. Grouping of network exploits into attack families.
Attacks on routing protocols could come from both within and outside the network. Outside attacks 
masquerade as routers that distributes fabricated, delayed or incorrect routing information while inside 
attacks are mounted by a subverted or compromised router. Such attacks may have serious 
consequences on the network infrastructure and on end-to-end communications. Feeding false routing
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information into an autonomous system (AS) may compromise the routing table of some of the AS 
routers. This will result in DoS on the hosts which trust that router with the implication that some hosts 
may not be able to reach some legitimate destinations, or the traffic flows for some particular destinations 
are deviated through sub-optimal routes. The packets, which follow routes that subverted, routers 
indicate, may be subject to eavesdropping and modification.
The manifestations of these attack sets are at the forefront of enterprise network security. This is more so 
because of the recognition that the responsibility for maintaining network connectivity falls on routing 
protocols, making it evident that routing security is an essential issue for the entire network infrastructure. 
Instantiations of these are attacks are given in table 3.
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Table 3. Instantiations of common attack 
TCP/IP attacks
Instantiation of these attacks come in different forms. For example, the Internet control message protocol 
(ICMP) a "best - effort" service used by IP nodes to report errors encountered while processing IP 
datagrams and to perform other network layer functions, such as diagnostics and monitoring have been 
used to launch different types of attacks such as DoS figures 2.
Figure 2. Topology of a DoS attack
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Consequently, for an IDS design to be effective, it must incorporate into the design process all safeguards 
to protect its reliance on transport protocols. This is extremely complex to define, delineate or 
workaround because of the constantly changing attack system topology. Suffice it to say that a limited 
remedy must include devising a good validation program for recreating known instantiations and 
implementing proactive programs that are used to identify issues at TCP/IP (e.g., ports scan) and routing 
protocol levels and incorporating sophisticated system debugging programs that attackers use to map 
enterprise networks.
9.0. Incorporation of Basic Principles into IDS Design.
Justification of any security policy for the design of IDS should be aimed to address the flaws in the 
current implementation.
The response to potential threats involves operational requirements analysis, risk analysis, system design 
support evaluation, and related access control modeling and analysis, and the evaluation of secure 
communications services and systems. The clear and unambiguous definition of specific security needs, 
a crucial step in security engineering must receive due emphasis in system security policy formulation.
Contemporary research on designing secure systems focus on several key issues with the
primary objective being security. System designs revolve around the security policy while providing a
large amount of functionality. Another issue is integrity, where system designs attempt to ensure data
integrity throughout the system. Additional issues include resource management, performance and user
interface.
The IDS architecture is designed with the above in mind. However, due to the complex nature of the 
environments where the IDS is deployed, several pitfalls are constantly experienced bringing to focus the 
question of whether proven formal methods were used in the development and design process.
The design of secure systems rely to a great extent on using appropriate methodologies to prove their 
correctness and efficacies throughout the life cycle of the design.
It is known that following a good design practice could reduce defective designs. Bugs in a design that 
are not uncovered in early design stages can be costly, and bugs that remain undetected until after the 
design is completed and deployed can be extremely expensive. The use of formal methods, i.e., the 
application of mathematical methodologies to specification and validation of systems, can aid in tackling 
these challenges.
The planning and design of secure systems draws from known safeguards against every known and 
potential threat. In the case of IDS, its main intent is to conceptualize the most appropriate response to 
the threat 'given current or the projected availability of appropriate countermeasures. In order to 
accomplish this task within various overriding security requirements, considerations begin to focus on risk 
and countermeasure cost trade-offs, including the cost of long-term maintenance and reliability 
requirements. Often conceptualized system development is different from the real world development 
model. Theoretically, the assumptions made might be correct but because of difficulties in vision and 
policy execution there are differences.
Often the design of effective systems entails adopting a complementary approach to encapsulate 
experience of good and bad practice into empirical rules. For instance, in the field of cryptographic 
protocol design, the robustness principles are helpful, because adherence to them contributes to the 
simplicity of protocols and avoids a considerable number of published confusions and mistakes. 
Anderson and Needham [20] propose a number of robustness principles, and Abadi and Needham [6] 
introduce complete analyses of desirable protocol properties and relevant limitations. These could be
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extended to the choice of objects for execution at the different stages of the design process for complex 
system design, i.e., IDS.
The experiences in the operation of IDS will be extremely beneficial in encapsulating both the good and 
bad practices into empirical design rules. The experiences are briefly discussed in Section 6.0.
The design process entails dealing with empirical rules and, in some cases; following one design principle 
will sometimes lead to violating another. In addition, even following all the rules will not guarantee a 
sound design. For instance in the design of protocols, many authors have considered the question of 
what are appropriate goals in the context of protocol analysis. Accordingly, Boyd el al. [1994] reviewed 
some design goals in authentication protocols and proposed a classification of them: intentional and 
extensional goals.
Intentional goals are generally concerned with ensuring that the protocol runs correctly as specified, while 
extensional goals are concerned with what the protocol achieves for its idealized and actual models of 
system development participants. It has been suggested that attacks should be measured by whether or 
not they violate extensional specifications even if intentional ones have been used to find the attacks in 
the first place. Boyd proposes a hierarchy of extensional protocol goals, which includes the major 
proposed goals for key establishment. He furthermore demonstrated how these extensional goals could 
be exploited to motivate design of entity authentication protocols.
The following useful set of principles applied to other designs could be extended to the IDS design 
process:
• Distributability: no central coordination takes place, which means there is no single point of 
failure;
• Multi-layered: an existing concept that combines different mechanisms to provide high overall 
security;
• Diversity: in diverse systems security vulnerabilities are likely to be less widespread. This can be 
achieved by either making the system unique or by diversifying the protected system;
• Disposability of any system component;
• Autonomy of each individual component; and
• Adaptability of the system to different environments.
The design process consists of steps each inter-relating to the other in a specific manner with input and 
output components that inform the next or previous design step in devising the essential design elements 
necessary to complete the terminal consideration of that particular step.
System design typically starts with a high-level specification, given in terms of block diagrams, tables, and 
informal text conveying the desired functionality. A combination of top-down and bottom-up design 
techniques is applied until a final design is obtained.
One item specific to the specification stage is the initial analysis also called risk assessment of every facet
of the enterprise network at the system, host and network levels. For the
enterprise, insuring high quality security for a system and host component is a major thrust of the initial
planning effort. Thorough knowledge of the system will provide the input materials for a sound IDS
design
The system security engineering management (SSEM) plans produced during this phase should 
delineate the criteria and operational environments for specific solutions to defined security needs. These 
needs may span the range from providing additional network connectivity to existing systems to the 
provisioning of new network and/or computing environments. The plans should identify specific security 
evaluation, implementation, and deployment requirements as needed to complete the delivery order.
In the analysis phase, crucial design implementation questions at the network levels that should define 
the scope of interoperation of the IDS with decomposable network components include:
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, What kinds of access controls (Internet, wide area network connections, etc.) are going to be in
place? 
. What authentication protocols and procedures are to be used for local area networks, wide area
networks and dialup servers? 
. What type of network media, for example, cables, switches, and routers, are used and what type of
security do they have?
• Will security be implemented on file and print servers?
. Will encryption and cryptography, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), e-mail systems, and remote 
access be used over the Internet?
• What procedures will be implemented to ensure conformity with networking standards?
The future IDS design should be such that its placement on the network should not impair its ability to 
function effectively. The optimum performance of the current designs has been shown [Iheagwara et al. 
2000] to depend on the deployment location of the IDS on the network. In this regard, in order to isolate 
points of vulnerability, it is necessary to analyze the data flow through the networks. From this 
perspective, there are two basic scenarios:
(i) Data stored on a computer: For data stored on a local computer, the operating system is the major 
provider of the necessary services for the protection task. Using these services requires that they be 
properly configured.
(ii) Data traveling across communication points: Data traveling between locations needs to be secured in 
a different way, and this often involves encryption. Generally speaking, this data is in one of two forms: 
data in the form of network packets coming into a system, and data that is leaving the system.
Protecting incoming data encompasses both guarding the data itself and guarding the system against 
threats posed by the data once it has entered the network. Protection activities include a system check to 
ensure that the data comes from an authorized sender and that it can perform only authorized tasks.
Protecting data that is leaving a computer involves insuring that it reaches its target in exactly the same 
format in which it was sent, without being changed. The session and data type, as well as data content, 
must be unreadable by a third party—that is, privacy must be preserved.
The enterprise network usually offers several possibilities for data to leave or enter a specific computer. 
Computers can have individual modems with a variety of available connection scenarios. Additionally 
most computers are connected to a local (internal) network from which data can branch through multiple 
points to numerous destinations.
From the security perspective, there are two major issues involved in this exchange of information: (i) the 
data that is leaving a computer must reach the target without being read or changed before it reaches its 
destination and (ii) the packets that are reaching and entering a computer must be from an authorized 
user and their objective must be to pursue authorized tasks.
Typical network scenarios are:
• A corporate network that shares a private network with another company.
• A corporate network with Web servers located at an ISP, accessible either via 
dial-up or a permanent connection.
• A corporate network with dial-up capabilities.
• A corporate network with a permanent connection to the Internet.
Given this complex scenario and the many opportunities it offers for breaches of security, implementing 
IDS security should be a step-by-step process that starts with the primary local resource where the data is 
housed, continues through the intervening points, and concludes with the permanent connection to the 
"rest of the world." To support this step-by-step security implementation process, a suitable analysis and 
deployment architecture is needed.
20
Data en route cannot be directly protected by services of the operating system. However, there are 
different technologies (protocols) available to create a tunnel between two nodes and encrypt the 
information, e.g., VPN. All of them have their individual limitations and the decision regarding the 
appropriate technology or combination of technologies needs to be well planned. This then becomes 
another vital IDS design input material because there must exist an interdependency relationship of these 
technologies, i.e., VPN and the IDS technology.
The goal of every enterprise network is growth with a motive for profit. Technically this translates to 
factoring in scale up parameters in the design. This is another thrust of the analysis phase of the design 
process. Any scale up of the network brings with it issues that will permanently or transiently affect the 
system thus warranting in some cases a revision of the system topology and architecture. For example, 
the growth of the enterprise network could mandate a redesign of the network system resulting to the 
reevaluation and determination of the basic elements of growth. Such could simply mean incorporating 
the Gigabit Ethernet in place of 10/100 MB Ethernet technology. The issue of increasing the network 
bandwidth mandates consideration of security at the component and network levels. This in fact has 
given rise to the introduction of Gigabit IDS.
High-availability and scalable bandwidth considerations are essential design goals. High availability is a 
function of the application as well as the whole network between a client workstation and a service 
located in the network. While the mean failure time of individual components is a factor, network 
availability is determined mostly by the network design. This means that the application of design 
principles in the implementation of IDS should short circuit such issues as memory and CPU usage.
Design validation is a critical design process. The purpose of validation is to determine secure design 
implementation weaknesses. This involves ascertaining that the physical design does indeed meet its 
specification. In a traditional design flow, this is realized through simulation and testing. Because testing 
for nontrivial designs is generally infeasible, • testing provides at best only a probabilistic assurance. 
Formal verification, in contrast to testing, uses rigorous mathematical reasoning to show that a design 
meets all or parts of its specification. This requires the existence of formal descriptions for both the 
specification and implementation. Such descriptions are given in notational frameworks with a formal 
semantics that unambiguously associates a mathematical object with each description, permitting these 
objects to be manipulated in a formal mathematical framework.
Issues pertinent to IDS design specification; verification and validation are discussed in the next section.
10. Specifications and Verification
The security property specification contains the information needed to validate a system and must 
aggregate system intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Thus, the specification of the secure communications 
capabilities or transport mechanism could be seen as performing robust validation and Quality Assurance 
exercises based on the defined requirements and evaluation criteria. Of importance is the demonstration 
of interoperability between components (hardware and software) of the system. The component level 
operational interoperability evaluated in this area should at a minimum honor known security constraints.
The security property specification of the IDS design should be defined after preliminary performance 
specifications for software, hardware; and network topology, architecture and subcomponents are 
prepared. Such properties must evolve to satisfy safeguards of identified threats known from operational 
experiences and vulnerabilities processed through system design modifications and risk management. 
Each adversarial threat is modeled and examined in terms of the capabilities of the countermeasure to be 
employed. Using a criterion, the alternatives are sequentially evaluated and accepted or discarded based 
on their current relevance to the protected information or attack scenario.
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Specification and verification generally requires that some assumptions be made on the behavior of the 
environment in which a device is intended to operate. If actual operating environment violates these 
assumptions, the device may fail despite successful verification.
Specification and verification of system design can be accomplished using different techniques that 
specify a set of constraints to satisfy. These constraints usually specify how the system handles 
concurrent access dependencies.
There are two main approaches to the specification and corresponding verification. The first is concerned 
with specifying desired properties for the design. Formal verification is concerned with properties of 
temporal nature, i.e., they do not pertain to static attributes of the system but rather characteristics of t&e 
system behavior or execution such as network traffic characteristics. Temporal logics are unifying 
framework for expressing such properties. Verification amounts to showing that all of the system's 
possible behaviors satisfy the temporal properties of its specification.
The other approach is based on specification in terms of a high-level model of the system. In this case, 
the behaviors of a system are given by a set of all behaviors of the higher-level model, rather than a set of 
temporal properties. Verification then requires showing that each possible behavior of the system's 
implementation is consistent with some behavior of its high-level specification.
The combination of the two approaches is common: First, a high-level model of the design is shown to 
satisfy a set of desired temporal properties. Then a series of more and more detailed specification are 
developed, each of which is an implementation of the specification at the next higher level. In an 
appropriate technical framework, the temporal properties of the highest-level model are preserved by the 
refinement steps and thus are satisfied by the lowest, most detailed, level. In this context, the first type of 
verification is also referred to as "design or property verification", while the second form is known as 
"implementation verification." The two are conceptually the same since they are verification instance of 
the same problem: the specification defines some constraint on the allowed behaviors of a system, and 
verification requires showing that the implementation meets this constraint. The two are relevant to the 
IDS verification process.
Because of the complexities of the design process, it is helpful to verify the effectiveness of the IDS 
design from the formal security property specifications that govern the mechanisms and functionality of 
the interconnected components and the IDS interprocess communication.
For instance, a secure IDS design must include verification of a set of specifications of entropy security 
values which should be hard coded into component (detection modules) and system level designs such 
as those used to protect transport protocols against known vulnerabilities like IP spoofing, UDP Spoofing, 
DNS and Zone Transfer, etc.
Requirements for validating secure IDS designs should be drawn from past implementation experiences. 
The validation testing should incorporate techniques known to be effective in discovering design flaws. 
The identification of interoperation defects of the design using different probing techniques (Appendix 3) 
with the transport mechanism (routing protocol) is an essential requirement. In this case, the first thing to 
do is to identify a network segment by setting up a network analyzer and collecting some traffic on that 
segment. Analysis of the interaction of the detection ability of the complex traffic stream may help identify 
potential design problems. There are a variety of proprietary network protocols that can accomplish this.
Another requirement is taking inventory of all of the network software in order to map out probing 
specifications. This could be accomplished in a short time frame. This includes identification of a variety of 
programs and protocols for parameterizing the traffic stream that is sought after in the test.
Depending on the situation and the available information, it can be very difficult to get a clear picture of all 
aspects of a security event on the network. Distinct events may not seem related until another piece of 
the puzzle is added for clarity. Attempting to answer the basic questions about system components or 
events such as vendor provided component and software specifications in order to determine functionality 
and performance parameters is a good place to start and this should provide the framework to paint a
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picture of what will transpire during the test, deviation of which is a trigger for insecure design and 
configuration. Thus, knowledge of the functional and performance specifications of system components 
is an essential requirement.
The testing process also entails using design objects, e.g., firewalls, routers and switches as targets 
(figure 3) for analysis of event streams. These objects as well as simulated event streams such as attack 
sets with parametric specifications are essential validation requirements. This will aid in the determination 
of threats and object threat levels once the target has been identified and the event stream set.
There is also the requirement to delineate and characterize the impact that a vulnerable system and/or te 
component will have on the network when in operation. This will help to determine what design remedies 
need to be applied. This is a precondition towards determining if the defect is a single point of failure for 
the network and if it could be remedied by making certain changes in the design.
Victim of/CMP attack
Traffic Load generator
Figure 3. Typical topology for validation testing.
11. Conclusion
This paper has discussed a few examples of the many possible issues associated with the effective 
design of secure systems that could be related to IDS design. As was shown, security issues manifest in 
virtually all aspects of system design from conceptual specification through verification to operation.
We presented the basic architecture of the IDS design, explored the implementation and design pitfalls. 
We reviewed the application of formal methods in secure designs using the development of transport 
protocols as an illustration. Further, we presented a few problems associated with the implementation of 
transport protocols.
Drawing from practical experiences in the implementation of the IDS, we discussed and analyzed 
associated design issues. This includes interoperability problems resulting from complex networking and 
operating systems technologies and the constantly changing landscape of enterprise security policies.
A veritable design goal is accurate verification. Design models can vary and do infact range from abstract 
models where the design is divided into a few blocks, down to very detailed descriptions that include the 
minutest component. Verification at high-level abstraction does not prove that the lower-level details of 
the implementation are correct. At the same time, formal methods can vary and be very effective at 
finding errors at high levels of abstraction before a large design effort is invested in implementing a flawed 
system architecture's network.
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The basic concepts underlying design verification were explored from the framework of proven theorem. 
Many examples using theorem provers verify that some model of a design is a refinement of a higher 
level, although deductive proofs of temporal properties are also possible.
We presented different specification and verification techniques and related them to actual system 
designs.
We proposed informal validation program (testing and simulation) that involves writing specifications for 
each class of design components using known issues in the implementation of the IDS - primarily 
transport protocols issues to create attacks for the modular validation of the design.
This work demonstrates that the correctness of the IDS architectures and implementation standards can 
guarantee its design functional effectiveness and is realizable if a methodical design approach based on 
formal arid .other methods is followed. Most notably the IDS interprocess communication, is a crucial 
design element because it's verification through layers of components that guarantee the correctness of 
system events that makes reference to operating system calls, of the operating system calls in terms of 
network calls, and of the network calls in terms of network transmission steps is decisive to the IDS 
functional effectiveness.
Concluding, it has become widely accepted that established standards and design rules must be taken 
into account distinctively and in combination in a complementary way during all phases of the design 
process in order to attain effectiveness and reliability of the security schemes for the enterprise network.
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Appendix 1 : The class hierarchy of Intrusion attacks.
Intrusions fall into two categories, namely Misuse and Anomalous Behavior. The Figure below shows the 
attack hierarchy. The forks below the rectangles represent inheritance.
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Appendix 2: Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model
The OSI seven-layer reference model is an attempt to rationalise the complexity of computer 
communications by standardising the functions into seven layers. Each layer is defined by the service it 
provides to the layer above. From an end users perspective, the applications they use sit above the top 
layer and use its facilities. The physical communication medium is underneath the bottom layer.
Data Flow
Host Host
The OSI reference model
Summary of Layers
1. Physical Layer: Transmission of bits through the physical medium
2. Data Link Layer: Exchange of data between two nodes on a network
3. Network Layer: Routing and Connection control of the network
4. Transport Layer: Transparent end-to-end transmission of data
5. Session Layer: Logical flow of data between communication end points
6. Presentation Layer: Translates and formats the data
7. Application Layer: Provides end user services
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Abstract
Contemporary e-business networks are increasingly implementing the multi-layer security scheme in order to pro­ 
vide a reasonable measure of security for their information systems. The implementation entails formation of a layered 
architecture (concentric security layers) using packet and application-level filters neither of which provides compli­ 
mentary functions. The layered architecture provides convenient abstractions and increases the end-to-end latency that 
results into sub-optimal system performance. In this paper, we present the results of the experiment to quantify the 
latency introduced by security layering on end-to-end latency and investigate the resulting degree of sub-optimality of 
system performance in a distributed and switched e-business network. 
© 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
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1. Introduction
The requirements [1] for performance, reliabil­ 
ity, speed and operational support of e-business 
activities in contemporary corporate information 
systems are increasingly becoming complex and 
extremely high. In terms of reliability, the system 
must be designed to ensure system-level availabil­ 
ity of 99.999% on a 24 x 7 basis. In terms of
'Corresponding author. Tel . +1-3015871236. 
E-mail address: iheagwarac@aol.com (C. Iheagwara).
operational support, the system must meet all of 
the requirements to be certified for operation. 
These requirements must also incorporate security 
schemes into the product design as a precursor 
to meeting all functional requirements established 
for the system. The implementation of the security 
scheme should be able to support these require­ 
ments in a manner that does not impede vital 
system performance indexes such as desirable low 
values for end-end latency, Web request-response 
time, network throughput and protection of the 
privacy of data.
To realize the above, stringent security mea­ 
sures such as implementation of the multi-layer
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security scheme is widely adopted. The scheme 
envisages the use of a combination of packet filters 
and application-level firewalls because neither the 
packet filter nor the application-level filters pro­ 
vide complimentary functions. The implementa­ 
tion requires the formation of security layers using 
packet-forwarding devices with varying degrees of 
packet filtering and blocking functions. A typical 
arrangement is the use of filtering routers at 
the perimeter of the network and application-level 
firewalls inside the network. Also, part of the 
stringent security measure is the deployment of 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to detect un­ 
wanted traffic.
Intrusion detection as an important compo­ 
nent of a security system, complements other se­ 
curity technologies. By providing information to 
site administration, an IDS allows not only for the 
detection of attacks explicitly addressed by other 
security components (such as firewalls and service 
wrappers), but also attempts to provide notifica­ 
tion of new attacks unforeseen by other compo­ 
nents. IDSs also provide forensic information that 
potentially allows organizations to discover the 
origins of an attack. In this manner, an IDSs at­ 
tempts to make attackers more accountable for 
their actions, and, to some extent, act as a deter­ 
rent to future attacks.
The IDSs detection modules are deployed at 
strategic locations across the enterprise network in 
order to stop attacks, misuse, and security policy 
violations before damage is done. When an IDSs 
detects unauthorized activity, it can respond in a 
number of ways, automatically recording the date, 
time, source, and target of the event, recording the 
content of the attack, notifying the network ad­ 
ministrator, reconfiguring a firewall or router, sus­ 
pending a user account, or terminating the attack.
Packet filtering routers are generally the small­ 
est and the simplest form of firewall [2]. They can 
provide a low-cost and useful level of firewall se­ 
curity. Their sole purpose is to check the source 
address, destination address and ports in individ­ 
ual IP packets. Packet-filtering firewalls work by 
dropping packets based on their source or desti­ 
nation addresses or ports. They make decisions 
only from the contents of the current packet. Fil­ 
tering can be done at input time, at output time or
both depending on the type of the router. Because 
they only perform cursory checks on the source 
address, there is no real demand on the router. It 
takes little time to identify a bad or restricted ad­ 
dress. The administrator makes a list of the ac­ 
ceptable machines and services and a stop list of 
unacceptable machines or services.
Packet filtering routers alone are inadequate 
to implement stringent security requirements. The 
reasons for these are:
1. A packet filter does not enforce transport- 
level issues, such as the early 1997 attacks against 
Windows NT (invalid TCP window size, invalid 
sequence number). One relies on the software 
running on internal systems for security, and as 
previously mentioned this is typically the weakest 
point. For example, any type of packet filter will 
pass through an SMTP connection to an internal 
mail server. None are able to filter out known 
problem areas before sending it onto an internal 
Mail Hub. An application gateway, such as the 
Gauntlet firewall, can and does.
2. A stateful packet filter keeps state informa­ 
tion about connections. It may let the entire packet 
go out just as it came in (or visa versa), so long as 
it matches the rules. A stateful packet filter typi­ 
cally does not examine the data. It does not talk on 
behalf of anything/anyone as a proxy does. When 
using an application gateway, you do not need to 
imitate TCP/UDP/ICMP handling because real 
handling is done by the firewall.
3. Current stateful packet filter implementations 
do not rewrite packets. The internal network is 
exposed to packet-based attacks. Packets are for­ 
warded based on security rules. No packets are 
forwarded by application gateways. New connec­ 
tions are established.
4. Packet filters log much less information than 
application gateways. A packet filter will log source 
and destination addresses, accepts, and rejects. For 
example, HTTP connections will show single pack­ 
ets not filenames, URLs, number of packets, etc.
5. Packet filters are less granular (look less 
deeply into the communication stream) and do less 
security work than application gateways. There­ 
fore, they are insufficient for applications that 
require a much tighter security.
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On the other hand, application-level firewalls 
gives the network manager complete control over 
each service, as well as over which services are 
permitted. Using proxies, application-level firewalls 
provide much finer control over which packets can 
be transmitted across the firewall. Application-level 
firewalls can support string user authentication, 
provide detailed logging information, and the fil­ 
tering rules for an application-level firewall are 
much easier to configure and test than those for 
a packet-filtering router. The other advantages of 
application-level firewalls are that they:
• do not allow any direct connections between in­ 
ternal and external hosts, i.e. lack of IP for­ 
warding;
• support user-level authentication;
• analyze application commands inside the pay- 
load portion of data packets (whereas the state- 
ful packet filters systems do not); and
• are able to keep comprehensive logs of traffic 
and specific activities.
The disadvantages are that they:
• are slower than packet filters;
• require the internal client to know about them;
• do not support every possible type of connec­ 
tion, i.e. that a proxy application must be cre­ 
ated for each networked service. Thus, one is 
used for FTP, another for Telnet, another for 
HTTP, and so forth; and
• the last disadvantage is a factor of the level of 
security desired by the organization using the 
firewall.
To address the limitations of both application- 
level firewall and filtering router, the multi-layer 
security scheme that incorporates both types is 
increasingly becoming a popular implementation. 
However, the scheme is associated with the addi­ 
tion of latency from the authentication process 
that increases the value of the end-to-end latency. 
By how much the latency (network transition time) 
is increased and the associated performance over­ 
head is the subject of this research.
In the main experiment, we measure the latency 
introduced by security layering and quantity the
contribution to the end-to-end latency. Further, 
we characterize the effects on system performance 
and as well measure the degree of sub-optimality 
in system performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we discuss the related works. Section 3 
presents the experimental details. The results are 
interpreted and analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5, 
we present the conclusions of this study and the 
recommended future work.
2. Related work
Improvements in critical system performance 
indexes such as network transition time, latency 
and network throughput have been at the fore­ 
front of numerous research works. Researchers 
have been fielding different methods to improve 
worldwide web latency. It has been recognized that 
there are generally two sources of worldwide web 
latency:
1. Network delay. Retrieving a document from 
a Web server using the HTTP 1.0 involves at 
least two round trips between the client and 
the server.
2. Request processing time. For each file re­ 
quested, a web server has to read it from its 
disks into a buffer to the client.
This entails that latency can be reduced either 
by reducing network delays or by reducing ser­ 
ver query/request response/processing time. HTTP 
enhancements and the use of different caching 
techniques on proxy servers and clients have been 
the focus of previous research works on the re­ 
duction of network delay. Improvement in Web 
servers' throughput has been made possible by 
incorporating cooperative servers, i.e. using mul­ 
tiple Web servers and server-side caching which 
is caching documents in a Web server's address 
space to increase Web response rate. Three cach­ 
ing techniques namely server-side caching, client- 
side caching and proxy caching have emerged as 
benchmark solutions.
Server-side caching strategies focuses on the re­ 
duction of servers' response time and improvement
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in throughput. Arlitt and Williamson [3] analyzed 
access logs from different Web servers and identi­ 
fied ten variances among workloads. Kwan et al. 
[4,5] described NCSA's Web caching research that 
uses AFS to cache documents in Web servers' local 
disks. Markatos [6] proposed the notion of mem­ 
ory caching of Web documents, the benefit being 
that it reduces the number of disk accesses. 
By keeping most frequently accessed files in main 
memory, many of the requests can be served 
without touching the file system thereby reducing 
access latency.
Cunha et al. [7] who researched client-side 
caching analyzed access patterns of individual 
users and found two access patterns. First, WWW 
clients tend to access small files. Secondly, keeping 
small files in clients cache is better than keeping 
small ones since the former has a high latency- 
savings-per-byte rate. Bestavros et al. [8] compared 
three caching levels at the client side: the session 
level, the host level, and the LAN level. According 
to their experiments, the LAN-level caching is the 
most cost-effective. The reason being that for a 
specific document, a LAN cache keeps only one 
copy of it while the host and session levels keep 
one copy of the document in their respective ca­ 
ches and therefore waste more cache space.
The limitations and potentials of proxy caching 
have been shown by Abrams et al. [9] in their 
evaluation studies to be the upper bound of the hit 
ratio of a proxy cache that is in the range of 30- 
50%. Since the basic idea of caching is to move the 
data that the clients need closer to them. Some 
proxy-cache researches take geographic distribu­ 
tion of clients request into account. Williams and 
coworkers [10] compared the performance of dif­ 
ferent caching policies and implementation and 
found that the widely used WWW caching policy, 
LRU, results in poor performance. Additionally, 
they provided insights into other proxy cache im­ 
plementations: the CERN cache [11], the Lagoon 
cache [12], the Harvest cache [13], and the Squid 
cache [14].
Martin and Russell [15], Martin et al. [16], 
Simpson and Alonso [17] and Tomasic and Gar- 
cia-Molina [18] also studied caching in distributed 
architecture. The client caches data so that oper­ 
ations data are not repeatedly sent to remote
servers. Instead, the client locally performs fre­ 
quent operations. The use of caching is most 
beneficial for systems that are distributed over 
slow networks or that evaluate queries slowly.
Gruber et al. [19] analyzed the challenges of 
realizing a prefix-caching service in the context of 
lETF's real-time streaming protocol, a multime­ 
dia streaming protocol that derives from HTTP. 
Their study explored how to avoid several round- 
trip delays by caching protocol information at 
the proxy server. In addition, they discussed how 
caching the partial content of multimedia streams 
introduces new challenges in cache coherency and 
feedback control.
Mogul [20,21] conducted research in HTTP 
improvement and proposed two mechanisms to 
improve HTTP latency: long-lived connections 
and request pipelining. The problem is that several 
features of HTTP interact badly with TCP two of 
which are that HTTP establishes a connection for 
each request and HTTP transfers only one object 
per request. In another instance, Padmanabhan 
and Mogul [22] use prefetching to hide the latency 
instead of reducing it. The argument is that the idle 
period of time between two adjacent requests from 
the same user can be used to prefetch the next 
document the user wants to read.
Burkowski [23] reports on a simulation study, 
which measures retrieval performance of a dis­ 
tributed information retrieval system. The experi­ 
ments focused on two strategies for distributing 
fixed workload across a small number of servers.
Couvreur et al. [24] analyzed the performance 
and cost factors of searching large text collections 
on parallel systems. They used simulation models 
to investigate three different hardware architec­ 
tures and search algorithms including a main­ 
frame system using an inverted-list IR system, a 
collection of RISC processors using a superim­ 
posed IR system, special-purpose machine archi­ 
tecture that uses a direct search. Hawking [25] 
designed and implemented a parallel information 
retrieval information system called PADRE97, on 
a collection of workstations. The basic architec­ 
ture of PADRE97 contains a central process that 
checks for user commands and broadcasts them 
to information retrieval engines on each work 
station.
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Benchmarking Web servers is an active re­ 
search area. Several benchmarks for Web serv­ 
ers have been developed, including WebStone 
[26] and SPEC Web. There are also studies on the 
overload behavior of the benchmarks and im­ 
provement of the benchmarks [27]. Almeida and 
Cao [28] used the Wisconsin proxy benchmark to 
compare the performance of four proxy servers. 
The study explored the effects of multiple disk 
use, low-bandwidth modem client connections and 
throughput on the performance of proxy servers. 
The study found that the latency advantage of 
caching proxies vanishes in front of modem con­ 
nections.
The above-cited studies demonstrate that by 
improving the server's throughput and imple­ 
menting different caching schemes, latency and 
Web query-response time can be reduced. How­ 
ever, the studies did not quantify or characterize 
the attributes of end-to-end latency in relation to 
process authentication in switched and distributed 
architectures with multi-layered security schemes. 
There is also no study on the impact of security 
layering on system performance that has been 
reported in scientific literature hence this is the 
primary motivation for this study. This study is 
unique in the sense that the experiments are 
conducted live on a distributed and switched 
e-business network in order to establish empirical 
values.
In the next section we describe the experiment 
on the empirical quantification of latency due se­ 




The following are the objectives of this study:
1. empirical quantification of the latency intro­ 
duced by security layering;
2. determination of the impact of security layering 
on end-to-end latency; and
3. determination of the resulting degree of sub- 
optimality on system performance.
3.2. Experimental setup
3.2.1. Test beds
The test beds for the performance tests are 
shown in Figs. A.1-A.5 in the appendix section.
For the latency measurements, the^test envi­ 
ronment shown in Fig. A.6 (see appendix) consist 
of a Netcom Systems' Smart Bits 2000 chassis 
running OS 1.4.15 with firmware Version 2.1.24, 
12 ML 7710 cards and two ML 7711 cards. All 
latency tests were performed using Netcom's 
Smart Flow Version 1.12.1 software suite. The 
error test was conducted with Netcom's Smart 
Window.
3.2.2. Web servers configuration
The Web servers are Intel-based Pentium 500 
MHz systems with dual processors and 256 MB 
RAM. They are configured with Windows NT 
4.0 (Service Pack 5) operating system and form 
a cluster farm with load balancing. The super 
fast caching scheme is implemented on the Web 
servers.
3.2.3. Client configuration
The client test server is a Dell brand Pentium 500 
MHz system with dual processors, 256 MB RAM 
and Windows NT 4.0 (Service Pack 5) operating 
system. It was configured with the performance 
measuring software WEBSTONE and Internet 
connection through which the test server accesses 
Web site applications was established.
3.2.4. Websites description
The four Web sites are the corporate sites of a 
major stock exchange market hosting multimedia 
applications that include video graphics, database 
applications, and financial news contents. Each 
site can handle up to 10,000 concurrent connec­ 
tions.
3.3. Experimental method
The experimental methodology envisaged em­ 
pirical quantification of the latency due to process 
authentication and measurement of its effects on 
system performance, i.e. Web query-response time. 
The results are then interpreted and analyzed
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within the framework of environmental conditions 
in the distributed and switched architecture.
The experiment is conducted in two phases 
(parts): I and II.
• Part I of the experiment is the determination 
of system performance using the Web query- 
response speed as benchmark under the differ­ 
ent security schemes.
• Part II of the experiment is the quantification 
and attributive characterization of the end- 
end latency and its contribution to the sub-opti­ 
mal performance determined in part I. There 
are two sub-parts here:
(a) measurement of latency due to switching; 
and
(b) computation of latency due to authentica­ 
tion.
3.4. Part I: determination of web request-response 
speed
3.4.1. Test procedure
The client test server was configured with the 
"WEBSTONE" Web performance benchmark 
that measures the performance of a Web server.
In the test, different workloads were created on 
each Web server by distributing and simulating up 
to 85 client computers on the client test server. 
This simulation enabled the client test server to 
generate multiple files retrieval requests from the 
Web servers. The benchmark tests are auto­ 
matically generated by the Webmaster, which used 
the performance measurements from the clients to 
generate the summary report.
Peak CPU utilization during the tests ranged 
from 43% to 57% for the Web servers and 49% to 
53% for the client test servers. The data from the 
log entries was recorded over a two-week period 
and the test results are presented in Tables 1-3 and 
Fig. A.5.
3.5. Part II: determination of end-to-end latency
3.5.1. Part Ha: latency due to switching
The latency of the switches was measured using 
Netcom Systems Smart Bits that is capable of mea-
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suring latency to an accuracy of 100 ns (0.1 ms). 
Multicast packets were used in the Ethernet-to- 
Ethernet switching. Measurements were at either 
layer 2 or 3 for 64-byte and 512-byte sized packets. 
The throughput test determines the highest rate 
at which a switch can receive, process and forward 
packets without loss. This value is important be­ 
cause a pause of up to a few seconds may occur 
when a packet is lost from a data stream: The ap­ 
plication—realizing data was lost—must retrans­ 
mit the missing data.
3.5.1.1. Test procedure. In the latency test, two 
streams of FTP data, which runs over TCP, and 
UDP, were sent to a single switch port. The stan­ 
dard 100 pps test stream is used to measure latency 
while multiple streams of background load are 
applied to a set of independent ports to determine 
if the switch latency is a function of the back­ 
ground load on the switch. To assure reliability of 
the testing conditions, each test was repeated three
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Table 3
Web query response time
Parameter Web request processing time





Web server farm with 53.3
load balancing
Web server without 57.7
load balancing
53 (without proxy server) 53.6 













times on the switching device under test (DUT), 
with a cold boot of the DUT between test runs. 
The results of the three tests were averaged within 
each test situation. The latency measurements were 
consistent for all packet sizes and for all loads 
ranging from 50% to 95% at layers 2 and 3.
The throughput test is performed by having the 
tester send a 30-s burst of traffic through the device 
at half the rate theoretically possible for the given 
test conditions. The number of sent packets is then 
compared to the number received. If all were re­ 
ceived, the data rate is increased and the trial is 
rerun. If all were not received, the rate is decreased 
and the trial is rerun. This process repeats until a 
rate is found at which all offered packets are for­ 
warded.
The latency test result is presented in Table 4, 
Figs. 1 and 2 while the results for the throughput 
tests are presented (Figs. 3 and 4).
3.5.2. Part lib: latency due to authentication
processes
3.5.2.1. Computational method. Latency due to
authentication mechanisms (£a ) was computed
using the following expressions:
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Fig. 1. Latency under the different security scheme.
Website 1 Webslte 2 Website 3 Website 4
Architecture 2 • Architecture 3 D Architecture 4
Fig. 2. Latency for the different authentication mechanisms.
where Ln is the network latency and Ls is latency 
due to switching.
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Security Schemes
Fig. 3. Network throughput under the different security 
schemes.
Security Schemes
Fig. 4. Aggregated throughput capacity for each security 
scheme.
By substituting the different values for Ls and Ln 
using the above expression the latency for each 
given security scheme can be computed.
Latency as a percentage of overall network 
delay (% Ia) for each security scheme is calculated 
with the following expression:






























The result of the computation is shown in Table 5 
and Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Web response time under varying network conditions.
4. Analysis
Three parameters characterize the network ar­ 
chitecture—latency, occupancy, and bandwidth. 
All have complicated aspects to them. Band­ 
width determines how fast data can be transferred 
through the network interface, i.e. between the 
different segments and the network. For messages 
that carry data, node-to-network bandwidth can 
become the bottleneck. Occupancy has little effect 
on the system when the caching scheme is opti­ 
mized, i.e. with maximization of memory cache 
and; latency significantly affects the system per­ 
formance.
Network latency is the delay from the trans­ 
mission of the packet header at the source to the 
reception of the end of packet at the destination. 
The latency of a message through the network 
depends, among other things; on how many hops 
the message travels in the network topology. The 
latency of the message from the processor to and 
from the network is the dominant constituent of 
the latency ascribable to the network topology. In
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our study, the topology-related latency was as­ 
sumed to be negligible because the network transit 
time from one node to another is always the same.
The impact of authentication latency on system 
performance depends not only on the structure 
of the authentication mechanism but also on its 
absolute value that is computed as a ratio of 
the end-to-end latency. The impact also depends 
on whether authentication really is the important 
performance bottleneck to begin with, or whether 
the bottleneck is some other thing, i.e. load im­ 
balance.
For a given number of workloads, larger data 
sets usually improve the load balance, and hence 
allow the system to deliver better performance. 
Thus, if an application with a given workload 
delivers good performance on a given architecture 
but not on one that uses speed-limiting processes 
on the network, this does not in itself mean that 
the architecture should be replaced but rather en­ 
hanced. There may be applications, for which the 
less fortified architecture performs well too, and 
perhaps another application for which it per­ 
forms almost as well as the other architecture. The 
question is how large are these applications rela­ 
tive to the base architecture that will make a major 
impact.
There is also the issue of the "desirable" level of 
performance. Typically, the larger the efficiency 
the larger the application size needed for a given 
combination of latency. Thus, the efficiency level is 
an important determinant of the constant factors 
in the expression for the required application. 
Furthermore, it can also affect the performance 
level of the required application with latency, if 
changing the desirable efficiency level changes the 
relative importance of different performance bot­ 
tlenecks. For example, for an efficiency level of 
30%, the dominant bottleneck to overcome by in­ 
creasing the problem size may be authentication, 
but for a 95% efficiency level it may be load im­ 
balance. The bottlenecks also may not behave in 
predictable ways as the problem size or efficiency 
level could change, particularly for irregular ap­ 
plications. In most cases, however, if the dominant 
bottleneck does not change, then the chosen level 
of efficiency will not affect the performance level 
required.
The impact of switching type on latency is also 
fundamental in defining the overall performance 
of Web query-response speed. High perfor­ 
mance switches perform the role of prioritization 
for any application in the application-defining li­ 
brary (ADL) or application added to ADL as a 
custom entity. This means that for those mission- 
critical applications, we can guarantee an allocated 
amount of available bandwidth even during peri­ 
ods of network congestion. For Web-based ap­ 
plications, high performance switching device can 
distinguish between the various Web (HTTP) ap­ 
plications that use TCP port 80 (e.g., mainframe 
access via the Web, Web-based access to ERP 
applications, e-commerce or Web browsing) by 
examining the URL field. This feature facilitates 
readily identified e-commerce transaction flows 
that are given higher priority than ordinary Web 
browsing.
The results of our study show that there is a 
difference in the performance of access response 
time for the various security layering schemes. 
Throughput was high in most of the tests. In com­ 
parison with the others, the multi-layered scheme 
performed poorly.
The effect of authentication type on network 
speed (throughput) was very pronounced. In gen­ 
eral, network throughput decreased with increase 
in the number of authentication negotiated. The 
decline as shown in Fig. 3 is largest for the multi­ 
layer security scheme. There are five schemes 
represented in Fig. 3 with schemes 2 through 5 cor­ 
responding to architectures 1 through 4. Scheme 1 
is the baseline network throughput.
As is evident in Fig. 5, the Web response speed 
under the load balancing configuration is faster 
than the speed under the proxy arraying configu­ 
ration by as much as 6.7%.
The network throughput for the baseline con­ 
figuration (network without any form of security 
implemented) represented as schemes #1 in Fig. 4 
was 18.4 Mbps. Throughput for the multi-layered 
architecture was the lowest at 9.81 Mbps. The 
significance here is that network throughput is 
slowed down considerably by almost 50% in the 
configuration with the multi-layering scheme.
The increase in latency values for the different 
security schemes (Fig. 1) is more pronounced as
836 C. Iheagwara. A. Blyth I Computer Networks 39 (2002) 827-840
» 64 Nodal ChlldB 
•»-128 Nodal Chikta 
> 2S« Nodal Child* 
i'!12NodilChild»
300 500 850 910
Network throughput (Mbytes) 1250
Fig. 6. Latency versus throughput for switched networks under 
random traffic with 64 byte packets.
the workload approaches saturation point. The 
increase is about 10% above the normal level. 
Thus, beyond saturation point, there is an accel­ 
erated increase in the latency values. Fig. 6 shows 
the latency of four different size switched networks 
under random traffic as a function of the aggregate 
network throughput. It clearly conforms to the 
findings of other researchers that there is a high 
increase in latency for a network load above sat­ 
uration.
The latency value for the first security scheme 
(i.e. with only filtering router) was very negligible 
and as such was not represented in Fig. 2.
The interpretation and analysis of the study 
given above established that the throughput and 
authentication effects are profound and are the 
dominant factors for end-to-end latency.
As network approaches saturation, the latency 
increases by roughly a factor of 2 for the ar­ 
chitectures with firewall and multi-layer security 
schemes (3 and 4). Further, latency values for the 
schemes (1 and 2) with filtering router and proxy 
servers were the lowest regardless of network load 
condition. This reflects the fact that communica­ 
tion time between the client and proxy is the 
dominant factor in the overall performance and it 
is much more important than the delay introduced 
by switching.
The implication is that authentication with 
proxy server is less time consuming than authenti­
cation with the firewall. Despite the shorter service 
time, network latency is lower for the experiments 
with lower throughput hence, it is clear that net­ 
work saturation is a major bottleneck in the 
transmission time.
5. Conclusions and future works
5.1. Conclusions
We have described the implementation of se­ 
curity layering schemes in switched and distributed 
e-business network environments. We have con­ 
ducted an experiment to quantify and characterize 
the end-to-end latency, and have analyzed their 
impact on the system performance under different 
security layering schemes.
Within the limits of our experiments, the fol­ 
lowing are our main findings:
• Under random traffic, latency increases linearly 
with increase in the workload. The degradation 
in the performance of Web traffic as the 
network size increases agrees with analytical 
models presented in [29]. The study predicts 
the throughput of switched networks under sus­ 
tained random load degrade by approximately 
25% from linear when the network size is 
increased from 64 to 512 nodes. The empirical 
value derived in our study is roughly 20% under 
similar network conditions.
• Web response time is fastest for processes with­ 
out layering, slower in the single layering 
schemes and slowest under multi-layer security 
scheme.
• Latency was highest for the multi-layer security 
scheme where client latency increased by 50%. 
There is also a substantial decrease in through­ 
put under the multi-layer scheme.
• In terms of network transmission time, the 
first and second layering schemes maintained 
roughly constant values but there is a significant 
decrease under the third and fourth schemes for 
the different network load conditions. This im­ 
plies that authentication by the Cisco firewall 
was more time consuming than that of Micro­ 
soft's proxy server.
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The absolute value of the end-to-end latency 
fluctuates based on the network load. Under 
multi-layering, when a firewall or proxy must 
handle requests sent through very low band­ 
width (under network throughput saturation), 
the time spent in the network (transmission 
time) dominates.
The multi-layer architecture suffers from not 
being able to respond well under heavy net­ 
work load. However, improvements are realized 
when load balancing and proxy caching are 
maximized.
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Appendix A
The corporate network (Fig. A.I)
5.2. Future works
The work presented in this paper quantified the 
overhead and performance problems introduced 
by security layering in switched and distributed 
networks. In future, we will investigate the tech­ 
niques that could possibly combine multiple logi­ 
cal security layers into a single implementation to 
alleviate the problems associated with the current 
implementation that uses multiple entities to form 
multiple security layers.
Appendix B
Architecture #1: under this scheme, the topol­ 
ogy shown in Fig. A.2 incorporates a packet fil­ 
tering router at the perimeter of the network.
Appendix C
Architecture #2: the topology shown in Fig. A.3 
incorporates a Proxy server.
Security & Account 
Validation Nrrsda - Online 
Production Network
Fig. A.I. Network topology with multi-layer security scheme.
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Coiparat* Corporate 
Network
Fig. A.2. Environmental logical diagram for architecture #1. Fig. A.4. Environmental logical diagram for architecture #3.
Appendix D
Architecture #3: the topology shown in Fig. A.4 
incorporates application-level filter (firewall) for 
process authentication.
Appendix E
Architecture #4: the setup incorporates a multi- 
layered scheme shown in Fig. A. 5.
Corporate 
Network
Fig. A.3. Environmental logical diagram for architecture #2.
Fig. A.5. Environmental logical diagram for architecture #4.
Appendix F
Configuration for testing latency with back­ 
ground load (Fig. A.6).
Appendix G
Features of the network security equipments 
used in the tests.
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Device Vendor Usage
Fix firewall 520 Cisco Authentication of network
access for applications
Router Cisco 7505 Authentication based on access
list (filtration)
Proxy Server Microsoft Authentication based on
applications
Switch Cisco 4500 Routing and Switching
Connectivity
Ethernet Interface 100 Mbps
Internal: 100 Mbps Ethernet
Interface to Fix firewall
External: Tl connection to
the Internet
Ethernet Interface 100 Mbps
for internal and external
connections





of ¥ire Speed 
Background 
Load
Fig. A.6. Environmental logical diagram for latency test.
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passive surveillance mechanisms to monitor net­ 
work traffic for signs of malicious or anomalous 
(e.g., potentially erroneous) activity. Such tools 
attempt to provide network administrators timely 
insight into noteworthy exceptional activity. Real- 
time monitoring promises an added dimension of 
control and insight into the flow of traffic between 
the internal network and its external environment. 
The insight gained through fielded network traffic 
monitors could also aid sites in enhancing the 
effectiveness of their firewall filtering rules.
An intrusion detection (ID) system is a tool 
that attempts to perform intrusion detection. Dif­ 
ferent ID systems have differing classifications of 
"intrusion"; a system attempting to detect attacks 
against web servers might consider only mali­ 
cious HTTP requests, while a system intended to 
monitor dynamic routing protocols might only 
consider RIP spoofing. Regardless, all ID systems 
share a general definition of "intrusion" as an un­ 
authorized usage of or misuse of a computer sys­ 
tem.
Typically, intrusions take advantage of sys­ 
tem vulnerabilities attributed to misconfigured 
systems, poorly engineered software, mismanaged 
systems, user neglect or to basic design flaw in 
for instance some Internet protocols. An ID sys­ 
tem is a fast moving market with new players 
entering continuously. Commercial tools range 
from the widely available anti-viruses, to enter­ 
prise tools (e.g., Cisco/Netranger), to NT centric 
(e.g., Internet Security Services/RealSecure) and to 
configurable freeware (e.g., Network Flight Re­ 
corder). In fact such tools only detect suspicious 
events and report the intrusion and/or attempt to 
the operator. They do not (yet) include decision- 
making support for preventive or recovery actions 
once.
Generally, ID system are classified as mecha­ 
nisms for parsing and filtering hostile external 
network traffic [1,2] that could reach internal net­ 
work services and they have become widely ac­ 
cepted as prerequisites for limiting the exposure of 
internal network assets while maintaining inter- 
connectivity with external networks. The encoding 
of filtering rules for packet- or transport-layer 
communication should be enforced at entry points 
between internal networks and external traffic.
Developing filtering rules that strike an optimal 
balance between the restrictiveness necessary to 
suppress the entry of unwanted traffic, while 
allowing the necessary flows demanded for user 
functionality, can be a non-trivial exercise [3].
ID as an important component of a security 
system, complements other security technologies. 
By providing information to site administration, 
ID system allows not only for the detection of 
attacks explicitly addressed by other security com­ 
ponents (such as firewalls and service wrappers), 
but also attempts to provide notification of 
new attacks unforeseen by other components. ID 
systems also provide forensic information that 
potentially allows organizations to discover the ori­ 
gins of an attack. In this manner, ID systems at­ 
tempt to make attackers more accountable for 
their actions, and, to some extent, act as a deter­ 
rent to future attacks.
At its most fundamental level, ID system is a 
collection of detection modules also called sensors 
with unique attack recognition and response ca­ 
pabilities. Two classes are discernable:
• Network sensors: that monitor the raw, un- 
filtered traffic on enterprise networks, looking 
for patterns, protocol violations, and repeated 
access attempts that indicate malicious intent.
• OS sensors: These sensors perform real-time in­ 
trusion monitoring, detection, and prevention 
of malicious activity by analyzing kernel-level 
events and host logs.
The detection modules are deployed at strategic 
locations across the enterprise network in order to 
stop attacks, misuse, and security policy violations 
before damage is done. When an ID system detects 
unauthorized activity, it can respond in a number 
of ways, automatically recording the date, time, 
source, and target of the event, recording the con­ 
tent of the attack, notifying the network adminis­ 
trator, reconfiguring a firewall or router, suspending 
a user account, or terminating the attack.
Because of its importance within a security 
system, it is critical that ID systems function as 
expected by the organizations deploying them. In 
order to be useful, site administration needs to be 
able to rely on the information provided by the
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system; flawed systems not only provide less in­ 
formation, but also a dangerously false sense of 
security. Moreover, the forensic value of infor­ 
mation from faulty systems is not only negated, 
but potentially misleading.
Due to the implications of the failure of an ID 
component, it is reasonable to assume that the 
performance of ID systems are themselves crucial 
to an organization's security as they could become 
logical targets for attack. A smart intruder who 
realizes that an ID system has been deployed on a 
network she is attacking will likely attack the ID 
system first, disabling it or forcing it to provide 
false information (distracting security personnel 
from the actual attack hi progress, or framing 
someone else for the attack).
As with any other technology, there are pit­ 
falls in the current implementation of commer­ 
cially available IDS. The pitfalls include the issues 
of variant signatures, false positive and negative 
alerts, data overload, dirBculties to function effec­ 
tively in switched environments and scale up issues.
This paper is intended to address one of the 
(difficulties to function effectively in switched en­ 
vironments) issues mentioned above. Thus, in or­ 
der to gauge the ability of currently available IDS 
to effectively function in switched and distributed 
environment, the goal of the research in this paper 
is therefore:
1. To provide an evaluation of the performance of 
IDS in a switched and distributed environment; 
and
2. To analyze the impact of the characteristics as­ 
sociated with traffic flow on the performance of 
the IDS.
Because of the importance of surveillance on 
network traffic, ID systems have been studied in a 
wide variety of areas under different contexts. The 
following section provides an overview of previous 
studies.
2. Related work
The increasing use of E-commerce in the last 
couple of years has given impetus to the rise and
growth of implementations of various secur 
systems to contain the rising waves of netwo 
attacks which comes in different forms and shad 
including unwanted intrusion into corporate I 
tranets. One of such mechanisms is ID systei 
which is used to detect and in some cases det 
attacks. Different technologies of these systec 
have been developed and it will be appropriate i 
state that network ID systems are driven off < 
interpretation of raw network traffic. They attemj 
to detect attacks by watching for patterns of su 
picious activity in this traffic. Network ID systerr 
are good at discerning attacks that involve lov 
level manipulation of the network, and can easil 
correlate attacks against multiple machines on 
network.
The significance of ID system has become ver 
much pronounced in complex network architec 
tures which often are inundated with a mesh o 
packet forwarding and routing devices known a 
switches and routers. Such networks are known a 
switched and distributed.
In a distributed and switched environment, tht 
most obvious aspect of ID system to attack is it- 
accuracy. The accuracy of ID system is compro­ 
mised when something occurs that causes the sys­ 
tem to incorrectly identify an intrusion when none 
has occurred (a "false positive" output), or when 
something occurs that causes the ED system to 
incorrectly fail to identify an intrusion when one 
has in fact occurred (a "false negative").
Research into and development of automated 
ID systems has been under way for well over 12 
years. By now a great number of systems have 
been deployed in the commercial or government 
arenas, but all are limited hi what they do. The 
creativity of attackers and the ever-changing na­ 
ture of the overall threat to targeted systems have 
contributed to the difficulty in effectively identify­ 
ing intrusions. While the complexities of host 
computers are already making intrusion detection 
a difficult task, the increasing prevalence of dis­ 
tributed network-based systems and insecure net­ 
works such as the Internet has greatly increased 
the need for ID.
Previous and present ID system research that 
relate to the technological approach of ID systems, 
are identified into three categories:
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(i) modeling—misuse or anomaly detection; 
(ii) analysis; and 
(iii) deployment.
Detection is performed in the misuse detection 
model by looking for specific patterns or sequences 
of events representing previous intrusions (i.e., 
looking for the "signature" of the intrusion. It is a 
knowledge-based technique and only known in­ 
trusions can be detected. This is the more tradi­ 
tional ID technique, which is usually applied, in 
for instance the anti-virus tools.
hi the anomaly detection model, this is realized 
by detecting changes in the patterns of utilization 
or behavior of the system performs detection. 
Building a model that contains metrics derived 
from normal system operation and flagging as in­ 
trusive any observed metrics that have a significant 
statistical deviation from the model perform it. 
The approach is behavior-based and should be 
able to detect previously unknown intrusions. It is 
a research and development (R&D) area in which 
currently innovative modeling paradigms are ex­ 
plored which is inspired from biological systems. 
Pioneers in this area are from the University of 
New Mexico whose work is based on the idea that 
ED systems should be designed to function like the 
way the human natural immune system distin­ 
guishes between "self" from "non-self" antibodies.
The main challenge with this approach, like for 
every behavior-based technique, is to model the 
"normal" behavior of a process. Learning the ac­ 
tivity of the process in a real environment can do 
this. Another approach, advocated by IBM re­ 
search, consists in describing the sequences of au­ 
dit events (patterns) generated by typical UNIX 
processes. Another method developed by Nokia is 
based on Kohonen Self Organizing Maps (SOM).
Off-line vs. real-tune analysis [4] is another area 
where more conventional classification divides ID 
systems into systems which operate after the event 
and rely on analysis of logs and audit trails for 
preventive action and those that attempt real-time 
monitoring in the hope that precursor signs of 
abnormal activity give indication that corrective 
action is possible before real damage occurs.
The work presented in this paper are extensions 
of earlier works on ID system and analytical
methods for detecting anomalous or known in­ 
trusive activity [4-7]. In the past, emphasis has 
been placed on session activity within host bound­ 
aries given the fact that the primary input to ID 
tools, audit data, is produced by mechanisms that 
tend to be locally administered within a single host 
or domain. However, as the importance of net­ 
work security has grown, so has the need to 
expand ID technology to address network infra­ 
structure and services. In this research effort, we 
explore the extension of ID methods to the ana­ 
lysis of network activity under a switched and dis­ 
tributed architecture.
Network monitoring, in the context of fault 
detection and diagnosis for computer network and 
telecommunication environments, has been stud­ 
ied extensively by the network management and 
alarm correlation community [8-11]. The high- 
volume distributed event correlation technology 
promoted in some projects provides an excellent 
foundation for building truly scalable network- 
aware surveillance technology for misuse. How­ 
ever, these efforts focus primarily on the health 
and status (fault detection and/or diagnosis) or 
performance of the target network, and do not 
cover the detection of intentionally abusive traf­ 
fic in distributed and switched environments. In­ 
deed, some simplifications in the fault analysis and 
diagnosis community do not translate well to a 
malicious environment for detecting intrusions. 
Examples include assumptions of stateless corre­ 
lation, which precludes event ordering; simplistic 
tune-out metrics for resetting the tracking of prob­ 
lems; ignoring individuals/sources responsible for 
exceptional activity.
The scale of scientific research of ID systems 
has grown by leaps and bounds in the last couple 
of years. Studies of ID systems attempting to ad­ 
dress the issue of network surveillance include the 
Network Security Monitor developed at UC Davis 
[12], and the Network Anomaly Detection and 
Intrusion Reporter [13] developed at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory. Both performed broadcast 
LAN packet monitoring to analyze traffic patterns 
for known hostile or anomalous activity. Further, 
research by UC Davis in the Distributed ID system 
[14] and later Graph-based ID system [15] pro­ 
jects has attempted to extend intrusion-monitoring
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capabilities beyond LAN analysis, to provide 
multi-LAN and very large-scale network coverage. 
Network Traffic Intensity measurement has 
been investigated by Morris [16] and Maimon [17]. 
Intensity measures distinguish whether a given 
volume of traffic appears consistent with historical 
observations. These measures reflect the intensity 
of the event stream (number of events per unit 
time) over time intervals that are tunable. Alter­ 
natively, a sharp increase in events viewed across 
longer durations may provide insight into a con­ 
sistent effort to limit or prevent successful traffic 
flow. Morris [16] investigated intensity measures 
of transport-layer connection requests, such as a 
volume analysis of SYN-RST messages, which 
could indicate the occurrence of a SYN-attack 
against port availability (or possibly for port 
scanning). Maimon [17] explored intensity mea­ 
sures of TCP/FIN messages as a variant consid­ 
ered to be a more stealthy form of port scanning. 
In their studies [16,17], the authors contend 
that monitoring overall traffic volume and bursty 
events by using both intensity and continuous mea­ 
sures provides some interesting advantages over 
other monitoring approaches, such as user-defin­ 
able heuristic rules that specify fixed thresholds. In 
particular, the intensity of events over duration is 
relative in the sense that the term "high volume" 
may reasonably be considered different at mid­ 
night than at 11:00 a.m. The notion of high bursts 
of events might similarly be unique to the role of 
the target system in the Intranet (e.g., web server 
host versus a user workstation).
Traffic analysis with signature analysis has been 
studied [2,6,18-21]. Signature analysis is a pro­ 
cess whereby an event stream is mapped against 
abstract representations of event sequences known 
to indicate the target activity of interest. Deter­ 
mining whether a given event sequence is indi­ 
cative of an attack may be a function of the 
preconditions under which the event sequence is 
performed.
The use of coding schemes for representing 
operating system penetrations through audit trail 
analysis was also the focus of other research works 
[6,18,19]. Using basic signature-analysis concepts, 
it was shown that some detection methods could 
support a variety of analyses involving packet and
transport datagrams as event streams. For exam­ 
ple, address spoofing, tunneling, source routing 
[20], SATAN [21] attack detection, and abuse of 
ICMP messages (Redirect and Destination Un- 
reachable messages) [2] could all be encoded and 
detected by signature engines that guard network 
gateways.
The advent of large-scale commercial ID sys­ 
tems tend to have given a relative assurance to the 
information technology community that has been 
very anxious to maximize the use of these highly 
advertised ID systems as added armor to secure 
network systems. Many IDS products have been 
deployed in commercial and corporate networks. 
With this has come a shift in research focus in so 
many areas. One of such is in the area of the IDS 
performance.
Richards [22] evaluated the functional and 
performance capabilities of the industries leading 
commercial type ID system. In the areas tested, the 
performance of the ID system was rated based on 
their distinctive features, which were characterized 
into different performance indexes. The research 
work represented a new direction for ID systems in 
that it moved the focus away from scientific con­ 
cepts research to performance evaluation of the 
industries best products. However, the study was 
limited to a small proto design isolated and non- 
switched network which did not reveal the impact 
of packet switching on the accuracy and ability to 
capture attack packets in their entirety. We believe 
that an effectiveness measurement study must take 
into account the complexity that characterize the 
existence of actual network traffic pattern and its 
logical effect on ID system study.
In our research, we leveraged the work of 
Richards [22] to an actual network of distributed 
and switched topology. Our IDS evaluation stud­ 
ies treat the relationship between deployment 
techniques and attack system variables and the 
performance of the IDS.
Porras and Valdes [23] discussed ID system 
failures in terms of deficiencies in accuracy and 
completeness, where accuracy reflects the number 
of false positives and completeness reflects the 
number of false negatives. We related our work 
in the context of interpretative analysis to their 
work.
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In Section 3 we describe the evaluation of IDS 




Our research objective is to determine the per­ 
formance characteristics and effectiveness of ID 
system using the RealSecure Suite for a distributed 
and switched network infrastructure.
3.2. Framework
The framework of this study is the extension of 
the work of Richards [22], This research work was 
conducted on a non-distributed and non-switched 
network. Hence factors such as packet loss due to 
routing and switching were not taken into account. 
In contrast, our study was conducted on a swit­ 
ched and distributed network. This is based on the 
fact that routing and switching constitute a major 
factor in network attacks as described in Section 4 
of this paper thus making it proper to conduct 
performance evaluation study on an environment 
similar to the actual IDS deployment environment. 
It is therefore imperative that the impact of rout­ 
ing and switching be taken into account when 
gauging the effectiveness of ID system in a dis­ 
tributed environment. Thus, the deployment of the 
ID system in the switched and routed network was 
intended to determine by how much the perfor­ 
mance of the ID system sensor is unpaired by 
packet switching and other network conditions.
3.3. Baseline and evaluation criteria
The basic performance indicators of any IDS 
should be reflected in the success or failure of event 
analysis, which are quantitatively measured for 
qualities such as accuracy and performance that 
are assessable through testing. A more difficult but 
equally important metric to assess is completeness. 
With regard to network monitoring, inaccuracy is 
reflected in the number of legitimate transactions 
flagged as abnormal or malicious (false positives),
incompleteness is reflected in the number of 
harmful transactions that escape detection (false 
negatives), and performance is measured by the 
rate at which transactions can be processed.
Equally, for an IDS evaluation, the standard 
of measurement is the ability of the IDS to satisfy 
the design, deployment functionality and perfor­ 
mance requirements described in Appendix A. The 
RealSecure IDS uses the pattern matching tech­ 
nique. The theory behind this is that a pattern- 
matching system does not know the contents of 
the packets, and must match packets for differ­ 
ent patterns. A pattern-matching system looks for 
patterns on ranges of ports where the exploit pro­ 
gram typically run.
Within the limits of our experiment, the evalu­ 
ation criteria used is the percentage of attacks 
captured by the IDS against the tunable experi­ 
mental parameters i.e., throughput, monitoring 
technique and attack signatures.
The following are the characteristics of the 
attack sets used in the experiment.
Attack taxonomy—intrusion attacks have been 
presented in the scheme of Kumar [26] and can be 
represented by an event or series of events. It is the 
relationship of these events to one another that 
provides the basis for recognizing differing at­ 
tack types. The class hierarchy is shown in Fig. 1. 
Under the attack taxonomy, intrusions fall into 
two categories: namely misuse and anomalous be­ 
havior. Misuse comprises attacks that are already 
known and whose behavior can be specified while 
anomalous behavior describes attacks involving 
unusual use of the system resources.
The manifestations of the misuse attack types 
can be grouped into the modes shown in Table 1. 
In our experiments the attack set described below 
falls under the active misuse attack type.
Header attack—the purpose is to gauge the 
ability of the ID system to handle IP packet header 
attacks. The LAND attack is a typical kind of this 
attack in which a SYN packet is sent with the same 
source and destination IP address and port. This 
forces the IP stack into a progressive loop that 
crashes the stack.
Reassembly attack—the purpose is to gauge the 
ability of the ID system to reassemble fragmented 
IP fragments and identify attacks that occur over
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Fig. 1. The class hierarchy of Intrusion attacks. (The forks below the rectangles represent inheritance.)
multiple packets. There are two types of attacks 
associated here:
• The TearDrop attack that is initiated by sending 
multiple fragmented IP packets, that when reas­ 
sembled, have data portions of the packet that 
overlap. This causes protocol and/or the system 
to become unstable;
• The Ping of Death attack is initiated by sending 
multiple fragmented ICMP packets, which when 
reassembled, have a data portion of greater than 
65,535 bytes. As this is a violation of the TCP/IP 
specification, it causes the TCP/IP stack to crash 
on vulnerable computers.
Empty packet attack—the goal is to quantify the 
ID system's ability to capture each packet without 
experiencing packet loss (throughput). There was 
no attack initiated, and the ID system sensor was 
configured without any signature loaded. We per­ 




The attacker is an Intel-based system running 
Windows NT 4.0 server (with Service Pack 5)
loaded with Network Associates CyberCo 
scanner located outside the perimeter of the In 
tranet.
3.4.2. Target
The targets are two Windows NT 4.0 server; 
dispersed at the following network locations de 
picted in Fig. 2:
1. News server with the IP address of 216.133. 
249.4.
2. Web server with IP address of 192.168.233.2.
3.4.3. Load generator
The load generator was a Windows NT 4.0 
server running Shomiti Surveyor 2.4. located out­ 
side the perimeter of the Intranet.
3.4.4. RealSecure sensor
It was a standard PC with the following hard 
and software configuration: Pentium II 300 MHz 
processor, 128 MB RAM, 100 MB disk space plus 
100 MB per managed sensor on the console. NT 
4.0 Workstation with SP5, 100 Mbps Ethernet 
adapters. The sensor analyzes the packets on the 
wire and alerts if it senses an attack.
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Table 1
The different modes of the misuse intrusion attack type
Mode of misuse Description __
Table 1 (continued}





































Observation of keystrokes or screen 
Deceiving operators and users 
Dumpster diving for printouts, floppy 
disks, etc.
Examining discarded/stolen media 
Intercepting electronic or other infor­ 
mation
Jamming, electronic or otherwise 
Damaging or modifying equipment or 
power
Removing equipment and storage 
media
Using false identities external to the
computer system
Usurping communication lines and
workstations
Using playback, creating bogus nodes
and systems
Masking physical whereabouts or
routing
Implanting malicious code, sending 
letter bombs
Setting up time or event bombs 
Acquiring distributed resources 
Attaching to programs and replicating
Utilizing existing flaws in the system 
and misconfigured network programs 
Password cracking etc.
Creating, modifying, entering false or 
misleading information 
Using salami attacks 
Perpetrating saturation attacks
Making random and selective searches 
Exploiting database inferences and 
traffic analysis
Exploiting covert channels or other 
information leakage
Wilfully failing to perform expected 
duties, or committing errors of omis-
Indirect misuse Preparing for subsequent misuses, as 
in off-line pre-encryption matching, 
factoring large numbers to obtain 
private keys, auto-dialer scanning
3.4.5. Attack signatures
We used the standard (5.0) attack detector 
policy. Each signature was set to count the number 
of packets it triggers. The signatures for all at­ 
tacks were enabled with alert console and the log 
to database responses was also enabled. Other 
attack signatures not needed in the attack were 
disabled and the RealSecure kill response was not 
used as the span ports were configured only for 
uni-directional traffic.
3.4.6. Deployment technique
In order to fully evaluate the impact of location 
and deployment techniques on the ID system 
performance we conducted the tests in the fol­ 
lowing deployment topologies (Table 2).
1. Outside decoy: to detect all traffic coining into 
the network from the Internet, the RealSe­ 
cure sensor was plugged into the Century Tap 
placed between the router/switch and the appli­ 
cable 100BaseT LinkSwitch on the given net­ 
work, or plugged into the management port of 
the LinkSwitch 3000, when the mirroring tech­ 
nique is used (Fig. 3).
2. Inside decoy: the RealSecure sensor was 
plugged into the Century Tap between the rou­ 
ter/switch and the applicable 100BaseT Link- 
Switch on the given network (as shown in Fig. 
4 for the Web server attack), or plugged into 
the management port of the applicable Link- 
Switch when the mirroring technique is used.
When using the port mirroring technique, we 
plugged the RealSecure sensor directly into the 
management port of the switch into which the 
other traffic ports were spanned. The management 
port mirrors all the traffic coming through the 
ports that are spanned. The RS sensor was con­ 
figured to operate in a stealth mode i.e., with two
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192.1M.214.0 192.1M.215.0 International feed
Fig. 2. Setup and topology of the network test bed.
Table!
Topological locations of the Century Tap and RealSecure sensor
Decoy Location
Outside decoy
Inside decoy for Web server attack
Inside decoy for News2 server attack
Between the Cisco 7505 router and LinkSwitch 3000 on the 198.133.426.0 network 
Between the LinkSwitch 3000 and LinkSwitch 1000 (Fig. 4) 
Between the Cisco 4700 router and 100BaseT 12 ports shared Switch on the 
216.138.240.0 network
NlCs. In this case, one card operates in a pro­ 
miscuous mode which implies that it will not be 
bound to the TCP/IP stack thus will have no IP 
address, and will do the actual monitoring. This is 
the interface that is plugged into the switch. The 
other NIC was bound to the TCP/IP stack and 
have an IP address that is used to communicate 
back to the console, send email notifications, and 
send SNMP traps for triggered events.
3.5. Methodology
Our methodology takes a pragmatic approach 
towards the issue of quantitative and qualitative 
treatment of intrusion detection analysis using the 
RealSecure ID system techniques in a switched 
and distributed network. We begin by describ­ 
ing the setup of the test bed, deployment of the 
ID system sensors, attack systems and targets.
102 C. Iheagwara. A. Blyth I Computer Networks 39 (2002) 93-112
Centuiy 12-Tap
Fig. 3. Deployment of the RealSecure sensor into the Century 
Tap for the outside decoy attack set.
Further, we define the attack sets. The initiation, 
sequence, generation and launching of the attack 
was then described in the test procedure (Section 
3.6). Based on the test results, we give a qualitative 
analysis of contributing factors for inaccuracies 
obtained on the test results. We describe the ana­ 
lytical techniques that are pertinent to ID system, 
and discuss their relevance in analyzing malicious, 
faulty, and other exceptional network activity.
We injected specifically configured attack pac­ 
kets onto a test network, on which the subject
RealSecure (ID) system was running. By tracking 
the subject's monitoring console output, we were 
able to observe the detection performance and 
functional characteristics of the ID system and the 
system's underlying TCP/IP implementation. In all 
cases, our tests involved interactions between in­ 
jected packets and the host target of attack. In 
each test, this target host was the explicit addressee 
of all the attack packets. With this, the presence of 
the target host allowed us to easily create the 
needed TCP connections for the subject ID system 
to monitor. In addition, the target host also acted 
as a control for our experiments. The target's 
response to injected attack packets allowed us to 
empirically record the behavior of the performance 
of the ID system in all test categories, and contrast 
the observed performance with the theoretical de­ 
sign performance of the ID system.
The actual tests were preceded by a series of 
baseline tests against the target host to ensure that 
the subject ID system was configured and func­ 
tioning properly according to design specifications. 
In almost all test cases, a process on the target host 
ran which accepted incoming TCP connections on 
the HTTP port and printed any input obtained 
from the machine's TCP stack. By examining the 
output of this process, we were able to deduce 
whether the subject ID system should have de­ 














Fig. 4. Test environment logical diagram.
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We mimicked a series of defined and designated 
attack sets that are incorporated into the software 
suite of the ED system. Each attack exploits a 
specific attack signature in the areas tested. In each 
test, we created the necessary network traffic flow 
and monitoring conditions that relied on certain 
differences in deployment and monitoring tech­ 
nique in order to evaluate their full Impact on 
the performance and functionality index of the 
ID system. In each test, the specific packets in­ 
jected into the network differed subtly. The sub­ 
ject ID system reacted to each test by capturing 
all, partially capturing or not capturing the at­ 
tack. By considering the IDS' output and the 
specific types of packets used for the test, we were 
able to deduce the significant characteristics of the 
IDS.
Within the context of a hierarchical model for 
a distributed architecture, RealSecure's capabil­ 
ity to monitor entry points that separate exter­ 
nal network traffic from an enterprise network 
and its constituent local domains is evaluated and 
compared with its capability to monitor network 
traffic inside the decoy. We present these moni­ 
toring techniques in the context of their effective­ 
ness.
We define and consider the characteristics of the 
candidate attack streams that pass through net­ 
work entry points. Critical to the effective ID 
system detection of attacks is the careful selection 
and organization of these event streams such that 
an analysis based on a selected event stream will 
provide meaningful insight into the target activity. 
We identify effective techniques for deploying the 
ID system sensor given specific test objectives. We 
explore the impact of ID system anomaly detec­ 
tion and how traffic flow analysis can be applied to 
identify activity worthy of review and possible 
response. More broadly, we discuss the correlation 
of analysis of network traffic and the results pro­ 
duced in our surveillance components deployed in 
the entry points and specific inside locations of our 
protected Intranet. We discuss how events of lim­ 
ited significance to a local surveillance monitor 
may be aggregated with results from other strate­ 
gically deployed monitors to provide insight into 
more wide-scale problems or threats against the 
Intranet.
3.6. Test procedure
The test suite assesses the sensor's packet pro­ 
cessing capability at both low and high network 
load. The Shomiti Surveyor (version 2.4) gener­ 
ated the network load and the attack was captured 
with Network Associates Sniffer Pro and launched 
at wire speed or as close to wire speed as the sniffer 
could send it. Network attack traffic load on the 
100 Mbps network was generated in the following 
incremental levels: 1000 packets; 5000 packets; 
10,000 packets; 12,000 packets; 25,000 packets; 
and 45,000 packets per second. All packets were 64 
bytes in size. For each attack set the sensor was 
configured with the appropriate signature.
Within the experimental setup environment, 
multiple instances of each attack sets were laun­ 
ched at the targets. The tests were conducted hi the 
following sequence:
1. generation of attack packets,
2. generation of background traffic and verifica­ 
tion with a network analyzer,
3. launching of attacks against target systems,
4. records and auditing of attack detection perfor­ 
mance of the RealSecure sensor,
5. termination of traffic generation,
6. purging (clearing) of the console display,
7. repetition of Steps 3-6, for each utilization two 
more times for a total of five trials,
8. repetition of Steps 1-7 with a single sensor at 
specified background utilizations.
3.7. Experimental results
We have presented the results obtained in the 
tests in Tables 3-9.
In Table 3, the data in each cell represents the 
number of attacks the sensor detected out of a 
potential 1000 attacks launched at the Web server. 
Figs. 5 and 6 are the graphical representations.
In Tables 4-9, the numbers in the first row 
corresponds to the number of packets in each in­ 
stance attack whereas the number in each cell is 
the average number of attack packets from five 
tests the sensor detected in each instance attack set 
at 40% network utilization.
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Table 3
Percentage of attacks captured at 20% and 40% network utilizations
Monitorring Inside decoy with Inside decoy with Outside 
technique Tap port mirroring Tap
No. of attacks 1000 
% Utilization 20 
Packet capture attack 824 
Land attack 807 
Ping of death attack 815
1000 1000 
40 20 40 20 
733 817 673 893 
625 789 647 861 














Inside decoy Century Tap deployment tests results for the Web server directed attack
Attack type 1000
Empty packet 796 
. LAND 850 
Ping of death 818
Table 5 
Outside decoy Century Tap deployment
Attack type 1000
Empty packet 893 
LAND 949 
Ping of death 919
Table 6 
Inside decoy port mirroring tests results
Attack type 1000
Empty packet 606 
LAND 668 
Ping of death 668
Table 7 
Inside decoy port mirroring tests results
Attack type 1000
Empty packet 665 
LAND 693 





















































Inside decoy Century Tap deployment tests results for the News2 server directed attack
Attack type 1000
Empty packet 740 
LAND 8H 













C. Iheagwara, A. Blyth I Computer Networks 39 (2002) 91-112 105
Table 9


























An analysis of the test results comparative to 
the metric design values showed a fairly acceptable 
result especially with the Century Cap deployment 
technique for the packet header (land) attack, and 
the IP fragment reassemble (Ping of Death) attack. 
The results could not just be explained by drawing 
contrasts with design parameters, but also by an­ 
alyzing the impact of other intrinsic factors of 
the test network that constitute the most serious 
challenge to the effective implementing RealSecure 
in a switched environment.
Attack detection is a crucial guage of the ef­ 
fective performance of ID system because, if the 
ID system sensor has difficulty capturing, reas­ 
sembling, or identifying attacks, the attacks will go 
unnoticed—thus defeating the purpose of having 
an ID system. Characterizing the detection ability 
of the ID system is very important for produc­ 
tion networks that are generally very busy, where 
the major challenge is determining how much 
of the attack traffic the sensor can handle before 
its performance begins to degrade as it drops 
packets.
The test results, which are graphically repre­ 
sented in Figs. 5-12, established obvious trends 
that could be a useful guide for network security 
managers who are charged with the responsibility 
of implementing network security. In analyzing 
the test results it is worth noting that there are 
many factors that could adversely affect the effec­ 
tiveness of the IDS some of which are discussed 
below:
1. deployment (monitoring) technique i.e. port 
mirroring or the use of packet loss restricting 
devices;
2. network traffic load and bandwidth;
Inside decoy with Inside decoy with Outside decoy Outside decoy 
Tap" "Port mirroring" with :Tap" with 'Port 
mirroring"
Monitoring technique
Fig. 5. Percentage of attacks captured at 40% network utili­ 
zation.
Inside decoy with Inside decoy with Outside decoy Outside decoy 
Tap" "Port mlirorino" wlth:Tap" with Tort
Monitoring technique
Fig. 6. Percentage of attacks captured at 20% network utili­ 
zation.
3. location of the sensor(s);
4. the condition of network packet forwarding de­ 
vices; and
5. network condition.
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va> sow 12000 25000 4«x»
Packets launched in each instance
attack at wire speed
Rg. 7. Outside decoy port mirroring tests results for the Web 
saver directed attack.
12000 25000 45000
Packets launched at each instance attack at 
wire speed
Fig. 8. Inside decoy port mirroring tests results for the News2 
server directed attack.
1000 5000 12000 25000 45000
Packets launched In each Instance 
attack at wire speed
* 9. Inside decoy port mirroring tests results for the Web 
wver directed attack.
1000 5000 12000 25000 45000
Packets launched in each instance 
attack at wire speed
Fig. 10. Inside decoy port mirroring tests results for the News2 
server directed attack.
i
1000 5000 12000 25000 45000
Packets launched In each instance 
attack at wire speed
Fig. 11. Inside decoy Century Tap deployment tests results for 
the Web server directed attack.
12000 25000 45000
Packets launched in each instance 
attack at wire speed
Fig. 12. Inside decoy Century Tap deployment tests results for 
the News2 server directed attack.
4.1. Monitoring techniques
Network capture and analysis in a switched 
LAN environment usually means "tapping" the
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switch's lines by using a "mirror" port or de­ 
ployment in other tapping configurations. In this 
approach, traffic is copied from one "source" port 
to another destination or "mirror" port; an ana­ 
lyzer attached to the mirror port then sees all of 
the traffic entering and exiting the source port—in 
theory.
With regard to port mirroring, a problem can 
arise when the switch ports are configured for full 
duplex operation. Since full duplex allows traffic to 
flow simultaneously in both directions, it effec­ 
tively doubles the available network bandwidth. A 
mirror port on a switch can monitor traffic in one 
direction but not two (i.e., it can copy traffic from 
the source port but cannot monitor traffic to it), 
and is therefore a logical half duplex operation. 
Even if the switch copies traffic from both transmit 
and receive channels on the source port, the traffic 
will eventually be forced onto the transmit channel 
of the mirror port. For this reason, mirroring a full 
duplex source port may cause packet loss as traffic 
on the full duplex source port exceeds the available 
bandwidth of the mirror port.
In contrast, a tapping device like the "Century 
Tap" eliminates the problems associated with port 
mirroring such as switch performance degrada­ 
tion, inability to mirror errors (packet undersize 
or oversize, and packets with bad CRC), inabil­ 
ity to view VLAN traffic on some switches and 
inability to show both sides of the full duplex 
link.
4.2. Network throughput
Over utilization could have a negative impact 
on the ability of the sensor to capture attacks. At 
times, there could be inaccurate report on the level 
of network utilization. For instance, the utilization 
reported by the analyzer on the mirror port could 
be less than 100% when in fact, not all packets 
have arrived safely. That is because over utiliza­ 
tion can occur at intervals shorter than that over 
which the analyzer is reporting its results. In other 
words, if actual throughput at the source port 
exceeds the mirror port's bandwidth for a half 
second, then drops significantly, the analyzer may 












- RealSecure 5 
sensors
- RealSecure 6 
sensors
- RealSecure 7 
sensors
- RealSecure 8 
sensors
- RealSecure 9
Fig. 13. Probability of detection vs. percent utilization.
Recent evaluation study [27] by Internet Secu­ 
rity systems and Top Layer Networks on the 
probability of detection by the RealSecure sensor 
shown in Fig. 13 established that with increase in 
network utilization, the probability of detection 
falls, but performance is enhanced with the addi­ 
tion of additional sensors.
4.3. Deployment (host or network) locations
Our test results show that the deployment lo­ 
cation of the ID system sensor plays an important 
role on its performance ability.
Intrusion monitoring can either be sited at 
the computer system that is the putative target 
or placed on a network level where traffic can be 
evaluated or where information aggregated from 
various hosts can give insight in co-ordinated at­ 
tack scenarios.
The effect of deployment on the performance of 
the ID system sensor has been presented in the 
EMERALD concept [24]. The distributed frame­ 
work concept (EMERALD module) illustrated in 
Fig. 14 depicts an example enterprise network 
consisting of interconnected local network do­ 
mains.
Inside the perimeter of the enterprise, each local 
domain maintains its traffic filtering control (F- 
boxes) over its own sub networks. These filters 
enforce domain-specific restriction over issues such
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Enterprise Network SP2
Fig. 14. The EMERALD module for the deployment of sur­ 
veillance in an enterprise network.
as UDP port availability, as well as acceptable 
protocol traffic. The surveillance monitors are 
represented by the S-circles, and are deployed to 
the various entry points of the enterprise and do­ 
mains. The surveillance modules develop analysis 
results that are then directed up to an enterprise- 
layer monitor, which correlates the distributed 
results into a meta-event stream.
This concept has given much weight to the 
correlation trend analysis in which attacks re­ 
peated against the same network service across 
multiple domains can also be detected through 
enterprise-layer correlation. For example, multiple 
ID system sensors deployed to various local do­ 
mains in the network might begin to report, in 
series, suspicious activity observed within sessions 
employing the same network service. Such reports 
could lead to enterprise-layer responses or warn­ 
ings to other domains, that have not yet experi­ 
enced or reported the session anomalies. In this 
sense, results correlation enables the detection of 
spreading attacks against a common service, which 
first raise alarms in one domain, and gradually 
spread domain by domain to affect operations 
across the enterprise. This in our view should pro­ 
vide a beneficial value towards the effective de­ 
ployment of ID system.
4-4. Network conditions
Network ID systems work by predicting the 
behavior of networked machines based on the 
packets they exchange [25]. The problem with this is 
ttat a passive network monitor cannot accurately
predict whether a given machine on the network is 
even going to see a packet, let alone process it in the 
expected manner. The existence of a number of 
factors could make the actual meaning of a packet 
captured by ID system ambiguous. These can be 
considered in the following context:
(1) A network ID system is typically on an en­ 
tirely different machine from the systems it's 
watching. Often, the ID system is at a completely 
different point on the network. The basic problem 
facing a network ID system is that these differences 
cause inconsistencies between the ID system and 
the machines it watches. Some of these discrep­ 
ancies are the results of basic physical differences, 
others stem from different network driver imple­ 
mentations. For example, consider an ID system 
and an end-system located at different places on a 
network. The two systems will receive any given 
packet at different points in time. This difference in 
time is important; during the lag, something can 
happen on the end-system that might prevent it 
from accepting the packet. The ID system, how­ 
ever, has already processed the packet thinking 
that it will be dealt with normally at the end- 
system.
(2) IP packet with a bad UDP checksum will 
not accepted by most operating systems. Some 
older systems might. The ID system needs to know 
whether every system it watches will accept such a 
packet, or it can end up with an inaccurate re­ 
construction of what happened on those machines. 
Some operating systems might accept a packet that 
is obviously bad. A poor implementation might, 
for example, allow an IP packet to have an in­ 
correct checksum. If the ID system does not know 
this, it will discard packets that the end-system 
accepts, again reducing the accuracy of the system.
(3) Even if the ID system knows what operating 
system every machine on the network runs, it still 
might not be able to tell just by looking at a packet 
whether a given machine will accept it. A machine 
that runs out of memory will discard incoming 
packets. The ID system has no easy way to de­ 
termine whether this is the case on the end-system, 
and thus will assume that the end-system has ac­ 
cepted the packet. CPU exhaustion and network 
saturation at the end-system can cause the same 
problem.
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Together, all these problems result in a situation 
where the ID system often simply cannot deter­ 
mine the implications of a packet merely by ex­ 
amining it; it needs to know a great deal about the 
networking behavior of the end-systems that it's 
watching, as well as the traffic conditions of then- 
network segments. Unfortunately, a network ID 
system does not have any simple way of informing 
itself about this; it obtains all its information from 
packet capture.
4.5. Packet forwarding/switch device
It is believed that security can be enhanced with 
layer two-switching technology, which sends traffic 
to a computer that is the target destination. The 
motive for this technology is performance. Gen­ 
erally, older technologies would broadcast each 
Ethernet packet to all connected computers mak­ 
ing it possible for sensitive information to be di­ 
vulged to the unintended target. The divulged 
information could be used to generate system at­ 
tacks. The Ethernet switch added a certain amount 
of security by only sending traffic to its proper 
destination. In this case, all connected comput­ 
ers will not receive all traffic. They only receive 
broadcast traffic and traffic that was sent to them.
However, the switching technology is still not 
completely safe. The problem with this technology 
lies on how these switches handle broadcast traffic. 
A typical attack is to use a program that sends 
fake ARP requests and replies. Typically, these 
switches keep tables of IP addresses and Ethernet 
addresses. By sending hi Ethernet packets with a 
broadcast source address, the switch may think 
that some or all IP addresses actually broadcast 
Ethernet addresses. This causes some switches to 
broadcast all IP traffic to all listening devices. The 
use of some special packet monitoring devices like 
the Shomiti system Century Tap, which allows 
visibility into 10/100 Ethernet LANs, is meant to 
solve the problem.
4.6. Network topology
The topology used in a test can influence the 
detectability of an attack path. The attack will not 
be detected if evasive alternative attack paths are
used to launch the attack. The topology that 
hacker would exploit could be unsuspected nel 
work points such as network routers that feed th 
target network. If these routers were owned by a 
ISP and not by the target network, an attacke 
would want to control those first few routes i 
order to sniff traffic, spoof DNS, and hijack nei 
work connections and many other techniques t 
leverage access.
Protocol spoofing can be used to alter almo; 
every major routing protocol. RIP and OSPF hav 
many attacks that can be affected simply by ir 
jeering fictitious route information in the form c 
spoofed packets. Spoofing ARP packets in ordt 
to overcome layer two-security partitioning is ar 
other technique to overcome topology segments 
tion.
4.7. Denial of service attack
A denial of service attack involves software thj 
deliberately crashes a system, or makes a system c 
network unusable. The attack does not invoh 
breaking into any of the targeted servers; rather, 
floods them with nonsense requests and erroi 
from Internet. These attacks are significant, a 
they rely upon weaknesses hi the design of ti 
Internet and TCP/IP, the set of rules (protocol: 
for exchanging data over the Internet.
The TCP/IP protocols defines an exchange c 
three packets to set up a connection Fig. 15, an 
the first of these three packets is marked SYN, fc 
synchronize. In normal use, the server sends a 
acknowledgement to the client that is requestin
Fig. 15. TCP three way handshake, connection initiation.
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the connection, and the client then responds 
with its own acknowledgement. When these three 
packets have been exchanged, both the client and 
the server have an established connection.
During a SYN flood attack, the target server 
attempts to complete the connection by sending 
acknowledgements to the spoofed source address. 
Since there is no system associated with the spoofed 
source address, there will either be no response, or 
an error response (an ICMP packet) will be gen­ 
erated. The TCP/IP stack that is designed to wait 
for a valid acknowledgement will never receive 
one during this attack. This will induce the TCP/ 
IP stack to keep track of all the invalid connec­ 
tion attempts, and will begin ignoring valid re­ 
quests.
While the SYN flood can work with relative 
trickle packets, there are other denials of service 
attacks that involve a torrent of packets. These 
attacks rely on overwhelming either the target 
system or the network leading to that system.
The task for ID systems is not just detecting the 
attack but also quantifying the attack. The ability 
of the ID system to capture the attack might be 
impaired by network conditions that might impair 
its ability to function. In this case, much will de­ 
pend on if the attack is well sustained to the extent 
of shutting down all network services. The possi­ 
bility of this depends on defensive and contingency 
measures in place.
5. Challenges for large-scale distributed infrastruc­ 
tures
ID for emerging large-scale distributed systems 
(e.g., global companies and virtual enterprise net­ 
works) faces a variety of difficult challenges. The 
most important ones can be summarized as:
Multiple attack scenarios: The anatomy of an 
intrusion is composed of increasingly complex at­ 
tack scenarios. An attack scenario consists in a 
logical sequence of actions that are applied for 
reaching a particular strategic goal (e.g., getting 
confidential information). These actions are typi­ 
cally applied on different hosts in a network and by 
using a variety of tools. Moreover, a variety of 
different attack scenarios are possible to reach the
same goal. There is a need for dynamically linking 
local individual events to global attack strategies 
in order to provide pro-active and adaptive in­ 
trusion monitoring.
Architectural approach: ID SYSTEM tech­ 
niques so far concentrate on local event moni­ 
toring. Important new issues in the large-scale 
network context are information exchange, work 
division and co-ordination amongst various ID 
systems. An emerging architectural approach is 
based on autonomous local ID system agents 
performing event processing coupled with co­ 
operative global problem resolution. However, the 
degree of autonomy of agents is subject to debate 
and research. Purdue University has been working 
on their AAFID, the Autonomous Agents for 
Intrusion Detection. However at the present stage, 
the system does not yet exploit the real mobility 
and autonomy aspects of agents.
Performance in complex infrastructures: Large 
distributed networks of systems need scalable 
ID system approaches for which performance is 
becoming an important attribute. This includes 
issues of timeliness of local event monitoring 
and communication of contextual data between 
nodes as well as of trust relationships between the 
nodes.
Challenges: Most of the individual techniques 
are more suitable for local event monitoring and 
analysis. Globally co-ordinate attack strategies re­ 
quire integration of methods and aggregation of 
disparate information sources. The critical issue 
lies in defining the high-level communication pro­ 
tocol to allow different methods of ID system to 
contribute to the intrusion detection process.
Integration with network management system: 
ID system methods must be better integrated 
with exiting network management systems if their 
widespread adoption in industry is to be guaran­ 
teed. One reason is that this should facilitate their 
maintenance/upgrades and a more coherent audit/ 
log data management.
ID systems are one mechanism to respond to 
new business dependability/survivability needs. It 
is as yet unclear how to integrate ID system with 
other dependability mechanisms (e.g., fault toler­ 
ance, recovery mechanisms) in a wider information 
risk and security policy context.
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6. Conclusion
We have conducted an IDS evaluation study to 
establish the relationship between deployment 
techniques, attack system variables and the per­ 
formance of the IDS.
We have outlined in this paper the basic prob­ 
lems associated with the reliability of traffic flow, 
attack detection analysis, the difficulties of accu­ 
racy of attack detection and the analysis of the 
facts pertinent to the ID system as an effective 
security tool.
We have also described the attack sets and 
techniques used to evaluate the performance of the 
RealSecure ID system in a switched and distri­ 
buted environment. We have presented the factors 
that make considerable (although some time diffi­ 
cult to quantify) impact on the ability of the ID 
system to attain optimum design performance. In 
the tables, we have summarized the results of our 
tests and have given an interpretative analysis of 
the results including identification of the best de­ 
ployment and monitoring techniques that could 
enhance surveillance on production networks.
The results established that deployment of the 
sensor at the gateway entry (outside decoy) pro­ 
duced better results, and specifically:
• Performance in the port mirroring technique for 
the Web directed attack was better from the out­ 
side decoy than the inside decoy by 16%.
• Deployment of the sensor with the Century Tap 
for the News2 server directed attack had a better 
performance by about 16% than the same attack 
using the port mirroring technique.
• The performance of the sensors in the attacks to 
the Web and News2 servers using the port mir­ 
roring technique is identical.
• Using the Century Tap outside decoy yielded 
better result than the using it inside decoy by 
11% for the Web based attacks.
» Equally, using the Century Tap inside decoy 
yielded better result than using the port mirror 
inside decoy by 27% for the Web based attacks.
Our studies provide justification that an effec­ 
tive ID system can be achieved by using a best 
effort delivery/deployment approach which inte­
grates the monitoring and deployment techmqui 
devised in this study to maximize the benefits c 
the ID system.
Further, for the effective use of IDS for networ 
surveillance, account must be taken of the poter 
tial impact of intrinsic factors gained from insighi 
in network operations on the performance of th 
IDS. The results also show that corporate nei 
works cannot rely entirely on currently availabl 
ID systems because of their inherent limitation; 
The underlying factors responsible for this hav 
been articulated in this paper.
Finally, the deployment and monitoring tech 
niques that produced the best IDS performano 
results in this study could serve as a useful guide ii 
any IDS implementation program.
Appendix A. The RealSecure IDS software suite 
theoretical design performance specification
The RealSecure test suite provides for inte­ 
grated network-based and host-based ID system 
available with over 450 built-in signatures. By 
design, it can monitor the IP traffic on the collision 
domain, or segment, the network engine resides. It 
can analyze 100% of IP traffic on 100 Mbps 
Ethernet segment with 60% sustained line utiliza­ 
tion. It can process approximately 30,000 packets 
per second depending on engine configuration. If 
there are more packets per second being trans­ 
mitted on the segment, RealSecure is still able to 
detect attacks but the reliability will decrease as 
the packet rate surpasses 30,000 pps. It is possible 
for RealSecure to process all packets on a segment 
that has more than 60% sustained utilization.
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Intrusion detection systems' (IDS) effectiveness requires balancing characteristics and elements so they 
fit together in appropriate compromises to create good network security systems. One major gauge for 
IDS effectiveness is the ability to detect attacks within operational specifications. Gigabit IDS sensors 
as opposed to Megabit IDS sensors promise dramatic increase in component performance and functional 
opportunities, possibly leading to dramatically changed system balance and overall performance. The 
research described here examines the system benefits of using a single Gigabit IDS sensor instead of mul­ 
tiple Megabit sensors for a wide range of defined system attacks, network traffic characteristics, and for 
their contexts of operational concepts and deployment techniques. The experimental results are analyzed 
in the content of practical experiences in the operation of these IDS systems. The difference in archi­ 
tectural designs, deployment strategies and operational concepts that characterized their performance in 
exploiting the strengths of attack systems are discussed.
Keywords: Intrusion detection, network security
1. Introduction
The introduction of IDS security monitoring tools in recent years has come as a 
result of the inadequacies of traffic measurement tools to serve as effective security 
monitors. Traffic measurement tools do not usually offer support for security, nor do 
they allow active actions to be taken when an attack happens but they simply notify 
the administrators when an attack already took place. This is because measurement 
tools classify network traffic according to some specified static rules with defined 
threshelds. These thresholds are often not able to express complex traffic patterns or 
are not flexible enough to cover a whole subnet without having to define the same rule 
for all the hosts of the subnet. This results to a significant increase in the processing 
time of each received packet.
In recent years, in addition to intelligent filtering, there have been various devel­ 
opments in passive surveillance mechanisms to monitor network traffic for signs of
0926-227X/03/$8.00 © 2003 - IOS Press. All rights reserved
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malicious or anomalous (e.g., potentially erroneous) activity. Such tools attempt to 
provide network administrators timely insight into noteworthy exceptional activity. 
Real-time monitoring promises an added dimension of control and insight into the 
flow of traffic between the internal network and its external environment. The insight 
gained through fielded network traffic monitors could also aid networks in enhancing 
the effectiveness of their firewall filtering rules.
Intrusion detection system is a security technology that attempts to identify and 
isolate 'intrusions' against computer systems. Different ID systems have differ­ 
ing classifications of 'intrusion'; a system attempting to detect attacks against web 
servers might consider only malicious HTTP requests, while a system intended to 
monitor dynamic routing protocols might only consider Routing Information Proto­ 
col (RIP) spoofing. Regardless, all ID systems share a general definition of 'intru­ 
sion* as an unauthorized usage or misuse of a computer system.
Typically, intrusions take advantage of system vulnerabilities [4] attributed to mis- 
configured systems, poorly engineered software, mismanaged systems, user neglect 
or to basic design flaw in for instance some Internet protocols. An intrusion de­ 
tection system is a tool that attempts to perform intrusion detection. An intrusion 
detection system is a fast moving market with new players entering continuously. 
Commercial tools range from the widely available anti-viruses, to enterprise tools 
(e.g., Cisco/Netranger), to NT centric (e.g., Internet Security Services/RealSecure) 
and to configurable freeware (e.g.. Network Flight Recorder). In fact such tools only 
detect suspicious events and report the intrusion and/or attempt to the operator. They 
do not include decision-making support for preventive or recovery actions.
Intrusion detection as an important component of a security system, complements 
other security technologies. By providing information to site administration, an ID 
system allows not only for the detection of attacks explicitly addressed by other se­ 
curity components (such as firewalls and service wrappers), but also attempts to pro­ 
vide notification of new attacks unforeseen by other components. Intrusion detection 
systems also provide forensic information that potentially allows organizations to 
discover the origins of an attack. In this manner, ID systems attempt to make attack­ 
ers more accountable for their actions, and, to some extent, act as a deterrent to future 
attacks.
Effective implementation of IDS security facilities requires the ability of the IDS 
to integrate with existing network infrastructure and its interoperation with other 
security implementations on the protected network. At the same time, the require­ 
ments should not impose an usual burden on the IDS and thus impair its ability to 
be effective in capturing all traffic that originate from all specified network inter­ 
nally protected and Internet traffic or its compliance with specified security policy. 
In particular, the IDS should be able to carefully monitor those units that statistically 
originated most of the security attacks.
As with any other technology, there are pitfalls in the current implementation of 
commercially available IDS. The pitfalls include the issues of variant signatures, 
false positives and negatives alerts, data overload, difficulties to function effectively
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in switched environments and scalability issues. The following is a brief description 
of the pitfalls.
Variants. While the ability to develop and use signatures to detect attacks is a use­ 
ful and viable approach, there are shortfalls to only using this approach that should 
be addressed. Signatures are developed in response to new vulnerabilities or exploits 
that have been posted or released. Integral to the success of a signature, it must be 
unique enough to only alert on malicious traffic and rarely on valid network traffic. 
The difficulty here is that exploit code can often be easily changed. It is not uncom­ 
mon for an exploit tool to be released and then have its defaults changed shortly 
thereafter by the hacker community.
Catch-up. New signatures can only be developed once an attack has been identi­ 
fied. Therefore between the creation of an attack and the deployment of a signature 
to detect the attack, a window of opportunity exists for an intruder to mount an attack 
with little to no chance of the attack being detected.
False positives. A common complaint is the amount of false positives an IDS gen­ 
erates. Developing unique signatures is a difficult task and often times the vendors 
will err on the side of alerting too often rather than not enough. This is analogous 
to the story of the boy who cried wolf. It is much more difficult to pick out a valid 
intrusion attempt if a signature also alerts regularly on valid network activity. A diffi­ 
cult problem that arises from this is how much can be filtered out without potentially 
missing an attack.
False negatives. Detecting attacks for which there are no known signatures. This 
leads to the other concept of false negatives where an EDS does not generate an alert 
when an intrusion is actually taking place. Simply put if a signature has not been 
written for a particular exploit, there is an extremely good chance that the IDS will 
not detect it.
Data overload. Anodier aspect, which does not relate directly to misuse detection 
but is extremely important is how much data can an analyst effectively and efficiently 
analyze. That being said the amount of data he/she needs to look at seems to be 
growing rapidly. Depending on the intrusion detection tools employed by a company 
and its size, there is a possibility for logs to reach millions of records per day.
Difficulties in switched environments. Network capture and analysis in a switched 
LAN environment usually means 'tapping' the switch's lines by using a 'mirror' port 
or deployment in other tapping configurations. In this approach, traffic is copied from 
one 'source' port to another destination or 'mirror' port.
It has been known that mirroring a full duplex source port may cause packet loss 
as traffic on the full duplex source port exceeds the available bandwidth of the mirror 
port.
Scalability Issues. In the last couple of years, there has been a significant increase 
in network traffic utilization. With this has come the introduction of Gigabit Ethernet 
technology to accommodate this increase in bandwidth - and thus the volume of traf­ 
fic to be analyzed. The "problem associated with this is that older EDS technologies 
that operate at 10 Mbps or 100 Mbps bandwidths are overwhelmed with the increase
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in traffic volume. With Gigabit, the older IDS technologies become seriously over­ 
loaded. This problem is discussed in depth in Section 4.
This paper is intended to address one of the issues (scalability) mentioned above. 
Thus, in order to gauge the ability of currently available IDS to effectively scale to a 
very large size, the goal of the research in this paper is therefore:
1. To provide a probabilistic evaluation of the ability of Intrusion Detections Sys­ 
tems in a Gigabit environment to correctly identify attacks based on the signa­ 
ture analysis of the attacks;
2. To provide an evaluation of the performance of IDS in a Gigabit environment;
3. To analyze the impact of the characteristics associated with traffic flow on the 
performance of the IDS.
Prior research efforts in ID systems are discussed in the next section.
2. Related Work
Research into and development of automated Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
has been under way for well over 12 years. By now a great number of systems have 
been deployed in the commercial or government arenas, but all are limited in what 
they can do. The creativity of attackers and the ever-changing nature of the overall 
threat to targeted systems have contributed to the difficulty in effectively identifying 
intrusions. While the complexities of host computers are already making intrusion 
detection a difficult task, the increasing prevalence of distributed networked-based 
systems and insecure networks such as the Internet has greatly increased the need 
for intrusion detection.
Previous and present IDS research that relate to the technological approach of 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS's) are identified into three categories:
1. Modeling - Misuse or anomaly detection;
2. Analysis; and
3. Deployment.
Detection is performed in the misuse detection model [ 1,3] by looking for specific 
patterns or sequences of events representing previous intrusions (i.e., looking for 
the 'signature* of the intrusion). It is a knowledge-based technique and only known 
intrusions can be detected. This is a more traditional ID technique, which is usually 
applied, for instance in the anti-virus tools.
hi the anomaly detection model [3,12,13], detecting changes in the patterns of uti­ 
lization or behavior of the system performs detection. Building a model that contains 
metrics derived from normal system operation and flagging as intrusive any observed 
metrics that have a significant statistical deviation from the model perform it. The ap­ 
proach is behavior-based and should be able detect previously unknown intrusions. 
It is in the research and development area in which currently innovative modeling
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paradigms are explored which is inspired from biological systems. Pioneers in this 
area are from the University of New Mexico whose work is -based on the idea that 
intrusion detection systems should be designed to function like the way the human 
natural immune systems distinguishes between 'self from 'non-self' antibodies.
The main challenge with this approach, like for every behavior-based technique, 
is to model the 'normal' behavior of a process. Learning the activity of the process 
in a real environment can do this. Another approach, advocated by IBM research, 
consists of describing the sequences of audit events (patterns) generated by typical 
UNIX processes. Another method developed by Nokia is based on Kohonen Self 
Organizing Maps (SOM).
'Off-line' vs. 'Real-time' analysis [12] is another area where more conventional 
classification divides IDS's into systems which operate after the event and rely on 
analysis of logs and audit trails for preventive action and those that attempt real-time 
monitoring in the hope that precursor signs of abnormal activity give indication that 
corrective action is possible before real damage occurs.
Previous research on analytical methods for detecting anomalous or known in­ 
trusive activity [1,3.12,13] emphasizes on the different aspects of session activity 
within host boundaries given the fact that the primary input to intrusion-detection 
tools, audit data, is produced by mechanisms that tend to be locally administered 
within a single host or domain. However, as the importance of network security has 
grown, so has the need to expand intrusion-detection technology to address network 
infrastructure and services.
In the context of fault detection and diagnosis for computer network and telecom­ 
munication environments, network monitoring has been studied extensively by the 
network management and alarm correlation community [9,11,15,16]. The high- 
volume distributed event correlation technology promoted in some projects provides, 
an excellent foundation for building truly scalable network-aware surveillance tech­ 
nology for misuse. However, these efforts focus primarily on the health and status 
(fault detection and/or diagnosis) or performance of the target network, and do not 
cover the detection of intentionally abusive traffic in distributed and switched en­ 
vironments. Indeed, some simplifications in the fault analysis and diagnosis com­ 
munity do not translate well to a malicious environment for detecting intrusions. 
For examples, assumption of stateless correlation, which precludes event ordering; 
simplistic time-out metrics for resetting the tracking of problems; ignoring individu­ 
als/sources responsible for exceptional activity.
As the scale of scientific research of IDS systems grows by leaps and bounds, so 
does the nature of IDS interoperation, architecture and implementation. Studies of ID 
systems attempting to address the issue of network surveillance include the Network 
Security Monitor developed at UC Davis [5], and the Network Anomaly Detection 
and Intrusion Reporter [10] developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Both per­ 
form broadcast LAN packet monitoring to analyze traffic patterns for known hostile 
or anomalous activity. Further, research by UC Davis in me Distributed Intrusion De­ 
tection System [24] and later Graph-based Intrusion Detection System [23] projects
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attempted to extend intrusion-monitoring capabilities beyond LAN analysis, to pro­ 
vide multi-LAN and very large-scale network coverage.
Morris [17] and Maimon [14] investigated network traffic intensity measurement. 
Intensity measures distinguish whether a given volume of traffic appears consistent 
with historical observations. These measures reflect the intensity of the event stream 
(number of events per unit time) over time intervals that are tunable. Alternatively, 
a sharp increase in events viewed across longer durations may provide insight into 
a consistent effort to limit or prevent successful traffic flow. Morris investigated in­ 
tensity measures of transport-layer connection requests, such as a volume analysis 
of SYN-RST messages, which could indicate the occurrence of a SYN-attack [17] 
against port availability (or possibly for port scanning), Maimon explored intensity 
measures of TCP/FIN messages as a variant [14] considered to be a more stealthy 
form of port scanning.
In their studies [14,17], the authors contend that monitoring overall traffic volume 
and bursty events by using both intensity and continuous measures provides some 
interesting advantages over other monitoring approaches, such as user-definable 
heuristic rules that specify fixed thresholds. In particular, the intensity of events over 
duration is relative in the sense that the term 'high volume' may reasonably be con­ 
sidered different at midnight than at 11:00 a.m. The notion of high bursts of events 
might similarly be unique to the role of the target system in the intranet (e.g., Web 
server host versus a user workstation).
Traffic Analysis with Signature Analysis has been studied [12,18,19,21,26]. Sig­ 
nature analysis is a process whereby an event stream is mapped against abstract 
representations of event sequences known to indicate the target activity of interest. 
Determining whether a given event sequence is indicative of an attack may be a 
function of the preconditions under which the event sequence is performed.
The use of coding schemes for representing operating system penetrations through 
audit trail analysis was also the focus of other research works [12,18,19]. Using basic 
signature-analysis concepts, it was shown that some detection methods could support 
a variety of analyses involving packet and transport datagrams as event streams. For 
example, address spoofing, tunneling, source routing [21], SATAN [26] attack detec­ 
tion, and abuse of ICMP messages (Redirect and Destination Unreachable messages) 
could all be encoded and detected by signature engines that guard network gateways.
The advent of large scale commercial intrusion detection systems tend to have 
given a relative assurance to the information technology community that has been 
very anxious to maximize the use of these highly advertised ID systems as added 
armor to secure network systems. Many IDS products have been deployed in com­ 
mercial and corporate networks. With this has come a shift in research focus in so 
many areas. One such area is the IDS performance.
EDS evaluation studies [8,22] treat the relationship between deployment tech­ 
niques and attack system variables and the performance of the IDS.
Richards [22] evaluated the functional and performance capabilities of the indus­ 
tries' leading commercial type IDS. In the areas tested, the performance of the IDS
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was rated based on their distinctive features, which were characterized into different 
performance indexes. The research work represented a new direction for ID systems 
in that it moved the focus away from scientific concepts research to performance 
evaluation of the industries' best products. However, the study was limited to a small 
proto design isolated and non-switched network which did not reveal the impact of 
packet switching on the accuracy and ability to capture attack packets in their en­ 
tirety. Iheagwara and Blyth [7] expanded this effort to an evaluation study of the 
effect of deployment techniques on EDS performance in switched and distributed 
system. They demonstrated that monitoring techniques could play an important role 
in determining the effectiveness of the IDS in a switched and distributed network.
Porras and Valdes [20] discussed IDS failures in terms of deficiencies in accu­ 
racy and completeness, where accuracy reflects the number of false positives and 
completeness reflects the number of false negatives.
All of the above research works predated the advent of Gigabit network and the 
scalability issue associated with IDS deployment in Gigabit environment thus open­ 
ing up a new area of research focus.
The problem here is that with the advent of Gigabit Ethernet not only is there a sig­ 
nificant increase in bandwidth - and thus a significant increase in the volume of traf­ 
fic to be analyzed — but also a move into the realms of the purely switched networks. 
Because in the promiscuous mode sensors can only see traffic on its own segment, 
and in a switched environment, every connection to the switch is effectively, a single 
segment In the older technologies of 10 mbps or 100 mbps bandwidths, this can be 
overcome by the use of network taps or mirroring all the switch traffic to a span port, 
to which the IDS sensor is attached. But with Gigabit networks, the result would be a 
seriously overloaded sensor. Currently suggested solutions include building an IDS 
technology into the switch hardware itself that will allow the sensor to grab traffic 
directly from the backplane or in the alternative move to a pure Network Node IDS 
implementation where the agents are concerned only with the traffic directed at the 
host on which they are installed.
The currently available commercial IDS were designed to accommodate traffic 
with bandwidth not exceeding 100 Mbps. Deployment of these IDS on Gigabit traffic 
.presents scalability problem and has not been independently evaluated (at least not 
in any published scientific literature).
In Section 3, we describe the research work conducted to evaluate and compare 




The goal of our experiment is two fold:
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1. To provide an evaluation of the performance of IDS in a Gigabit environment; 
and
2. To analyze the impact of the characteristics associated with the traffic flow on 
the performance of the IDS.
3.1. Evaluation criteria
The basic performance indicators of the IDS are reflected in the success or failure 
of event analysis, which are quantitatively measured for qualities such as accuracy 
and performance: both are assessable through testing. A more difficult but equally 
important metric to assess is completeness. In this case, inaccuracy is reflected in the 
number of legitimate transactions flagged as abnormal or malicious (false positives), 
incompleteness is reflected in the number of harmful transactions that escape detec­ 
tion (false negatives), and performance is measured by the rate at which transactions 
can be processed.
Within the limits of our experiment, the evaluation criteria used is the percentage 
of attacks captured by the IDS against the tunable experimental parameters, i.e., 
bandwidth, throughput, traffic characteristics and attack signatures.
3.2. Framework
The study is based on the premise that the only true way to scale an EDS effectively 
is to use a flow based switch to 'split' or 'load balance' the sessions or connections 
etc. across multiple IDS's.
Using this concept, we tested the IDS against a Gigabit traffic background by 
spanning all traffic (attack, victim, background) to a gigabit port that feeds the traffic 
to a switch. The switch then feeds the traffic to one attached gigabit IDS sensor or 
load balances it to multiple 100 Mbps IDS sensors. The derivative benefits here are:
1. The span traffic can be incremented up to or less than 100 mbps and the sig­ 
nature libraries tested against multiple 100 Mbps sensors versus one gigabit 
sensor; and
2. The span traffic can be incremented up to one gigabit and the IDS performance 
is tested with gigabit sensor versus multiple 100 mbps sensors.
3.3. Experimental method
The experimental model envisages mimicking a series of defined and designated 
attack sets that are incorporated into the software suite of the ID system. The attack 
set classification is given Section 3.9. For each attack, we used a specific attack 
signature exploit in the areas tested. The attack list is not meant to function as a 
complete list of attacks, but rather as a limited test suite that has been designed to 
test the performance capabilities of IDS systems on a Gigabit network.
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In each test, we injected specifically configured attack packets onto a test net­ 
work, on which the subject ID system was running in order to establish interactions 
between injected packets and the host target of attack. To create the needed TCP 
connections for the subject IDS to monitor, the target host was the explicit addressee 
of all the attack packets. In addition, the target host also acted as a control for the ex­ 
periments. The target's response to injected attack packets allowed us to empirically 
record the behavior of the performance of the ID system in all test categories.
We observed the attack detection performance and functional characteristics of 
the ID system and the system's underlying TCP/IP implementation by tracking the 
subject's monitoring console output and considering the specific types of packets 
used for the test.
In order to provide experimental Quality of Service (QoS), the following, which 
could impact the test results, were considered:
(i) Environmental test condition; 
(ii) Flow control; and 
(iii) Switch culture.
3.3.1. Environmental test condition
The environment created for the testing was designed to mimic a real network that 
simulated high bandwidth and realistic traffic with a few test systems. Background 
traffic with modest distribution of packet size to avoid any testing bias was created 
with valid headers and checksums so that the switches would never pass them to the 
intrusion detection system (IDS) sensors. Spanning tree was disabled on the switch 
connecting the network sensors.
3.5.2. Flow control
Flow control was established by implementing full client/server flows for back­ 
ground traffic by using UDP requests and replies transmitted between the ML7710 
SmartBits cards (see the Appendix for a description). This was important to prevent 
flooding large quantities of test traffic to unknown destinations. Full duplex network 
analyzers were used to validate and troubleshoot the test environment (from bad 
patch cables to flooding traffic on switch ports) in order to remove any restriction 
on traffic flow that may impair the functionality of the IDS or AppSwitch (see the 
Appendix for a description).
3.3.3. Switch culture
The switch was cultured to treat the simulated systems as real by issuing layer 
3 ARP packets from the SmartBits cards before every round of testing. The attack 
traffic was live with real source and destination MAC and IP addresses.
3.4. Test bed
The test bed is represented in two logical diagram Figs 1 and 2. The two figures 
are essentially the'same except for the placement of the sensors. In the test diagram
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Fig. 1. RealSecure IDS test environment logical diagram.
(Fig. 1), ten Realsecure sensors were used to monitor the traffic stream coming from 
the AppSwitch 3502 that they are connected to. Whereas in Fig. 2, only one Networ- 
klce Gigabit sensor is used. The rest of the test setup is identical.
In the logical test diagrams, 13 SmartBits network cards from the SmartBits tester 
background traffic generator were connected to 13 (100 Mbps) ports on a Cisco Cat­ 
alyst 6000 48 port module. Traffic flow between the SmartBits tester, Cisco catalyst 
6000, attack and target systems depicted in Figs 1 and 2 were organized into two 
virtual local area networks (VLANS) 201 and 202. VLAN 201 consists of UDP 
background traffic from the SmartBit tester and traffic from the 13-100 Mbps and 
4 Gigabit ports on the Cisco catalyst 6000. VLAN 202 consists of traffic from the 
attacker and target systems. Traffic from VLAN 202 was inserted into VLAN 201 
via a Gigabit crossover cable to disburse the attack throughput the background traffic 
before forwarding it to the AppSwitch. Addition of the Gigabit ports to VLAN 201 
ensured enough bandwidth within the VLAN.
Systems description of the set up for the attacker and victims are given in the 
Appendix. The Cisco catalyst 6000 48 port module consists of 44 100 Mbps and 4 
Gigabit ports.
All traffic from VLAN 201, which included attack traffic, was mirrored to a Cat­ 
alyst Gigabit SPAN port. Traffic from the Catalyst Gigabit SPAN port fed the App-
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Fig. 2. Networklce IDS test environment logical diagram.
Switch Gigabit input which then flow mirrored the traffic to the RealSecure network 
sensors connected to a maximum of 10, 100 Mbps ports or the NetworkICE gigabit 
sensor. The IDS sensors monitored that traffic via their stealth interfaces and reported 
attacks to the management console via their second interface.
3.5. Test procedure
In the performance tests, we used the AppSwitch and Cisco switches, which only 
pass valid traffic to real systems with both the attack and the background traffics 
containing real source and destination MAC addresses.
Once the test bed and environmental test control was set up, control runs were 
completed against each component to ensure that they are functioning properly. In 
order to validate the integrity of the test, the following control methods were em­ 
ployed:
• Monitoring of the test network with background traffic or attacks to ensure there 
is no erroneous traffic other than bridging protocols.
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• Generation of each level of background traffic, from 100 Mbps to 1 Gbps and 
verified the traffic generation settings by monitoring with a network LAN ana­ 
lyzer.
• With no background traffic, attacks used against the RealSecure sensors were 
generated to be sure their policies are properly configured to alert on the attacks 
and that they are communicating with their consoles.
• For ease of execution, we used either Network Associates, Inc. Cybercop Scan­ 
ner IDS attack testing suite or created an interactive TCL and Casl scripts to 
log into the appropriate service to run each attack. There were 10 of each attack 
type - HTTP, FTP, and SMTP launched against each of the two target systems 
during each run for a total of 30 attacks per target and 60 attacks for the entire 
test
• The RealSecure kill response was not used as the Cisco span ports were config­ 
ured only for uni-directional traffic in RX only mode.
The tests were preceded by a series of baseline tests against the target host to 
insure that the subject IDS was configured and functioning properly according to 
design specifications. In almost all test cases, a process on the target host ran which 
iccepted incoming TCP connections on the HTTP port and printed any input ob- 
ained from the machine's TCP stack. By examining the output of this process, we 
vere able to deduce whether the subject IDS should have detected the attack based 
>n the network conditions we created.
The sequence of the test procedure is as follows:
1. Generation of ARP packets with SmartBits to update switch ARP cache.
2. Generation of 100 Mbps (10% of Gigabit) background traffic and verifying 
with a network analyzer.
3. Generation of attacks against both target systems.
4. Recording how many of the total attacks were caught by the RealSecure sen­ 
sor.
5. Discontinuation of traffic generation.
6. Clearing of the RealSecure console display.
7. Repetition of steps 3-6 two more times for a total of three trials at each uti­ 
lization.
8. Repetition of steps 1-7 with a single sensor for background utilizations of 
200 Mbps (20% of Gigabit), 300 Mbps (30% of Gigabit), 700 Mbps (70% of 
Gigabit), and 800 Mbps (80%).
9. Addition of 1 sensor to the AppSwitch, for a total of 2 and repeating steps
1-8.
10. Addition of one sensor at a time until the IDS sensor is able to capture all 
attacks at the highest utilization.
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Traffic PatUr n
Fig. 3. Traffic distribution profile.
3.6. Traffic generation
To generate realistic background traffic during the testing, the SmartBits tester was 
configured to generate 3 UDP sessions from each of the 12 transmitting ML7710 
modules for a total of 36 sessions or streams. A single receiving ML7710 module 
was configured to transmit infrequent replies to the transmitting modules to maintain 
the MAC and ARP forwarding databases in the AppSwitch and Catalyst and thus 
avoid flooding of traffic (a session is defined as a flow of UDP traffic). The SmartBits 
cannot currently generate real TCP sessions as of this writing with a unique source or 
destination MAC address, source or destination IP address, and source or destination 
UDP port number. Stated differently, any deviation in any of the above field values 
constitutes a unique session. A variety of UDP port numbers were used to make the 
traffic more realistic.
A component level description of the test bed is given below and the specification 
of the AppSwitch is given in the Appendix.
3.7. Traffic characteristics
The profile of background traffic consisted of three packet sizes: 64 bytes, 512 
bytes and 1514 bytes. Of the 12 transmitting ML7710 SmartBit cards, 4 sent 64 byte 
packets, 4 sent 512 byte packets, and 4 sent 1514 byte packets. The total offered load 
for each test sequence is defined in Mbps-megabits per second. The total offered load 
was controlled by manipulating the frames per second transmit parameter on each of 
the transmitting ML7710 SmartCards. Utilization for each test run was verified with 
multiple network analyzers.
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Traffic breakdown by type
Fig. 4. Traffic distribution by type.
Packet size traffic distribution was as follows: 50% of the total load in Mbps from 
the 1514 byte packets, 40% of the total load from 512 byte packets, and 10% of the 
total load from the 64 byte packets. This profile was derived from on-going studies 
[2] that measure typical Internet traffic patterns at two MCI backbone points in the 
USA performed by CAIDA - Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis.
3.8. Attack signatures
We used the standard 5.0 attack detector policy. Each signature was set-to count 
the number of packets it triggers. All signatures for all attacks were enabled with 
alert console. The log to database responses was also enabled. Other attack signa­ 
tures not needed in the attack (ARP, IP Duplicate, IP Frag, IP ProtocolViolation, 
IP Unknown Protocol, SourceRoute and TCP_Overlap_Data) Were disabled because 
some SmartBits packets are recognized as non-standard by the RealSecure network 
sensor.
Some signatures (port scans and indexed attack signatures) were not tested be­ 
cause load balancing is known to diminish their effectiveness across multiple sen­ 
sors.
3.9. Classification of test attack set
The attacks used were a mixture of Web, email and ftp attacks representing a 
nixture of typical, multi-packet attacks using a variety of protocols that are common 
n most networks today [27]. The purpose of the attack set is to function as a test 
mite. The common vulnerability exploits cross-reference is shown in Table 1. The 
•atio of packet generation of each attack type shown in Fig. 4 is:





























• HTTP packets - 77%;
• FTP packets-10.5%;
• SMTP packets-11.5%.

















The results obtained in the tests are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The main objective 
of using intrusion detection for real-time monitoring of TCP/IP-based networks traf-
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Table 2 




































































































































































fic is the detection, quantification and analysis of malicious (or exceptional) network 
traffic. This is accomplished by examining captured packets, which individually rep­ 
resent parsable activity records, where key data within the header and data segment 
can be analyzed and/or heuristically parsed for response-worthy activity. In line, the 
test results represented in Figs 5 and 6 show the number of attacks detected. We have 
used the number of attacks detected instead of the number of packets captured since 
the ultimate in any instance or scenario attack is quantification of attack detection.
When interpreting the test results of two IDS products with different architectures, 
a standard yardstick for their comparison must be well denned. Here a common 
metric of comparison is to use the nominal attack detection capability specified by 
the product designers. The RealSecure sensor is designed to operate at 100 Mbps




Fig. 5. Probability of detection vs. % utilization with NetworkICE gigabit sensor.
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% Network Utilization (Mbps x 100)
Fig. 6. Probability of detection vs. percent utilization with RealSecure Muldple sensors.
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Table 4 
IDS sensor vs % detection



























although best performance in actual networks is in the range of 30 to 40 Mbps. The 
Networklce Gigabit sensor is designed to operate at 100% detection rate in Gigabit 
traffic, which technically is from 300 Mbps to 1 Gbps. This essentially means that 
3 RealSecure sensors should match the detection rate of 1 Networklce sensor at 
300 Mbps or at 800 Mbps, which is more realistic than 1 Gbps, 8 Realsecure sensors 
will match the performance of the Networklce sensor.
We can use the above standards to discuss the data in Table 4. Essentially, the 
data clearly shows that from low to middle level Gigabit traffic (100-600 Mbps), 
stream between 4 to 6 RealSecure sensors or 1 Networklce sensor can detect more 
than 75% of the attacks. Above this point, detection rate drops to undesirable levels 
although only about 4 RealSecure sensors will be needed to match the detection rate 
of 1 Networklce Gigabit sensor.
Individually, the percentage of detection shown in Figs 5 and 6 demonstrate that 
the Networklce sensor was more effective in detecting attacks from 100 Mbps to 
300 Mbps while the Realsecure sensor was more effective at network loads above 
300 Mbps. This is due to the fact that the number of the RealSecure sensors matching 
the detection rate of the Networklce was smaller than expected by the design metrics.
Generally, as is shown in Fig. 7 the detection rate for both types of IDS de­ 
creases with increase in network utilization. The decrease is more pronounced above 
600 Mbps of network utilization.
An accurate determination of false alarms could be a daunting task as false alarms 
could be overwhelming. In the experiments, closer analysis of the test data of all 
attacks showed that the number of false alerts generated is in the order of 17%. This 
figure was obtained from the recording and analyses of the log to database responses, 
which was e.nabled as described in Section 3.8.
4. Analysis
In analyzing the results, there are many factors that impact the performance of 
the IDS sensor that needs to be considered. Some of which are due to differences





Rg. 7. Throughput vs % detection.
in the IDS's design while others are due to a variety of factors. The analysis must 
also take account of the experiences in the operation of the EDS products in real 
world environments. Experience has shown that the IDS performance and its stability 
(i.e., ability to function within design limits without failure) are determined by the 
following:
Design limitations
Traffic rate (number of packets per second)





Number of signatures active
Workstation hardware
Half/Full duplex transfer mode
4.1. Design limitations
Evaluation of test results requires a methodical analysis of the many factors that 
could affect the IDS performance in actual network environments. This is because 
it is possible for the IDS to perform differently even under the same parametric 
specifications but different environmental contexts.
For instance, there could be cases of attaining a 100% detection rate when 100% 
of the traffic was scripted, but when background/normal traffic or encrypted traffic 
is used of added the performance goes down. Equally, it is possible to toss 40 Mbps
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of traffic at the IDS that won't phase it, and another 40 Mbps that will phase it. In 
this regard, experience has been that what breaks an EDS is more often packets per 
second than Layer 7 content [8], although both are relevant.
Generally, there are three bottlenecks that affect the performance of the IDS in 
real world environments.
• Raw sniffing speed
• Signature degradation
• Memory usage.
4.1.1. Raw sniffing speed
Sniffing speed as a measure of how much packets per seconds can be captured 
is a very important factor when evaluating the performance of ID systems. This is 
due to the fact that this could be used as a baseline when determining the maximum 
packet capture/second in order to quantify the operational bandwidth limits after 
which the performance of the IDS begins to diminish. Thus, it is a valuable measure 
that shows the maximum load at which the IDS will still operate effectively. The 
figures available from some IDS vendors as performance bottlenecks are:
• 200000 packets/second for Cisco's Secure;
••» 70000 packets/second for Intrusion.corn's Gigabit sensor; and
• 700000 packets/second for ISS's NetworkICE Gigabit sensor.
Of interest here is Networklce's 700 000 packets/second sniffing rate. This means 
that given optimum conditions, the Gigabit sensor's engine should be able to process 
700000 packets per second. The RealSecure sensor will not sniff beyond 100000 
packets/second. It is assumed that the packets related to the above numbers are true 
for all (typical) packet sizes.
Consequently, what this means is that seven RealSecure sensors will be required to 
match the performance of NetworklCE's sensor for a 700 000 packets/second capture 
in any given identical context.
In analyzing the results, we used the vendor provided data as the baseline reference 
in setting a comparison standard. Evaluation of the IDS products was based on the 
percentage of detection of attacks.
It should be noted that this could take a different meaning if we factor in packet 
size in the packets per second discussion. For instance, it is possible to address 
1-Gbps networks by pushing through 1500-byte packets at 70000 packets/second. 
This means using the smaller packet sizes that are likely to be seen in the real world 
means that IDS product is unlikely to exceed 200-mbps.
4.1.2. Signature degradation
The second bottleneck is that Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) analy­ 
sis at high rates comes with signature degradation. Most NIDS use 'pattern-matching 
routine' (signature-based), which slows/degrades with successive addition of signa­ 
tures. Network ICE uses 'state-based protocol-analysis', which means that it does
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not slow down as you add signatures because it follows a decision tree. This means 
that when running in the 1-Gbps ranges, all signatures can be enabled. To solve the 
problem of false positive alerts, filters can be set up on some signatures, thereby 
making it not necessary to remove signatures in order to performance tune.
The RealSecure IDS uses the pattern matching technique that somewhat impairs 
its functionality because the pattern matching technique degrades with an increase 
in the number of active signatures.
The theory behind interpreting IDS performance, by comparing 'state-based 
protocol-analysis' vs. 'pattern-matching' techniques could be explained from the 
perspective of the two fundamental advantages that state-based protocol-analysis has 
over pattern-matching hi regards to performance:
1. More efficient processing of traffic.
2. Scales better as you add more signatures.
A good example would be to compare how an IDS looks for RFC exploits. 
A pattern-matching system looks for patterns on ranges of ports where RFC pro­ 
grams typically run. For example, it might look on ports in the range 634 through 
1400 for the AMD exploit. In contrast, a state-based system can remember which 
ports the AMD service is running on, and only test the AMD signatures on those 
ports that are actually running AMD. If no system on the network is running AMD, 
then a state-based system will never test network traffic for those signatures-.
The theory behind this is that a pattern-matching system doesn' t know the contents 
of the packets, and must match that packet for many different patterns. In contrast, a 
protocol-analysis system knows the contents of the packet, and only tests signatures 
that apply to those contents.
Given an average packet, a pattern-matching system might have to match for 10 
different patterns within that packet. In contrast, on average, a state-based protocol- 
analysis system tests less than 0.1 signatures per packet.
This doesn't come for free: the state-based protocol-analysis that knows whether 
or not it should test for signatures itself costs the same as testing for a couple of 
signatures. Thus, the per-packet cost for pattern-matching might be 10 signatures, 
and the per-packet cost for state-based protocol analysis might be 2 signatures.
The second part of the theory is that for pattern-matching systems, the more sig­ 
natures you add to the system, the slower the system becomes. If you look in the 
documentation for the average sensor, it will have a comprehensive discussion on 
how to remove signatures in order to improve performance. This isn't applicable to 
a state-based protocol-analysis system.
A good example is to consider looking for Telnet login strings. There are many 
well-known login names that rootkits will leave behind on the system. A pattern- 
matching system must scan all Telnet traffic for all these patterns - the more patterns 
you add, the slower it becomes.
In contrast, a protocol-analysis system will decode Telnet and extract the login 
name. It can then lookup the name in a binary-matching tree or a hash table. The
22 C. Hieagwara et al /A comparative experimental evaluation study
difference is that a pattern-matching system must match for patterns within network 
traffic, which scales poorly. In contrast, a protocol-analysis system pulls out a field 
from network traffic, and matches that field within an internal table, which scales 
very well to log in name.
Again, not in the Telnet example that a useraame signature is only tested against 
the username field - another demonstration of the first point that a packet is only 
tested for a signature when needed, and not when it isn't needed.
This is the theory behind the comparison. In practice, there are a lot of issues that 
can become more important. For example, CPU speeds are doubling every year.
The limitations imposed by signature issues are discussed hi Section 3.8 and only 
apply to the scope. However, there is no known impact of signature degradation on 
the performance of the RealSecure sensors because we did not run into signature 
overloads.
4.1.3. Memory usage
All currently available network intrusion detection system (NIDS) track TCP con­ 
nections because they have to reassemble them, or risk being evaded The problem 
here is that Gigabit networks in most cases have millions of outstanding TCP connec­ 
tions. This causes most boxes to fail over. The architecture of the NetworkICE sensor 
incorporates memory-saving techniques that optimize memory consumption in pref­ 
erence to speed. So also does the ReakSecure architecture hold well with memory 
consumption.
Therefore, within the context of our test studies, memory usage was not a problem 
obviously due to the fact that the architecture of both IDS systems does well with 
memory usages.
From the above discussions, it is clear that the design-related performance bottle­ 
necks did not impair the performance of the IDS products evaluated due to the scope 
of the experiments. That being said, in real network environments, these could im­ 
pact the IDS performance especially from signature overload of the RealSecure IDS 
sensors.
4.2. Typical traffic
When evaluating the performance of the IDS, network throughput is important. 
This is commonly expressed in either Megabits (Megabytes) or Gigabits (Gigabytes). 
A crucial question is how many megabits (Mb) can the IDS handle before its perfor­ 
mance nosedives?
Gauging the performance of the IDS is a function of many variables. For instance, 
if a packet of 1500 byte that is invalid or contains no interesting information is loaded 
on the network at a high rate, it will not be effective in testing the IDS. To characterize 
the true bandwidth limits within which the IDS is effective, the processing power of 
the IDS must be tested using properly configured packets. It is not just enough to 
send 100 Mbits of 512 byte packets with a traffic generator. There is the need for a
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traffic that is close or identical to real traffic from real machines that is repeatable; yet 
still random enough that one does not end up with the vendors catering to bandwidth 
benchmark. That is why it is necessary to use traffic that is identical to real traffic 
from real machines in a performance evaluation. We applied this principle to our 
tests by mimicking a 'typical traffic' as discussed in Section 3.7.
Another dimension here is the variable nature of traffics on most networks. Traffic 
varies greatly from network to network. Internal enterprise networks might see a lot 
of SMB, NFS, SNA, and SQL network traffic. For example, while external/DMZ 
networks might see mostly HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and the occasional SSH session, a 
university network will see a lot of HTTP, FTP, SSH, SMTP, IMAP, POP, Napster, 
IRC, and a myriad of other protocols that you won't see in the average corporate 
space and a carrier network will see everything from HTTP traffic to BGP updates, 
and every other protocol that goes across the network.
The point is that there isn't really an easy way to say 'typical traffic'. One might 
be able to craft some baseline assumptions on what university traffic looks like, what 
internal corporate traffic looks like, what DMZ/external corporate traffic looks like, 
what ISP traffic might look like, etc., but environments are so wide and varied that 
there is no 'one size fits all* approach to traffic modeling. For example, sending 
100 Mbits of a typically used protocol (like HTTP) could crush an IDS that'wouldn't 
produce the same result with for instance, 500 Mbits of UDP traffic on a non-standard 
port
To ensure that the test traffic fits into the 'typical traffic' type, we used a repre­ 
sentative mix of traffic as discussed in Sections 3.7 and 3.8. This shows that the test 
results would not have been different in a real word context bearing other factors.
4.3. Packet size
Instances exist when the attainment of maximum (%100) utilization will have dif­ 
ferent meaning depending on the context For instance, in analyzing an output such 
as the one depicted in Table 5 (chart) [25], 100% utilization could be 64 byte frames 
at 14 880 pps, or 1518 byte frames at 812 pps. There is a big difference here because 
processing-wise, the two are not equal. We can not relate the above to capacity uti­ 
lization, because we have less than 50% of the information required to simply say 
that utilization is 'X' Mbps.
Table 5 
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In the tests, we used varying packet sizes as discussed in Section 3.7. This also 
indicates that bearing other factors, the results will hold in real world traffic environ­ 
ments.
4.4. Number of sessions
The complexity of analyzing IDS performance increases with another variable - 
number of sessions. This is because many ID systems have to track state and to a cer­ 
tain extent; the number of sessions is a huge factor. In this regard, 4880 pps between 
two hosts is very different from 14 880 pps between 5000 hosts. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that there have been instances when ID systems starts degrading in per­ 
formance at 6500 pps under 35 Mbps network load with little chance of recovering 
based on the number of sessions observed by the IDS.
4.5. Other factors
There are other factors that could affect the performance of the IDS that did not 
affect our test results due to die size, scope, nature, and environmental test conditions 
used in our tests.
Network ID systems work by predicting the behavior of networked machines 
based on the packets they exchange. The problem with this is that a network monitor 
that is not active cannot accurately predict whether a given machine on the network 
is even going to see a packet, let alone process it in the expected manner. The exis­ 
tence of a number of factors could make the actual meaning of a packet captured by 
IDS ambiguous. These can be considered as follows:
1. A network IDS is typically on an entirely different machine from the systems 
it's watching. Often, the IDS are at a completely different point on the network. 
The basic problem facing a network IDS is that these differences cause incon­ 
sistencies between the ID system and the machines it watches. Some of these 
discrepancies are the results of basic physical differences, others stem from 
different network driver implementations. For example, consider an IDS and 
an end-system located at different places on a network. The two systems will 
receive any given packet at different points in time. This difference in time is 
important; during die lag, something can happen on the end-system that might 
prevent it from accepting the packet. The IDS, however, has already processed 
the packet thinking that it will be dealt with normally at the end-system.
2. IP packet with a bad UDP checksum will not be accepted by most operating 
systems. Some older systems might. The IDS needs to know whether every 
system it watches will accept such a packet, or it can end up with an inaccurate 
reconstruction of what happened on those machines. Some operating systems 
might accept a packet that is obviously bad. A poor implementation might, for 
example, allow an IP packet to have an incorrect checksum. If the IDS don't 
know this, it will discard packets that the end system accepts, again reducing 
the accuracy of the system.
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3. Even if the IDS knows what operating system every machine on the network 
runs, it still might not be able to tell just by looking at a packet whether a 
given machine will accept it. A machine that runs out of memory will discard 
incoming packets. The IDS has no easy way to determine whether this is the 
case on the end-system, and thus will assume that the end-system has accepted 
the packet. CPU exhaustion and network saturation at the end-system can cause 
the same problem.
Together, all these problems result in a situation where the IDS often simply can't 
determine the implications of a packet merely by examining it; it needs to know a 
great deal about die networking behavior of the end-systems that it's watching, as 
well as the traffic conditions of their network segments. Unfortunately, a network 
IDS doesn't have any simple way of informing itself about this; it obtains all its 
information from the packets it captures during attack detection.
4.6. Teehno-economic analysis
The sole purpose of an intrusion detection system is to detect intrusions to the 
system it is protecting. But when choosing the right IDS product, IDS performance 
is not the only factor used in the selection process but some others such as scalability, 
availability and the total cost of the system relative to the price of the system the IDS 
is protecting, just to mention a few. That is why the overall evaluation of any IDS 
product is be based on a wide range of criteria. These criteria have been denned 
[19] in the common IDS architecture classification shown in Fig. 9. The architecture 
consists of both a quantitative and a qualitative component
The following is a brief description of the classification.
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Fig. 9. Common IDS architecture [22].
4.6.1. Quantitative evaluation architecture
An IDS sensor's job is to watch the network and detect attacks a role that is per­ 
formed by the packet-processing engine. To do this, the sensor looks at every packet 
on the network it is watching. The busier the network, the more packets there are 
to watch. If the sensor can't keep up, it will start to miss (or drop) packets. In the 
case that the attacks span multiple packets, the sensor holds the packets, assembles 
them and makes a determination on whether there is an attack. The extent and scope 
of accomplishing the above roles is the gauge of the effectiveness of the IDS and 
that is why the IDS performance is evaluated based on the ability of the process­ 
ing engine effectively filter and reassemble packets to any given network through­ 
put.
Equally important is the functionality of the IDS. In this case, the architecture is 
designed to define the operational setup that is used to assess the attack set detection, 
configuration alert triggering, logging and reporting facilities.
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4.6.2. Qualitative evaluation architecture
The architecture defines the evaluation criteria of the IDS based on certain usabil­ 
ity features such as ease of user interface (ease of use, ease of configuration, ease 
of filter customization); integration and interoperability with operating systems and 
existing network infrastructure; product maturity; company focus and price.
Although the focus of our work is primarily a subset of the Quantitative evaluation 
(performance testing), it is worth noting that there are other related issues that merit 
consideration. We have presented a comparison of the major features of both IDS 
products in Table 6.
From the perspective of cost benefit analysis, it is worthy to note that using our test 
results, 6 RealSecure sensors costing $53 970 will yield savings of almost $10 000 if 
deployment decision is based on the results on Fig. 6. It could also be said that the 
cost of the Gigabit sensor will fall with time thereby establishing an overall advan­ 
tage over the use of multiple 100 Mbps sensors.
On the other major issues, both sensors in their numbers will trigger multiple 
alerts but the Networklce sensor will benefit from easier operational management 
with other collateral cost savings.
5. Implications for Gigabit Network Systems
The study presented in this paper provides a side-by-side comparison of two dif­ 
ferent techniques for intrusion detection. One being older (Megabit IDS) and the 
other representing evolutions from pure megabit EDS to gigabit EDS based on the 
extension of recurrent characteristics of ID system to new technologies.
The results are significant because the data on which the techniques are evaluated 
represent a significant corpus of empirically obtained data by which the probability 
of detection of a given intrusion detection technique can be simultaneously mea­ 
sured and evaluated against that of another technique in order to compare the correct 
detection rates that could aid the process of selecting the most feasible IDS product.
Given that Gigabit requirements will increasingly become mandatory especially 
for carrier networks with associated problems of information overload and data man-. 
agement, there is the need for commercial as well as corporate network infrastruc­ 
tures to tackle IDS issues that come along with this. For example, with the deploy­ 
ment of one Gbps EDS could come the issue excessive alerts triggers. This is eVen 
the case with the deployment of multiple NEDS devices, even at medium traffic rates 
that trigger so many alerts. Our tests were not intended to address all the issues as­ 
sociated with large-scale IDS deployment but the performance characteristics based 
on defined environmental settings, which we think could be a fairly good general­ 
ization. For instance, there are some common things on most networks - things like 
more TCP traffic than UDP traffic, packet size trends, a certain percentage of native 
fragmentation, etc.
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Table 6 
IDS features





Integrates with file integrity checkers
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Customizable signatures
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The point being made is that the study is more about trying to find a better tech­ 
nique to monitor networks against intrusion and not without context, arguing about 
the best NIDS which is about as useful as arguing about the best OS.
In this work, we believe that based on the facts that its important to note that 
the requirements of an enterprise network that is deploying a few devices locally to 
watch over a class-C is going to be different from that of a multi-nadonal corporation 
that is deploying hundreds of devices.
C. Iheagwara a al. /A comparative experimental evaluation study 29
Figures 5 and 6 show the performance of the equality matching the probability for 
detecting attacks at a particular threshold of network load. Generally speaking, if the 
threshold is set low, then the detection rate will be high. Similarly, a threshold set too 
high may end up not detecting most intrusions.
While the figures are useful for quickly determining how many attacks using a 
particular technique were detected, a more useful measure of the performance of the 
techniques can be obtained from analyzing the effects of the different parametric 
variables such as traffic type and size distribution and network conditions.
A measure of the overall effectiveness of a given intrusion detection system can be 
provided by the Probability of Detection (POD) curve. A POD curve is a parametric 
curve that is generated by varying the threshold of the intrusive measure (traffic type, 
particle size traffic distribution, etc.), which is a tunable parameter, and computing 
the probability of detection at each network utilization value. The curve is a plot of 
the likelihood that an intrusion is detected under defined network load conditions, 
against the likelihood that a non-intrusion is misclassified (i.e., a false positive) for 
a particular parameter, such as traffic type, particle size traffic distribution, tunable 
threshold, etc. The POD curve can be used to determine the performance of the ID 
system for different network load utilizations under any given configurable thresh­ 
olds, or for comparing the performance of different intrusion detection techniques 
for given network utilization values.
5.1. Selective and adaptive deployment based on network capture/packet analysis
Packets per second and overall bandwidth are two of the common criteria for any 
networking equipment. These metrics are important for IDS for the same reasons. 
Packets per second allow quantification of the maximum amount of sustained load 
that can be handled with very little, time to handle each packet. Maximum packet 
rate is achieved by lowering the packet size to the Ethernet minimum of 64 bytes. 
However, best practices entail pre-deployment analysis of the network traffic. This 
can be realized by testing the IDS over different packet sizes. Testing with only 64 
byte packets, for sure, will make it difficult to evaluate the different effects variable 
packet sizes will have on the capture ability of the IDS sensor. As a result, this will 
not be effective.
From the performance standpoint, NIDS observes packets on the wire. If packets 
are sent faster than the NIDS can process them, there is no degradation in the network 
performance because the NIDS does not sit directly in the flows of data. However, 
the NIDS will lose effectiveness and packets could be missed causing both false- 
negatives and false-positives. It is therefore better to avoid exceeding the capabilities 
of IDS so as to maximize benefits. From a routing standpoint, IDS, like many state- 
aware engines, does not operate properly in an asymmetrically routed environment. 
Packets sent out from one set of routers and switches and returning through another 
will cause the IDS systems to see only half of the traffic, causing false-positives and 
negatives.
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An IDS is most useful when there is an unusual traffic stream passing through the 
network. If the IDS could not handle the full bandwidth available with an upstream 
provider, at 64 byte packets, and a denial of service (DDoS) attack comprised of only 
64 byte packet is initiated, the IDS will fail. There is therefore a need to have an EDS 
that can handle 64 byte packets up to and including the full load that could possibly 
be sent it's way. At the same time, the IDS needs to still watch and alarm at activity 
that might be going on in the 'noise' of the DDoS.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how a probabilistic method can be used to determine 
the performance of the IDS in a Gigabit traffic stream for multiple IDS 100 Mbps 
sensors. Two misuse detection techniques for evaluating the performance of the IDS 
against tunable parametric specifications were presented. The techniques use a uni­ 
form methodology to measure the ability of the IDS to detect attacks under vary­ 
ing test parameters. The ability of intrusion detection systems to correctly iden­ 
tify the attacks was measured under different network configurations. The perfor­ 
mance of the different intrusion detection systems was compared by testing them 
with known common vulnerability exploits (CVE) provided by the SAN Intrusion 
Detection Evaluation program. The results of this analysis provide us with a prob­ 
abilistic framework for assessment of deployment of IDS's within a Gigabit traffic 
stream.
In this regard, the test results show that in general, IDS performance is greatly 
influenced by bandwidth utilization. The following are conclusions drawn from the 
study:
1. For a Gigabit traffic throughput ranging from 100 to 600 Mbps, more than 75 % 
attack detection rate is realizable with a maximum of 6 RealSecure sensors or 
1 Networklce sensor. Beyond this point, detection rate drops to undesirable 
levels although only about 4 RealSecure sensors will be needed to match the 
detection rate of 1 Networklce Gigabit sensor.
2. Networklce sensor is more effective in detecting attacks in the low Gigabit level 
range (100 to 300 Mbps), while multiple Realsecure sensors are more effective 
at Gigabit traffic throughput ranging above 300 Mbps.
3. Generally, the detection rate for both types of IDS decreases with increase in 
network utilization. The decrease is more pronounced above 600 Mbps of net­ 
work utilization.
4. Additionally, beyond 800 Mbps the detection rate falls to undesirable limits for 
both IDS sensor types.
Finally, it is concluded that currently available IDS products if selectively utilized 
based on effective deployment techniques are realistic technologies that could pro­ 
vide a reasonable measure of security monitoring in Gigabit networks with large
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traffic volumes. In comparative terms, when the cost and other techno-economic fac­ 
tors are taken into account, the use of a single Gigabit IDS sensor instead of multiple 
lOOMbps IDS sensors will be advantageous.
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Appendix
Specifications of the SmartBits ML-7710
The 10/100 Ethernet SmartBit cards (ML-7710) are interfaces that transmit traf­ 
fic to the various interfaces of devices under tests. It is used for network perfor­ 
mance analysis for 10/100/Gigabit Ethernet, ATM, Packet over SONET, Frame Re­ 
lay, xDSL, Cable Modem, IP QoS, VoJP, Routing, MulticastTP, and TCP/IP.
Specifications of the AppSwitch ASS502
The AppSwitch is a switch that was designed to include IDS redundancy, flood 
protection and 100% inspection of attacks. Data can be gigabit broken into smaller 
100 mbps chunks or many 100 mbps segments combined into a gigabit IDS (and 
combinations between). The following are the specifications. 
One lOOOBase-SX input port 
12 10/100Base-TX full duplex output ports 
Processor: 125 MhzRISC 
RAM: 128 Mb DRAM/4 Mb SRAM 
Firmware/OS version 3.11
Attacker configuration
The attacker is an Intel-based system running Windows NT 4.0 server (with Ser­ 
vice Pack 6) loaded with Network Associates CyberCop scanner which has a modu­ 
lar IDS test suite and interactive CASL script generator.
Target system configuration
The targets are two Windows NT 4.0 servers with Microsoft US Web server, ftp 
server, and Hermes mail server software installed and active.
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Background traffic generator
The load generator was a SmartBits tester configured to generate 3 UDP sessions 
from each of the 12 transmitting ML7710 modules for a total of 36 Sessions or 
streams.
RealSecure Sensor
A standard PC with the following hard and software configuration: Pentium III 
600 MHz processor, 256 Mb RAM, 100 Mb disk space plus 100 Mb per managed 
sensor on the console. NT 4.0 Workstation with SP6, Internet explorer 5.5 and two 
100 Mbps Ethernet Intel Pro/100+ PCI adapters (one configured for stealth monitor­ 
ing and the other in promiscuous mode). The sensor analyzes the packets on the wire 
and alerts if it senses an attack.
NetworklCE Gigabit sensor
NetworkICE Gigabit sensor was configured per manufacturer's specification.
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1.0 Abstract
This paper discusses emerging approaches to risk as­ 
sessments, as well as the issues and challenges that are 
presented when applying certain risk assessment 
mediods to increasingly complex and interdependent 
infrastructures, such as government agencies with dis­ 
persed locations and distributed architectures. Further, 
the paper provides an approach to support decision- 
making about appropriate techniques for the assess­ 
ment of the IDS or other security products in a given 
networked system. On a broader level, it is hoped that 
the novel concept presented here will serve as a foun­ 
dation for further developing and formalizing the de­ 
scription, asset valuation, analysis and selection of 
cools to support risk management of security products 
in complex environments.
2.0 Introduction
The constandy evolving and fast-changing corporate 
security policies and government regulations aimed 
at addressing the increasingly networked environ­ 
ment and complex of interdependent infrastructures, 
risk management is becoming an increasingly impor­ 
tant tool in corporate management strategies.
"Financial losses to business and government due 
to Internet vulnerabilities could exceed $100 billion 
per year by 2004" [DOS01]. It seems to be a realis­ 
tic view, since Computer Economics, a California-
based Internet research organization, estimates the 
economic impact of only the last four major mali­ 
cious code incidents (Love Bug, SirCam, Code Red, 
Nimda) to be over $13 billion [COM02]. It is obvi­ 
ous to say that "as die number of companies con­ 
ducting business on the Internet rises, so too does 
the sophistication and number of cyber attacks."
Based on their own projections, Computer Eco­ 
nomics notes that the probability of targeting and 
hitting each organization is growing: "Computer 
crime will grow by an estimated 230 percent during 
2002. Similar trends are expected with Internet 
fraud, which will be up over 100 percent, and 
viruses, which will increase by 22 percent during the 
same period." Even more disturbing is underreport­ 
ing: "According to government and industry sources, 
only about 20 percent of computer security viola­ 
tions are actually reported" [COM02].
Often risk assessments are conducted as a result of 
mandatory government audit requirement. For ex­ 
ample, the U.S. GAO, as a result of an annual audit 
of a selected government agency, reports that the in­ 
formation system controls is a material weakness in 
the agency's Highway Trust Fund's financial audit 
report for the fiscal year under review. This could 
then prompt an audit of the information system 
general controls.
The GAO evaluation is usually based on the Fed­ 
eral Information System Controls Audit Manual 
(FISCAM), which contains guidance for reviewing 
information system controls diat affect the integrity, 
confidentiality and availability of computerized data, 
along with the May 1998 GAO study of security
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management best practices at leading organizations.
As a result of the GAO audit, the agency's manage­ 
ment could conduct a risk assessment on its IT infra­ 
structure, including critical information system 
control mechanisms, local and wide area networks. 
"The assessment will serve as the agency's critical busi­ 
ness driver for IT security practice and any subse­ 
quent mitigation and compliance program.
[n die past decade, several risk management ap­ 
proaches have been introduced [RISKIT] and while 
some organizations, especially in the U.S. defense 
sector [RISKIT], have defined their own risk man­ 
agement approaches, most organizations do not 
manage their risks explicidy and systematically. Risk 
management based on intuition and individual ini­ 
tiative alone is seldom effective and rarely consistent 
either across time or across industry norms.
The use of risk management in corporate entities 
has not been widiout problems. There are various 
reasons for this, including known issues with user ac­ 
ceptance of the results. When risk management 
methods are used, they are often simplistic and users 
have little confidence in the results of their risk analy­ 
sis results. The following factors contribute to the 
low use of risk management methods in practice: 
0 Risk is an abstract and fuzzy concept and users 
lack the necessary tools to define risk more ac­ 
curately for deeper analysis. 
0 Many current risk management methods are 
based on quantification of risks for analysis and 
users are rarely able to provide sufficiently accu­ 
rate estimates for probability and loss for the 
analysis results to be reliable. On the other 
hand, table-based approaches are often biased 
and too coarse for risk prioritization. 
0 Risks have different implications to different 
stakeholders. Few existing methods provide 
support for dealing with these different stake­ 
holders and their expectations. 
0 Each risk may affect a project in more than one 
way. Most existing risk management approaches 
focus on cost, schedule or quality risks, yet their 
combinations or even other characteristics (such 
as future maintenance effort or company repu­ 
tation) may be important factors that influence 
the real decision-making process. 
J Many current risk management methods are 
perceived as too complex or costly to use. A risk
management method should be easy to use and 
require a limited amount of time to produce re­ 
sults; otherwise it will not be used. 
Given the increasing interest in risk management, 
there is the need for the present risk management 
methods to gain wider acceptance. This can be real­ 
ized by evolving effective strategies to address the 
aforementioned issues. Furthermore, risk manage­ 
ment methods should also provide comprehensive 
support for risk management in projects, practical 
guidelines for application, reasons for communica­ 
tions between participants and credibility.
3.0 The Basic Principles of 
Effective Risk Assessment
An effective risk assessment method should be able, 
to address the issues (factors that contribute to the 
low usage of risk management methods in practice) 
listed. The specific characteristics can be described 
by the following principles [RISKIT].
1. The risk assessment method should result in 
explicit definition of objectives, constraints and 
other drivers that influence the project Risk is a 
relative concept; its definition depends on expecta­ 
tions that are associated with a situation. In order to 
analyze risks, it is necessary to formalize the expecta­ 
tions. When expectations are recognized and defined, 
we refer to them as goals. While some goals cannot be 
stated precisely, at least they should be identified and 
documented as well as the available information al­ 
lows. The method contains an explicit step and sup­ 
porting templates to assist in the goal definition.
2. The risk assessment method should provide 
precise and unambiguous definitions for risks. The 
common definition of risks, either by dictionaries or 
everyday usage, associates several different meanings to 
risk. It can refer to a possibility of loss, the actual loss 
that would result if the risk occurs, a factor or element 
that is associated with a threat, or a person that con­ 
tributes to the possibility of loss [RISK3T]. The dictio­ 
nary definitions for risk are so broad that it is fair to 
define risk as anything that is related to the possibility 
of loss. Clearly, there is some value in having such a 
broad and encompassing concept to facilitate initial 
discussion about risk However, we believe that this 
wide range of meanings associated to the word "risk 
can also prevent adequate precision in more detailed
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analysis or risks unless this ambiguity is explicitly ad­ 
dressed and removed.
3. The risk assessment method should be 
aimed at modeling and documenting risks quali­ 
tatively. The method provides conceptual and 
graphical tools to model different aspects of risks 
qualitatively, instead of requiring quantitative esti­ 
mation of risk probability and impact to take place 
' early in the project. Given the difficulty of these es­ 
timations and the often-ambiguous interpretations 
of risks, the margin of error in risk quantification is 
high. By emphasizing the qualitative understand­ 
ing of risks, there is a better basis for understand­ 
ing and communicating risk.
4. The risk assessment method should be able 
to use both ratio and ordinal scale risk ranking 
information to prioritize risks reliably. The 
mediod should reduce the estimation problem. In­ 
stead of forcing the quantification of risks using 
ratio scale metrics (often an unrealistic goal), the 
method only attempts to accomplish the necessary 
quantification of risks. For risk management pur­ 
poses, it may be enough to identify the biggest 
risks and propose action to control them, while the 
exact values of probability and loss may not be 
needed. The selection of the type of metrics to be 
used in risk analysis should be based on the objec­ 
tives of the analysis and the availability of data 
about risks.
5. The risk assessment method should use the 
concept of utility loss to rank the loss associated 
with risk. Many current risk management ap­ 
proaches are based on ranking of risks—based on the 
loss they cause to some specific attributes of the pro­ 
ject, such as cost, time delay or quality metrics. 
Often a single metric is used. This can be detrimental 
for two reasons. First, the use of a single metric, or a 
small number of metrics, can create strong bias away 
from secondary, yet influential goals that should be 
considered. Second, research in economics and man­ 
agement science has strongly indicated that decisions 
are made based on die changes in the expected utility 
(or utility loss) of alternatives. As the utility functions 
of stakeholders are likely to be non-linear, use of di­ 
rect loss metrics can lead to wrong estimates and 
rankings of die risks.. Therefore, die risk assessment 
mediod should use die concept of utility loss to com­ 
pare and rank losses of risks.
6. Different stakeholder perspectives should 
be explicitly modeled in the risk assessment 
method. All projects have more than one stake­ 
holder that is interested in its results. They may 
have different priorities and levels of expectations. 
Risk management should be based on the recog­ 
nition of these stakeholder expectations and pri­ 
orities. Traditionally, direct project metric based 
approaches cannot easily support the comparison 
of different stakeholder views and few risk man­ 
agement approaches attempt to address the issue. 
The risk assessment method should support 
stakeholder views by documenting their expecta­ 
tions explicitly and evaluating the utility loss for 
each separately.
7. The risk assessment method should have an 
operational definition and training support. 
The risk assessment mediod should have an opera­ 
tional definition so diat it can be applied easily and 
consistently. There should be a tutorial available 
and an application guideline.
in Risk Management
Risk, the possibility of damage or loss, is described 
mostly in dependencies of threat and vulnerability, 
or impact and probability. The general framework 
developed by NIST workshops in 1992 [CRA98] 
formalized six concepts in risk analysis: "assets, vul­ 
nerabilities, threats, impacts, likelihoods and safe­ 
guards. " In another framework Ozier lists 12 
elements of risk by indicating quantifications and 
dependencies (e.g. motivation, capability and re­ 
source availability for threat agents) for some of 
them [OZI99].
There is a wide consensus among information se­ 
curity professionals that a 100 percent infallible se­ 
curity solution is not realistic or affordable. Failsafe 
security plans are often not practical since the mea­ 
sures would cost more than the asset value to be 
protected. Thus die emphasis of dealing with risks 
in this context moves from risk avoidance to risk 
management. Basically risk analysis and risk man­ 
agement are defined as follows [CHI97]: 
d Risk analysis involves the identification and as­ 
sessment of the levels of risks calculated from 
the known values of assets and the levels of
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threats to, and vulnerabilities of, diose assets. 
0 Risk management involves the identification, se­ 
lection and adoption of countermeasures justi­ 
fied by the identified risks to assets and the 
reduction of those risks to acceptable levels. 
Thus, the measure of risk can be determined as a 
product of threat, vulnerability and asset values.
The risk elements and their corresponding coun­ 
termeasures can best be visualized with a cuboid 
(Figure 1). The system has an initial level of risk 
before any countermeasures are applied. Counter- 
measures, assuming diat their values are assigned 
by the same parameters diat are used for threat, 
vulnerability and asset valuation, can reduce risk, 
i.e., by reducing threat (locked doors, firewalls), re­ 
ducing vulnerability (awareness, patches, hot fixes) 
or reducing asset value (encryption). After calculat­ 
ing the results from each combination of threat, 
vulnerability, asset and countermeasure die residual 
risk is determined [BREOO]. Here the impact ele­ 
ment is covered in asset value, die likelihood in 
threat and vulnerability values.





figure I Risk as a function of asset value, threat
Considering the business environment and re­ 
sources available, the decision-makers in an organi­ 
zation may then implement one or more of the 
following risk management strategies: 
0 Risk mitigation (reducing die risks with apply­ 
ing selected countermeasures) 
" Risk acceptance (accepting the residual risk or
even the initial level if the countermeasures are 
more cosdy dian die asset values) 
n Risk transfer (transferring the risk to another or­ 
ganization, e.g., by insurance or outsourcing) 
The option of eliminating assets may also be men­ 
tioned here in case of very high risk, unavailable or 
unaffordable countermeasures as well as impossible 
risk transfer.
5.1 Development phases
The present dieory of risk assessment is relatively 
robust because of significant developments flowing 
from first- to fourth-generation tools. While the 
concept of risk has not changed very much, die ap­ 
proach and die technology have. At die present 
time we can categorize risk assessment methodology 
(technology) as belonging to four generations. The 
first consists of paper-based methods, e.g., 
CRAMM, "Memo 10." These methods deal with 
risk in simple terms (high, medium and low), diey 
are ignorant of specific software vulnerabilities, deal 
in generic network topologies and use look-up ta­ 
bles in order to calculate the risk. Second-genera­ 
tion tools are merely a software version of their 
first-generation counterparts. Third-generation 
tools (such as "Expert") make use of vulnerability- 
safeguard libraries diat are regularly updated, which 
allow for network scanning and the use of more so­ 
phisticated algoridims. Fourth-generation tools 
(e.g., RiskWatch) have undergone considerable re­ 
finements that make it possible for die effectiveness 
of safeguards to be determined and the risk of dif­ 
ferent networks to be compared.
Today, risk analysis methodologies include identi­ 
fication and valuation of assets, followed by identify­ 
ing threats likely to occur to them with related 
vulnerabilities. Finally, risk is determined for combi­ 
nations of identified assets, threats and vulnerabili­ 
ties to propose appropriate countermeasures. 
During this process two different measurement 
schemes can be applied to risk elements; quantita­ 
tive or qualitative. The quantitative approach articu­ 
lates risk in numerical terms, i.e., expected monetary 
loss and probability (e.g., Annual Loss Expectancy, 
ALE). The qualitative approach has no numeric
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value and is usually opinion based. Results are sum­ 
marized in words like "low," "medium" and "high."
There are several methodologies promulgated 
via U.S. government FIPS 65 guideline (with­ 
drawn in 1995) for performing risk analysis in 
large data processing centers [GIL89]. Recent ap­ 
proaches attempt to adapt technological advances 
like the Internet by prototyping real-time risk 
analysis [VEN99] and emerging applications like 
e-commerce by using case- 
based reasoning [CHA99] or 
consider a framework for the 
"whole system" during the risk 
management life cycle 
[CRA98]. In the latter work 
and especially in [LAB99] 
three generations of risk 
analysis and management 
methodologies are identified 
and their shortcomings dis­ 
cussed, in which the first generation corresponds 
to the mainframe era, the second to networks and 
distributed computing, and the third to open en­ 
vironments and the Internet.
If a security level is high 
and a threat frequency is
low, it is hard to 
assign corresponding
numbers to these
ratings and come up with
a useful outcome.
Quantitative and qualitative risk analyses offer two 
perspectives to the assessment of risk. The argu­ 
ment for justifying quantitative risk assessment is 
that cost-effective safeguards cannot be evaluated 
against losses unless the risks are quantified. Quali­ 
tative methodologies emphasize descriptions rather
than calculations. Quantitative risk assessments 
make use of a mathematical calculation produced 
from the probability of an event occurring and the 
likely loss should it occur. This is called the Annual 
Loss Expectancy (ALE). Probability can rarely be 
precise and can, in some cases, promote compla­ 
cency. In addition, controls and countermeasures 
often tackle a number of potential events and the 
events themselves are frequently interrelated. In 
qualitative risk assessment, 
probability data is not required 
and only estimated potential 
loss is used. The quantitative 
approach attempts to assign 
real numbers to the costs of 
countermeasures and tlie 
amount of damage that can 
take place [Harris]. The quan­ 
titative approach also provides 
concrete probability percent­ 
ages when determining the likelihood of threats and 
risks. Each element widiin the analysis (asset value, 
threat frequency, severity of vulnerability items) is 
quantified and entered into equations to determine 
total and residual risks. Purely quantitative risk 
analysis is not possible because the method is at­ 
tempting to quantify qualitative items. If a security 
level is high and a threat frequency is low, it is hard 
to assign corresponding numbers to these ratings 
and come up with a useful outcome.
The classic quantitative algorithm, as presented in 
FIPSPUB-65, which laid the foundation for infor-
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mation security risk assessment, is presented below: 
(Asset Value x Exposure Factor = Single Loss Expectancy) x
Unnualized Rate of Occurrence = Annualized Loss Expectancy 
for example, let's look at the risk of fire. Assume 
the Asset Value is $ 1 million, the exposure factor is 
50 percent, and the Annualized Rate of Occur­ 
rence is 1/10 (once in 10 years). Plugging these val­ 
ues into the algorithm yields the following: 
($111 x 50% = $500K) x 1/10 = $SOK
Using conventional cost/benefit assessment, the 
$50K ALE represents the cost/benefit break-even 
point for risk mitigation measures. In other words, 
the organization could justify spending up to $50K 
per year to prevent the occurrence or reduce the im­ 
pact of a fire.
The qualitative approach does not assign mone­ 
tary values to components or losses. Instead, quali­ 
tative methods walk through different scenarios of 
risk possibilities and rank the seriousness of the 
threats and the sensitivity of the assets. Qualitative 
analysis techniques include judgment, intuition 
and experience. Examples of qualitative techniques 
are Delphi, brainstorming, storyboarding, focus 
groups, surveys, questionnaires, checklists, one-on- 
one meetings and interviews.
Because of the nature of risk assessment, there 
are inherent advantages and disadvantages in both 
methodologies.
In the following brief analysis, the features of specific 
risk assessment tools will not be discussed. Rather, the 
pros and cons associated in general with qualitative 
and quantitative methodologies will be addressed.
Quantitative and qualitative approaches have their 
own pros and cons and each applies more appropri­ 
ately to certain situations. The organization, risk 
analysis team, and the tools they decide to use will de­ 
termine which approach is best based on the culture 
and local environment. There are several advantages 
and disadvantages for each assessment methodology.
Qualitative—advantages
0 Calculations, if any, are simple and readily un­ 
derstood and executed.
^ It is usually not necessary to determine the mon­ 
etary value of information (its availability, confi­ 
dentiality and integrity).
G It is not necessary to determine quantitative 
threat frequency and impact data.
G It is not necessary to estimate the cost of recom­ 
mended risk mitigation measures and calculate 
cost/benefit.
G A general indication of significant areas of risk 
that should be addressed is provided.
Qualitative—disadvantages
G The risk assessment and results are essentially 
subjective in both process and metrics. The use 
of independently objective metrics is eschewed.
G No effort is made to develop an objective mone­ 
tary basis for the value of targeted information 
assets. Hence, the perception of value may not 
realistically reflect actual value at risk.
O No basis is provided for cost/benefit analysis of 
risk mitigation measures, only subjective indica­ 
tion of a problem.
G It is not possible to track risk management perfor­ 
mance objectively when all measures are subjective.
Quantitative—advantages
O The assessment and results are based substantially 
on independently objective processes and metrics. 
Thus meaningful statistical analysis is supported.
CD The value of information (availability, confiden­ 
tiality and integrity), as expressed in monetary 
terms with supporting rationale, is better under­ 
stood. Thus, the basis for expected loss is better 
undetstood,
G A credible basis for cost/benefit assessment of risk 
mitigation measures is provided. Thus, informa­ 
tion security budget decision-making is supported.
G Risk management performance can be tracked 
and evaluated.
G Risk assessment results are derived and expressed 
in management's language, monetary value, per­ 
centages and probability annualized. Thus risk 
is better understood.
Quantitative—disadvantages
G Calculations are complex. If they are not under­ 
stood or effectively explained, management may 
mistrust the results of "black box" calculations.
G It is not practical to attempt to execute a quanti­ 
tative risk assessment without using a recognized 
automated tool and associated knowledge bases.
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A manual effort—even with the support of a 
spreadsheet and generic statistical software—can 
easily take 10 to .20 times the work effort re­ 
quired with the support of a good automated 
risk assessment tool.
O A substantial amount of information about the 
target information and its IT environment must 
be gathered.
D As of this writing, there is not yet a standard, in­ 
dependently developed, and maintained threat 
population and threat frequency knowledge base. 
Thus users must rely on the credibility of the 
vendors who develop and support extant auto­ 
mated tools or do threat research on their own. 
What is known with certainty is that all the meth­ 
ods involve some level of subjectivity and the quan­ 
titative approach expresses risks in monetary values. 
Quantitative assessments are ineffective in organiza­ 
tions with poor IT accounting management prac­ 
tices. This is because of the high dependence of the 
automated tool on data input accuracy. When and 
where that is the case, the qualitative methodology 
should be the appropriate approach.
Since the qualitative metrics are all subjective in 
nature, the first two metrics, "Low, Medium and 
High, or Ordinal Ranking," can characterize virtu­ 
ally every risk element. "Vital, Critical and Impor­ 
tant," however, are descriptive only of an asset's 
value to an organization.
The qualitative approach makes no effort to scale 
risk or to value information assets. Rather, the ap­ 
proach seeks to identify in-place safeguards, com­ 
pare those with what industry peers are doing to 
secure their information, and then enhance secu­ 
rity wherever it falls short of industry-peer security. 
A further word of caution is appropriate here. The 
approach is founded on an interpretation of "due 
care" that could sometimes be at odds with the 
well-established legal definition of "due care."
6.0 Risk Assessment ot IDS/ 
Security Products in Complex Environments
Today's technology base is becoming increasingly 
large and complex. Networks are growing, and appli­ 
cations are being migrated from centralized systems to
client-server environments. In addition, organizations 
are connecting their networks to those of other orga­ 
nizations and to the Internet at a rapid rate. All of this 
added complexity presents a challenge to administra­ 
tors who are responsible for managing these systems. 
The growth in the number of networked systems-has 
increased their complexity and has raised the thresh­ 
old of expertise required of these administrators.
Complexity has likewise increased due to die de­ 
sire to integrate the operational data of an enter­ 
prise and to provide centralized (thus controlled) 
access to that data. The technology of computer 
networks, on the other hand, promotes a mode of 
work that goes against all centralized efforts.
The enterprise network is a system that intercon­ 
nects a multitude of computers and devices for com­ 
munications and information/resource sharing. The 
design of an enterprise network is often an assembly 
of very dissimilar components. To keep the various 
interconnected parts of the system interoperable, ap­ 
propriate data transport and exchange technologies, 
rules and procedures are implemented.
The complexity of systems consisting of indepen­ 
dent, interacting components lies In the extremely 
large number of possible factors in which actions of 
the individual components can interleave.
The network design often incorporates an outside 
network, an intermediary (DMZ) network and an 
internal network. Among the mission-critical 
servers/devices in the network system are VPN, 
Web, FTP, DNS/Mail servers, routers, and FIX fire­ 
walls with redundant failover mechanisms and local 
directors for load balancing. A typical topology of 
the network is shown in Figure 2 (following page).
Thus, the complexities range from different sys­ 
tems applications to varied complex topological 
designs within a cross-functional business environ­ 
ment. Because of these complexities, it is often dif­ 
ficult to conduct accurate asset valuation of the 
individual components within the system.
6.2 Difficulties of asset valuation of networked 
devices in complex environments
Before appropriate security tools can be identified, 
valued and assessed, an organization must conduct a 
comprehensive examination of its networked assets. 
The organization must know and have documented 
all of its current and anticipated information assets,
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Figure 2 Typical enterprise network
along with the infrastructure in which these assets are 
stored and communicated. Policies must be clearly 
defined regarding expectations and responsibilities for 
physical, personnel and networked systems security, 
as well as the relationships between them. The organi­ 
zation must define expectations about how informa­ 
tion is communicated between internal and external 
entities. As the needs and activities of an organization 
change with time, it is imperative that knowledge 
about the organizations information assets, infra­ 
structure, personnel and policies be kept up-to-date 
and consistent with one another. The organization 
must also maintain current knowledge about the 
™ds of security problems to which their information 
assets, infrastructure and personnel may be suscepti­ 
ve. Once these preparations have been completed, 
and procedures put in place to maintain the currency 
and accuracy of policies and knowledge of the organi­ 
zation, then specific security objectives may be de- 
"•Kd for each information asset and service.
The practical reality is that the tasks involved in risk 
assessments can be overwhelming. This is because the 
process tends to establish metrics as yardsticks to prof­ 
fer remedies while at the same time trying to main­ 
tain, to a considerable degree, a high level of accuracy.
In complex environments, conducting risk as­ 
sessments becomes even more complex as a result 
of the difficulties created by the interplay of peo­ 
ple, technology and operations. Risk determina­ 
tion even with the simplest asset could be complex.
Historically, the use of automated tools has alleviated 
these problems in blunt fashions, but diey can be used 
successfully in environments where there are good ac­ 
counting practices and where the outcome of auto­ 
mated report satisfies the requirements of the 
information system management. However, it does 
seem that automated tools generally cannot meet all 
die requirements of complex, multi-dimensional envi­ 
ronments with non-traditional or governmental ac­ 
counting practices that require extensive modification.
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The determination of the asset value when there is 
interdependence in networked environments could be 
extremely difficult. This is because of the asset value 
when taken in up- and downstream dimensions. Thus, 
an asset such as IDS can be measured in so many di­ 
mensions and in tangible and intangible measures.
During risk assessments, certain challenges could 
be encountered, especially in complex infrastruc­ 
tures where die valuation of mission-critical security 
equipment like IDS could be difficult. Other diffi­ 
culties could manifest in obtaining the necessary 
data input needed for the quantitative calculations 
when the quantitative technique is used. The associ­ 
ated difficulties include:
O Inability to obtain input data when die agency's 
accounting practices do not readily provide the 
type of asset value data required by automated 
quantitative assessment tools. 
O Difficulties in obtaining meaningful financial 
information. Subsequently, inadequate financial 
data invalidates single and annualized loss ex­ 
pectancy (SLE and ALE) calculations, and im­ 
properly skews recommendations for safeguards 
with the greatest return on investment (ROI). 
D Lack of clear definitions for the agency's organi­ 
zational structures, which contribute to the 
challenge of not being able to place dollar values 
on assets. This affects asset values for personnel 
and supporting infrastructure. 
D Inability to obtain die agency's share of responsibili­ 
ties with other intra-agency entities—which makes 
it very difficult to assign partial responsibility. 
Because of the importance of the valuation process, 
I propose to introduce a new approach for risk as­ 
sessment asset valuation in complex infrastructures 
using the IDS as an illustration.
The main concepts of risk management and related 
equations are given in Table 2 (opposite page). In 
the world of new technologies, the interplay of tech­ 
nological processes, policies and risk management 
introduces complexities into risk management and 
requires the development and introduction of new 
approaches and concepts like that of the cascading 
threat multiplier (CTM) [KEV02] to accurately 
conduct valuation studies or calculate ROI for any 
acquired or developed technology.
CTM factors in die importance of other critical as­ 
sets tied (networked) to the specific asset being ana­ 
lyzed in the SLE calculation. It also coaxes risk 
analysts to think in broader terms and to look at the 
bigger picture when considering the risks associated 
with the compromise of a given asset. Thus, die intro­ 
duction of CTM will help in the analytical discussion 
and an accurate valuation and calculation of a mean­ 
ingful ROI. This lends credence to the efficacy of the 
selected approach used to determine the effectiveness 
of deploying IDS technology into a given network
With the introduction of the cascading threat 
multiplier (CTM)—a multiplying factor—the def­ 
inition of Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) is ex­ 
panded. CTM, although somewhat subjective, is 
introduced mainly for the purpose of adding "fla­ 
vor" to SLE. The formula for CTM is as follows:
Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) = I + ((UEA x EfS) / AV)
In this formula, Underlying Exposed Assets (UEA) 
is measured in dollars. These are the assets that are 
now exposed due to the compromise of a specific 
asset. Asset Value (AV) is identical to the calculation 
described elsewhere in this paper. Exposure Factor 
(EFS) represents Secondary Exposure Factor and is re­ 
lated to die percentage loss on the UEAs. Secondary 
Exposure Factor (EFS) is very similar to Exposure 
Factor (EF), as described in the standard equation in 
Table 2, with a few minute differences.
The primary reason for introducing EFS is to factor 
in the importance of an asset's logical location within 
a network For example, if the asset is a Web server 
that is in a true demilitarized zone (DMZ) and has no 
access into the network or to any other corporate 
servers, EFS would be low since it is unlikely that an 
attacker can use this device to further compromise the 
network. But if the asset is on the same broadcast do­ 
main as other servers are on (such as e-mail, DNS and 
FTP), or there is no access control between the asset 
and other servers, rhen EFS will be higher. Finally, if 
the asset is on a network that has access to the rest of 
the network, then EFS will be very high. Examples of 
this would include hosts that offer some public ser­ 
vices but are terminated within the internal network 
or hosts that have valid SSH keys to all other hosts.
It is important to consider what assets are easily (or 
even not so easily) accessible from a specific nee- 
worked asset once that asset is compromised. When a 
given asset is compromised and used as a staging
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Table 2 ROI Variables and Risk Equations
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AV (Asset Value) i
EF (Exposure Factor) ',
UEA (Underlying Exposed Assets)
EFS (Secondary Exposure Factor) :
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j AV = hardware + comm. software + proprietary software + data
; EF is the % estimation of the exposure of the initial compromised asset
! UEA is the estimation of the $ value of the assets behind the compromised 
initial asset
; EFS is the % estimation of the exposure of the UEAs
CTM (Cascading Threat Multiplier) New j CTM = 1 + ((UEA x EFs) / AV)
SLE (Single Loss Expectancy) New SLE = EF x AV x CTM
ARO (Annual Rate of Occurrence) ; New | ARO is estimated number, based on available industry statistics or experience
ALE1 (Annual Loss Expectancy New ! ALE1 = SLE x ARO
ALE2 (Annual Loss Expectancy New ALE2 = conservative 50% reduction of ARO when IDS is managed skillfully with 
with IDS using auto-response) 1 auto-response
ALE3 (Annual Loss Expectancy New j ALES = conservative 25% reduction of EF and EFS when IDS is managed skillfully with auto- 
with IDS using auto-response and j response and incident response 
incident response) !
T (Annual Cost) of IDS 
Technology and Mqmt





E (Annual Dollar Savings) gained New E = ALE1 - (ALE2 or ALE3) 
bystopping intrusions with IDS i
ROSI (Traditional Return on 
Security Investment) equation
ROSI = R - ALE, where ALE = (R - E) + T
ROI1 (6AIC ROI of IDS with New j ROM = ALE1 - ((ALE! - (ALE1 
_auto.-jfispDnse)... ....... ......_ ............. ... _.__._ _ .. . . .. ......
ROI2 (GAIC ROI of IDS with auto- New ROI2 = ALE1 - ((ALE1 - (ALE1 - 
response and incident response)
ALE2)) + T)
ALE3)) + T)
point for attacks on other assets inside and outside a 
company's network, it could have potentially devas­ 
tating consequences for the organization. If an attack 
is staged from die compromised asset to another asset 
outside the organization, even if die owner was not 
directly involved in the malicious activity, they can 
and probably will be held accountable. One can envi­ 
sion the UEA factor of SLE representing some por­ 
tion of a trusted business partners assets. It is easy to 
imagine the negative business impact die offending 
organization would encounter if one of their compro­ 
mised assets were used as a staging ground to compro- 
"tise and damage their business partner's assets.
What is the risk, quantified in dollars, of not con­ 
sidering a business partners assets when performing a 
valuation exercise on your company's assets, ones 
which, if compromised, may enable access to more 
sensitive data and systems? The CTM concept pro­
vides the analytical framework to closely scrutinize 
the assets under an organization's control, assign more 
comprehensive valuations to those assets, and to more 
accurately measure the impact that a compromise of 
these assets could have on the organization.
As a practical example, we assume that a Web 
server has been compromised and used by a mali­ 
cious person to stage attacks on other networked 
assets containing critical data valued at 10 times 
the amount (in dollars) of the data contained on 
the compromised Web server.
As the perpetrator hopscotches his way from asset 
to asset, penetrating deeper and deeper into the net­ 
work, he may finally gain access to critical data on a 
vulnerable asset deep inside the company's network. 
The CTM for the Web server would be calculated 
as follows if we surmise (best estimate or WAG) 
that the Secondary Exposure Factor of the Underly-
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ing Exposed Asset(s) is 70 percent:
CTH = I+((IO * .1) /I) = 8
Thus, the CTM has increased the SLE for the com­ 
promised Web server by a factor of 8. We can fol­ 
low the white arrow originating from the 
compromised Web server to better visualize this 
concept in Figure 3.
Figured Cascading threat multiplier
Tying the CTM concept back into the SLE cal­ 
culation, a new definition of Single Loss Ex­ 
pectancy can be expressed as:
SLE = EF x AV x CTM
A thorough risk management exercise should fac­ 
tor in the CTM concept by executing a more com­ 
prehensive valuation methodology, which included 
more subjective, intangible factors into their Asset 
Value (AV) variable calculation. As mentioned 
above, goodwill (i.e., business and consumer loy­ 
alty built on trust) and opportunity costs (i.e., 
choosing not to consider the effect that a compro­ 
mised asset can have on other assets) are somewhat 
analogous to the CTM concept when these intan­ 
gibles are factored into the Asset Valuation (AV) 
used in the SLE calculation.
The importance of capturing intangible value, 
and understanding the risks associated with jeopar­ 
dizing the value, is one of the more challenging as­ 
pects of risk and return analysis. By introducing
the CTM concept into the traditional SLE calcula­ 
tion we are attempting to make the capture of the 
intangible aspects of asset valuation a litde less 
daunting of a task.
The risk analysis calculations listed above can be 
tied to an accepted formula for calculating the .ROI 
for a security product.
Return on Investment (KOI) = Recovery Cost (R). ALE 
Where ALE = (R-E) + T, and E equals the savings 
gained by preventing an attack and T equals the 
cost of a security product. In Table 2 (previous 
page), each variable and risk equation is itemized 
for risk analysis and ROI calculations for IDS de­ 
ployment in complex infrastructure. A review of the 
table shows how the traditional Return on Security 
Investment ROSI equation has been tied back to 
the ALE containing the CTM factor, i.e.,
ROSI = R - ALE,
Where the commonly accepted ALE = (R - E) + T 
is now replaced with
ALE = ARO * SLE, 
And
SLE = AV * EF * CTM
Consequently, when all the numbers are tied to­ 
gether, the efficacy of the devised methodology for 
security product (e.g., IDS) risk assessment and 
ROI calculation can be demonstrated through a 
case study approach.
In the final analysis, conducting an effective risk 
assessment in complex infrastructures is entirely 
dependent upon a good valuation of networked se­ 
curity devices like the IDS.
7.0 Conclusion
There are several approaches to consider when con­ 
ducting risk assessments for networked security 
products like Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). 
During a risk assessment, the assessment team uti­ 
lizes a multi-dimensional approach in anticipating 
on capitalizing on the benefits of both the qualita­ 
tive and quantitative assessment approaches. Both 
assessments methodologies have unique benefits, as 
well as their own weaknesses.
The goal of any risk assessment is to ensure that 
the security of the computer systems is cost effec­ 
tive, up-to-date, and that the countermeasures in 
place are responsive to the various threats. There is
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no one technique that can be relied upon as being 
the best. The product of the method selected will 
be as good as the input.
As noted earlier, it has been extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, for security products in complex 
environments to be assessed properly because of 
the difficulty to come up with asset values or re­ 
placement costs within the organization—ele­ 
ments critical to a risk analysis. SLE and ALE 
calculations are highly dependent on asset values 
in order to derive ROI of various mitigation 
strategies and safeguards. If accurate asset replace­ 
ment values cannot be obtained, the quantitative 
analysis has no value. You simply cannot quantify 
something you can't obtain figures for.
Several researchers have pointed out the impor­ 
tance of using IDS for risk management. To effec­ 
tively conduct a risk analysis of IDS, there is the 
need to have a sound understanding of the com­ 
pany, including at a minimum, the business prac­ 
tice, network topology and asset values. Equally, a 
good analysis of system vulnerabilities and associ­ 
ated threats should be addressed within the frame­ 
work of a sound security policy and risk mitigation 
techniques.
Therefore, we can conclude that without quan­ 
tifiable asset information, a quantitative analysis 
would provide little relative value to the organiza­ 
tion. Finally, a positive risk assessment of security 
products like the IDS is attainable with an effective 
technique that utilizes the concept of cascading 
threat multipliers. •
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ABSTRACT
In this paper we explore IDS deployment techniques and risk 
analysis methodologies. We discuss general IDS technologies 
and expand on the impact that the logical location of a 
company's critical networked assets could have on the risk 
equations. To this end we introduce the Cascading Threat 
Multiplier (CTM) to expand on the Single Loss Expectancy
(SLE) equation. We also review commonly accepted risk 
equations. We examine the effect of IDS management 
techniques on the annual loss expectancy. We propose new 
formulas for accurate risk analysis valuations culminating in a 
new formula for calculating ROI for security, otherwise 
commonly known as Return on Security Investment (ROSI). 
Finally, we demonstrate the efficacy of this equation through a 
casestudy.
Keywords: Intrusion Detection, Risk Assessment. 
I Introduction
The recent CSI-FBI survey [1] of 503 American organizations 
validated the continued concerns of business leaders today with 
doing business in the electronic era. Of the 503 organizations 
surveyed, 90% detected a security breach of their information 
systems and 80% experienced financial losses as a result of 
breaches. While internal threats remain a top priority, 40% cited 
breaches from outside their organization. Additionally, 85% 
experienced viruses and 74% stated their Internet connection 
*as most frequently targeted. The most signification piece of
data from this survey indicates that 90% of these respondents 
have a Web site, 90% have firewalls and antivirus programs and 
100% conduct business electronically in some fashion.
The statistics in the survey points to a notable trend, not 
necessarily the percentages, but simply that 100% of those 
surveyed are conducting business electronically and 90% of 
them have firewalls and antivirus, yet 90% reported system 
breaches. Protecting information systems today must be done in 
a layered process, which includes technology and human 
analysis. As the CSI-FBI survey revealed, most companies have 
already deployed firewalls and antivirus programs, and many 
are moving aggressively towards acquiring Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS), a security system that monitors computer
systems and network traffic and analyzes that traffic for possible 
hostile attacks originating from outside the organization and 
also for system misuse or attacks originating from inside the 
organization.
But given the high cost of an IDS deployment especially when 
multiple deployments are involved, organizations must justify 
implementation expenses by proving that the IDS is a value 
added resource. The justification is to prove that the 
deployment of the IDS is going to lead to a reduction in the 
annual loss expectancy (ALE) and the return on security 
investment (ROSI). This is realized if the IDS is able to 
effectively detect and deter attacks.
One method for justifying IDS is by determining the value of 
the ALE using conventional cost/benefit (risk) assessment; the
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represents *^e cost/benefit break-even point for risk 
measures. In other words, the organization could
nstify spending up to the dollar amount equivalent of the ALE 
ier year to prevent the occurrence or reduce the impact of a fire. 
^ risk assessment can identify what types of intrusions a 
company's infrastructure is vulnerable to and the potential for 
loss should an attack occur. It will also provide the justification 
of IDS deployment as an effective safeguard. Another way to 
analyze the benefits of IDS is to document the misuses of an 
organisation's network. The CSI-FBI survey shows that 78% of 
its respondents detected employee misuse of its systems and its 
Internet connection. This included web surfing, email abuse, and 
use of company hardware/software for personal gain. This 
misuse directly increases the risk of systems being attacked and 
information compromised, which can be tied to justifying the 
need and expense of IDS.
An alternative method for justifying IDS is to demonstrate the 
ibility of the IDS to effectively detect and deter attacks in 
quantifiable measures. There are performance studies [2,3,4] 
that demonstrate the different aspects to this. A more elaborate 
discussion on the performance studies is given in Section 2.
In this paper, we review risk analysis methodologies, introduce 
new (CTM) concepts into risk equations, explore the impact of 
threat mitigation on the annual loss expectancy (ALE) and 
correlate the effect of IDS management Echnique on threat
mitigation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we 
discuss current IDS deployment and implementation methods. 
We discuss risk assessment methodologies in Section 3. In 
Section 4 we present a novel concept to risk analysis - the 
Cascading Multiplier Effect (CTM) and discuss the relation of 
the annual loss expectancy (ALE) to threat mitigation in Section 
5. We then present a case study to illustrate the impact of 
deployment techniques on ALE reduction and a positive Return 
On Investment (ROI) in Section 6.
1 IDS Technologies and Deployments in Complex 
Environment
Intrusion detection is an overlay of two separate and different 
(N1DS) and Host-based IDS (HIDS) technologies. The primary 
advantage of NIDS is that it can watch the whole network or 
any subsets of the network from one location. Therefore, NTDS 
can detect probes, scans, and malicious and anomalous activity 
across the whole network. These systems can also serve to 
identify general traffic patterns for a network as well as aid in 
troubleshooting network problems. When enlisting auto- 
response mechanisms, NIDS can protect independent hosts or 
the whole network from intruders. NIDS does, however, have 
s«al inherent weaknesses. These weaknesses are its 
susceptibility to generate false alarms, as well as its inability to 
detect certain attacks called false negatives. NIDS also is not 
able to understand host specific processes or protect from 
unauthorized physical access.
HIDS technology overcomes many of these problems. However, 
HIDS technology does not have the benefits of watching the 
whole network to identify patterns like NIDS does. A 
recommended combination of host and network intrusion 
detection systems, in which a NIDS is placed at the network 
border and an HIDS is deployed on critical servers such as 
databases, Web services and essential file servers, is the best 
way to significantly reduce risk.
Generally speaking, most of these host-based systems have 
common architectures, meaning that most host systems work as 
host agents reporting to a central console. The associated cost of 
HIDS deployments can vary depending on vendor and software 
versions. A good baseline is that agents can cost between $500 
and $2000 each and consoles may cost in the $300045000 
range. This does not include OS, hardware or maintenance costs. 
Network intrusion detection systems can be deployed as stand­ 
alone hosts with a possible management interface or distributed 
sensors and management console. Generally speaking, 
commercially available sensors run in the $5000-$20,000 area 
depending on vendor, bandwidth and functional capabilities. 
Management consoles can be free or can cost several thousand 
dollars depending on the vendor. This does not necessarily 
include hardware or back-end databases. The total cost of an 
IDS deployment depends on implementation costs combined 
with the costs for managing the technology.
In the enterprise, IDSs are implemented as either a single or 
multiple deployments. Multiple IDS deployments are intended 
to solve the problem of the high volume traffic stream that are 
increasingly becoming common place in today's enterprise 
network systems that represent a vast array of complex 
technologies often with highly switched topology. A big reason 
many networks operate in a switched environment can be 
attributed to the security/performance benefits [5].
In considering the implementation of any IDS technology, a 
return on investment can be understood by analyzing the 
difference between annual loss expectancy (ALE) without IDS 
deployment and the ALE with IDS deployment, adjusted for 
technology and management costs. The ultimate initial goal, 
then, should be to prove that the value proposition (re: a benefit 
in the form of a quantifiable reduction in ALE) in implementing 
and effectively managing the IDS technology is greater than the 
implementation and management costs associated to deploying 
the IDS technology.
A positive return on investment (ROI) of intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) is dependent upon an organization's deployment 
strategy and how well the successful implementation and 
management of the technology helps the organization achieve 
the tactical and strategic objectives it has established. For 
organizations interested in quantifying the IDS's value prior to 
deploying it, their investment decision will hinge on their ability 
to demonstrate a positive ROI. ROI has traditionally been 
difficult to quantify for network security devices, in part 
because it is difficult to calculate risk accurately due to the 
subjectivity involved with its quantification. Also, business-
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[(levant statistics regarding security incidents are not always 
jviilable for consideration in analyzing risk.
is companies race to deploy ihore IDSs to meet the demands 
placed by Gigabit traffic the difficulty for accurate risk 
adulations will multiply. Another concern is how best to 
deploy the IDS so as to maximize performance benefits. This is 
s legitimate concern because of the correlation between the IDS 
mitigation ability and deployment technique as has been shown 
u Section 5. Studies [2] have demonstrated the effect of 
deployment techniques on the performance of the IDS. Equally, 
Ihe benefits of multiple deployments or the use of Gigabit 
sensors have been demonstrated [3], Iheagwara et al [3] 
Diamines the system benefits of using a single Gigabit IDS 
sensor instead of multiple Megabit sensors (see Figure 1 in 
Appendix 1) for a wide range of defined system attacks, 
network traffic characteristics, and for their contexts of 
operational concepts and deployment techniques. The 
tsperimental results were analyzed in the context of practical 
experiences in the operation of these IDS systems. The results 
of this analysis provide the probabilistic framework (Figure 2 in 
Appendix 2) for the performance measure of the IDS within a 
Oigabit traffic stream Specifically, the study point to the fact 
that the IDS detection rates increase with the number of sensors 
deployed thereby making the case for multiple deployments.
There is, therefore, every reason to believe that multiple IDS 
deployments will increasingly become a common place as 
companies scale up to Gigabit bandwidth. As noted before, ROI 
has traditionally been difficult to quantify for network security 
devices, in part because it is difficult to calculate risk accurately 
due to the subjectivity involved with its quantification. The 
difficulty becomes even more arduous in environments with 
multiple deployments, highly networked and interdependent. 
Hence, devising an effective technique or methodology for 
accurate risk analysis of multiple IDSs assumes a great 
importance.
Devising effective risk analysis technique for the IDS in 
complexity environments requires a re-examination of the basic 
concepts, assessment approach, and risk analysis formulas. 
Pertinent questions to which answers are sought include: how do 
we accurately assess the value and hence the effectiveness of the 
IDS? And what deployment techniques will have the most 
positive impact on threat mitigation and reduce the annual 
expectancy loss of protected assets? Before we explore the 
answers to these questions in Sections 4.0 and 5.0 let us review 
in the next Section risk assessment methodologies and the 
challenges of IDS risk assessment in complex environments.
'Assessment Methodologies
The landscape of risk assessment methodologies is constantly 
'lunging. Some methodologies promulgated via U.S. 
government FTPS 65 guideline for performing risk analysis in 
toge data processing centers [6] were withdrawn in 1995. 
Recent approaches to risk assessment attempt to adapt 
technological advances like the Internet by prototyping real-time 
isk analysis [7] and emerging applications like e-commerce by
using case-based reasoning [8] or considering a framework for 
the "whole system" during the risk management life cycle [9]. In 
the latter work and especially in [10], three generations of risk 
analysis and management methodologies are identified in which 
the first generation corresponds to the mainframe era, the second 
to networks and distributed computing, and the third to open 
environments and the Internet and their shortcomings discussed.
The following are the widely used methodologies in risk 
analysis.
3.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Methodologies
There are two broad approaches for risk assessment: 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies. In practice, none of 
the two are sufficient for a robust risk assessment of intrusion 
detection systems in complex environments - hence a new 
technique or assessment approach is necessary.
The quantitative approach articulates risk in numerical terms, i.e. 
expected monetary loss and probability (e.g. annual loss 
expectancy, ALE). The qualitative approach has no numeric 
value and is usually opinion based. Results are summarized in 
words like "low", "medium" and "high".
Quantitative and qualitative risk analyses offer two perspectives 
to the assessment of risk. The argument for justifying 
quantitative risk assessment is that cost-effective safeguards 
cannot be evaluated against losses unless the risks are quantified. 
This is not tenable with qualitative methodologies that 
emphasize descriptions rather than calculations. Quantitative 
risk assessments make use of a mathematical calculation 
produced from the probability of an event occurring and the 
likely loss should it occur to assign real numbers to the costs of 
countermeasures and the amount of damage that can take place 
[11], This is called the Annual Loss Expectancy. Probability can 
rarely be precise and can, in some cases, promote complacency. 
In addition, controls and countermeasures often tackle a number 
of potential events and the events themselves are frequently 
interrelated. In qualitative risk assessment, probability data is 
not required and only estimated potential loss is used.
The quantitative approach also provides concrete probability 
percentages when determining the likelihood of threats and risks. 
Each element within the analysis (asset value, threat frequency, 
severity of vulnerability items) is quantified and entered into 
equations to determine total and residual risks. Purely 
quantitative risk analysis is not possible because the method is 
attempting to quantify qualitative items. If a severity level is 
high and a threat frequency is low, it is hard to assign 
corresponding numbers to these ratings and come up with a 
useful outcome.
The classic quantitative algorithm, as presented in FIPSPUB-65 
[6] laid the foundation for information security risk assessment:
(Asset Value x Exposure Factor = Single Loss Expectancy) x
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Annualized Rate of Occurrence
Expectancy. (1)
Annualized Loss
for example, let's look at the risk of fire. Assume the Asset 
Value is $1M, the exposure factor is 50%, and the Annualized 
Rate of Occurrence is 1/10 (once in ten years). Plugging these 
values into the algorithm yields the following:
($1M x 50% = S500K) x 1/10 = SSOK
Using conventional cost/benefit assessment, the SSOK ALE 
icpresents the cost/benefit break-even point for risk mitigation 
measures. In other words, the organization could justify 
spending up to -SSOK per year to prevent the occurrence or 
reduce the impact of a fire.
Jhe qualitative approach does not assign monetary values to 
components and/or losses. Instead, qualitative methods walk 
Ihrough different scenarios of risk possibilities and rank the 
seriousness of the threats and the sensitivity of the assets. 
Qualitative analysis techniques include judgment, intuition, and 
experience. Examples of qualitative techniques are Delphi, 
brainstorming, storyboarding, focus groups, surveys, 
questionnaires (Table 1 in Appendix 3), checklists, one-on-one 
meetings, and interviews.
12 The Challenges of IDS Risk Assessment in Complex
Environments
The idea/concept of an IDS risk assessment is to demonstrate 
Ihrough the chosen methodology that the organization will 
suffer immensely if the IDS is not available in the event of an 
intrusion. Answers gathered from a formal risk assessment can 
help establish companies' valid business reasons for adding IDS 
to their infrastructure. The risk formulas used in the current 
methodologies do not factor in the new concepts presented in 
Section 4, which are needed to integrate the new elements 
introduced by technological improvements and changing 
landscapes.
Generally speaking, the risk assessment methodology for IDS 
follows the same methodology that is used in other assessments. 
However, a major difference is that performing an IDS risk 
assessment is like trying to determine the return on investment. 
In addition, because there are different deployment 
configurations i.e. deployment of multiple IDS sensors in the 
combination of firewalls, filtering routers, etc. the risk 
assessment effort in itself becomes determining how much the 
IDS contributes to the defense of the network.
In today's complex environments with increasingly large 
number of complex network architectures, the challenges 
become more profound. The enterprise network as a system 
*hich interconnects a multitude of computers and devices for 
At purpose of communications and information/resource 
sharing are complex environments trying to balance policy 
Priorities, user expectations, technological development and
demands, and scalability issues while under changing economic 
constraints. Developments in technology overwhelm almost 
every factor in its balance.
The complexity of the network environments gets more 
compounded with the addition of new technological resources 
used to integrate and centralize the enterprise systems, in order 
to control access to protected data. The technology of computer 
networks, on the other hand, promotes a mode of work that goes 
against all centralized efforts. Also with the growth of networks 
comes the migration of applications from centralized systems to 
client-server environments. In addition, organizations are 
connecting their networks to those of other organizations and to 
the Internet at a rapid rate. All of this added complexity presents 
a challenge to risk assessors who are responsible for making 
sure that the basic elements of risk assessment in such 
environments are accurate and takes into account all of the 
above mentioned relational schemes.
Also, the practical reality is that the tasks involved in risk 
assessments can be overwhelming. This is because the process 
tends to establish metrics as yardsticks to proffer remedies while 
at the same time try to maintain to a considerable degree a high 
level of accuracy. In complex environments, conducting risk 
assessments become even more complex as a result of the 
difficulties created by the interplay of people, technology and 
operations. In this case, risk determination even with the 
simplest asset could be complex.
The determination of the asset value when there is 
interdependence in networked environments could be extremely 
difficult. This is because the asset value can be taken in up and 
down stream dimensions. An asset value can be measured in so 
many dimensions and in tangible and intangible measures. This 
challenge is encountered in complex infrastructures where the 
valuation of mission critical security devices like intrusion 
detection products is difficult.
It is therefore, obvious that the current quantitative risk formulas 
are devoid of the new concepts that provide the analytical 
framework for accurate valuation of IDS devices that are deeply 
enmeshed in a complex web of new technological environments. 
The fact is that the technological environments are constantly 
changing while the risk formulas crucial for accurate valuation 
have not changed in commensurate proportions. The importance 
of a good risk assessment cannot be overstated because only the 
accurate valuation will lead to the establishment of the true cost 
of the IDS, which will be used to judge its performance against 
the cost of the asset that it is trying to protect.
In the final analysis, conducting an effective risk assessment in 
complex infrastructures is entirely dependent upon a good 
understanding of the environment and the accurate valuation of 
networked security devices like the IDS. In Section 4.0, we 
introduce the new concepts that tie the intangible factors into 
risk formulas and present through our analytical discussion a 
modular approach for the assessment of IDS devices in complex 
infrastructures.
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I Novel Concepts: The cascading Threat Multiplier
Die interplay of technological processes, policies and risk 
methods in today's enterprise environments
•(quires the formulation of new analytical frameworks and 
concepts like the Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) to 
jccurately conduct valuation studies and quantify the return on 
jjvcstment (R01) for any acquired or developed technology.
The CTM factors in the importance of other critical assets tied 
(re: networked) to the specific asset being analyzed in the SLE 
calculation. It also coaxes risk analysts to think in broader terms 
and to look at the bigger picture when considering the risks 
associated with the compromise of a given asset. Thus, the 
introduction of the Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) will help 
jj (he analytical discussion and an accurate valuation and 
calculation of a meaningful ROI. This lends credence to the 
efficacy of the selected approach used to determine the 
effectiveness of deploying IDS technology into a given network.
With the introduction of the Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) 
. a multiplying factor, the definition of Single Loss Expectancy 
(SLE) is expanded. CTM, although somewhat subjective is 
introduced mainly for the purpose of adding, "flavor" to SLE.
In our analytical approach working up to the calculation for ROI, 
we will use commonly accepted formulas and definitions 
associated with asset valuation, exposure, threat, vulnerability 
and loss expectancy. The Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM), 
an additional factor we've added to the mix, enables us to 
Expand on the widely accepted calculation for Single Loss 
Expectancy (SLE) where, traditionally, SLE = Exposure Factor 
(EF)x Asset Value (AV).
In order to stress the importance of the intangible considerations 
that will help us apply our holistic approach for quantifying risk 
ind calculating a meaningful ROI, the concepts of goodwill and 
opportunity costs should be considered when performing 
valuation exercises on company assets. Although intangible 
factors inherently introduce subjectivity into risk and return 
analysis, it is nonetheless an important step to consider 
intangibles before one can arrive at a more meaningful 
calculation of ROI. It is worth mentioning here that, in general, 
it may be safe to assume that organizations would tend to 
undervalue certain data assets if they have not fully taken into 
account (or bothered to understand for that matter) how these 
assets relate to the "big picture". It is simple human nature to 
lake the path of least resistance when given a choice. But that's a 
»cry dangerous path to take for anyone attempting to arrive at an 
accurate assessment of the value of data assets residing on their 
network. Understanding the tangible costs and benefits of an 
asset is much easier than understanding, or even considering for 
inat matter, the intangible costs and benefits associated to that 
sime asset. Clarifying this understanding is one of our 
challenges and one we will address throughout the rest of the 
wide as we work toward calculating the IDS ROI for Wally's 
Building Supplies, Inc.
The following are the commonly accepted risk/return analysis 
definitions and formulas[11]:
Asset value: One can measure an informational assets 
value by estimating the development, purchasing, 
licensing, supporting and replacement costs associated 
with the resource. Value can also be measured from an 
organizational as well as an external market 
perspective. The asset value is represented as follows:
Asset Value (AV) = hardware + comm. software + proprietary 
software + data. (2)
Exposure Factor: The Exposure Factor (EF) represents 
the percentage of loss that a realized threat could have 
on a specific asset when the specific threat matches up 
with a specific vulnerability. A threat is a single event 
that has the potential to cause damage to an asset and 
vulnerability is a known or unknown weakness that can 
be exploited by any number of known or unknown 
threats. The threat usually manifests itself through 
vulnerability in the information system.
Single Loss Expectancy: In the end, risk is evaluated 
in terms of money. This is true even if life is lost; in the 
case of loss of life, it may be a lot of money. For any 
threat we have defined, we take the value of assets at 
risk and multiply that by how exposed they are. This 
yields the expected loss if we were to get clobbered by 
the threat. This is called the single loss expectancy 
(SLE) and is expressed as
(SLE) = EF x AV. (3)
Annual Loss Expectancy: The Annual Loss 
Expectancy (ALE) is the annually expected financial 
loss to an asset resulting from one [specific] threat. 
The Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO) is the estimated 
number of times a threat on a single asset is estimated 
to occur. The higher the risk associated to the threat the 
higher the Annual Rate of Occurrence. The expression 
is given as
ALE = SLE x ARO. (4)
Now let's introduce a new concept, Cascading Threat Multiplier 
(CTM), into the mix. This will greatly aid us in our analytical 
discussion and move us further along in distilling a meaningful 
ROI calculation that can help us determine the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of deploying IDS technology into a given 
network.
The Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) shown in Figure 3 
(Appendix 4) is a multiplying factor that will be included into 
our expanded definition of Single Loss Expectancy (SLE). CTM 
is somewhat subjective and is introduced mainly for the purpose 
of adding a little more "flavor" to SLE. CTM factors in the 
importance of other critical assets tied (re: networked) to the 
specific asset being analyzed in the SLE calculation. It also
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siaKS us to think in broader terms and look at the bigger 
5icturewhen considering the risks associated to the compromise 
Jif i given asset. The formula for CTM is as follows:
(CrM)=l+((UEAxEFS)/AV). (5)
In this formula, Underlying Exposed Assets (UEA) is measured 
K dollars. These are the assets that are now exposed due to the 
jotnpromise of a specific asset. Asset Value (AV) is identical to 
the calculation previously described above. Exposure Factor 
(EPS) represents secondary exposure factor and is related to the 
percentage loss on the UEAs. Secondary Exposure Factor (EFS) 
jsvery similar to Exposure Factor (EF), as previously described 
in the standard equation above, with a few minute differences. 
He primary reason for introducing EFS is to factor in the 
importance of an assets logical location within a network. For 
example, if the asset is a Web server that is in a true DMZ and 
has no access into the network or to any other corporate servers, 
EFS would be low since it is unlikely that an attacker can use 
this device to further compromise the network. But if the asset is 
m the same broadcast domain as other servers are on (such as e - 
mail, DNS and FTP), or there is no access control between the 
asset and other servers, then EFS will be higher. Finally, if the 
asset is on a network that has access to the rest of the network, 
than Secondary Exposure Factor (EFS) will be very high. 
Examples of this would include hosts that offer some public 
services but are terminated within the internal network or hosts 
that have valid SSH keys to all other hosts.
It is important to consider what assets are easily (or even not so 
easily) accessible from a specific networked asset once that 
asset is compromised. When a given asset is compromised and 
used as a staging point for attacks on other assets inside and 
outside a company's network, it could have potentially 
devastating consequences for the organization. If an attack is 
staged from the compromised asset to another asset outside the 
organization, even when the owner was not directly involved in 
the malicious activity, they can and probably will be held 
accountable. One can envision the UEA factor of SLE 
representing some portion of a trusted business partner's assets. 
It is easy to imagine the negative business impact the offending 
organization would encounter if one of their compromised 
assets were used as a staging ground to compromise and damage 
their business partner's assets. What is the risk, quantified in 
dollars, of not considering a business partner's assets when 
performing a valuation exercise on your company's assets, ones 
tot, if compromised, may enable access to more sensitive data 
and systems? The CTM concept reminds us to closely scrutinize 
'lie assets under our control, assign more comprehensive 
valuations to those assets, and more accurately try to measure 
the impact that their compromise could have on the organization.
Let's assume that a Web server is compromised and used by a 
malicious person to stage attacks on other networked assets 
containing critical data valued at 10 times the amount (in dollars) 
of the data contained on the compromised Web server. As the 
Ptipetrator hopscotches his way from asset to asset, penetrating 
deeper and deeper into the network, he may finally gain access 
10 critical data on a vulnerable asset deep inside the company's
network. The CTM for the Web server would be calculated as 
follows if we surmise (re: best guess or WAG) that the 
secondary exposure factor (EFS) of the Underlying Exposed 
Asset(s) (UEA) is 70%: CTM = 1+((10 * .7) /I) = 8. The CTM 
has increased the SLE for the compromised Web server by a 
factor of 8. Follow the white arrow originating from the 
compromised Web server to better visualize this concept.
Tying the CTM concept back into our SLE calculation, our new 
definition of Single Loss Expectancy is as follows:
SLE = EF x AV x CTM. (6)
Factoring in our CTM concept makes for a more comprehensive 
valuation methodology that includes intangible factors into their 
Asset Value (AV) variable calculation. As mentioned above, 
goodwill (i.e. business and consumer loyalty built on trust) and 
opportunity costs (i.e. choosing not to consider the effect that a 
compromised asset can have on other assets) are somewhat 
analogous to our CTM concept when these intangibles are 
factored into the Asset Valuation (AV) used in the SLE 
calculation. The importance of capturing intangible value, and 
understanding the risks associated to jeopardizing that value, is 
one of the more challenging aspects of risk and return analysis. 
By introducing our CTM concept into the traditional SLE 
calculation we are attempting to make the capture of the 
intangible aspects of asset valuation a little less daunting of a 
task.
All of the above concepts of risk management and other related 
equations are given in Table 2 (Appendix 5) will lead us to 
accurately calculate the annual loss expectancy (ARO).
In Section 5.0 we explore the different deployment techniques 
and analyze within the context of operational performance how 
each technique affect the annual loss expectancy (ARO).
5 Deployment Technique vs. Threat Mitigation
The measure of risk can be determined as a product of threat, 
vulnerability and asset values:
Risk = Asset x Threat x Vulnerability.
AsseT
Counts- Values
Threat Counts- Va to
Vutoanfcflity
Fig. 4.Risk as a function of asset value, threat and vulnerability 
[12].
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The risk elements and their corresponding countermeasures for 
, specified system can best be visualized with a cuboid (Figure 
4) The system has an initial level of risk before any 
jountermeasures are applied. Countermeasures, assuming that 
Ijjeir values are assigned by the same parameters that are used 
for threat, vulnerability and asset valuation, can reduce risk, i.e. 
by reducing threat (e.g. locked doors, IDSs), reducing 
vulnerability (e.g. awareness, patches, hot fixes) or reducing 
uset value (e.g. encryption). After calculating the results from 
tjch combination of threat, vulnerability, asset and 
countermeasure the residual risk is determined [13]. Here the 
impact element is covered in asset value, the likelihood in threat 
ad vulnerability values.
The effectiveness of the IDS as a countermeasure to reduce 
threat in an organization is very dependent on the deployment 
lechnique. Independent of implementation and management 
costs, the method in which the devices are deployed can have a 
serious effect on the annual loss expectancy and the return on 
investment (ROI). Two deployment and management 
techniques - proactive and reactive are generally implemented. 
To this point, the key question to answer is: is the system going 
lo be proactive or reactive as security events are detected? The 
following in Table 3 depicts the normal event flow in each 
method. A proactive implementation response is automated by 
the system while a reactive implementation response is done 
once personnel have been enlisted.





























By examining the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE = ARO * SLE, 
where SLE = Exposure Factor * Asset Value * Cascading 
Threat Multiplier) we can determine which variables are 
affected by each of these two management methods. In a 
reactive design, where personnel must be engaged to respond to 
tach event, the exposure factors (primary [EF] and secondary 
[EPS]) will be affected. In a proactive design there will be 
similar benefits to the exposure factors (re: a reduction) and, in 
"Won, the Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO) will be 
influenced in a beneficial way as well. To demonstrate the 
""pact of threat vs. time (Figure 5 in Appendix 6) we will use 
the concept of primary and secondary mitigation windows. In 
™ following graph the primary mitigation window affects ARO
while the secondary mitigation window affects Exposure Factor 
and Cascading Threat Multiplier. An effective way of impacting 
ARO is through automated response.
Auto-response can take many forms. On host-based IDS this is 
sometimes called shielding, where a specific process is 
terminated. Network-based IDS generally employs TCP resets 
or shunning. TCP resets effectively kill one specific session 
based on suspicious activity, but it still allows other activity 
from that same IP. Shunning, on the other hand, changes 
firewall rules or router access lists and effectively denies all 
traffic from that host for a specific period of time. In essence, 
shielding will protect a single host from one process, resets will 
protect a host from a specific session, and shunning will protect 
the entire network from a specific host for a pre-determined 
amount of time.
The accuracy of automated response can vary tremendously. 
This is dependent on the skill level of the engineers managing 
the devices. If the engineers are moderately skilled then auto- 
response will not be very effective, which may adversely affect 
the ROI of the IDS deployment. This adverse effect may 
manifest itself in the form of a loss of productivity from 
network-related problems due to improperly implemented auto- 
response, as well as the additional fallout related to a false sense 
of security throughout the company.
With skilled engineers managing the devices, auto-response can 
be very accurate and effective. Because few statistics exist that 
illustrate the accuracy of automated response we will use 
statistics [14] generated from our analysis of one month's worth 
of data on networks that NetSolve, Incorporated manages. If we 
include Code Red and Nimda activity, in 99.96% of the attacks, 
where automated response was used to mitigate the threat, the 
activity was malicious. Excluding large-scale worms, the attacks 
were malicious in 95.8% of auto-response uses. Of the 4.2 % of 
the traffic that was not malicious, not all of it was desirable. 
Some of this traffic was peer-to-peer programs, on-line gaming, 
chat and other undesirable traffic that triggered alarms. The 
percentage of traffic that was denied that was business related 
was very small. It should be noted that many of these devices 
provide numerous different techniques for ensuring that very 
little, if any, legitimate traffic is denied through the use of 
automated response.
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To determine how effective the device is in recognizing attacks 
uewill use the most recent NSS study [15]. In this test the 
worst NIDS detected 67 of 109 attacks or 61.5%, while the best 
detected 94 of 109 attacks for an 86.2 % detection rate. Even the 
wrstcase, the 61.5% detection rate was out of the box and it 
wis reported that it would not be difficult to improve this with 
some custom signatures and tuning?
What does all this mean? It means that the worst IDS tested can 
still detect at least 61.5% of attacks. Realistically that number 
ihould be closer to 70% when a skilled engineer or technician 
manages the device. This ultimately means that the auto- 
response feature, when properly used, can be a very effective 
method of intrusion detection (and hence avoidance) which 
ultimately reduces the Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO).
In section 6.0, we present a case study to demonstrate how each 
deployment technique affect the annual loss expectancy (ALE) 
and the return on investment (ROI).
6 Case Study
This case study will permit the in-depth exploration of the 
benefits of performing risk analysis to maximize the 
management techniques of intrusion detection systems. From 
these, we hope to glean some general concepts about intrusion 
detection system ARO & ROI and determine the viability of the 
management approach that will enhance the maximization. By 
developing the examples, we also hope to develop a possible 
method of reasoning about IDS risk analysis more generally. 
The case study will be presented in the context of events and 
risk analysis in a hypothetical company called WBS, Inc.
6.2 The Wally's Building Supplies
The case study is a risk analysis of Wally's Building Supplies 
(WBS) shown in Figure 6 (Appendix 7), which experienced a 
VPN attack that resulted to a compromise of the company's 
assets. WBS has six supply outlets, with the business office 
located within the primary outlet. WBS has several business-to- 
business (B2B) VPN connections to its suppliers. Their small 
staging department procures most of WBS items for all six 
outlets over these B2B connections by running an over-the- 
counter order procurement software application agreed on by 
each of the suppliers. Of the dozen or so suppliers, ACME is 
WBS most important one, accounting for 50% of all WBS 
procurement needs. ACME and WBS have built their trust 
relationship over the course of many years doing business 
together. ACME has experienced phenomenal growth over the 
past decade and supplies scores of building suppliers around the 
country. WBS orders account for a mere 1% of total ACME 
sales.
For several years WBS has maintained a simple informational 
Web page showing store locations and directions, general goods 
and services available and monthly specials. The primary target 
market for WBS consists of residential and commercial building 
contractors. Contractors comp rise 75% of total WBS sales, with 
the remaining 25% generated from do-it-yourself consumers.
Recently WBS had contracted out the development of a 
dynamic database-driven Web site that allows contractors to 
order supplies on-line, check the status of their orders, and 
confirm deliveries to the construction site. The dynamic Web 
site has already had a positive effect on the operational ROI of 
WBS by improving efficiencies related to its' antiquated order 
fulfillment and delivery confirmation process. Inventory 
turnover has increased as a result of these efficiency gains, 
which in turn has improved WBS bottom line. That's the good 
news. WBS maintains Internet connectivity through a Tl. Most 
of WBS servers, routers and infrastructure have been set up by 
outside IT contractors. So what's the bad news?
6.1 Methodology
In Section 6.2 we describe the enterprise business setting of the 
company (Wally's Building Supplies) that we use in this case 
study. We then discuss the threats and attacks that 
compromised the security of the business in Section 6.3. Next, 
in Section 6.4 we analyze the attacks, compromises and 
contributing factors and delineate the sources of the security 
breach. Part of the analysis is the recommendation of the 
necessary safeguards to forestall future attacks and in this case 
deployment of intrusion detection systems. Based on the 
analysis results, we then calculate the annual loss expectancy 
ALE in Section 6.5. Finally, we summarize the results in 
Sectbn 6.6.
6.3 Compromise
WBS primary supplier, ACME, recently informed WBS that 
a malicious attacker gained access to ACME'S data and 
network through the VPN tunnel with WBS. It is unknown 
to ACME if this was an outside attacker or an ill-willed 
employee from WBS. Because of this, ACME has 
disconnected the B2B VPN with WBS and temporarily 
discontinued service with WBS until the issue is resolved. 
They have agreed to fulfill all outstanding orders in the 
interim. Since WBS has very little technical expertise, they 
called in ABC Security Consulting Services (ABC) for a 
thorough analysis of the alleged compromise. 
Using risk analysis concepts, we characterize the attack 
into three compromise scenarios (Table 5) for the purpose
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WBS NT 4.0 Web server (AV); 
WBS NT Domain (UEA)
WBS UNIX-based Web server' 
(AV); old internal WBS database 
containing inventory data and 1 
pricing for customers and suppliers! 
(UEA)
WBS router; Primary supplier! 
ACME'S network I
i.j Incidence Analysis
After extensive network and operational analysis by ABC, 
several key operational deficiencies were uncovered that 
revealed the inadequacies of the WBS network. Furthermore, 
ABC found several key security vulnerabilities and design flaws.
These vulnerabilities included:
run on the Web servers and a network-based IDS run at the 
border. See Table 4 for general statistics on how often these 
types of attacks occur (note: numbers in Table 4 are based on 
networks that NetSolve manages).
The choice of the IDS implementation scheme will depend on 
the scheme that provides the best annual loss expectancy and 
return on investment (ROI). In Section 6.5 we calculate the 
ALE and ROI to determine this.
6.5 Risk assessment calculations
Procedurally, once the Asset Valuations (AV & UEA) has been 
conducted and the Exposure Factors (EF & EPS) estimated, 
the single loss expectancy (SLE) and the Annual Rate of 
Occurrence (ARO) are then calculated. In general, there are two 
types of ARO -Site-specific ARO, which is generated from a 
site of interest, and National ARO, which is computed, based on 
the analysis of the annual frequency of threats.
The ARO is estimated based on available industry statistics [14]. 
The asset values were estimated based on current market prices 
[14]. The calculations were made using the risk formulas listed 
in Table 2. The results of the calculations are listed on Table 6 
in Appendix 8.
6.6. Interpretation of results
• The original static Web site was on a NT 4.0 server that 
was several service packs behind. This server ran 
multiple vulnerable programs. This server was also 
configured as a part of the NT domain so it had 
network access to many of the internal devices as if it 
was on the internal network. There was also no 
network access control between this server and the 
internal network.
• The newer dynamic Web site was on a modern Unix 
server that was relatively current. This was also the 
only Unix host on the network. This host was 
connected to an older internal database that contains 
inventory, availability, and pricing information. This 
was the contractor Web site and is a large part of the 
WBS business plan going forward. Even though this 
host was relatively current, it still had vulnerabilities 
within Apache and SSH and had FTP and RPC 
daemons running.
• WBS has a router that had the WEB management 
interface open on the internal interface (which was still 
accessible from the internet). This gives away complete 
router configuration, including VPN information and 
internal network architecture.
ABC recommended that there is a definite need for WBS to 
implement IDS technology to monitor the content of each 
connection. The recommendation is that a host-based IDS be
The results shows that auto-response affects primary mitigation 
windows, which has a direct impact on partially reducing the 
Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO). This is illustrated in table 6, 
where we see a beneficial conservative reduction in ARO of 
50% (highlighted in yellow in the "IDS w/Auto-Response" rows 
for each of the three scenarios). Equally, incident response 
affects the secondary mitigation window, which impacts 
exposure factor (EF) and secondary exposure factor (EPS), 
which in turn impacts the Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM). 
This is also illustrated in table 6, where we see a beneficial 
conservative reduction in EF and EFS of 25% respectively 
(highlighted in yellow in the "IDS w/ Auto-Response & Incident 
Response" rows for each of the three scenarios).
These reductions have positive effects on the Annual Rate of 
Occurrence (ARO) and the ultimately the Return on Investment 
(ROI) of IDS. Once the aggregate annualized savings (ALE1 - 
ALE2 or ALE1 - ALE3) occurring from IDS deployment equals 
the support costs associated to the deployment a positive ROI 
should materialize. In the case of WBS, the two ROIs (ROI1 & 
ROI2) for each support profile are as follows:
• Single support with IDS using auto-response (ROI1) = 
-4%;
• Single support with IDS using auto-response and 
incident response (ROI2) = 36%;
• MSSP support with IDS using auto-response (ROI1) = 
81%; and
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i MSSP support with IDS using auto-response and 
incident response (ROI2) = 155%.
The single support management scheme refers to the 
ujnagement by a single skilled in-house technician, 
nanagement in which there are five shifts of skilled technicians 
ptovidmg 24x7x365 coverage, while the MSSP schemes refers 
I3 the management provided by an MSSP.
; Conclusion
His studies presented in this paper underscores the importance 
uf the new concepts we have introduced into risk analysis 
formulas. When an IDS device is deployed in a complex 
5l)vironment a lot of factors are brought to bear on the 
performance index. In order to accurately measure the 
performance of the IDS using the annual loss expectancy (ARO) 
js a measure, it is necessary to formulate the analytical 
framework for asset valuation and risk calculations. This can be 
rtalized using the new concepts and formulas we have proposed.
Because the main function of the IDS in enterprise systems is to 
restrain or at least mitigate losses resulting from attacks, there is 
the need to optimize the effectiveness of the IDS using proven 
deployment techniques. In this regard, this study demonstrates 
the effectiveness of the proactive deployment technique in 
mitigation threat occurrence.
Finally, for an effective assessment of the IDS in complex and 
interdependent environments, there is the need to develop a 
suitable risk analysis framework. In the end, to maximize the 
performance of the IDS, you need to have a sound 
understanding of the enterprise environment including, at a 
minimum, how it does business, how its connected, where the 
asset value really lies and what vulnerabilities and associated 
threats (equating to risk and exposure) need to be analyzed and 
addressed through sound a security policy and risk mitigation 
techniques.
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Fig. 1 Multiple IDS deployment in a large enterprise system
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Fig. 3 Cascading threat multiplier
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Appendix 5
Table 2. Risk analysis equations
Variable
Asset Value (AV) '
Exposure Factor (EF)
Underlying Exposed Assets (UEA)
Formula or expression
AV = hardware + comm. software + proprietary 
software + data
EF is the % estimation of the exposure of the initial 
compromised asset _____
UEA is the estimation of the $ value of the assets behind 
the compromised in itial asset
'[Secondary Exposure Factor (EFs) 
IJCascading Threat Multiplier (CTM)
|EFs is the % estimation of the exposure of the UEAs 
1 + ((UEA x EFs) / AV)
jlSingleLoss Expectancy (SLE) ! SLE = EF x AV x CTM
Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO)
Annual Loss Expectancy without IDS 
i(ALEl)
Annual Loss Expectancy with IDS using 
auto-response (ALE2)
ARO is estimated number, based on available industry 
statistics or experience
ALE 1 = SLE x ARO
Annual Loss Expectancy with IDS using 
auto-response & incident response (ALES) ]
Annual Cost (T) of IDS Technology and 
Mgmt
Annual Recovery Cost ('R) from Intrusions! 
without IDS
Annual Dollar Savings (E) gained by 
stopping intrusions with IDS
Traditional Return on Security Investment 
(ROSI) equation
ALE2 = conservative 50% reduction of ARO when IDS 
is managed skillfully with auto-response
ALE3 = conservative 25% reduction of EF & EFS when 
IDS is managed skillfully with auto-response and 
incident response
= ALE1
E = ALE1 - (ALE2 or ALE3)
ROSI = R - ALE, where ALE = (R-E) + T
-ALK))+T)
ROI of IDS with auto-response & incident ;| 
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Table 6. Risk calculation results the different deployment schemes
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Abstract This paper examines how implementation methods, management 
methods, and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) policy affect Return on Investment 
(ROl). The paper will seek to demonstrate the value associated with a well thought 
out implementation and effective lifecycle management of IDS technology and 
will culminate in a case study with a number crunching exercise to calculate the 
ROl for an IDS deployment by a hypothetical financial company named UTVE, Inc. 
on risk.
The paper also discusses general IDS types and expands on the impact that the 
logical location of a company's critical networked assets could have on the risk 
equations. To this end, the Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) is introduced to ex­ 
pand on the Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) equation. Also, implementation and man­ 
agement costs based on various support profiles and commonly accepted risk 
equations are reviewed. Finally, a formula for calculating ROl for security, other­ 
wise commonly known as Return on Security Investment (ROSI) is devised. 
© 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
An IDS is a security system that monitors computer 
systems and network traffic and analyzes that 
traffic for possible hostile attacks originating from 
outside the organization and also for system misuse 
or attacks originating from inside the organization. 
By providing information to site administration, an
*Tel: +1-301-459-7674; fax: +1-202-659-2810. 
E-mail address: iheagwarac@aol.com.
IDS allows not only for the detection of attacks 
explicitly addressed by other security components 
(such as firewalls and service wrappers), but also 
attempts to provide notification of new attacks 
unforeseen by other components. Intrusion detec­ 
tion systems also provide forensic information that 
potentially allows organizations to discover the 
origins of an attack.
Currently there are two basic approaches to in­ 
trusion detection. The first approach is to define 
and characterize correct static form and/or 
acceptable dynamic behavior of the system and
0167-4048/$ - see front matter © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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then to detect abnormal behavior by defining sta­ 
tistical relations. This is called anomaly detection. 
It relies on being able to define the desired form or 
behavior of the system and then to distinguish 
between that definition and undesirable form or 
anomalous behavior. While the boundary between 
acceptable and anomalous forms of stored code 
and data can frequently be precisely defined, the 
boundary between acceptable and anomalous 
behavior is much more difficult to define.
The second approach, called misuse detection, 
involves characterizing known ways to penetrate 
a system, usually described as a pattern, and then 
monitoring for the pattern by defining rule-based 
relations. The pattern may be a static bit string, 
for example, a specific virus bit string insertion. 
Alternatively, the pattern may describe a suspect 
set or sequence of events.
Intrusion detection systems have been built to 
explore both approaches: anomaly detection and 
misuse detection. In some cases, they are com­ 
bined in a complementary way in a single intrusion 
detector. There is a consensus in the community 
that both approaches continue to have value.
As a matter of practical reality, organizations 
evaluate the effectiveness of the IDS implementa­ 
tions from both technical and economic perspec­ 
tives. Thus, the overall evaluation of any IDS 
implementation is based on a wide range of crite­ 
ria especially when a choice has to be made as to 
what is the right IDS product.
Practically speaking, a very important but often 
neglected facet of intrusion detection is its cost- 
effectiveness, or cost-benefit trade-off. An edu­ 
cated decision to deploy a security mechanism 
such as IDS is often motivated by the needs of se­ 
curity risk management. The objective of IDS is 
therefore to provide protection to the information 
assets that are at risk and have value to an organi­ 
zation. An IDS needs to be cost-effective because 
it should cost no more than the expected level of 
loss from intrusions. This requires that an IDS 
should consider the trade-off among cost factors, 
which at the minimum should include develop­ 
ment cost, the cost of damage caused by an intru­ 
sion, the cost of manual or automatic response 
to an intrusion, and the operational cost, which 
measures constraints on time and computing 
resources.
It should also be noted that it is not always nec­ 
essary to justify the cost of an organization's IDS 
deployment because the implementation might 
be undertaken as part of a standard due care.
The performance of IDS for many organiza­ 
tions is not just measured in the ability of the IDS 
to capture or prevent attacks but on its value
when expressed in economic terms. This is more 
so because when choosing a security product, com­ 
panies tend to justify their investments based on 
both economic returns and technical performance. 
In the selection of an IDS product, performance 
is measured using such factors as scalability, avail­ 
ability, ROI and the total cost of the system 
relative to the price of the system the IDS is pro­ 
tecting, just to mention a few.
A positive ROI of an IDS is dependent upon an or­ 
ganization's deployment strategy and how well the 
successful implementation and management of the 
technology helps the organization achieve the tac­ 
tical and strategic objectives it has established. 
For organizations interested in quantifying the 
IDS's value prior to deploying it, their investment 
decision will hinge on their ability to demonstrate 
a positive ROI. The ROI has traditionally been diffi­ 
cult to quantify for network security devices, in 
part because it is difficult to calculate risk accu­ 
rately due to the subjectivity involved with its 
quantification. Also, business-relevant statistics 
regarding security incidents are not always avail­ 
able for consideration in analyzing risk.
In considering an implementation of an IDS 
technology, a positive ROI can be understood by 
analyzing the difference between Annual Loss Ex­ 
pectancy (ALE) without IDS deployment and the 
ALE with IDS deployment, adjusted for technology 
and management costs. The ultimate initial goal, 
then, should be to prove that the value proposition 
(re: a benefit in the form of a quantifiable reduc­ 
tion in ALE) in implementing and effectively man­ 
aging the IDS technology is greater than the 
implementation and management costs associated 
with deploying the IDS technology.
The insights gained from previous research stud­ 
ies that describe proven techniques to implement 
the IDS technology could be helpful. However, it is 
important to note that there are no known research 
studies on the ROI of IDS. Related works border on 
IDS performance and cost models, none of which 
integrated or established a link between the tech­ 
nical, operational and cost/economic factors that 
serves as a gauge for justifying IDS deployment.
The related works are fundamental studies on 
IDS performance (Iheagwara and Blyth, 2002; 
Iheagwara et al., 2003; Richards, 1999) that treat 
the relationship between deployment techniques 
and attack system variables and the performance 
of the IDS; and models on cost-benefit/sensitive 
analysis (Irvine et al., 1999; Lee et al., 1999) for 
intrusion detection deployment.
Richards (1999) evaluates the functional and 
performance capabilities of the industries' lead­ 
ing commercial type IDS. In the areas tested, the
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performance of the IDS was rated based on their 
distinctive features, which were characterized 
into different performance indexes. The research 
work represented a new direction for IDSs in that 
it moved the focus away from scientific con­ 
cepts research to performance evaluation of the 
industries' best products. However, the study 
was limited to a small proto design isolated to 
a non-switched network, which did not reveal the 
impact of packet switching on the accuracy and 
ability to capture attack packets in their entirety. 
Iheagwara and Blyth (2002) expand this effort to 
an evaluation study of the effect of deployment 
techniques on IDS performance in switched and 
distributed system. They demonstrated that moni­ 
toring techniques could play an important role in 
determining the effectiveness of the IDS in a 
switched and distributed network.
Iheagwara et al. (2003) in a comparative exper­ 
imental evaluation study of intrusion detection 
system performance in a gigabit environment ex­ 
amine the system benefits of using a single Gigabit 
IDS sensor instead of multiple Megabit sensors for 
a wide range of defined system attacks, network 
traffic characteristics, and for their contexts of 
operational concepts and deployment techniques. 
As mentioned above, cost—benefit model and 
analysis studies of IDS deployments are relatively
• few. Lee et al. (1999) study the problem of build-
;: ing cost-sensitive intrusion detection models. For
intrusion detection, Irvine et al. (1999) define
- auditing of network control functions in intermedi- 
: ate nodes, and rule-based network intrusion sys­ 
tems in the total subnet as the mechanisms. 
They also discuss the costs of those security serv­ 
ices and mechanisms.
In contrast to the above, the focus of this paper 
is the return of investment of IDS products and an 
examination of how implementation methods, man­ 
agement methods, and IDS policy affect the ROI. 
The paper will seek to demonstrate the value asso­ 
ciated with a well thought out implementation and 
effective lifecycle management of IDS technology 
and will culminate with a number crunching exer­ 
cise to calculate the ROI for an IDS deployment by 
a hypothetical brick and mortar wholesale hard­ 
ware supply company named UTVE, Inc. on risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
The current IDS implementation is discussed in 
the following section. Then in the next sections, 
the management and costs structures, the Cascad­ 
ing Multiplier Effect (CTM) and a discussion on the 
effects of proactive and reactive management 
techniques are given. This is followed by a case 
study on the ROI and finally a conclusion section 
is presented.
Current IDS implementation
In enterprise systems, IDS implementation requires 
deployment of the IDS either at the computer 
system that is the putative target or placement on 
a network level where traffic can be evaluated or 
where information aggregated from various hosts 
can give insight in coordinated attack scenarios.
Hence it is important to maximize the imple­ 
mentation through effective deployment techni­ 
ques. Ptacek and Newsham (1999) and Iheagwara 
and Blyth (2002) conduct studies to evaluate the 
effect of deployment techniques on the perfor­ 
mance of the IDS. The studies demonstrate that 
the IDS can be very effective if optimally deployed 
or it could just be another waste for the company 
if improperly managed. Since the IDS effective­ 
ness in detecting intrusions depends as much on 
the deployment technique, a significant change in 
the approach to the implementation of intrusion 
detection is needed for improvements.
Of interests are IDS product implementation 
technology and the architecture that has so often 
been used to evaluate their effectiveness. The 
next two sections discuss the technologies and 
evaluation architectures.
Technologies
Intrusion detection is an overlay of two separate 
and different technologies: Network IDS (NIDS) 
and Host-based IDS (HIDS) systems. The primary 
advantage of NIDS is that it can watch the whole 
network or any subsets of the network from one 
location. Therefore, NIDS can detect probes, scans, 
and malicious and anomalous activity across the 
whole network. These systems can also serve to 
identify general traffic patterns for a network as 
well as aid in troubleshooting network problems. 
When enlisting auto-response mechanisms, NIDS 
can protect independent hosts or the whole net­ 
work from intruders. NIDS does, however, have 
several inherent weaknesses. These weaknesses 
are its susceptibility to generate false alarms, as 
well as its inability to detect certain attacks called 
false negatives. NIDS also is not able to understand 
host specific processes or protect from unautho­ 
rized physical access. HIDS technology overcomes 
many of these problems. However, HIDS techno­ 
logy does not have the benefits of watching the 
whole network to identify patterns like NIDS does. 
A recommended combination of host and network 
intrusion detection systems, in which an NIDS 
is placed at the network border and an HIDS is 
deployed on critical servers such as databases,
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Web services and essential file servers, is the best 
way to significantly reduce risk.
Implementation architecture
Generally speaking, most (host- and network- 
based) intrusion detection systems have common 
architectures, meaning that most host/network 
systems work as agents reporting to a central con­ 
sole. The present implementation architecture is 
built on the concepts of the qualitative and quan­ 
titative operational functionality of the IDS. In 
Fig. 1 the IDS architecture is presented into the 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation modules.
In the quantitative evaluation module the main 
components—detection engine, filters, alerting 
and configuration facilities—are used for func­ 
tional and performance testing of the IDS. The IDS 
detection engine's (sensor's) job is to watch the 
network, and detect attacks, a role that is per­ 
formed by the packet-processing engine. To do 
this, the sensor looks at every packet on the net­ 
work it is watching. The busier the network, the 
more packets there are to watch. If the sensor can­ 
not keep up, it will start to miss (or drop) packets. 
In the case an attack spans multiple packets, the 
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Figure \ The standard IDS architecture.
makes a determination on whether there is an 
attack. The extent and scope of accomplishing 
the above roles is a gauge of the effectiveness of 
the IDS and that is why the IDS performance is 
evaluated based on the ability of the processing 
engine to effectively filter and reassemble packets 
to any given network throughput.
The quantitative architecture includes attack 
set detection, configuration alert triggering, log­ 
ging and reporting facilities modules that define 
the ability of the IDS to accurately characterize 
the operational setup of the environment and cus­ 
tomizable utilities.
The qualitative architecture includes a module 
that defines the product usability effectiveness of 
the IDS based on certain usability features such as 
the ease of user interface (ease of use, ease of con­ 
figuration, ease of filter customization); integra­ 
tion and interoperability with operating systems 
and existing network infrastructure; product ma­ 
turity; company focus and price.
The associated management and costs struc­ 
tures of IDS implementation are presented in the 
following section.
Management and costs structures
Deployment cost
The associated cost of HIDS deployments can vary 
depending on vendor and software versions. A good 
baseline is that agents can cost between $500 and 
$2000 each and consoles may cost in the $3000- 
$5000 (Kevin and Kinn, 2002) range. This does not 
include OS, hardware or maintenance costs. Net­ 
work intrusion detection systems can be deployed 
as stand-alone hosts with a possible management 
interface or distributed sensors and management 
console. Generally speaking, commercially avail­ 
able sensors run in the $5000-$20,000 range (Kevin 
and Kinn, 2002) depending on vendor, bandwidth 
and functional capabilities. Management consoles 
can be free or can cost several thousand dollars 
depending on the vendor. This does not necessarily 
include hardware or back-end databases. IDS usage 
requires human interaction at the end point be­ 
cause the IDS will generate pertinent information 
and data, but this serves no purpose without sub­ 
sequent examination of the data. This will cer­ 
tainly require allocating a skilled staff for IDS 
management, log analysis, etc. If this is not the 
case, then the investment will fail to pay off.
The total cost of an IDS deployment depends on 
implementation costs combined with the costs for
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managing the technology. Some standard imple­ 
mentation and management methods common to 
IDS deployments include using a Managed Security 
Services Provider (MSSP), utilizing a single in-house 
employee or technician, or enabling 24 x 7 X 365 
multi-shift coverage in-house with a skilled techni­ 
cal staff. Of course the size of the organization and 
its associated IT budget (or lack thereof) factor in 
to how the IDS technology will be deployed and 
managed. The generalized cost structure used for 
discussions in this paper is shown in Table 1.
Comparison of aggregate costs of different 
implementation schemes
Based on this generalized cost structure in Table 1, 
let us now consider the aggregate costs of three 
different IDS deployments. Tables 2 and 3 repre­ 
sent implementation (purchase) costs combined 
witlvlife cycle management costs over a three- 
year period. The three scenarios include man­ 
agement by a single skilled in-house technician, 
management in which there is five shifts of skilled 
technicians providing 24 X 7 X 365 coverage, and 
management provided by an MSSP. It is very impor­ 
tant to understand that full-service MSSPs will 
provide 24 x 7 x 365 coverage just like the multi- 
shift internal coverage provides. For completeness, 
there will be a review of two different IDS deploy­ 
ments (one small and one medium) and the cost 
structure of implementing and managing them.
From the numbers it is evident that in smaller 
IDS deployments the value proposition of MSSP
support is very strong relative to internal 24 X 
7 X 365 multi-shift support. In larger IDS deploy­ 
ments, the cost differential between internal 
(highly skilled) multi-shift coverage and MSSP cov­ 
erage diminishes due to economies of scale on the 
internal multi-shift coverage side. Single support 
coverage is not a realistic option to consider 
when contemplating a deployment of 30 security 
devices. Also, this cost model does not take into 
account proprietary tools development necessary 
to manage several different types of technology 
(if that were the case) effectively.
The concept of cascading threat 
multiplier
The main concepts of risk management and re­ 
lated equations are given in Appendix 3. In the 
world of new technologies, the interplay of tech­ 
nological processes, policies and risk management 
introduces complexities into risk management and 
requires the development and introduction of a 
new concept—Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) 
used to accurately calculate the ROI for any 
acquired or developed technology.
Consequently, the introduction of a new con­ 
cept, Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM), into the 
mix will help in any analytical discussion that helps 
in distilling a meaningful ROI calculation in order 
to determine the effectiveness of deploying IDS 
technology into a given network.
The Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) is a mul­ 
tiplying factor that will be included into our
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expanded definition of Single Loss Expectancy 
(SLE). CTM is somewhat subjective and is intro­ 
duced mainly for the purpose of adding a little 
more "flavor" to SLE. CTM factors in the impor­ 
tance of other critical assets tied (re: networked) 
to the specific asset being analyzed in the SLE cal­ 
culation. It also coaxes risk analysts to think in 
broader terms and to look at the bigger picture 
when considering the risks associated with the 
compromise of a given asset. The formula for CTM 
is as follows:
Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) 
= 1+ ((UEA X EFs)/AV)
In this formula, Underlying Exposed Assets (UEA) is 
measured in dollars. These are the assets that are 
now exposed due to the compromise of a specific 
asset. Asset Value (AV) is identical to the calcula­ 
tion described elsewhere in this paper. Exposure 
Factor (EFs) represents secondary exposure factor 
and is related to the percentage loss on the UEAs. 
Secondary Exposure Factor (EFs) is very similar to 
Exposure Factor (EF), as described in the stan­ 
dard equation in Appendix 3, with a few minute 
differences.
It should be noted that the CTM formula is rele­ 
vant only to the threat of unauthorized disclosure, 
as would typically be of primary concern to a mili­ 
tary or diplomatic agency. It does not address in­ 
terruption in service, as would for instance be 
very important for an Internet merchant. Likewise, 
it does not address data corruption, as would for 
instance be very important for a bank.
The primary reason for introducing EFs is to fac­ 
tor in the importance of an asset's logical location 
within a network. For example, if the asset is a 
Web server that is in a true Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ) and has no access to the network or to any 
other corporate servers, EFs would be low since 
it is unlikely that an attacker can use this device 
to further compromise the network. But if the as­ 
set is on the same broadcast domain as other serv­ 
ers are (such as e-mail, DNS and FTP), or there is 
no access control between the asset and other 
servers, then EFs will be higher. Finally, if the
asset is on a network that has access to the rest 
of the network, the Secondary Exposure Factor 
(EFs) will be very high. Examples of this would in­ 
clude hosts that offer some public services but are 
terminated within the internal network or hosts 
that have valid Secure Shell (SSH) keys to all hosts. 
SSH is a protocol used to provide strong authenti­ 
cation and secure communications over unsecured 
channels.
It is important to consider what assets are easily 
(or even not so easily) accessible from a specific 
networked asset once that asset is compromised. 
When a given asset is compromised and used as 
a staging point for attacks on other assets inside 
and outside a company's network, it could have 
potentially devastating consequences for the 
organization. If an attack is staged from the com­ 
promised asset to another asset outside the orga­ 
nization, even when the owner was not directly 
involved in the malicious activity, they can and 
probably will be held accountable. One can envision 
the UEA factor of SLE representing some portion of 
a trusted business partner's assets. It is easy to 
imagine the negative business impact the offending 
organization would encounter if one of its compro­ 
mised assets were used as a staging ground to com­ 
promise and damage its business partner's assets.
What is the risk, quantified in dollars, of not 
considering a business partner's assets when per­ 
forming a valuation exercise on your company's 
assets, ones that, if compromised, may enable 
access to more sensitive data and systems? The 
CTM concept provides the analytical framework 
to closely scrutinize the assets under an organiza­ 
tion's control, assign more comprehensive valua­ 
tions to those assets, and to more accurately 
measure the impact that compromising of these 
assets could have on the organization.
As a practical example, it is assumed that a Web 
server has been compromised and used by a mali­ 
cious person to stage attacks on other networked 
assets containing critical data valued at 10 times 
the amount (in dollars) of the data contained on 
the compromised Web server. As the perpetrator 
hopscotches his way from asset to asset, penetrat­ 
ing deeper and deeper into the network, he may
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finally gain access to critical data on a vulnerable 
asset deep inside the company's network. The 
CTM for the Web server would be calculated as fol­ 
lows with a summation (re: best guess) that the 
Secondary Exposure Factor (EFs) of the Underlying 
Exposed Asset(s) (UEA) is 70%: CTM = 1 + ((10x 
OJ)/1) = 8. The CTM has increased the SLE for 
the compromised Web server by a factor of 8. 
The white arrow originating from the compromised 
Web server should be followed to better visualize 
this concept as shown in Fig. 2.
Tying the CTM concept back into the SLE calcu­ 
lation, a new definition of Single Loss Expectancy 
can be expressed as:
SLE = EF X AV X CTM
A thorough risk management exercise should fac­ 
tor in the CTM concept by executing a more com­ 
prehensive valuation methodology that included 
more subjective, intangible factors into their Asset 
Value (AV) variable calculation. As mentioned 
above, goodwill (i.e. business and consumer loy­ 
alty built on trust) and opportunity costs (i.e. 
choosing not to consider the effect that a compro­ 
mised asset can have on other assets) are some­ 
what analogous to the CTM concept when these 
intangibles are factored into the Asset Valuation 
(AV) usedfin the SLE calculation.
The importance of capturing intangible value, 
and understanding the risks associated with jeop­ 
ardizing the value, is one of the more challenging 
aspects of risk and return analysis. Introducing 
the CTM concept into the traditional SLE calcula­ 
tion will make the capture of the intangible as­ 
pects of asset valuation a little less daunting of 
a task.
Figure 2 Cascading threat multiplier.
Finally, the risk analysis calculations listed 
above can be tied to an accepted formula for cal­ 
culating the ROI for a security product.
ROI = recovery cost (/?) - ALE
where ALE = (R - E) + T, and E equals the savings 
gained by preventing an attack and T equals the 
cost of a security product.
It should be noted that the use of the ALE ap­ 
proach in risk management is not suitable when 
a worst-case analysis involving discussion of repu­ 
tation risk and loss of goodwill is required.
Section "The effects of proactive vs. reactive 
management on risk" is a discussion on proactive 
and reactive management methodology and a dem­ 
onstration on how this methodology affects analy­ 
sis of risk. This will set up the framework for the 
calculation of IDS ROI and will culminate in a 
case study in section "A case study on IDS ROI cal­ 
culation modular approach" to demonstrate the 
efficacy of the new concept (CTM). Finally, all 
the numbers will be tied together to demonstrate 
the devised technique for calculating the ROI for 
UTVE deployment of one network-based IDS and 
two host-based IDSs.
The effects of proactive vs. reactive 
management on risk
Independent of implementation and management 
costs, the method in which the devices are man­ 
aged can have a serious effect on the ROI. As a re­ 
sult, the key question to answer is: is the system 
going to be proactive or reactive as security events 
are detected? Table 4 depicts the normal event 
flow in each method. A proactive implementation 
response is automated by the system while a reac­ 
tive implementation response is manually driven 
with the help of enlisted personnel.
By examining the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE = 
ARO X SLE, where SLE = exposure factor x asset 
value X cascading threat multiplier), the variables 
that are affected by each of these two man­ 
agement methods can be determined. In a reactive 
design, where personnel must be engaged to re­ 
spond to each event, the exposure factors (pri­ 
mary [EF] and secondary [EFs]) will be affected. 
In a proactive design there will be similar benefits 
to the exposure factors (re: a reduction) and, in 
addition, the ARO will be influenced in a beneficial 
way as well. It will be beneficial to use the concept 
of primary and secondary mitigation windows 
to demonstrate the impact of threat vs. time. As 
illustrated in Appendix 1, the primary mitigation
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window affects ARO while the secondary mitiga­ 
tion window affects exposure factor and cascading 
threat multiplier. An effective way of impacting 
ARO is through automated response.
Auto-response can take many forms. On host- 
based IDS this is sometimes called shielding, where 
a specific process is terminated. Network-based 
IDS generally employs TCP resets or shunning. 
TCP resets effectively kill one specific session 
based on suspicious activity, but it still allows other 
activity from that same IP. Shunning, on the other 
hand, changes firewall rules or router access lists 
and effectively denies all traffic from that host 
for a specific period of time. In essence, shielding 
will protect a single host from one process, resets 
will protect a host from a specific session, and 
shunning will protect the entire network from a 
specific host for a pre-determined amount of time.
The accuracy of automated response can vary 
tremendously. This is dependent on the skill level 
of the engineers managing the devices. If the engi­ 
neers are moderately skilled then auto-response 
will not be very effective, which may adversely af­ 
fect the ROI of the IDS deployment. This adverse 
effect may manifest itself in the form of a loss of 
productivity from network-related problems due 
to improperly implemented auto-response, as well 
as the additional fallout related to a false sense of 
security throughout the company.
With skilled engineers managing the devices, 
auto-response can be very accurate and effective. 
The data generated over a period of 30 days from 
the network of NetSolve, Incorporated (Kevin and 
Kinn, 2002) will be used to illustrate the accuracy 
of automated response. If Code Red and Nimda 
activities are included, in 99.96% of the attacks, 
where automated response was used to mitigate 
the threat, the activity was malicious. Excluding 
large-scale worms, the attacks were malicious in 
95.8% of auto-response uses. Of the 4.2% of the 
traffic that was not malicious, not all of it was de­ 
sirable. Some of this traffic was peer-to-peer pro­ 
grams, on-line gaming, chat and other undesirable 
traffic that triggered alarms. The percentage of 
traffic that was denied and business related was 
very small. It should be noted that many of these 
devices provide numerous different techniques for 
ensuring that very little, if any, legitimate traffic 
is denied through the use of automated response.
The most recent statistics (http://www. 
silicondefense.com/software/acbm/speed_of_ 
snort_03_16_2001 .pdf) was used to determine how 
effective the device is in recognizing attacks. In 
this test the worst NIDS detected 67 of 109 attacks 
or 61.5%, while the best detected 94 of 109 attacks 
for an 86.2% detection rate. Even the worst case, 
the 61.5% detection rate, was out of the box 
(http://www.nss.co.uk/Articles/lntrusionDetection. 
htm) and it was reported that it would not be dif­ 
ficult to improve this with some custom signatures 
and tuning.
The above could be interpreted to mean that 
the worst IDS tested can still detect at least 61.5% 
of attacks. Realistically that number should be 
closer to 70% when a skilled engineer or technician 
manages the device. The auto-response feature, 
when properly used, can be a very effective 
method of reducing the ARO. This provides some 
general numbers, which can be plugged into the 
equations for calculating a ROI for UTVE.
A case study on IDS ROI calculation 
modular approach
The lack of established literature on a suitable 
management approach that can maximize the IDS 
ROI mandates the use of a case study approach 
that permits the in-depth exploration of the bene­ 
fits of performing an ROI analysis to maximize the 
management techniques of intrusion detection 
systems. From these, it is possible to glean some 
general concepts about IDS ROI and determine 
the viability of the management approach that will 
enhance the maximization. By developing the 
examples, it is also hoped to develop a possible 
method of reasoning about IDS ROI more generally. 
The case study will be presented in the context of 
events and risk analysis in a hypothetical company 
called UTVE, Inc.
Framework for risk analysis and 
ROI computation
In order to prepare for the IDS ROI computational 
model, it will be useful to set up a hypothetical 
company called UTVE and through a case study
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present the threat and incidence scenarios to cal­ 
culate the ROI based on the effective implementa­ 
tion and lifecycle management of HIDS and NIDS 
technologies. There is the need to articulate a ho­ 
listic approach and, at the same time introduce 
some new concepts for analyzing risk. In the ana­ 
lytical discussion leading up to the calculation of 
the ROI, commonly accepted formulas and defini­ 
tions associated with asset valuation, exposure, 
threat, vulnerability and loss expectancy will be 
used. The Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM), an 
additional factor added to the mix, enables the 
expansion of the risk assessment widely accepted 
calculation for Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) where, 
traditionally, SLE = Exposure Factor (EF) X Asset 
Value (AV).
In order to stress the importance of the intangi­ 
ble considerations that will help to apply a holistic 
approach for quantifying risk and calculating 
a meaningful ROI, the concepts of goodwill and 
opportunity costs should be considered when per­ 
forming valuation exercises on company assets. 
Although intangible factors inherently introduce 
subjectivity into risk and return analysis, it is 
nonetheless an important step to consider intan­ 
gibles before one can arrive at a more meaningful 
calculation of the ROI.
It is worth mentioning here that, in general, it 
may be safe to assume that organizations would 
tend to undervalue certain data assets if they have 
_ not fully taken into account (or bothered to under­ 
stand for that matter) how these assets relate to 
the "big picture". It is simple human nature to take 
the path of least resistance when given a choice. 
But that is a very dangerous path to take for anyone 
attempting to arrive at an accurate assessment of 
the value of data assets residing on their network.
Understanding the tangible costs and benefits of 
an asset is much easier than understanding, or 
even considering for that matter, the intangible 
costs and benefits associated with that same asset. 
Clarifying this understanding is a challenge and 
one that will be addressed throughout the rest of 
the paper as the IDS ROI is calculated in the case 
study for UTVE, Inc.
Ultimately, the framework is the use of hypo­ 
thetical events and data derived from such events 
to develop a process model for the computation of 
IDS ROI. The threat events and the incidence anal­ 
ysis are given in the context of risk analysis.
Methodology
The methodology used in the case study takes 
a pragmatic approach towards the issue of
calculating the IDS ROI. First, the enterprise 
business, IT infrastructure, business relations and 
security practices are described. This is followed 
with a discussion on the threats and attacks that 
compromised the security of the business. In this 
case, a series of defined and designated attacks 
to compromise the system are mimicked. Each 
attack exploits a specific vulnerability in the enter­ 
prise network system. Next, the attacks, compro­ 
mises and contributing factors are analyzed and 
the sources of the security breach delineated. Part 
of the analysis is the recommendation of the 
necessary safeguards to forestall future attacks 
and in this case deployment of intrusion detection 
systems. Based on the results of the analysis, the 
Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) is quantified, the ana­ 
lytical techniques that are pertinent to the IDS 
ROI, and their relevance in developing a model 
for calculating the ROI for IDS deployment in busi­ 
ness settings are described. The study will culmi­ 
nate into a discussion of the best management 
and effective techniques for deploying the IDS to 
maximize the ROI.
The UTVE enterprises
UTVE's remote offices (Toronto, Manchester, Net­ 
ting, Sony) are connected via private T1 lines 
to the corporate office with no Internet outlet. 
Employees of the firm who require access to com­ 
pany data while out of the office use the VPN over 
the Internet.
In order to successfully conduct business with 
UTVE enterprises, customers and business associ­ 
ates need to have consistently reliable telephone, 
fax, e-mail, Internet, file, print and database ac­ 
cess, whether in a remote office or in the corpo­ 
rate office. UTVE sales associates must also have 
the same system reliability and availability while 
remotely accessing the corporate systems over 
the VPN (Virtual Private Network). Remote users 
are primarily sales associates and trusted business 
associates who connect to UTVE's VPN over some 
sort of broadband technology. The remaining asso­ 
ciates need VPN access while traveling, which is 
typically dial-up access.
VPN attack and risk analysis
The UTVE network was compromised when a mali­ 
cious attacker gained access to UTVE's data and 
network through the VPN tunnel that was estab­ 
lished with one of its business associates. Because 
of this, UTVE disconnected its VPN connection with
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(Table 5 UTVE's asset valuation
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the business associate (ACME) and temporarily 
halted any business transactions with ACME until 
the issue is resolved.
After an extensive network and operational 
analysis of the incidence, several key operational 
deficiencies were uncovered that revealed several 
security flaws of the UTVE network. The descrip­ 
tion of the compromised assets and underlying 
exposed assets is given in Appendix 2.
The general replacement cost for UTVE's asset 
category is given in Table 5. It is assumed that 
the valuation exercise was separately undertaken 
before the ROI calculations, which in itself, is not 
the best approach. The replacement cost is the 
cost of acquiring an asset as itemized in the asset 
category in the event of loss.
To quantify and characterize the loss associated 
with the VPN attack, a quantitative risk analysis 
was conducted. The analysis revealed that data in­ 
tegrity was affected by the intrusion. The various 
incidents that could be associated with the intru­ 
sion at UTVE enterprise are shown in Table 6. 
The ALE is based on an ARO of three (3.0).
In Table 6, the 5LE and ALE are presented for 
each incident. The ALE is generated by multiplying 
the SLE for the incident by the ARO of the threat. 
The overall ALE for a threat is the sum of the ALEs 
for each of the associated incidents. This is shown 
as the total of the third column. The percentage of 
this total represented by the ALE for each incident 
is indicated in the fourth column. Also shown for 
each threat is a bar chart that provides a visual 
presentation of the relative magnitudes of the 
ALE for each incident. Pie charts are also provided 
to indicate the percentage of each threat ALE that 
is accounted for by each incident that is used in its 
calculation.
The incidence class is the grouping of the vari­ 
ous losses in the event of a threat materializing 
according to their form. For example, the direct 
loss is the loss from the associated asset and 
modification is the loss in monetary value due to 
modification of data, application, system, etc. 
The concepts and definitions for ALE and SLE have 
been given in Appendix 3 and the plots are repre­ 
sented in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively.
Risk mitigation
As a result of the risk analysis, the following miti­ 
gation measures were recommended.
• Guidelines should be created for the use of 
UTVE remote access facilities. Example- 
access privileges are generally only granted 
to managers, team leaders, associates respons­ 
ible for overnight/weekend support, and sales 
staff.
• Employees or those requiring remote access 
to the network should have the approval of 
senior management, as well as the operation 
department.
• There should only be one method of connecting 
to the network from a remote location. The IT
Losses from compromised data integrity with an ARO of three (3)
Incident class
Direct loss, procedures 
Direct loss, security
Direct loss, applications 
Modification, databases
Direct loss, databases
Direct loss, system software 
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Figure 3 Data integrity loss—ALEs.
department should have the ability to turn 
remote access off at any time.
• Proper authentication and data encryption 
mechanisms (e.g. VPNs) should be put in place.
• The scope and techniques of data encryption 
should be expanded.
• Also, part of the stringent security measure is 
the need for UTVE to implement IDS technology 
to monitor the content of each connection. The 
recommendation is that a host-based IDS be 
run on the Web servers and a network-based 
IDS run at the border.
• Remote access use should be limited to only 
those needing it for business with technical and 
management safeguards.
In section "A case study on IDS ROI calculation 
modular approach", the ROI is calculated using 
risk management data and IDS implementation 
costs (for both the single support and MSSP support 
scheme) at UTVE for the different IDS deployment 
options discussed in section "Comparison of aggre­ 
gate costs of different implementation schemes".
Calculation of ROI
Procedurally, once the Asset Valuations (AV and 
UEA), Exposure Factors (EF and EFs) have been cal­ 
culated, the SLE and the ARO are then calculated.
In general, the ARO is computed based on the 
analysis of the annual frequency of threats. A 
distinction has to be made on the two types of 
ARO—Site-specific rate ARO and National ARO.
Based on the analysis and assumptions in each 
scenario, the computations for AV and UEA, EF 
and EFs and ARO are shown in Appendix 2.
For each threat, an ARO is derived by analyzing 
available national data. The derived ARO values 
developed from the national data are not as appli­ 
cable as AROs developed with site-specific data. 
Site-specific data are defined as information gath­ 
ered directly on or from the site itself such as 
those represented in Table 7. Historically recorded 
data of previous threat occurrences, which can 
generally be collected from any specific site are: 
maintenance logs, documentation on system 
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Figure 4 Data integrity loss—SLEs.
and power failure, and component mean-time be­ 
tween failure reports, etc. The following are the 
guidelines to follow when determining the ARO 
value for a given threat:
• When possible, the ARO value for the given 
threat is developed from site-specific/resident 
data. This requires gathering site resident data 
as needed to calculate the mean and standard 
deviation for any specific threat ARO. Examples 
of threats that are best represented by site- 
specific data are: air-conditioning failures, 
power outages, operator errors, user input 
errors, system crashes, and theft.
• When it is not practical to gather the site- 
specific data required to calculate the ARO 
value for a particular threat, the standard ARO 
value can be used.
An example of local site statistics on the rate of 
occurrence of known attacks is given in Table 7. 
These are actual numbers based on network 
attacks that NetSolve, Inc. manages (Ptacek and 
Newsham, 1999).
In Appendix 3, each variable and risk equation 
that was used in the ROI calculations for UTVE 
IDS deployment is itemized. A review of the Ap­ 
pendix shows how the traditional ROSI equation 
has been tied back to the ALE containing the 
CTM factor i.e.
ROSI = R - ALE,
where the commonly accepted
is now replaced with
ALE = ARO X SLE,
and
SLE = AV X EF X CTM.
The support costs ($83,217/year for single sup­ 
port coverage and $44,217/year for MSSP support 
coverage) used to calculate these ROIs were taken
_____ ;H,:.-SJP$PMB^PI
Table 7 Average attack occurrences per network •••••• '•
Per network attempts (April)Attack Per year attack attempts Scenario
General Cmd.Exe 9492
Root, exe backdoor 1869
Ida overflow 105
SSH attacks 2
DNS bind attacks 7
FTP attacks 3
Apache chunked 6 
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from Table 3. The results of the calculations are 
shown in Appendix 4. The use of auto-response 
scheme produces by far better ROI in both NIDS 
and HIDS deployments. A conservative estimate 
of 50% reduction in ARO is facilitated by the utili­ 
zation of auto-response. Also, the 25% reduction 
in both exposure factors (EF and EFs) should also 
be considered a conservative estimate in the IDS 
deployment with auto-response and prompt inci­ 
dent response scheme.
The benefits of a better IDS management are 
reflected in the reductions in the values of the 
variables in the highlighted cells under ARO, EF 
and EFs in Appendix 4. The overall effect is visible 
in the increase in the ROI values for the UTVE IDS 
deployment for both the single in-house support 
and MSSP support schemes.
Auto-response affects primary mitigation win­ 
dows, which has a direct impact on partially reduc­ 
ing the Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO). This is 
illustrated in the ROI Appendix 4, where a benefi­ 
cial conservative reduction in ARO of 50% (high­ 
lighted in yellow (web version) in the "IDS 
w/Auto-Response" rows for each of the three sce­ 
narios) is attained. Incident response affects the 
secondary mitigation window, which impacts Expo­ 
sure Factor (EF) and Secondary Exposure Factor 
(EFs), which in turn impacts the Cascading Threat 
Multiplier! (CTM). This is also illustrated in the 
ROI in Appendix 4, where a beneficial conserva­ 
tive reduction in EF and EFs of 25%, respectively 
(highlighted in yellow (web version) in the "IDS 
w/ Auto-Response & Incident Response" rows for 
each of the three scenarios) is attained.
These reductions have positive effects on the 
IDS ROI. Once the aggregate annualized savings 
(ALE1-ALE2 or ALE1-ALE3) occurring from IDS de­ 
ployment equals the support costs associated with 
the deployment a positive ROI should materialize. 
In the case of UTVE, the two ROIs (ROI1 and ROI2) 
for each support profile are as follows:
• single support with IDS using auto-response 
(ROM) = -4%;
• single support with IDS using auto-response and 
incident response (ROI2) = 36%;
• MSSP support with IDS using auto-response 
(ROI1) = 81%; and
• MSSP support with IDS using auto-response and 
incident response (ROI2) = 155%.
These ROIs are based on the aggregate annualized 
savings from deploying and effectively managing 
the IDS technology and the resulting impact 
the IDS technology could reasonably have on the 
combined effect of the three compromise scenari­ 
os described above (Appendix 4).
In the final analysis, attainment of a better ROI 
depends on a good management practice especi­ 
ally the use of highly skilled engineers or tech­ 
nicians who have a sound understanding of the 
technology including the inherent strengths and 
weaknesses to manage the IDS technology. It is 
also a reasonable assumption that a single in-house 
engineer or technician would better support IDS 
deployment of one NIDS and two HIDSs. On the 
other hand, it will be ineffective to assume that 
one person can support this highly dynamic tech­ 
nology on a continual 24/7/365 basis with active 
auto-response and real-time incident response 
for every security event. Multi-shift internal sup­ 
port as well as Managed Security Service Provider 
(MSSP) support is the preferred ways of providing 
definitive 24/7/365 support and real-time incident 
response.
Conclusions
The importance of using intrusion detection as 
a means of risk management has been pointed 
out by several researchers. This work in ROI mod­ 
eling for IDSs has benefited from the insightful 
analysis from real-world experiences demons­ 
trated in the case study and draws from research 
in intrusion detection systems using knowledge 
gained from security risk management.
The contributions made by this paper are in the 
development and introduction of a new concept- 
Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) and the model 
framework used to accurately calculate the ROI 
for any acquired or deployed IDS technology.
To effectively analyze and calculate the IDS 
ROI, there is the need to have a sound understand­ 
ing of the environment where the IDS is deployed 
including, at a minimum, the business prac­ 
tice, and network architecture and asset values. 
Equally, a good analysis of system vulnerabilities 
and associated threats should be addressed 
within the framework of a sound security policy 
and risk mitigation techniques.
Finally, this paper has demonstrated that a 
positive IDS ROI is attainable with an effective 
deployment technique and optimal management 
approach.
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Appendix 1. Threat mitigation window
Primary Threat Mitlgs tlon 
Window Proactive Response










NT 4.0 Web server (A V); 
NT Domain (UEA)
UNIX-based Web server 
(AV); old internal dbase 
containing inventory 
data/pricing for 
customers and suppliers 
(UEA)
Router; Primary supplier 
UTVE's network
Considerations in assigning estimates for Asset Valuations (AV & 
UEA), Exposure Factors (EF & EFs) and Annual Rate of 
Occurrence (ARO)
Cost of lost productivity/revenue from downtime? Cost of 
compromised underlying data/assets? Cost of rebuilding web server? 
Potential cost of compromise of NT domain resources?
Cost of lost productivity and revenue from downtime? Cost of loss of 
trust or confidence of UTVE's online customers? Cost of 
compromised data and assets? Cost of rebuilding web server? 
Immediate cost of fulfilling current orders to satisfy customers?
Cost of supply interruption from primary supplier? Cost of loss of 
trust or confidence of primary supplier? Potential cost of 
compromised data? Cost for UTVE to replace ACME as a supplier? 
Difference in credit terms for new supplier (compared to highly 
favorable terms that UTVE currently enjoys with ACME)? 
Difference in pricing between normal (new) supplier and ACME'S 
pricing? Potential cost of litigation if ACME determines UTVE 
employee is at fault? Cost of UTVE compromise? Potential cost of 
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Appendix 3. ROI variables and risk equations
Variable j Formula or expression •
Asset Value !|AV = hardware + comm. software + proprietary software + data •
Exposure Factor \
Underlying Exposed Assets \
Secondary Exposure Factor
EF is the % estimation of the exposure of the initial compromised asset j
UEA is the estimation of the $ value of the assets behind the j 
compromised initial asset I
EFs is the % estimation of the exposure of the UEAs !
Cascading Threat Multiplier j [cjM = 1 + ((UEA x EFs) / AV) 1
Single Loss Expectancy
Annual Rate of Occurrence I
1 Annual Loss Expectancy without IDS j
Annual Loss Expectancy with IDS using auto-response
i \
Annual Loss Expectancy with IDS using auto-response & incident 
response
[Annual Cost (T) of IDS Technology and Mgmt \
Annual Recovery Cost ('R) from Intrusions without IDS
|Annual Dollar Savings (E) gained by stopping intrusions with IDS
j|Traditional Return on Security Investment (ROSI) equation
UTVE IDS ROI with auto-response
SLE = EFxAVxCTM I
ARO is estimated number, based on available industry statistics or ! 
experience 1
ALEl=SLExARO j
ALE2 = conservative 50% reduction of ARO when IDS is managed ] 
skillfully with auto-response j
ALE3 = conservative 25% reduction of EF & EFs when I DS is j 
managed skillfully with auto-response and incident response I
T j
R = ALE1 I
E = ALEl-(ALE2orALE3) j
ROSI = R - ALE, where ALE = (R-E) + T I
ROI1 =ALE1 -«ALE1-(ALE1-ALE2)) + T) I
UTVE IDS ROI with auto-response & incident response JROI2 = ALE1 - ((ALE1 - (ALE! - ALE3)) + T)
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This paper discusses the financial benefit of intrusion detection systems (IDS) deployment techniques 
and addresses the problems of bridging the gap between technical security solutions and the business need 
for it. This is an area of interest to both the research and the business community; most IDSes balance 
host and network monitoring, but the decision about how to adjust usage of each technique tends to be 
made in a rather ad-hoc way, or based upon effectiveness of detection only without regard to cost of tech­ 
nique. In practice, selections based on how well a strategy helps a company to perform are preferable and 
methodologies supporting a selection process of this type will assist an Information Technology officer to 
explain security mechanism selections more effectively to CEOs. In this context, the approach we propose 
could be applied when choosing one intrusion detection system over another based on which has a better 
or higher return on investment for the company.
Through a case study, we illustrate the benefits of a better IDS management that leads to a positive 
Return on Investment (ROI) for IDS deployment. We conceive strategies and approaches to support ef­ 
fective decision-making about which techniques are appropriate for the cost effective management of the 
IDS in a given environment It is our intent that this research will serve as a foundation for the formal 
description of cost structures, analysis, and selection of effective implementation approaches to support 
the management of IDS deployments.
1. Introduction
Independent of implementation costs, the method in which security devices such 
as IDSes are managed can have a serious effect on the Return on Investment (ROI). 
Thus, a positive ROI for the IDS is dependent upon an organization's deployment 
strategy and how well the successful implementation and management of the tech­ 
nology helps the organization achieve the tactical and strategic objectives it has es­ 
tablished.
However, given the high cost of IDS deployments especially when multiple de­ 
ployments are involved, organizations must justify implementation expenses by 
proving that the IDS is a value added resource. One possible justification is to es­ 
tablish that the deployment of the IDS should lead to a reduction in the annual loss 
expectancy (ALE) and the return on security investment (ROSI).
0926-227X/04/S17.00 © 2004 - IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved
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One method for justifying IDS is by determining the value of the ALE using con­ 
ventional cost/benefit (risk) assessment; the ALE represents the cost/benefit break­ 
even point for risk mitigation measures. In other words, the organization could justify 
spending up to the dollar amount equivalent of the ALE per year to prevent the oc­ 
currence of loss or reduce the impact of a cyber attack for example. An alternative 
method for justifying IDS is to demonstrate the ability of the IDS to effectively de­ 
tect and deter attacks in cost-effective quantifiable measures or to implement it as a 
standard due care measure. There are prior research studies [1-3] on this. Another 
option is to analyze the benefits of IDS by documenting the misuses of an organiza­ 
tion's network
• Hence, for many organizations, investment decisions on IDS deployment will 
hinge on the ability to demonstrate a positive ROI and are not just motivated by 
the needs of security risk management. For the IDS to be cost-effective, it should 
cost no more than the expected level of loss from intrusions. This requires that the 
IDS purchaser consider the trade-off among cost factors [4,5], which at the mini­ 
mum should include the cost of damage or compromised asset due to an intrusion, 
the cost of manual or automatic response to an intrusion, and the operational cost, 
which measures constraints on time and computing resources. For example, an in­ 
trusion where the response or mitigation cost is higher than the damage cost should 
usually not be acted upon beyond simple logging.
Therefore, implementation costs are very important and should be among the de­ 
terminant factors for effective EDS management. Although in current IDS implemen­ 
tations, cost value propositions are rare due to the complexities of the networked en­ 
vironment in which they are deployed. Another reason for this is the fact that many 
organizations are not educated about the cost-benefits of security systems and for 
some, analyzing site-specific cost factors could be very challenging [6].
The challenge could be partly attributed to the difficulties in the assessment of 
costs related to computer security, in part because accurate metrics have been inher­ 
ently unrealistic. Of those costs that can be measured, the largest in terms of mone­ 
tary value typically involve theft of proprietary information or financial fraud. Others 
that are more difficult to quantify but have resulted in severe loss of use or produc­ 
tivity include viruses and malware, Web server denial-of-service attacks, abuse of 
access privileges, and equipment vandalism or outright theft. The challenge is also 
due to the fact that cost structures and cost management (and costing for that mat­ 
ter) of IT security devices have not been extensively studied; at least not very well 
documented in technical or scientific literature. The few available studies have been 
presented from different perspectives.
In the business arena, management costs are calculated through cost benefit analy­ 
sis (CBA) models/equations with a high degree of accuracy. Here, the models incor­ 
porate the use of risk-adjusted cash flows in order to examine internal rate of return 
(IRR) and maximum net present value (NPV) figured as a percentage of information 
security expenditures. The basis for this is the observation that a simple return on in­ 
vestment (ROI) calculation that divides income by asset value is insufficient because
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it is based on historical rather than future valuations as affected by breach incidents. 
A more elaborate discussion of CBA is given in Section 2.
The increase in the use of IDS products mandates formulation of appropriate 
frameworks for their cost-effective management. Such frameworks among others 
could be used to translate existing cost models into technical solutions as implemen­ 
tation cost structures. This could be realized by first developing the cost metrics and 
then integrating them with existing theoretical cost models developed in previous 
studies within the contexts of the frameworks we propose in this research.
The insights gained from previous research studies that describe proven techniques 
to implement the technologies could be helpful in understanding effective manage­ 
ment techniques for IDS deployments. Research in the area of cost modeling for 
network intrusion detection systems typically follow a risk analysis procedure to se­ 
lect sensitive data/assets and create a cost matrix for each intrusion.
Wei et al. [7] propose a cost-benefit analysis methodology and build a cost model 
that can be used to quantitatively and qualitatively calculate the cost of detecting and 
responding to an intrusion.
Lee [4] and Stolfo's [5] studies the problem of building cost-sensitive intrusion 
detection models and define cost models to formulate the total expected cost of IDS 
and examine the major cost factors associated with IDS, which include development 
cost, operational cost, damage cost due to successful intrusions, and the cost of man­ 
ual and automated response to intrusions. The cost components related to intrusion 
detection are:
• Damage cost;
• Operation cost; and
• Response cost.
Combining the above cost components Lee [4] proposes a cost matrix for a risk 
analysis calculation:
N ^ 
Cost_total(e) = ^(CCost + OperationCost(e)). (1)
In the above formula, Cost total(e) is the total cost for some event e, N is the event 
number, and CCost is the consequential cost of the prediction by the network intru­ 
sion detection system for the intrusion event e, which is determined by the damage 
cost and response cost. The Damage cost (DamageCost) represents the maximum 
amount of damage to an attack target when the intrusion detection system and other 
protective measures are either unavailable or ineffective. The Response cost (Re- 
sponseCost) is the cost of responding to the intrusion, which includes taking some 
action to stop the intrusion and reduce the damage. These actions or countermea- 
sures should be defined during the risk analysis process according to specific threats. 
Operation cost (OperationCost) is the cost of processing the stream of events be­ 
ing monitored by an intrusion detection system and analyzing the activities using 
intrusion detection models.




















Processor clocks per byte
In bytes per message network
bandwidth, plus c clocks per byte
N Mbytes per second of overall
bandwidth, plus m instructions per
second, plus 6 bytes per second
storage
Thus, Lee's [4] major contribution to IDS cost models is that he proposed a cost 
matrix that combines the different cost features defined above for a risk analysis 
calculation.
For intrusion detection, Irvine [8] defines auditing of network control functions 
in intermediate nodes, and rule-based network intrusion systems in the total subnet 
as the mechanisms. Irvine also discusses the costs of those security services and 
mechanisms (Table 1).
In Irvin's proposition, security services include data confidentiality, integrity, traf­ 
fic flow confidentiality, authenticity, non-repudiation, availability, audit and intrusion 
detection, and boundary control. For the three service areas delineated for security 
service analysis, a client or server system is an example of ES, routers and switches 
are the examples of IN, and NC indicates the wires that connect systems and nodes. 
Additionally, Irvin defines Total Subnet (TS) as a service area that can't be assigned 
exclusively to IN, NC or ES and defines at least one security mechanism for each 
security service and service area. For example, to protect data confidentiality, he de­ 
fines operating system and cryptographic credentials as the security mechanism in 
the ES and IN's. Irvine also defines auditing of network control functions in IN and 
rule-based network intrusion systems in TS as the mechanisms.
The above propositions are difficult to realize because the units of the cost mea­ 
sure are impracticable to use. Equally, the lack of a quantitative and qualitative cost- 
benefit analysis and cost benefit tradeoff criteria for the computer security services 
complicates the application of the proposition.
In another cost model [9], five different prediction cases are identified as False 
Negative (FN), True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), True Negative (TN) and Mis- 
classified Hit.
False Negative (FN) is the cost of not detecting an attack. FN is incurred either 
by a system that does not install an intrusion detection system, or one in which 
the intrusion detection system does not function properly and mistakenly ignores 
an attack. This means that the attack will succeed and the target resource will be 
damaged. The FN cost is therefore defined as the damage cost of the attack. True 
Positive (TP) occurs in the event of a correctly classified attack, and involves the
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cost of detecting the attack and responding to it. This is represented by the formula 
"Progress x DamageCost", where Progress is the percent of the attack's progress.
False Positive (FP) occurs when an event is incorrectly classified as an attack. True 
Negative (TN) cost is always 0, as it is incurred when a network intrusion detection 
system correctly decides that an event is normal. Misclassified Hit cost is incurred 
when the wrong type of attack is identified. If the response cost is less than the 
damage cost, a response action will be taken to stop the attack. Since the action is 
not useful for the actual attack, some damage cost occurs due to the progression of 
the true attack.
The above cost model [9] may be impracticable to use and it is not clear how to 
account the cost for management, maintenance, etc.
In contrast to the above, our contribution in this study is to use reverse engineering 
technique to formulate appropriate cost-effective management frameworks for IDS 
implementations. Using the knowledge and experiences gained in the implemen­ 
tation of IDSes, we demonstrate how different management techniques affect the 
return on investment and will then craft the frameworks around these experiences 
to improve operational and implementation costs. The frameworks we propose are 
effective in assessing network intrusion detection systems. They can be used to pe­ 
riodically review the effectiveness of planned and implemented IDSes to determine 
if they are doing what they are supposed to do, rather than add more cost than the 
anticipated benefit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the state- 
of-the-art of cost benefit analysis techniques that have been proposed by other re­ 
searchers. Implementation approaches are discussed in Section 3 and management 
and costs structures are presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we present a case study 
that explores the effects of different implementation schemes on the return on invest­ 
ments. We then propose effective management frameworks in Section 6 and conclude 
our discussion in Section 7.
2. The state-of-the-art of cost benefit analysis techniques
One of the most important problems facing information assurance is coming up 
with a method that accurately calculates the costs associated with lost. This in part is 
because accurate metrics have been inherently unrealistic. Of those costs that can be 
measured, the largest in terms of monetary value typically involve theft of proprietary 
information or financial fraud. Others that are more difficult to quantify but have 
resulted in severe loss of use or productivity include viruses and malware, Web server 
denial-of-service attacks, abuse of access privileges, and equipment vandalism or 
outright theft. Results of surveys of organizations provide estimates as to breach 
incidents, security expenditures, malicious code, and so on, with numbers continuing 
to reflect dramatic growth each year. However, lacking any way to translate such 
statistics into expenditures and losses per organisation, per computer, or per user, the
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true impact of these figures remains uncertain. An alternative method has been to 
use the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) to estimate risks and hence project potential 
loses that could result from the risks materializing.
The ALE, a quantitative method for performing risk analysis has been used as one 
of the earliest estimators in the computer industry was. The ALE is used to calcu­ 
late risk estimates by multiplying the estimated frequency of occurrence of attacks 
by the possible loss amount for each data file, and then summing these results. The 
method has been criticized because of the "lack of empirical data on frequency of 
occurrence of impacts and the related consequences" thus producing an interpreta­ 
tion of "results as having more precision than they actually had" [10]. Nevertheless, 
the ALE figures may still provide some useful information. As a result, informa­ 
tion technology companies are now resorting to using the established Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA) method.
The CBA, which has become the most popular metrics, is applied to the assess­ 
ment of computer-related risks. CBA is well established in microeconomic and man­ 
agement accounting theory, and can be used to determine estimated levels of expen­ 
ditures appropriate to the values of assets requiring protection. Hazlewood [11] con­ 
tends that it is particularly convincing since "most managers and directors know little 
about computers and computer security, but they do understand risk and cost-benefit 
analysis". The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has a useful guidance document 
for preparing CBAs as required by the US. Federal government to support IT man­ 
agement decisions [12]. Although the NIH document does not specifically pertain to 
security, many of the IT topics and examples discussed are highly relevant, so it is 
worth a close look.
CBA concepts are distinctively multiple depending on the manner and environ­ 
ment of their application. In IT fields, CBA models are increasingly becoming im­ 
portant in cost estimations and have been effective in assessing network intrusion 
detection systems. The process involves first performing a risk analysis that pro­ 
duces a cost matrix for the assets under attack, and then independently calculating 
damage, response, and operation costs for those assets. Resources to counter the at­ 
tack can be classified as low, medium, or high, in terms of price, and weighted by 
amounts of use where appropriate, to obtain total expenditures. Probabilistic models 
also include false negative and false positive costs, since these may have an impact 
on losses.
An example of early CBA use in computer security is in the I-CAMP (Incident 
Cost Analysis Modeling Project) model developed by the Big Ten Universities dur­ 
ing the 1990s. Factored together are the time, wages, overhead, and direct costs re­ 
lated to the resolution of individual security incidents. Person-hours are logged, typi­ 
cally for incident investigation, system administration, and recovery efforts and then 
salary-weighted sums (including benefits) are computed. Necessary direct expendi­ 
tures (such as for replacement hardware, software, and analysis tools) are also added. 
The I-CAMP model is appropriate for situations where the related usage losses are 
considered to be modest or ignored entirely.
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There are other costs that may be incurred with security protection mechanisms 
even when provided for free (as in the case of automatically downloaded software 
patches). Researchers on a DARPA-funded project [13] developed "a mathemati­ 
cal model of the potential costs involved in patching and not patching at a given 
time". They observed that the risk of loss of functionality from applying a bad patch 
decreases in time, while the risk of loss due to penetration while the patch is not 
applied increases with time. They hypothesized that the optimal time to apply the 
patch is when these curves cross, and developed a mathematical model (similar to 
the weighted ROI) that took into account various cost and probability factors. Using 
data collected from a study involving 136 patches, they were able to determine that 
at" 10 and 30 days following a patch release, application is optimal. Of course, these 
intervals rely on some folks applying the (potentially bad or even bogus) patches 
sooner and reporting the defects they experienced - if everyone waits for the patches 
to be fixed, the time would be shifted forward, thus increasing early penetration risks.
There are also potential misuses of the CBA. Among these is in the application 
of the CBA to public-key cryptography in order to derive appropriate key sizes and 
expirations.
Silverman [14] asserts that a financial model, rather than a purely computational 
one, should be used to assess cryptographic vulnerabilities. He says "it makes no 
sense for an adversary to spend (say) $10 million breaking a key if recovering the 
key will only net (say) $10 thousand".
The CBA has also not been without problems in terms of use and acceptance. One 
of the major impediments in the use of CBA is the complexity of the equations. This 
has been a problem in the business arena where CBA equations are considered more 
complex. Here, the models incorporate the use of risk-adjusted cash flows in order to 
examine internal rate of return (IRR) and maximum net present value (NPV) figured 
as a percentage of information security expenditures. Gordon and Loeb [15] explain 
that a simple return on investment (ROI) calculation that divides income by asset 
value is insufficient because it is based on historical rather than future valuations 
as affected by breach incidents. They use weighted annual expected loss estimates 
derived by multiplying the dollar value associated with potential breaches by the 
probability of occurrence for each breach. But they note that even the IRR and NPV 
metrics may be deficient because these compare the actual cost savings from the 
security investment to the anticipated cost savings, which "is difficult because the 
benefits of specific investments aren't easily separated from other activities within a 
company. This is particularly relevant to security investments, the more successful 
the project, the less likely you are to see breaches".
All of this presents the opportunity to broaden the scope and dept of cost-benefit 
analysis using a multi-faceted approach and also to address business process con­ 
cerns in the hope that empiricism can shift the balance in favor of the consumers 
of computer security products and services. In the process, those "add-ons" and 
providers that do not demonstrably improve the security cost bottom line will be 
exposed and dispensed with. And as a necessity new tools and metrics that enable
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risk and cost-benefit assessments will be developed and proliferated. Only through 
such independent quantification can we hope to get a true handle on the financial 
ramifications of security problems so that we might best direct our efforts toward 
resolving them.
With the above in mind, it needs to be pointed out that recent studies point to the 
direction of Grafting new CBA techniques through interactive or adaptive techniques. 
Shawn [6] uses a cost-benefit analysis method called SAEM to compare alternative 
security designs in a financial and accounting information system. The goal is to 
help information-system stakeholders decide whether their security investment is 
consistent with the expected risks.
3. Implementation approaches
Although there are many different approaches to intrusion detection, we believe 
that all of these variations can be categorized into two basic approaches, reactive and 
proactive. We will provide a context-based analysis on how each approach affects 
management cost in Section 6.3.
3.1. Reactive approach
We define a reactive approach as one in which response is done once person­ 
nel have been enlisted. Reactive approaches generally rely on techniques, such as 
cryptographic checksums or audit trail analysis mechanisms. A good example of 
a widely used UNIX IDS utility is Tripwire. Tripwire allows the files of a UNIX 
operating system to be cryptographically sealed for later review and comparison. 
If a file is modified, the checksum won't match, and an intrusion can be assumed. 
Several other passive IDS tools are available either as commercial products or as 
freeware/shareware. In almost every case, the tools provide a "post-mortem" of a 
security event or action. Since the tools don't monitor data transactions or other 
real-time events, they don't provide a means of preventing unauthorized intrusions. 
Instead, they provide a means to quickly respond to a security compromise, and in 
some cases, act as a deterrent to would-be system intruders.
3.2. Proactive approach
We define a proactive approach as one in which response is automated by the 
system. The proactive approach is based on active monitoring and analysis. Tools 
and utilities, using active techniques, monitor the actual data traffic, keystrokes, or 
other actions, and compare them against some predefined set of thresholds or rules. 
If a threshold or rule is exceeded, an alarm is activated. The key concept in active 
monitoring systems is that of real-time data collection, analysis, and alarms.
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The distributed intrusion detection system (DIDS) is an example of proactive 
network-based IDS. DIDS is UNIX-based IDS that includes both agent software 
running on network hosts and a central security management console (the DIDS Di­ 
rector), where data is fused and alarms are generated in a graphical user interface. 
Developed by students at UC Davis, DIDS captures TCP/IP data traffic, in real time, 
and compares the collected traffic to stored "hacker profiles". If the system detects a 
condition that appears to indicate an unauthorized intrusion, an alarm is generated at 
a console, much like a traditional network management system.
It should be noted that just because an IDS captures raw network traffic, it still 
might not provide active IDS capabilities. Many times, network-based IDS will cap­ 
ture packets or raw network traffic, store it to a file, and review it at a later date or 
time, hi a recent analysis performed by Secure Networks, Inc. of several IDS prod­ 
ucts, most of the current product offerings were found to be based on passive IDS 
techniques.
Another approach to active intrusion detection is based on monitoring specific 
characteristics at the host operating system level, such as CPU utilization, memory 
utilization, input/output rates, etc. By creating a baseline (over time) of a system or 
collection of systems, these parameters can be monitored and measured to identify 
potential anomalous behavior. Since this data can be collected and analyzed in real 
time, it can be considered a proactive form of intrusion detection.
4. Cost and management structures
In order to prepare for the next section, we present a cost and management struc­ 
ture for IDS implementation in Section 4.1. Using a holistic approach, we analyze 
the cost aggregate for the different implementation schemes in Section 4.2.
4.1. Implementation cost
The associated cost of host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) deploy­ 
ments can vary depending on vendor and software versions. A good baseline is that 
agents can cost between $500 and $2000 each and consoles may cost in the $3000- 
$5000 range [16]. This does not always include OS, hardware or maintenance costs. 
Network intrusion detection systems can be deployed as stand-alone hosts with a 
possible management interface or distributed sensors and management console. Gen­ 
erally speaking, in the last couple of years commercially available sensors run in the 
$5000-$20000 area [16] depending on vendor, bandwidth and functional capabili­ 
ties. Management consoles can be included free as part of the cost, or sold separately 
and can cost several thousand dollars depending on the vendor. This does not neces­ 
sarily include hardware or back-end databases.
The total cost of implementing an IDS-based security solution depends on pur­ 
chasing costs combined with the costs for managing the technology. Giving IDS
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Table 2 








$5000 (may not apply for all products)
15% of the cost of NIDS and/or HIDS
MSSP network IDS management per year $24 000 ($2K per month)
MSSP host IDS management per year $6000 ($500 per agent per month)
Engineer cost $75 000 ($60 000 salary plus $15K benefits and admin)
Group manager cost __ ______ $100000 ($80 000 salary plus $20K benefits and admin)
Tables 
Cost structures [17]
Single support 24 x 7 x 365 Multi-shift support MSSP support
Technology cost $24650
Management cost $225 000
Total cost $249650
Average cost per year $83217











management duties to a person not skilled in IDS technology is a poor idea. Some 
standard implementation and management methods common to IDS deployments 
include using a Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP), utilizing a single in- 
house employee or technician, or enabling 24 x 7 x 365 multi-shift coverage in-house 
with a skilled technical staff. Of course the size of the organization and its' associ­ 
ated IT budget (or lack thereof) factor in to how the IDS technology will be deployed 
and managed. Tables 2 and 3 represent the generalized cost structure that we will use 
for our discussion and case study.
4.2. Comparative analysis of aggregate costs for different implementation schemes
An analysis of the aggregate costs for three different IDS deployments can be 
made based on the generalized cost structure in Tables 2 and 3. Tables 4 and 5 rep­ 
resent implementation (purchase) costs combined with life cycle management costs 
over a three-year period. The three scenarios include management by a single skilled 
in-house technician, management in which there are five shifts of skilled technicians 
providing 24 x 7 x 365 coverage, and management provided by an MSSP. It is very 
important to understand that full-service MSSPs will provide 24 x 7 x 365 coverage 
just like the multi-shift internal coverage provides. For completeness, we will review 
two different IDS deployments (one small and one medium) and consider the cost 
structure of implementing and managing them.
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Table 4 
Implementation and management cost of one network IDS and two host IDS [17]
Single support 24 x 7 x 365 Multi-shift support MSSP support
Technology cost $24650
Management cost $225 000
Total cost $249 650
Average cost per year $83217












Implementation and management cost of 15 network IDS and 15 host IDS [17]
_________________Single support 24 X 7 x 365 Multi-shift support MSSP support
Technology cost N/A$268 250 $268 250
Management cost N/A $1425000 $1350000
Totalcost N/A $1693000 $1618250
Average cost per year N/A $564417 $539417
Average cost per device per year N/A______$18814 $17981
From the numbers it is evident that in smaller IDS deployments the value propo­ 
sition of MSSP support is very strong relative to internal 24 x 7 x 365 multi-shift 
support. In larger IDS deployments, the cost differential between internal (highly 
skilled) multi-shift coverage and MSSP coverage diminishes due to economies of 
scale on the internal multi-shift coverage side. Single support coverage is not a realis­ 
tic option to consider when contemplating a deployment of 30 security devices. Also, 
this cost model does not take into account proprietary tools development necessary 
to manage several different types of technology (if that were the case) effectively.
5. A case study on cost effective management approach
In this section we will use a hypothetical case study [16] to demonstrate the effi­ 
cacy of the different management approaches. To do this we shall derive a value for 
the return on investment of each management method. The results will then be used 
to articulate a management framework.
5. 1. Framework for risk analysis and ROI computation
Studies on suitable management approaches that maximize the IDS ROI are not 
clearly established. Therefore, the use of this case study approach will permit in- 
depth exploration of the benefits of illustrating ROI analysis in order to determine 
the management technique that maximizes the IDS deployment. From the case study, 
we hope to glean some general concepts about intrusion detection system ROI and
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determine the most effective management approach that will maximize the return 
on investment. By developing the examples, we also hope to develop a possible 
method of reasoning about IDS cost effective management approaches more gen­ 
erally.
The case study will be presented in the context of the risk assessment and ROI 
studies given in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. In order to prepare for the studies, we set up a 
hypothetical company called ABC, Inc. and through the case study present the threat 
and incidence scenarios needed to calculate ROI - which is the indicator for effective 
implementation and lifecycle management of the IDS deployments.
Table 6 
ROI variables and risk equations
Variable Formula or expression
Asset Value (AV) 
Exposure Factor (EF) 
Underlying Exposed Assets (UEA) 
Secondary Exposure Factor (EFs)
Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM) 
Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) 
Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO)
Annual Loss Expectancy Without IDS (ALE1)
Annual Loss Expectancy with IDS using auto- 
response (ALE2)
Annual Loss Expectancy with IDS using auto- 
response and incident response (ALE3)
Annual Cost (T) of IDS Technology and Mgmt
Annual Recovery Cost ('R) from Intrusions
without IDS
Annual Dollar Savings (E) gained by stopping
intrusions with IDS
Traditional Return on Security Investment
(ROSI) equation
ABC, Inc. ROI of IDS with auto-response
(ROI1)
ABC, Inc. ROI of IDS with auto-response and 
incident response (RO12)
AV = hardware + comm. software + propri­ 
etary software + data
EF is the % estimation of the exposure of the ini­ 
tial compromised asset
UEA is the estimation of the $ value of the assets 
behind the compromised initial asset
EFs is the % estimation of the exposure of the 
UEAs
CTM = 1 + ({UEA X EFs)/AV) 
SLE = EF x AV x CTM
ARO is estimated number, based on available in­ 
dustry statistics or experience
ALE1 = SLE x ARO
ALE2 = conservative 50% reduction of ARO 
when IDS is managed skillfully with auto- 
response
ALE3 = conservative 25% reduction of EF and 
EFS when IDS is managed skillfully with auto- 
response and incident response
T
R = ALE1
E = ALE1 - (ALE2 or ALE3)
ROSI = R - ALE, where ALE = (R - E) + T
ROI1 = ALE1 - (((ALE1 - (ALE1 - ALE2))
+ T) 
ROI2 = ALE1 - (((ALE1 - (ALE1 - ALE3))
+ T)
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5.2. Risk assessment
A risk assessment (analysis) study [16] was conducted to quantify the loss asso­ 
ciated with the occurrence of an incidence or a threat at ABC, Inc. In the analytical 
approach leading up to the calculation for ROI, commonly accepted formulas and 
definitions (Table 6) are used to calculate Asset Valuations (AV and UEA), Expo­ 
sure Factors (EF and EPS), the single loss expectancy (SLE) and the Annual Rate 
of Occurrence (ARO). To fully explore the risk factors, three different scenarios of 
possible asset compromises were considered.
Procedurally, once the Asset Valuations (AV and UEA) and Exposure Factors (EF 
and EPS) have been calculated, the single loss expectancy (SLE) and the Annual Rate 
of Occurrence (ARO) are then computed. The Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO) is 
computed based on the analysis of the annual frequency of threats and the computa­ 
tions for Asset Valuations (AV and UEA), and Exposure Factors (EF and EPS) and 
(ARO). The results of these calculations for our case study are shown in Table 7.
One of the results of the study is the recommendation to implement IDS technol­ 
ogy to complement other security devices as a counter measure to future attacks. 
We now incorporate into our case study the different IDS implementation schemes 
described in Tables 4 and 5 in Section 4 in order to delineate the effect of each imple­ 
mentation scheme on the return on investment (ROI). The ROI will be the ultimate 
gauge of the effectiveness of the IDS management approach.
Consequently, in Section 5.3 we calculate the ROI using the data derived from the 
risk assessment study and IDS implementation management costs (for both single 
and MSSP support schemes) discussed in Section 4.
5J. Return on investment
The formulas used for the ROI calculations are shown in Table 6. The support 
costs ($83 217/year for single support coverage and $44 217/year for MSSP support 
coverage) taken from the Table 4 are used in the ROI calculations. The results of the 
ROI calculation for the different IDS implementation are shown in Table 8.
5.4. Analysis of results
Auto-response affects primary mitigation windows, which has a direct impact on 
partially reducing the Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO). This is illustrated [16] in 
the ROI Table 8 above, where a beneficial conservative reduction in ARO of 50% 
(highlighted in yellow in the "IDS w/Auto-Response" rows for each of the three 
scenarios) is attained. Incident response affects the secondary mitigation window, 
which impacts exposure factor (EF) and secondary exposure factor (EFs), which in 
turn impacts the Cascading Threat Multiplier (CTM). This is also illustrated in the 
ROI Table 8 above, where a beneficial conservative reduction in EF and EFS of
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Table 7 
Calculations for asset valuations, exposure factors and annual rate of occurrence
Scenario Descriptions of Co­ 
mpromised Asset 
(AV) and Underly­ 
ing Exposed Assets 
(UEA)
Considerations in assign- 
ing estimates for Asset 
Valuations (AV and UEA), 
Exposure Factors (EF and 
EPS) and Annual Rate of 
Occurrence (ARO)




ABC, Inc. NT 4.0 
Web server (AV); 
ABC, Inc. NT Do­ 
main (UEA)
ABC, Inc. UNIX- 
based Web server 
(AV); old inter­ 
nal ABC, Inc. 
database contain­ 
ing inventory data 
and pricing for 
customers and 
suppliers (UEA)
ABC, Inc. router; 
Primary supplier 
ABC, Inc.'s net­ 
work
Cost of lost productivity 
and revenue from down­ 
time? Cost of compro­ 
mised underlying data and 
assets? Cost of rebuilding 
web server? Potential cost 
of compromise of NT do­ 
main resources? 
Cost of lost productivity 
and revenue from down­ 
time? Cost of loss of trust 
or confidence of ABC, 
Inc.'s online customers? 
Cost of compromised data 
and assets? Cost of re­ 
building web server? Im­ 
mediate cost of fulfilling 
current orders with what­ 
ever it takes to satisfy cus­ 
tomers?
Cost of supply interrup­ 
tion from primary sup­ 
plier? Cost of loss of trust 
or confidence of primary 
supplier? Potential cost of 
compromised data? Cost 
for ABC, Inc. to replace 
ACME as a supplier? Dif­ 
ference in credit terms for 
new supplier (compared to 
highly favorable terms that 
ABC, Inc. currently en­ 
joys with ACME)? Differ­ 
ence in pricing between 
normal (new) supplier and 
ACME'S pricing? Poten­ 
tial cost of litigation if 
ACME determines ABC, 
INC. employee is at fault? 
Cost of ABC, INC. com­ 
promise? Potential cost of 
liability for attacks di­ 
rected at other non-partner 
networks?
$2000 75% $20000 75% 3
$2000 50% $50000 50% 2
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25% respectively (highlighted in yellow in the "IDS w/Auto-Response and Incident 
Response" rows for each of the three scenarios) is attained.
These reductions have positive effects on the ROI of IDS. Once the aggregate 
annualized savings (ALE1 - ALE2 or ALE1 - ALE3) occurring from IDS deploy­ 
ment equals the support costs associated to the deployment, a positive ROI should 
materialize. In the case of ABC, Inc., the two ROIs (ROI1 and ROI2) for each support 
profile are as follows:
• Single support with IDS using auto-response (ROI1) = -4%;
• Single support with IDS using auto-response and incident response (ROI2) = 
36%;
• MSSP support with IDS using auto-response (ROI1) = 81%; and
• MSSP support with IDS using auto-response and incident response (ROE) = 
155%.
These ROIs are based on the aggregate annualized savings from deploying and 
effectively managing the IDS technology and the resulting impact the IDS technol­ 
ogy could reasonably have on the combined effect of the three compromise scenarios 
described above (see Table 7).
6. Propositions for cost effective management frameworks
The case study presented in the preceding section provides the insight needed 
to articulate the frameworks for a cost effective IDS management approach. From 
these, we propose the following management frameworks for the cost effective man­ 
agement of IDS deployments:
• Developing a composite metrics for cost estimates;
• Using local environmental factors to optimizing product selection;
• Implementation with the proactive and auto response mechanism; and
• Adopting a cost effective staffing and support structure.
6.1. Developing a composite metrics for cost estimates
Developing a composite metrics from known implementation cost items will in the 
longer run help establish a somewhat accurate budget for IDS management. Apart 
from the functional requirements, the IDS must also satisfy a number of economical 
requirements, in particular, cost. The following cost categories are integrated into the 
costs structure of IDS management [18]:
• Cost of the IDS product.
• Cost of additional computer resources needed.
• Cost of administration.
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In addition, the costs components (technology, management, maintenance) de­ 
scribed in Section 4.1 should be factored into the costs of acquiring additional com­ 
puter resources and administration. Together all of this will be used to create an IDS 
cost metrics.
The importance of these cannot be under estimated. This will then become a ref­ 
erence for large, medium and small size enterprises, or indeed anyone trying to im­ 
plement an IDS security solution.
6.2. Using local environmental factors to optimizing product selection
• Iheagwara et al. [3] demonstrate that IDS performance is greatly influenced by IDS 
product selection for a given environment. The study investigates the relationship be­ 
tween different IDS products performance in varied network and traffic stream con­ 
ditions; and also provides a side-by-side comparison of two different technologies 
for intrusion detection. One being older (Megabit IDS) and the other (Gigabit IDS) 
representing evolutions from pure megabit IDS to gigabit IDS based on the extension 
of recurrent characteristics of ID system to new technologies.
Given that Gigabit requirements will increasingly become mandatory especially 
for carrier networks that are associated with problems of data management and in­ 
formation overload, the results are significant because the data on which the tech­ 
niques are evaluated represent a significant corpus of empirically obtained data. This 
can be used to simultaneously measure and evaluate the probability of detection of a 
given intrusion detection technique against that of another technique in order to com­ 
pare the correct detection rates. Detection rates are among the many criteria used in 
selecting the most feasible IDS product.
Iheagwara et al. [3] demonstrate that the IDS performance in large-scale in­ 
frastructures is directly related to traffic and environmental characteristics.
Operationally, the requirements of an enterprise network that is deploying a few 
devices locally to watch over a class-C network is going to be different from that of 
a multi-national corporation that is deploying hundreds of devices. The requirements 
should tie known performance values with the IDS product selection. In this regard, 
a clear delineation of the traffic load in order to estimate the type or number of a 
particular IDS product that will match expected performance level should precede 
the management approach.
In a different study, Iheagwara et al. [2] provide justification that an effective ID 
system can be achieved by using a best effort delivery/deployment approach that 
integrates the monitoring and deployment techniques to maximize the benefits of the 
ID system. The effectiveness of the IDS is closely linked to various factors including 
network topology, deployment techniques, and network throughput, bandwidth and 
network traffic conditions.
The conclusions drawn from the studies are that IDS product selection should be 
based on local factors. Comparatively, cost and other techno-economic factors should 
determine the product type and the implementation technology.
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6.3. Implementation with the proactive and auto response mechanism
The concepts of proactive and reactive management techniques have been ex­ 
plained in Section 2 above. The sequence of events for each technique is explained 
in Table 9.
By examining the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE = ARO * SLE, where 
SLE = Exposure Factor * Asset Value * Cascading Threat Multiplier) we can de­ 
termine which variables are affected by each of these two management methods. In 
a reactive design, where personnel must be engaged to respond to each event, the 
exposure factors (primary [EF] and secondary [EFs]) will be affected. In a proactive 
design there will be similar benefits to the exposure factors (re: a reduction) and, 
in addition, the Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO) will be influenced in a benefi­ 
cial way as well. To demonstrate the impact of threat vs. time we will use the con­ 
cept of primary and secondary mitigation windows. In Fig. 1, the primary mitigation 
window affects ARO while the secondary mitigation window affects Exposure Fac­ 
tor and Cascading Threat Multiplier [16]. CTM factors in the importance of other 
critical assets tied (re: networked) to the specific asset being analyzed in the ALE 
calculation. An effective way of impacting ARO is through automated response.
Auto-response can take many forms. On host-based IDS this is sometimes called 
shielding, where a specific process is terminated. Network-based IDS generally em­ 
ploys TCP resets or shunning. TCP resets effectively kills one specific session based 
on suspicious activity, but it still allows other activity from that same IP. Shunning, on 
the other hand, changes firewall rules or router access lists and effectively denies all 
traffic from that host for a specific period of time. In essence, shielding will protect 
a single host from one process, resets will protect a host from a specific session, and 
shunning will protect the entire network from a specific host for a pre-determined 
amount of time.
The accuracy of automated response can vary tremendously. This is dependent on 
the skill level of the engineers managing the devices. If the engineers are moderately 
skilled then auto-response will not be very effective, which may adversely affect the 
ROI of the IDS deployment. This adverse effect may manifest itself in the form of a 
loss of productivity from network-related problems due to improperly implemented 
auto-response, as well as the additional fallout related to a false sense of security 
throughout the company. It is assumed that a moderately skilled engineer is one 
who has gone through a formal process of training on intrusion detection systems 
operation and must have managed or operated the device for at least twelve (12)
Table 9 
Proactive and reactive management methods
Method System actions Personnel actions Follow up information
Reactive Log —> Alert —» Respond —> Analyze —> Eradicate Forensics and Evidence
Proactive Respond —+ Log —> Alert Analyze —» Eradicate if necessary Forensics and Evidence
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months while a highly skilled engineer is one who in addition to the above have 
managed and operated the device for at least twenty-four (24) months.
With skilled engineers managing the devices, we believe auto-response can be 
very accurate and effective. Because few statistics exist that illustrate the accuracy 
of automated response the statistics [16] generated from our analysis of one month's 
worth of data on NetSolve, Incorporated networks will be used for the illustration. If 
we include Code Red and Nimda activity, in 99.96% of the attacks, where automated 
response was used to mitigate the threat, the activity was malicious. Excluding large- 
scale worms, the attacks were malicious in 95.8% of auto-response uses. Of the 4.2% 
of the traffic that was not malicious, not all of it was desirable. Some of this traffic 
was peer-to-peer programs, on-line gaming, chat and other undesirable traffic that 
triggered alarms. The percentage of traffic that was denied that was business related 
was very small. It should be noted that many of these devices provide numerous 
different techniques for ensuring that very little, if any, legitimate traffic is denied 
through the use of automated response.
To determine how effective the device is in recognizing attacks we will use the 
most recent results [19]. In this test the worst NIDS detected 67 of 109 attacks or 
61.5%, while the best detected 94 of 109 attacks for an 86.2% detection rate. Even 
the worst case, the 61.5% detection rate was out of the box [20] and it was reported 
that it would not be difficult to improve this with some custom signatures and tuning. 
What does all this mean? It means that the worst IDS tested can still detect at least
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Fig. 1. Threat mitigation window [16].
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61.5% of attacks. Realistically that number should be closer to 70% when a skilled 
engineer or technician manages the device.
The cost benefit is that the auto-response feature, when properly used, can be a 
very effective method of reducing the Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO).
6.4. Adopting a cost effective staffing and support structure
The results of the studies in Section 5 demonstrate that the use of auto-response 
scheme produces by far better return on investment in both NIDS and HIDS de­ 
ployments. A conservative estimate of 50% reduction in ARO is facilitated by the 
utilization of auto-response. Also, the 25% reduction in both exposure factors (EF 
and EPS) should also be considered a conservative estimate in the IDS deployment 
with auto-response and prompt incident response scheme.
The benefits of a better IDS management are reflected in the reductions in the 
values of the variables (see highlighted cells under ARO, EF and EPS in Table 8). 
The overall effect is visible in the increase in the ROI values for the ABC, Inc. IDS 
deployment for both the single in-house support and MSSP support schemes.
In the final analysis, attainment of a better ROI depends on a good management 
practice especially the use of highly skilled engineers or technicians that have a 
sound understanding of the technology including the inherent strengths and weak­ 
nesses to manage the IDS technology. It is also a reasonable assumption that a single 
in-house engineer or technician would better support EDS deployment of one NIDS 
and two HEDSs. On the other hand, it will be ineffective to assume that one per­ 
son can support this highly dynamic technology on a continual 24/7/365 basis with 
active auto-response and real-time incident response for every security event. Multi- 
shift internal support as well as Managed Security Service Provider (MSSP) support 
is the preferred ways of providing definitive 24/7/365 support and real-time incident 
response.
7. Conclusions
The decision to deploy a security mechanism such as IDS is often motivated by 
the needs of security risk management. As a matter of reality, a very important but 
often neglected facet of intrusion detection is its cost-effectiveness, or cost-benefit 
trade-off. The objective of IDS is therefore to provide protection to the information 
assets that are at risk and have value to an organization. For IDS to be cost-effective, 
it should cost no more than the expected level of loss from intrusions. This requires 
that the IDS consider the trade-off among cost factors, which at the minimum should 
include development cost, the cost of damage caused by an intrusion, the cost of 
manual or automatic response to an intrusion, and the operational cost, which mea­ 
sures constraints on time and computing resources. For example, an intrusion that has
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a higher response cost than damage cost should usually not be acted upon beyond 
simple logging.
The effectiveness of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is dependent upon an or­ 
ganization's deployment strategy and how well the successful implementation and 
management of the technology helps the organization achieve the tactical and strate­ 
gic objectives it has established. One such strategic objective could be a positive 
Return on Investment (ROI). For organizations interested in quantifying the IDS's 
value prior to deploying it, their investment decision will hinge on their ability to 
demonstrate a positive ROI. ROI has traditionally been difficult to quantify for net­ 
work security devices, in part because it is difficult to calculate risk accurately due 
to the subjectivity involved with its quantification. Also, business-relevant statistics 
regarding security incidents are not always available for consideration in analyzing 
risk.
In considering an implementation of IDS technology, a return on investment can 
be understood by analyzing the difference between annual loss expectancy (ALE) 
without IDS deployment and the ALE with IDS deployment, adjusted for technol­ 
ogy and management costs. The ultimate initial goal, then, should be to prove that 
the value proposition (re: a benefit in the form of a quantifiable reduction in ALE) in 
implementing and effectively managing the IDS technology is greater than the im­ 
plementation and management costs associated with deploying the IDS technology.
Finally, this paper has demonstrated that effective management methods will max­ 
imize the performance of the IDS and that a positive IDS ROI is attainable with an 
effective deployment technique and optimal management approach.
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I8STRACT
'is paper discusses the challenges facing IDS deployments in 
ije-scale infrastructures. Further, the paper discusses emerging 
ditetural and structural approaches to intrusion detection 
i*ms (IDS) design, as well as the performance issues 
inociated with implementations in complex, inter-dependent 
mstmctures and distributed architectures. The paper suggests 
Bejies to enhance the performance of the IDS and support 
Ifelive decision-making about which techniques are 
ppriate for the management of the IDS in a given 
nironment.
'INTRODUCTION
,ti Intrusion detection system (IDS) is a security system that 
tailors computer systems and network traffic and analyzes that 
(ffic for possible hostile attacks originating from outside the 
Ipizatton and also for system misuse or attacks originating 
in inside the organization. Thus, the main task of intrusion 
taion systems is defense of a computer system by detecting 
d possibly repelling attacks it. Detecting hostile attacks 
'Ns on the number and type of appropriate actions. Intrusion 
"ration requires a well-selected combination of "baiting and 
ting" aimed at both investigations of threats. Diverting the 
Wer's attention from protected resources is another task. 
to the real system and a possible trap system are constantly 
Stored. Data generated by intrusion detection systems is 
"My examined (this is the main task of each IDS) for 
*clion of possible attacks (intrusions). 
^ an intrusion has been detected, the IDS issues alerts 
%ing administrators of this fact. The next step is undertaken 
^ ty the administrators or the IDS itself, by taking 
'*ge of additional countermeasures (specific block
functions to terminate sessions, backup systems, routing 
connections to a system trap, legal infrastructure etc.) - 
following the organization's security policy (Fig.l).
Khfa
Figure 1 Intrusion detection system infrastructure [1]
Among the various IDS tasks, intruder identification is one of 
the fundamental ones. It can be useful in the forensic research of 
incidents and installing appropriate patches to enable the 
detection of future attack attempts targeted on specific persons 
or resources. Intrusion detection may sometimes produce false 
alarms, for example as a result of malfunctioning network 
interface or sending attack description or signatures via email. 
Among the many challenges facing the IDS is the complex 
networked environment it operates in. This is compounded in 
large-scale deployments where various technical and operational 
issues bug the IDS performance. To effectively deploy the IDS 
in such complex and networked environments requires a broad 
understanding of computer security and good product delivery. 
As the information technology landscapes and infrastructures 
become more and more complex so also has the performance 
effectiveness of the IDS diminished in such environments [2],
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, deployment in large companies presents several unique 
odes. The most obvious difference between small and large 
jprise implementations is the number of endpoint machines 
it must be protected. More computers, servers, and network 
j^ts mean a more complicated setup and a longer 
'.filiation time. Smaller institutions, by definition, have less 
juices and options about where to strategically install the IDS. 
i contrast. Larger institutions must often spend days or even 
!!# deciding on the optimal placement of IDS agents, 
jjjgers, and IDS configuration groupings. 
lifter well-known issue facing big companies involves 
utility and the agent/console ratio. Depending on how many 
-uloyees will monitor the IDS managers for output, the 
joyee skill and comfort level, the number of intrusion alerts 
u minute, the IDS software implemented, and several other 
aors, the ideal agent/console ratio can vary from 5:1 to 50:1. 
tyigh others may claim that these numbers are low, our 
jperience indicates that even the high end of this spectrum is 
ply achieved. Unfortunately, thorough planning in this 
nance may not help the situation because of the many 
[teermined and unpredictable factors that influence the 
iMial ratio. Different IDS solutions scale differently in 
gsrent environments and situations. Regardless of how this 
$n is resolved, it must be addressed: several organizations' 
[5 units and entire managed security services providers have 
Utdas a result of their inability to scale, 
forest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
IKUSS IDS structure and architecture. In Section 3, we present 
>;!DS challenges in large-scale distributed infrastructures and 
inss mitigation strategies Section 4. We conclude our 
frasion in Section 5.
! THE STRUCTURE AND ARCHITECTURE OF
HTRUSION 
lldetection systems
:i the component level, an intrusion detection system always 
It its core element - a sensor (an analysis engine) that is 
Hponsible for detecting intrusions. This sensor contains 
Kision-making mechanisms regarding intrusions. Sensors 
wive raw data from three major information sources: own IDS 
bwledge base, syslog and audit trails. The syslog may include, 
hexample, configuration of file system, user authorizations etc. 
Ss information creates the basis for a further decision-making 
Ittess.
It sensor is integrated with the component responsible for data 
Action (Fig.2) — an event generator. The collection manner 
5 determined by the event generator policy that defines the 
:bing mode of event notification information. The event 
l*rator (operating system, network, application) produces a 
"fey-consistent set of events that may be a log (or audit) of 
Ifcm events, or network packets. This, set along with the 
% information can be stored either in the protected system 
:'outside. In certain cases, no data storage is employed for 
^P'e, when event data streams are transferred directly to the 
"%er. This concerns the network packets in particular.
Figure 2: IDS components [3]
The role of the sensor is to filter information and discard any 
irrelevant data obtained from the event set associated with the 
protected system, thereby detecting suspicious activities. The 
analyzer uses the detection policy database for this purpose. The 
latter comprises the following elements: attack signatures, 
normal behavior profiles, and necessary parameters for example, 
thresholds, In addition, the database holds IDS configuration 
parameters, including modes of communication with the 
response module. The sensor also has its own database 
containing the dynamic history of potential complex intrusions 
(composed from multiple actions).
Intrusion detection systems can be arranged as either centralized 
(for example, physically integrated within a firewall) or 
distributed. A distributed IDS consists of multiple Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) over a large network, all of which 
communicate with each other. More sophisticated systems 
follow an agent structure principle where small autonomous 
modules are organized on a per-host basis across the protected 
network [4]. The role of the agent is to monitor and filter all 
activities within the protected area and — depending on the 
approach adopted — make an initial analysis and even undertake 
a response action. The cooperative agent network that reports to 
the central analysis server is one of the most important 
components of intrusion detection systems. BIDS can employ 
more sophisticated analysis tools, particularly connected with 
the detection of distributed attacks [5]. Another separate role of 
the agent is associated with its mobility and roaming across 
multiple physical locations. In addition, agents can be 
specifically devoted to detect certain known attack signatures. 
This is a decisive factor when introducing protection means 
associated with new types of attacks [6], IDS agent-based 
solutions also use less sophisticated mechanisms for response 
policy updating [7],
One multi-agent architecture solution, which originated in 1994, 
is AAFID (Autonomous Agents for Intrusion Detection). It uses 
agents that monitor a certain aspect of the behavior of the system 
they reside on at the time. For example, an agent can see an 
abnormal number of telnet sessions within the system it monitors. 
An agent has the capacity to issue an alert when detecting a 
suspicious event. Agents can be cloned and shifted onto other 
systems (autonomy feature). Apart from agents, the system may 
have transceivers to monitor all operations effected by agents of 
a specific host. Transceivers always send the results of their 
operations to a unique single monitor. Monitors receive 
information from a specific network area (not only from a single
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,, which means that they can correlate distributed 
.^nation. Additionally, some filters may be introduced for 
f selection and aggregation [8].
^CHALLENGES FOR LARGE-SCALE 
INFRASTRUCTURES
detection for emerging large-scale distributed systems 
companies and virtual enterprise networks) faces a
gtty of difficult challenges. The most important ones can be
(jiiarized as:
y Multiple attack scenarios
h anatomy of an intrusion is composed of increasingly 
attack scenarios. An attack scenario consists in a 
sequence of actions that are applied for reaching a
•dollar strategic goal (e.g. getting confidential information). 
|tse actions are typically applied on different hosts in a 
,t,ork and by using a variety of tools. Moreover, a variety of 
jferent attack scenarios are possible to reach the same goal. 
jsre is a need for dynamically linking local individual events 
(global attack strategies in order to provide pro-active and 
eptive intrusion monitoring
VPerformance in complex infrastructures
jige distributed networks of systems need scalable IDS 
poaches for which performance is becoming an important 
(fate. This includes issues of timeliness of local event 
witoring and communication of contextual data between 
ides as well as of trust relationships between the nodes.
LI Communication protocols
1st of the individual techniques are more suitable for local 
wit monitoring and analysis. Globally co-ordinate attack 
elegies require integration of methods and aggregation of 
iparate information sources. The critical issue lies in defining 
k high-level communication protocol to allow different 
riiods of IDS to contribute to the intrusion detection process.
^Integration with network management system
I) system methods must be better integrated with exiting 
Kwork management systems if their widespread adoption in 
khistry is to be guaranteed. One reason is that this should 
kilitate their maintenance/upgrades and a more coherent 
Wl/log data management. IDS are one mechanism to respond
• new business dependability/survivabiliry needs. It is as yet 
Kbr how to integrate IDS with other dependability 
Uclianisms (e.g. fault tolerance, recovery mechanisms) in a 
'to information risk and security policy context.
li Implementation issues
ttnowledging the need for IDS protection, and subsequently 
^wsing the IDS that best fits the company's needs are 
"Pwtant steps in the quest for overall information security. 
"""ever, these steps only complete the initial stages of a
•°ugh IDS implementation process. After selecting and 
Basing the optimal IDS, a company must properly and 
'faently deploy it throughout the organization.
The first step in a well-planned and thorough deployment should 
be to design an IDS strategy and then express it in the context of 
an IDS policy. This policy document serves as a guide for the 
implementation process, answering questions such as:
1. Will network traffic restrictions be tight or loose?
2. Who will be authorized to make changes to the IDS 
policy or configurations?
3. On which machines will an IDS installation be required?
4. How frequently will IDS logs undergo analysis? 
The planning and coordination required in creating this policy 
will reinforce the communication between company 
management and security officials. At the same time, tkis_will 
allow both organizational units to identify and resolve conflicts 
before they become obstacles to successful IDS deployment. 
Organizations should incorporate this policy into their overall 
security policy or company rules and regulations.
3.5.1 Installing: After the IDS policy is set, we move to the next 
logical step, installation. Installing an IDS system typically 
begins with installation of the IDS manager. Generally, the 
procedures for this installation are similar to those for most 
software: insert the CD and locate the executable. Although this 
process is straightforward, Murphy's Law suggests that it 
infrequently runs smoothly. The installation wizard might freeze, 
the installation options available might sound complicated and 
unfamiliar, or a particular .DLL file might not unpack correctly. 
Though these problems are comparatively miniscule in the 
overall process of IDS deployment, they must still be resolved 
prior to moving on to the next phase of deployment. 
Upon completion of manager installation, the IDS tool must be 
distributed to agents through one of a number of different 
methods. Most installation problems occur in this portion of IDS 
deployment. The major obstacles that arise in distributing IDS 
agents relate to communication between the agents and 
managers. These problems often surface in the following areas:
1. The trust relationship between the systems on which 
agents and managers reside;
2. Communication issues with Network Address 
Translation; and,
3. Discrepancies in the installation process itself- i.e., the 
steps that must be followed to maintain establishment 
of a secure channel between an agent and the manager. 
Companies have several available options to deal with these 
issues: using the system defaults, reading the manual, navigating 
through on-line help, calling the IDS vendor's software help 
desk, and/or using outside consultants. Any of these methods 
should ultimately result in a successful installation.
3.5.2 Configuration: Organizations must deal with the issue of 
setting the IDS to capture relevant data only. Every organization 
has different expectations and different requirements, so the 
default IDS settings usually need to be altered. Finding the 
perfect balance between a massive amount of data generation, 
which leads to an over-saturation of information, and a small 
amount of data generation, which may cause ineffective 
monitoring, can complicate a deployment. In general, a 
sophisticated IDS solution will require a sophisticated IDS 
configuration, so companies should budget plenty of time for 
thorough configuration development, tuning, and testing.
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.ylonitoring of key segments
Ijrtt scale environments there may be a requirement to place 
^ network intrusion detection devices in several locations 
jj network. Network based Intrusion Detection Systems are 
«able to monitor network traffic on the network segment 
^reside on.
STRATEGIES FOR THE EFFECTIVE SUSTENANCE 
t IDS PERFORMANCE
k complexity, as well as the importance of enterprise system 
Stated computer networks and their information resources 
£ for new approach in the management of intrusion 
uitoring.. Large theoretical and practical efforts are 
pirated on this problem today. In the Sections below, we 
put demonstrated strategies that can help improve the IDS 
jfamance in large-scale infrastructures.
p Defining attacks
I'tffectively defend the network, one must delineate what a 
unal or abnormal traffic is. Since intrusion detection systems 
bl with hacking breaches, one must clearly define and 
toacterize all the possible attacks that are presently known or 
iteivable. Towards this, intrusion attacks have been presented 
lie scheme of Kumar [9] and can be represented by an event 
iseries of events. It is the relationship of these events to one 
rther that provides the basis for recognizing differing attack 
|ei. Under the attack taxonomy, intrusions fall into two 
Kgorjes: namely misuse and anomalous behavior. Misuse 
mprises attacks that are already known and whose behavior 
t be specified while anomalous behavior describes attacks 
wiving unusual use of the system resources. In our 
laments the attack set described below falls under the active 
tee attack type.
^Recognizing Attacks: Symptomatic Precursors
taining systems for any abnormal behavior could lead to 
ftgnition of possible attacks. This may be helpful in detecting 
teks. In most cases, any attempt to take advantage of faults in 
pzation security systems may be considered as an attack 
rithis is the most common symptom of an intrusion. However 
k organization itself may "facilitate" the task of attackers,
*g tools, which aid in the process of securing its network - so 
<W security and file integrity scanners. They operate either 
lolly (assisting system administrators during scanning) or 
Owtely but may also be deliberately used by intruders. 
tain scanning tools often double-edged swords available for 
W the users and hackers are good for monitoring system and
**ork activities e.g. file integrity scanners and known 
'^ability scanners. It is worthy to note the following: 
1 Detection of file integrity scanners. The available file 
integrity testing tools operate in a systematic manner so 
that it is possible to use modeling techniques and 
specialized tools for detection purposes, for example 
the anti-SATAN software, Courtney.
A good correlation between scanning and usage is required - 
scanning for flaws may further use a service featuring such flaws, 
this may be a precursor of an attack to come.
4.3 Suspicious network activity
An intruder actually trying to compromise a system often uses a 
large number of exploits and makes many unsuccessful attempts. 
His activities differ from those of the user working with the 
system [10]. Any penetration-testing tool should be able to 
identify suspicious activities after a certain threshold has been 
exceeded. Then, an alert may be produced and diffused. This 
passive technique allows detection of intruders without 
discovering a clear picture of the event (exploits involved, tools, 
services, software configuration, etc.), by only quantitatively 
examining network activities. 
Passive methods used in intrusion detection are driven from 
databases of recurrent attack signatures that should consider the 
following technical aspects:
• Repetition thresholds to help distinguish between legal 
and suspicious activities (that trigger alerts). Network 
activities can be identified using multiple parameter 
values derived, for example, from the user profile or 
Session State.
• Time between repeat instances - a parameter to 
determine the time to elapse between consecutive 
events, for example, an activity is to be considered 
suspicious if within a two-minute interval, three 
consecutive unsuccessful login attempts are made.
• Constructing a database of repetitive attack signatures. 
An attack may involve neutral activities (mostly in the 
reconnaissance phase) and/or those misleading the IDS 
defense devices. In such a case, construction of an 
attack signature may be impossible or very difficult.
4.4 Incompatible or illegal commands
Network services/protocols are documented in a precise manner 
and use determining software tools. Any incompatibility with 
known patterns (including typical human errors such as 
misprints occurring in network packets) may be valuable 
information to detect services that are possibly being targeted by 
an intruder.
If the system audit facility uses, for example, send mail relaying, 
then the relevant log sequence behaves in a regular and 
predictable manner. However, if the log indicates that a specific 
process has given illegal commands, it might be a symptom of 
either a non-malicious event or a spoofing attempt. 
The examining of hostile attempts may include:
• Detection of attempts to recover mistyped commands or 
answers followed by re-launching them,
• Detecting several failed attempts to observe syntax 
protocols followed by successful ones,
• Detecting adaptive learning attempts to capture errors 
committed by the same object (service, host). After a 
certain period, these errors will cease.
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^normal attributes
^inost frequent cases are the ones where one is expected to 
j with a set of attributes of packets or specific requests for 
^s. It is possible to define the expected attribute pattern. If 
jjijitered attributes do not match this pattern, this may 
jjjte a successful intrusion or intrusive attempt.
, Calendar and time attributes
, System resource attributes.
, Packets with unexpected TCP acknowledgement
settings. 
, Service mix attributes.
I, Odd System Behavior
potential intruder may design its malicious activity with side 
£$ that will cause odd behavior of the system. Monitoring 
f\ side effects is difficult since their location is hardly 
jsctable. Below there are some examples of:
• Unexplained problems with system hardware or 
software, for example server down, particularly 
daemons not running, unexplained system restart 
attempts, changes to system clock settings.
• Unexplained system resource problems: file system 
overflow; abnormal consumption of CPU usage.
• Odd messages from system daemons, system daemons 
not running or disturbed (particularly superuser 
daemons and those designed to monitor the system state, 
for example Syslog). Such symptoms are always 
suspicious.
i Unexplained system performance problems (routers or 
system services, for example long server response
times).
• Unexplained user process behavior, for example 
unexpected access to system resources.
• Unexplained audit log behavior. Audit logs that shrink 
in size (unless intentionally reduced by the system 
administrator).
^Effective Configuration Strategies
"o maximize the IDS effectiveness, there is the need to develop 
feycle operational Strategies that enhances the performance 
abes.
".1 Reviewing the deployment policy: The IDS administrator 
:«is to review the current IDS deployment policy detailing the 
'Jpnization's approach to intrusion detection in general. The 
% determines which strategy to employ, hence determine 
totcan be done to help improve IDS performance. This could 
"instance stipulate the methods to monitor attacks. Possible 
Pfons include:
'• To monitor for all attacks, regardless of what systems 
are prevalent in an organization; for example, looking 
for RFC exploits in a Microsoft environment. 
2. To monitor only for attacks that would be relevant to 
the network environment, such as configuring the NIDS 
to detect all Microsoft exploits in an all Microsoft 
environment;
3. To monitor all vulnerabilities for a particular service 
regardless environment, such as detecting all HTTP 
exploits in an US-only environment.
4.7.2 Filtering Signatures: After determining the strategy, IDS 
engineer should trim the amount of attacks that the IDS will look 
for. The NIDS default configuration may monitor for potential 
attacks that are not are not relevant to the environment that. This 
can lead to wasted resources and, thus, to inefficiencies. For 
example, if the company is a pure Windows environment there is 
no real reason to look for RPC exploits. Signature trimming can 
remove many unnecessary signatures at a time. For example, if 
the system is running Snort, the admin can simply edtf. the 
snortconf file and remove the entire rules file (i.e. rpc.rules, 
x 11.rules). To get more granular, the administrator should look 
at the more common services (i.e. HTTP, FTP, SMTP) and see if 
the attack signatures they are looking for match the services that 
the company runs. In this context, it makes sense to look for 
signatures that match software vendors that are on the network. 
For example, if the company uses FTP servers, but none of them 
are running wu-ftp, the NIDS does not need to be configured to 
look for wu-ftp exploits.
4.7.3 Traffic Filtering: Most NIDSs have some sort of filtering 
function that allows certain types of traffic to be disregarded. 
There are a couple instances when this type of filtering may be 
of value. Firstly, if there is a server or subnet that generates a lot 
of traffic that does not need to be monitored. One form of this 
type of traffic would be multicast traffic, which is usually some 
type of streaming media. Some switch vendors may be able to 
filter the traffic before it gets to the NIDS. This would be the 
preferred approach, as the NIDS will not have to unnecessarily 
process data that has already been determined to be harmless. 
Secondly, this type of filtering may be useful if there are servers 
or subnets that generate traffic that is encrypted or that the NIDS 
otherwise can't decode. Since this type of traffic would need to 
be to thrown away, there is no reason to search the packets in the 
first place. Also, most NIDS are installed with two NICs 
(Network Interface Cards), one for monitoring a particular 
network segment and one for management. Depending on how 
the network is designed there could be a lot of erroneous packets 
hitting the. MIDS management NIC, even in a purely switched 
environment.
4.7.4 Load Balancing: Another type of filtering could be done 
with some type of hardware device. This would allow traffic to 
be split up and sent to a NIDS farm (a logical grouping of 
multiple physical NIDS to handle high bandwidth networks). 
This is the same idea as DNS or Web server load balancing that 
is currently used on many networks. There are products called 
IDS Balancers, which are aimed at NIDS load balancing. With 
these types of devices, 100Mbs+ of bandwidth can be distributed 
over multiple sensors in the NIDS farm. In a basic distribution 
scenario, the traffic would be evenly distributed among each 
NIDS in the NIDS farm. This means that each NIDS should get 
an equal amount of traffic. Since today's NIDSs are more 
stateful than previous generations, each NIDS would have to get 
traffic distributed to it based on sessions (conversations), not 
individual packets. This way the NIDS can watch the entire 
conversation and be aware of any attacks or anomalies. Each 
NIDS would have the same policies, so that they would catch the 
same exploits and anomalies. With devices such as NIDS load
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and layer-7 switches, the traffic could be filtered 
M it is sent to the NIDS farm.
0 dunging Default Timeouts: Depending on the NIDS 
ft deployed, there maybe options to configure how may
*jjctkms are tracked. Altering this configuration will affect 
.jnount of memory used to store this information, as well as 
flaunt of CPU cycles used to search this information. When 
«jtimeouts are defined, a certain amount of memory is set 
a for these tables, regardless of whether or not they are filled, 
lining some traffic analysis on the network, the settings could 
changed to make the NIDS more efficient when watching a 
jjBlar network segment.
%t may be options available to define timeouts for particular 
^Is. These may be as generic as TCP and UDP timeouts, 
[itymay be as granular as HTTP, DNS and SMTP timeouts, 
(joding on the type and amount of a particular protocol on 
> network, the NIDS administrator may need to specify a 
faaA timeout than the default.
rjj Reducing the Traffic Volume: This options fall into the 
jgory of reducing the volume of information that the 
frock-based IDS is required to filter without reducing or 
(jug off the information that employees or customers need. 
I'.ltlje information caches: Both proxy and client caches are 
(fill in the effort to reduce traffic. "Web Caching is the act of 
ting copies of Web pages on a 'local' system. If the same 
ps are requested at a later time, and the cached copy is still 
id, there is no need to contact the origin server again."7 The 
KJK could be on a separate server that is pointed to by client 
B browsers and used as a proxy, or it can be the built in cache 
kt is part of most web browsers. By implementing caches, 
rt> will download information from a web page, the 
tomation will be checked by the network-based IDS, and it 
ill be displayed to the user. In addition, the downloaded 
tarnation will be stored in the cache. The next time that 
tarnation is requested, it comes from the cache and does not 
|-.s to be checked by the network-based IDS. This only works 
lae cache server is positioned after the network-based IDS in 
ktnffic flow, or if users are using the cache capability in their 
us browsers. Web browsers can be configured with how much 
ispace to use to store downloaded web pages. If this value is 
It tow, it may need to be raised to be of any benefit. 
I'J Remove unused protocols: Preconfigured, out-of-the-box
*pter systems normally have multiple network protocols 
tailed that are not needed. Uninstalling those protocols will 
Kice the load on a network and on network-based IDS. If a 
Wcol is not running on a network then obviously the 
work-based IDS will not have to spend cycles analyzing its 
Nats. Removing protocols that the network-based IDS will
* analyze will not provide as much benefit as removing those 
Ncok that it will analyze. It is still a good security practice to 
toove them though. Most network-based IDS systems only
*yze IP traffic and not AppleTalk, NetBEUI, or IPX. 
^work-based IDS tools normally consist of a packet collection
*?« and a packet analysis engine. The packet collection 
'!« will pull all packets off of the network, including 
Walk and IPX packets, but it will not send the packets 
Plaining protocols that the analysis engine cannot analyze to
*: analysis engine itself. So pulling the unused protocols off the
network means the packet analysis portion of the network-based 
IDS tool will have fewer packets to process.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has discussed the challenges associated with 
deployment of the IDS in large-scale infrastructures and the 
factors that impede their performance. The effectiveness of the 
IDS is dependent upon an organization's deployment strategy 
and how well the management of the IDS technology helps the 
organization achieve the tactical and strategic objectives it has 
established. The strategies to attain such objectives haiej^een 
outlined and discussed in Section 4 of this paper. Finally, it has 
been shown how the use of effective configuration techniques 
can reduce the problems associated with the IDS performance in 
large deployments.
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ABSTRACT
The intrusion detection system (IDS) technology is very 
powerful. It provides an incredible view into the security 
problems fachg an organization. However, it still requires 
considerable refinements to eliminate the weaknesses in 
currently available products. Some of the weaknesses that are 
considered short-term i.e. scalability, hierarchical repotting, 
and dynamic remote updates are already being addressed by 
vendors and some of the solutions are in the alpha- or beta- 
testing stage. The long-term weaknesses, which by and large 
are metrics for IDS performance, are being addressed as 
research topics in and of themselves.
In this paper, we explore the new areas of IDS development 
and chart the course for future research. We propose standard 
frameworks to conceptualize the most appropriate remedies to 
current design problems given the present or projected 
availability of appropriate countermeasures. We explore how 
the proposed frameworks can be translated into design 
standards for IDS products in the most consistent and 
meaningful way.
Keywords: Intrusion detection systems, Intrusion challenges, 
IDS Design.
I INTRODUCTION
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a security system that 
monitors computer systems and network traffic and analyzes 
that traffic for possible hostile attacks originating from outside 
fie organization and also for system misuse or attacks 
originating from inside the organization.
IDS, much like the security industry itself, have grown rapidly 
over the past few years. These tools have become essential 
security components - as valuable to many organizations as a 
firewall. However, as in any environment, things change. As 
networks and crackers evolve and grow rapidly, demanding 
that security tools keep up, the IDS faces several daunting but 
exciting challenges in the future and are sure to remain one of 
the best weapons in the arena of network security.
Among the many challenges is the development of 
commercial IDS products to suite the needs of today's 
complex networked environments. To effectively deploy the 
IDS in such complex and networked environments requires a 
broad understanding of computer security and good product 
delivery. As the information technology landscapes and 
infrastructures become more and more complex so also has the 
performance effectiveness of the IDS diminished in such 
environments [1]. The complexities have often resulted into 
the most significant obstacle to the success of an information 
security improvement initiative due to lack of management 
support. In surveys conducted by security trade magazines [2], 
lack of management support was cited as one of the principal 
barriers to effective information security.
Within the IDS market place are two broad categories of 
products: Host-based and Network-based. Commercially 
available IDS products (Table 1) are classified according to 
their approach to intrusion detection with all being either host 
or network-based. None of the products integrate host-based 
and network-based intrusion detection capabilities and a few 
integrate security assessment capabilities with basic IDS
Copyright © 2003
ftinctionality, such as audit trail analysis and malicious 
software protection.
The insights and operational experience gained from the 
implementation of the currently available IDS products 
demonstrates the need for product enhancements. In this 
regard, results of previous research studies on performance 
effectiveness could be helpful in evolving an effective design 
approach and charting the course for new products 
development. Crucial to this is the results of those research 
studies that established a link between IDS performance in 
technical, operational and cost/economic terms and product 
architectures.
With so many studies on IDS technologies, those that are 
performance-based have leaped forward to take the center 
stage as developers race to refine existing products. IDS 
performance studies [1,3,4] measure the effectiveness of the 
IDS using a variety of metrics for different environments.
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accuracy and ability to capture attack packets in their 
entirety. Iheagwara et al. [1] expands this effort with an 
evaluation study of the effect of deployment techniques on 
IDS performance in switched and distributed system. The 
study demonstrates that monitoring techniques could play an 
important role in determining the effectiveness of the IDS in a 
switched and distributed network.
In an experimental evaluation study of intrusion detectien 
system performance in a gigabit environment, Iheagwara et. al. 
[4] examines the system benefits of using a single Gigabit IDS 
sensor instead of multiple Megabit sensors for a wide range of 
defined system attacks, network traffic characteristics, and for 
their contexts of operational concepts and deployment 
techniques. The study established the relationship between 
traffic parametric values and the IDS performance for 
specified environments.
The results of cost-benefit model and analysis studies of IDS 
deployments, although relatively few shades some light on the 
integral economic building blocks that could serve as a guide 
for acquisition and deployment of the products. Lee et. al. [5] 
studies the problem of building cost-sensitive intrusion 
detection models. For intrusion detection, Irvine [6] defines 
auditing of network control functions in intermediate nodes, 
and rule-based network intrusion systems in the total subnet as 
the mechanisms. Irvine also discusses the costs of those 
security services and mechanisms. Yet to be developed, is a 
cost model to serve as a guide for new product design.
While these studies characterize areas of design and 
implementation weaknesses, none have provided the IDS 
developers with the data and techniques necessary to create 
truly "next -generation" intrusion detection algorithms and 
tools. For instance, none of the performance evaluation studies 
[1,3,4,] that explore the relationship between deployment 
techniques and attack system variables and the performance of 
the IDS; and the studies [5, 6] on cost models that investigate 
the cost-benefit/sensitive analysis for intrusion detection 
deployment presents developers with any concrete guide on 
how to translate research results into practical design tools.
Going by the results of the studies, the need to establish a 
uniform framework for new products development or the 
refinement of existing ones using the results of research works 
and experiences gained from IDS implementations cannot be 
overstated.
Richards [3] evaluates the functional and performance 
capabilities of the industries' leading conmercial type IDS. In 
the areas tested, the performance of the IDS was rated based 
on their distinctive features, which were characterized into 
different performance indexes. The research work represented 
anew direction for ID systems in that it moved the focus away 
from scientific concepts research to performance evaluation of 
ihe industries' best products. However, the study was limited 
to a small proto design isolated and non-switched network 
*hich did not reveal the impact of packet switching on the
Therefore, this paper will seek to chart a course for the future 
development of new IDS products by drawing from the field 
experiences of the authors in the operation of the IDS 
technology. Further, we will demonstrate that the concepts 
proposed here could reasonably be associated with well 
thought out propositions on the requirements and functions 
that must be satisfied in order for new products to be 
implemented successfully in all design lifecycle.
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The test of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
present a development framework for future product design. In 
Section 3, we present the basic elements that will make for 
reliable and effective IDS and then propose research and 
development directions to realize this in Section 4 and 
conclude our discussion in Section 5.
I FRAMEWORK FOR IDS 
"DEVELOPMENT
hs with other security and monitoring products, intrusion 
detection systems functions as one element of a corporate 
security policy. Successful intrusion detection requires that a 
well-defined policy on IDS development be set up to ensure 
that intrusions are handled according b corporate security 
policy guidelines. The development of new IDS products 
requires innovative approach on how the IDS is designed, 
deployed and maintained. Without this, the successful use of 
this technology will be short 4ived.
In order to develop any innovative approach towards IDS 
product development within various overriding security 
requirements, considerations will begin to focus on defects, 
remedial design measures and cost trade-offs, including the 
cost of long-term maintenance and reliability cquirements. 
The approach will take into account the fact that often 
conceptualized product development model is different from 
the real world development model. Theoretically, the 
assumptions made under conceptualized product development 
model might be correct but because of difficulties in vision 
and execution differences could exist with the real world 
development model. Consequently, the development of 
standard design frameworks should draw from the lessons 
learned from current implementation failures; should be 
valuable in directing remedial and redeveloping efforts and 
should aim to eliminate known defects in current commercial 
products.
The conceptualized product development model always takes 
into account the desire of both developers and users lhat the 
design of the IDS incorporates the basic elements that will 
maximize the technical effectiveness of the IDS. This 
often translates into IDS vendors attempting to use brute force 
methods to correctly detect a larger spectrum of intrusions 
than their competitors. However, the goal of catching all 
attacks has proven to be a major technical challenge. After 
more than two decades of research and development efforts, 
the leading IDSs still have marginal detection rates and high 
Wse alarm rates, especially in the face of stealthy or novel 
intrusions, This goal (of catching all attacks) is also 
impractical for IDS deployment, as the constraints on time 
(i.e., processing speed) and resources (human/computer) may 
become very restrictive.
The Frameworks that will set the stage for product 
development should be formulated in broader terms and 
should be drawn from the difficulties in the current 
implementation. Despite the fact that the technologies of IDS
commercial products are laden with multiple problems 
many vendors are still developing new products at a furious 
pace. Some of the weaknesses that are considered short-term 
i.e. scalability, hierarchical reporting, and dynamic remote 
updates are already being addressed by vendors and some of 
the solutions are in the alpha- or beta-testing stage. 
Compounding the situation are the problems posed by the 
huge number of applications that have unknown and 
undocumented holes. For the typical IDS the main way of 
detecting such attacks is to use attack signatures to learn what 
a weakness looks like and detecting attempts to trigger the 
hole from outsiders. This is fairly limited, technically.
The other pitfalls [7] include:
1. The issues of variant signatures,
2. False positives and negatives alerts,
3. Data overload,
4. Interoperability,
5. Difficulties to function effectively in switched 
environments, and
6. Scalability issues. 
A description of the pitfalls is given elsewhere [4].
Thus, the frameworks should provide indication of possible 
future directions, by addressing the following pitfalls-related 
questions:
» How can IDSs be evaluated?
• Do current systems, particularly anomaly-based IDSs, 
produce too many false positives?
• Can network IDSs be scaled to the ever increasing 
bandwidth of networks?
• Can intrusion detection be used to detect unknown 
attacks?
• How can the reports of multiple intrusion detection 
systems be combined to detect attacks that span 
multiple locations and subsystems, or that plays out 
over time?
• Can intrusion detection and automated response be 
integrated, as necessary to cope with rapidly 
spreading attacks or situations where human response 
is not possible?
• Will intrusion detection technology be useful for 
potentially devastating attacks, such as a malicious 
worm that in the absence of a defense would spread 
over the Internet?
The formulation of standard frameworks would also entail 
adopting a complementary approach to encapsulate both the 
good and bad experiences in the current implementations into 
empirical design rules.
The frameworks should detail how empirically derived 
solutions could be applied to specific design processes and 
should provide the necessary safeguards to guarantee that 
following one design principle will not lead to violating 
another. The following perspectives that border on IDS 
implementation should serves as the frameworks for future 
development directions and the evolution of design standards:
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1 IDS technology itself is undergoing a lot of enhancements 
jjd the technology has not reached a level where it does not 
({quire human intervention. Of course today's IDS technology 
offers some automation like notifying the administrator in case 
Of detection of a malicious activity, shunning the malicious 
tonnection for a configurable period of time, dynamically 
modifying a router's access control list in order to stop a 
malicious connection etc. But it is still important to monitor 
the IDS logs regularly to stay on top of the occurrence of 
events. Monitoring the logs on a daily basis is required to 
malyze the kind of malicious activities detected by the IDS 
over a period of time. Today's IDS has not yet reached the 
level where it can give historical analysis of the intrusions 
detected over a period of time. This is still a manual activity. It 
is therefore important to use this as a framework for 
itchnology refinement.
2, The success of an IDS implementation depends to a large 
extent on how it has been deployed. A lot of planning is 
required in the design as well as the implementation phase. In 
most cases, it is desirable to implement a hybrid solution of 
network based and host based IDS to benefit from both. In fact 
one technology complements the other. However, this decision 
can vary from one organization to another. A network based 
IDS is an immediate choice for many organizations because of 
its ability to monitor multiple systems and also the fact that it 
does not require a software to be loaded on a production 
system unlike host based IDS. Some organizations implement 
a hybrid solution. A suitable framework here would be for 
organizations to clearly define their expectations and to align 
them with policy definitions of technological effective 
performance of the IDS.
J, It is important to take care of sensor to manager ratio. 
There is no thumb rule as such for calculating this ratio. To a 
large extent it depends upon how many different kinds of 
traffic is being monitored by each sensor and in what 
environment. Lot of organizations deploy at a 10:1 ratio. Some 
organizations go for 20:1 and some others 15:1. Therefore an 
important framework would be to design the baseline policy 
before starting the IDS implementation in order to avoid false 
positives. A badly configured IDS sensor may send a lot of 
false positives to the console and even a 10:1 or even better 
sensor to console ratio can be inadequate.
4. The IDS technology is still reactive rather than proactive. 
The IDS technology works on attack signatures. Attack 
signatures are attack patterns of previous attacks. The 
signature database needs to be updated whenever a different 
kind of attack is detected and the fix for the same is available. 
The frequency of signature update varies from vendor to 
"endor. A suitable framework would be to design the IDS with 
> periodic pull mechanism similar to what obtains with anti 
virus update mechanisms.
5 - While deploying a network based IDS solution, it is 
wportant to keep in mind one very important aspect of the 
network based IDS in switched environment. Unlike a HUB
based network, where a host on one port can see traffic in 
and out of every o ther port in the HUB, in a switched network 
however, traffic in and out of one port cannot be seen by a 
host in another port, because they are in different collision 
domains.
6. A network based IDS sensor needs to see traffic in and out 
of a port to detect any malicious traffic. In a switched 
environment, port mirroring or spanning is required to achieve 
this. One entire VLAN can be spanned to one port on which 
the network based IDS sensor is installed. Although this is a 
solution, there may be performance issues for a busy network. 
If all the 10/100 Mbps ports in a VLAN are mirrored to 
another 10/100 Mbps port in the VLAN, the IDS sensor may 
drop traffic, as the combined traffic of all the ports could be 
more than 100 Mbps. Now, with Gigabit port speed being 
available, this becomes a more difficult challenge. Cisco 
systems has an IDS module for Catalyst 6000 series switch 
which can sit on the switch back plane and can monitor traffic 
right off the switch back plane. But this solution is yet to scale 
to Gigabit speed. This module supports traffic only up to 100 
Mbps as of now. The portability of network based IDS in a 
switched environment is still a concern and should be a design 
framework.
The above-proposed frameworks should be used to define the 
development of design architectures and to prove their 
correctness throughout the life cycle of the IDS products.
In the next Section, we chart a course for IDS design.
3. CHARTING THE COURSE FOR 
FUTURE DESIGNS
Generally, expectations for IDS performance revolve around 
accuracy and border on the stated missions of intrusion 
detection systems as discovery and detection tools. The IDS 
technology does not directly address some other important 
security issues such as identification/authentication, 
confidentiality, etc., though some of them will be integrated 
with the IDS technology in the near future. Given the above 
and the implementation failures discussed in Section 4, there 
is the need to accurate the development directions in terms of 
not only remedial design actions but also in terms of the stated 
mission objectives of the IDS.
While not exclusive the following could be described as 
potential directions for the refinement and enhancement of 
existing products and development of new technologies:
1. The development of data correlation tools using analysis 
and correlation techniques is an immediate product 
development challenge. This will help to resolve data 
correlation issues. The challenge is to devise a tool and 
mechanism that will reduce human errors in the correlation of 
data. No matter how good the IDS analyst, abuses such as 
slow port scans are difficult to detect, especially on large 
networks. Projects such as Spice and Spade [8] are working to
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Biikethis possible. Acting as anomaly detectors, they examine 
strange packets and look to group them using sophisticated 
statistical analysis. Tools like these will aid the intrusion 
jrtection analyst to pull out " needles in the haystack" and 
bring them to our attention. It is worth noting that it is much 
easier to discover and categorize patterns when you have all 
tje relevant data in front of you, without the noise that 
generally follows. Furthermore, applications similar to these 
wj|l be used to fine tune filters and rules in order to reduce 
false positives, over time providing a kind of IDS feedback 
system, based on administrator input and response.
2. As a functional requirement an IDS deployment should 
have some operational procedure behind it to gather additional 
information and fine-tune the network and the process. A good 
IDS will automate much of this process.
). Realistic expectations are that the product should detect, in 
near real-time, any kinds of attempts to exploit known 
weaknesses, or to probe your internal network. They should 
also keep track of attempts to overload necessary resources. 
Along with this, they should perhaps sound an alarm, trigger 
some predefined action, and keep a good log for analysis. 
Many customers think that a given security product like an 
IDS will protect them from 100% of the "bad things." In a 
practical world, there are no absolutes, instead IDS can 
significantly reduce the risk from network-based threats, but 
they're not perfect.
4. A reasonable expectation is to have an IDS detect attacks 
against previously unknown vulnerabilities, detect slow 
attacks by insiders, have built -in automatic protection for your 
network when an attack is detected, or to be operable in 
"hands-off' mode.
i. With the exception of better databases of attack signatures 
and methods to update those databases, the single-sensor 
solution has gone as far as it can go. The next big step is 
distributed intrusion detection-taking the results from multiple 
sensors, deployed throughout the enterprise, and correlating 
them into a single "big picture" view of the network. The only 
way to do this today is manually, and human in the process for 
some time to come. But there's going to be a lot of "software 
assist" showing up in the next few years. This is currently 
happening in the firewall market is going to hit the IDS market 
in the next 18-24 months. There will be several products; all 
more or less interchangeable at their core, with differentiation 
based on the assorted bells and whistles bundled with the base. 
One area to pay close attention to is what the vendors do to 
take advantage of all these sensors deployed throughout the 
network, all with the ability to report information back to a 
central location-there are several interesting things you can do
*ith that.
6. There will be an increase in three (potentially conflicting) 
tfeas [9]: deployment, commoditization, and sophistication of 
"tack signature. For deployment, intrusion detection points
*ill be showing up all through the network: at the network
level (on the firewall, on the switch, on the router), at the 
system level (on servers, on desktops), and at the application 
level (on the database or SAP server, for example). Ever 
increasing speeds will push IDS technologies. For 
commoditization, given that there will be more and more 
detection points, they will become simpler to operate and 
more "appliance-like," so that they drop into the network 
infrastructure with no changes. It is thought as a "security 
toaster." For sophistication of attack signatures, the attack 
recognition logic will start to involve things like behavioral 
profiles and deviations from that profile (as an example). 
There will be much more "intelligence" in determining what 
constitutes an attack or resource misuse. Inevitably the total 
number of attacks will increase in concert with the increase in 
network speeds.
7. There will be merged IDS products that are burglar alarm 
and expert-based. Ideally, they will be merged into suites of 
network management tools.
8. The next issue to be addressed by commercial products is 
the inclusion of automated reactions to certain kinds of 
detected problems. This is beginning to emerge with systems 
changing firewall/router rules. There will be more of "active 
defenses" in the way detections and reactions are combined. 
This trend will increase over the next 2-4 years.
9. It is desirable to develop an IDS console, which will 
communicate with multiple pieces of the network architecture: 
firewalls, routers, switches and even different ID systems. 
Also, an IDS protocol or reporting fcrmat will be a design 
requirement: routers could relay SNMP traps and network 
statistics, firewalls could transfer failed packets for analysis 
and different ID systems could exchange findings. The 
possibilities are endless, leaving us with the definitive network 
monitor, manager and security package, thanks to the pooled 
efforts of each individual component.
In the next Section we define the research directions that could 
translate the above goals into realities.
4. DEFINING RESEARCH AREAS AND 
DIRECTIONS
Although intrusion detection is new to the commercial market, 
it's been around in the research labs for a couple of decades. 
Until recently, the commercial sector has paid little attention 
to it, and has to some extent been busy reinventing the wheel. 
But it is easy to predict that as the importance of security 
continues to increase, the gap between R&D and commercial 
products will shrink.
Among the most visible areas of active research [10] in the 
IDS community is the development of technologies to manage 
and interpret security relevant alert streams produced from an 
ever-increasing number of INFOSEC devices. In recent years, 
the growing number of security enforcement services, access 
logs, intrusion detection systems, authentication servers,
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julnerability scanners, and various operating system and 
jpplications logs have given administrators the leverage to 
have an insightful view into security-relevant activities 
occulting within their systems. The motivation for INFOSEC 
,lann correlation is straightforward: as we continue to 
incorporate and distribute advanced security services into our 
networks, we need the ability to understand the various forms 
of hostile and fault-related activity that our security services 
observe as they help to preserve the operational requirements 
of our systems.
Today, in the absence of significant field -able technology for 
security-incident correlation, there are several challenges [11] 
10 meet while providing effective security management for 
mission-critical network environments:
i Domain expertise is not widely available that can interpret 
and isolate high threat operations within active and visible 
Internet-connected networks. Also not widely available 
are skills needed to understand the conditions under 
which one may merge INFOSEC alerts from different 
sources (e.g., merging firewall and OS syslogs with 
intrusion detection reports). In an environment where 
thousands (or tens of thousands) of INFOSEC alarms may 
be produced daily, it is important to understand 
redundancies in alert production that can simplify alert 
interpretation. Equally important are algorithms for 
prioritizing which security incidents pose the greatest 
administrative threats.
• The sheer volume of INFOSEC device alerts makes 
security management a time-consuming and therefore 
expensive effort. There are numerous examples of 
organizations that have found even small deployment of 
IDS sensors to be an overwhelming management cost. As 
a result, these IDS components are often tuned down to an 
extremely narrow and ad hoc selection of detection 
heuristics, effectively minimizing the coverage of the IDS 
tool.
• In managing INFOSEC devices, it is difficult to leverage 
potentially complementary information produce from 
heterogeneous INFOSEC devices. As a result, security 
relevant information that, for example, is captured in a 
firewall log, is typically manually analyzed in isolation 
from potentially relevant alert information captured by 
IDS, Syslog, or other INFOSEC alert source.
Additionally, other areas of research interests are beginning to 
Merge and most originated from the failures in the 
implementation of currently available IDS products. The 
following are the borderline issues at the center stage of these 
research works:
1. Data sets: Better data sets are necessary for better 
calculation of metrics in future evaluations and to further 
research. Datasets need to consist of many more examples of 
both attack and background traffic than have previously been
available. Datasets need to be gathered collaboratively by a 
wide variety of researchers and stored centrally so that they 
represent a wide variety of network and system configurations 
and can be updated periodically without undue effort by any 
one entity. Datasets will need to take on new forms such as 
specifications and tools for created attack and background 
traffic in ones own environment so that IDS developers can 
explore use of new and different inputs for their systems.
2. Performance metrics: Metrics for IDS performance are a 
research topic in aid of themselves, and will need to be 
expanded to better calculate and compare the amount by 
which an IDS improves the security of a given network 
configuration rather than simply tallying attack and false 
alarm rates.
3. Anomaly-based detection approach: Generally speaking, 
there seems to be much interest in going back to the anomaly - 
based approach of years ago without really understanding the 
value of what has been accomplished with the misuse 
detection approach. Thus, the industry is likely to move much 
faster to address the anomaly-based approach because of the 
successes and lessons learned from the misuse approach.
4. Expert-based approaches: A large number of IDS 
researchers are working on expert-based approaches because 
those are technically more interesting and are more likely to 
really evolve into something useful in the long run. The big 
gap is that the research tends to also ignore the "real security 
equals network management" problem and builds systems that 
are hard to manage, don't have intuitive user interfaces (or 
documentation) or that are cumbersome to use. It is likely that 
the good ideas from the R&D systems will wind up in 
commercial products. This will be the right research direction 
since good ideas, not products, come from research.
5. Data correlation: It could be successfully argued that the 
future of IDS lies in data correlation research. The IDS of 
tomorrow will produce results by examining input from 
several different sources. The notion of NIDS and HIDS will 
disappear, leaving us with a group of distributed components 
performing specific tasks.
The concept of HIDS plays an important role in this scenario. 
Encrypted traffic demands that we shift packet analysis, an 
important part of ID, to the host. It is difficult to find another 
solution. There is however, a distinct advantage gained by 
using this method of analysis. The signatures can be tailored to 
one host, as opposed to the heterogeneous mix of Microsoft, 
Unix and application specific rules in place on most NIDS. 
Moreover, a recurring scan could quickly monitor which 
services/programs run on a machine, allowing for an even 
more precise rule-set. So, instead of a sensor capturing all 
traffic on a network, the client machines will monitor their 
own traffic.
Research efforts will vigorously continue in this area as the 
way to solve this problem lies in statistical analysis and
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predictive artificial intelligence performed on strange data sets. 
•foe management console, having received these abnormal 
[vent notifications from many clients, needs to concentrate on 
possible relationships, relevance and correlation. It needs to 
determine the likely triggers for such infrequent events. 
Moreover, the console will need to communicate with multiple 
pieces of the network architecture: firewalls, routers, switches 
and even different IDSs.
5. Audit trails: Research to determine what kinds of 
information should be in audit trails, and when such data 
uteds to be collected to optimally drive any intrusion detection 
system will be critical h defining the architecture of data 
mining technologies.
I Storage format: Research to determine the best 
structure/storage formats for audit data so that it can be 
quickly processed without taking up huge amounts of storage 
will aid data mining architectural designs.
8. Software automation: Exploring how to define policy in a 
consistent and meaningful way such that it can be expressed in 
software for automated comparison and detection of intrusions 
and internal misuse is a viable research field.
9. Reference model: There is a need to develop a reference 
model for IDS design as any meaningful design should take a 
queue from a standard reference model just as the one done by 
Christopher Schuba on a formal reference model for firewalls. 
The lack of one was prevalent in the early days of firewall 
development when people were so busy building firewalls, 
selling firewalls, giving firewall tutorials, and hyping firewalls 
that they neglected to study what really should constitute a 
firewall.
Something simihr would benefit research and development 
intrusion detection systems. There is so much need, and so 
much pressure will soon be applied from various quarters, that 
basic scientific foundational research won't be done. Already, 
the focus is largely on engineering research-how to build a 
better version without understanding the underlying principles. 
The security marketplace/government has a poor track record 
of helping support research in academia, while at the same 
time offering incredible incentives to lure away promising 
students and even some faculty who are best suited to do this 
work.
Thus, there is the need to have the commercial realm-both 
vendors and customers-providing support to academia to do 
basic research rather than simply implementing small 
variations of the same ideas all over again (which is what is 
going on at many places right now). This is an area where 
there is a need for some radically new ideas investigated. 
Some welkargeted research could pay off in the long run with 
better technology.
5. CONCLUSION
The issues discussed in the preceding Sections makes us to 
believe that the IDS are here to stay, although future systems 
will undoubtedly take a different form than current versions. 
The ideas presented here, while optimistic, are attainable. 
Presently, there are several ongoing research and development 
efforts worldwide. For example, the mathematical and 
artificial intelligence concepts required for success in new 
technologies are already being developed, tested and improved 
upon. A USA company - SRI has a great start with the 
N1DES and EMERALD projects, using a distributed model." 
Equally, Internet Security Systems, Inc. (ISS) [12] is 
developing products that will scan networks for vulnerabilities 
and modify the IDS filters based on the results. So also is 
Lancope's StealthWatch [13] that is using a "flow-based 
architecture to recognize abnormal behavior. Several other 
refinements and features outlined above are being 
incorporated into upcoming products, all of which will 
improve with time and research.
Finally, as security continues to move to the center stage, and 
with vendors and other research organizations working to 
eliminate the shortcomings of IDS products, the future looks 
brighter for this technology. Future IDS will merge all of the 
independent network components and tools, which exist today, 
into a complete and cooperative system, dedicated to keeping 
networks, stable. There will be many distributed elements 
performing specific jobs, each passing the results onto a 
higher level for correlation and analysis.
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The 2002-2003 Chapter year is coming 
to a close. In my last message to you 
as President, I wanted to express my 
thanks to all of the volunteer board 
members for their consistent dedication 
and cooperation. The results we 
achieved through our voluntary efforts- 
cost effective and meaningful special 
and luncheon seminars, informative 
newsletters and web sites, and contin­ 
ued positive financial posture, have not 
gone unnoticed. Our chapter won the 
K Wayne Snipes award this year as the 
best ISACA chapter worldwide. Jay 
Jacobsen, the in-coming president for 
2003-2004, and I will be attending the 
annual ISACA leadership conference in 
May at Houston to accept the award on 
behalf of our chapter.
Although we should all be proud of the 
international recognition our chapter 
received, we cannot lessen our drive or 
effort to improve the quality of our 
services for the chapter members. To 
remain a consistent top-notch chapter, 
we need continued infusion of dedicated 
volunteers to bring in fresh ideas on the 
type and delivery of services for our 
chapter members. Over the last couple 
of years, we have dramatically improved 
our services including allowing the use 
of credit card to pay for seminars, 
adding incentives to increase seminar 
attendance, and using an on-line service 
to conduct the annual survey of mem­ 
bership needs. Another example is the 
recently approved change to distribute 
future chapter newsletter and other 
special announcements via email and/or
the Web. I hope many of you consider 
volunteering to serve on the board.
As in my previous messages, I want to 
recognize the volunteer service of one . 
of the Board members. Hanh Do, 
serving on the CISA Review and 
Certification Committee, has been the 
person spending considerable effort in 
setting up the annual quality CISA 
review class for the past three years. 
She ordered the study material in 
advance and coordinated with the 
instructors to schedule each review 
class. She registered the attendees and 
made sure they received the study 
materials. She also attended the 5 
Saturday sessions to resolve last minute 
difficulties and provided valuable 
feedbacks on the instructors and the 
materials provided. Because of Hanh's 
dedication, the CISA review classes has 
always been well attended and with 
favorable feedback.
Hanh is a dedicated volunteer working 
very diligently with the rest of the 
board members to keep the cost 
reasonable and still provide chapter 
members with a top quality CISA 
revjew class. We on the Board intend 
to continue being responsive to your 
needs. As always, we do want con­ 
structive feedback from you. Please 
contact any board members by phone, 
email, or through our Website.
I hope you will continue to take 
advantage of the services provided to 
you by our chapter. Best wishes for the 
coming ISACA-NCAC year.
Ben Hsiao
2003 Chapter Luncheon Meetings hejd at the Holiday Inn Capitol, 550 C Street, SW
(Located 1 Block from L'Enfant Plaza Metro Station)
5/27/03 and 6/24/03
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Future Directions in the Development of 
Intrusion Detection Systems
,jhor: Charles Iheagwara and 
jjrew Blyth
10 Introduction
^Intrusion detection system (IDS) is 
iKurity system that monitors 
mputer systems and network traffic 
d analyzes that traffic for possible 
Bdle attacks originating from outside 
^organization and also for system 
isuse or attacks originating from 
side-the organization. Historically, 
imsion Detection Systems (IDS) 
jived from the system audit informa- 
ianalysis [1). A strong need for IDS 
icrged due to the fact that system 
tit information, for example system 
! files, were difficult to decipher, 
ilyze, and review by auditors and 
•terns administrators.
elDS technology is very powerful. It 
ivides an incredible view into the 
unity problems facing an organiza- 
i However, it still requires consid- 
ble refinements to eliminate the 
iknesses in currently available 
ducts. Some of the weaknesses that 
considered short-term i.e. 
lability, hierarchical reporting, and 
amic remote updates are already 
ig addressed by vendors and some 
tie solutions are in the alpha- or 
i-testing stage. The long-term 
faiesses, which by and large are 
fics for IDS performance, are being 
'essed as research topics in and of 
wives.
products, much like the security 
stry itself, have grown rapidly over 
iast few years. These tools have 
me essential security components - 
Juable as a firewall to many 
lizations. However, as in any
environment, things change. As 
networks and crackers evolve and grow 
rapidly, demanding that security tools 
keep up, the IDS faces several daunting 
but exciting challenges in the future 
and are sure to remain one of the best 
weapons in the arena of network 
security.
Among the many challenges is the 
development of commercial IDS 
products to meet the needs of today's 
complex networked environments. To 
effectively deploy the IDS in such 
complex and networked environments 
requires a broad understanding of 
computer security and good product 
delivery. As the information technology 
landscapes and infrastructures become 
more and more complex so also has the 
performance effectiveness of the IDS 
diminished in such environments [2]. 
The complexities have often resulted 
into the most significant obstacle to the 
success of an information security 
improvement initiative due to lack of 
management support. In surveys 
conducted by security trade magazines 
[3], lack of management support was 
cited as one of the principal barriers to 
effective information security.
Within the IDS market place are two 
broad categories of product: Host-based 
and Network-based. Generally, the 
commercially available IDS products 
shown in Table 1 are classified accord­ 
ing to their approach to intrusion 
detection, all being either host or 
network-based. None of the products 
integrate host-based and network-based 
intrusion detection capabilities and a 
few integrate security assessment 
capabilities with basic IDS functional­ 
ity, such as audit trail analysis and 
malicious software protection.
See Table 1 on next page.
Each implementation has been 
plagued with a couple of problems 
some of which are discussed in 
Section 2.
The solution to some of the problems 
could come from the insights and 
operational experience gained from 
the implementation of currently 
available IDS products. In this regard, 
results of previous research studies on 
performance effectiveness could be 
helpful in evolving an effective design 
approach and charting the course for 
new products development. Crucial to 
this is the results of research studies 
that established a link between IDS 
performance in technical, operational 
and cost/economic terms and product 
architectures.
With so many studies on IDS tech­ 
nologies, those that are performance- 
based have leapt forward to take 
center stage as developers race to 
refine existing products. IDS perfor­ 
mance studies [2,4,5] measure the 
effectiveness of the IDS using a 
variety of metrics for different 
environments, as described below.
Richards [4] evaluates the functional 
and performance capabilities of the 
industries' leading commercial type 
IDS. In the areas tested, the perfor­ 
mance of the IDS was rated based on 
their distinctive features, which were 
characterized into different perfor­ 
mance indexes. The research work 
represented a new direction for ID 
systems in that it moved the focus 
away from scientific concepts research 
to performance evaluation of the 
industries' best products. However, 
the study was limited to a small proto


















Network-based Packet capture, signature 
analysis, and real-time playback
Network-based. Passive network monitor 
with packet filtering router
Host-based. Passive ID capabilities with 
assessment functions
Host-based. Passive ID capabilities (audit 
trail analysis and file checksums) and 
assessment functions








Table 1: IDS products
design isolated and non-switched 
network which did not reveal the 
impact of packet switching on the 
accuracy and ability to capture attack 
packets in their entirety. Iheagwara et 
al. [2] expands this effort with an 
evaluation study of the effect of 
deployment techniques on IDS perfor­ 
mance in switched and distributed 
system. The study demonstrates that 
monitoring techniques could play an 
important role in determining the 
effectiveness of the IDS in a switched 
and distributed network.
In an experimental evaluation study of 
intrusion detection system performance 
in a gigabit environment, Iheagwara et 
al. [5] examines the system benefits of 
using a single Gigabit IDS sensor 
instead of multiple Megabit sensors for 
a wide range of defined system attacks, 
network traffic characteristics, and for 
their contexts of operational concepts 
and deployment techniques. The study 
established the relationship between 
traffic parametric values and the IDS 
performance for specified environ­ 
ments.
The results of cost-benefit models and 
analysis studies of IDS deployments, 
although relatively few sheds some 
light on the integral economic building
blocks that could serve as a guide for 
acquisition and deployment of the 
products. Lee et al. [6] study the 
problem of building cost-sensitive 
intrusion detection models. For 
intrusion detection, Irvine [7] defines 
auditing of network control functions in 
intermediate nodes, and rule-based 
network intrusion systems in the total 
subnet as the mechanisms. Irvine also 
discusses the costs of those security 
services and mechanisms. A design 
cost component model, which could 
serve as a guide for new product 
development is yet to be developed.
While these studies characterize areas 
of design and implementation weak­ 
nesses, none have provided IDS 
developers with the data and techniques 
necessary to create truly "next- 
generation" intrusion detection algo­ 
rithms and tools. For instance, none of 
the performance evaluation studies 
[2,4,5,] that explore the relationship 
between deployment techniques and 
attack system variables, and the 
performance of the IDS; and the studies 
[6, 7] on cost models that investigate 
the cost-benefit/sensitive analysis for 
intrusion detection deployment presents 
developers with any concrete guide on 
how to translate research results into 
practical design tools.
Going by the results of the studies, the 
need to establish a uniform framework 
for the new products development or 
the refinement of existing ones using 
proven results of research studies and 
the operational experiences gained 
from IDS implementations cannot be 
overstated.
Therefore, this paper will seek to chart 
a course for the future development of 
new IDS products by drawing from the 
field experiences of the authors in the 
operation of the IDS technology. 
Further, we will demonstrate that the 
concepts proposed here could reason­ 
ably be associated with well thought 
out propositions on the requirements 
and functions that must be satisfied in 
order for new products to be imple­ 
mented successfully from design to 
lifecycle management.
2.0 Problems with the current 
designs
There are pitfalls in the current 
implementation of commercially 
available IDSs. The pitfalls include the 
issues of variant signatures, lag time 
between the time an attack is discov­ 
ered and an IDS signature is provided 
to users (catch-up), false positives and 
negatives alerts, data overload, difficul-
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(Sto function effectively in switched 
jvjronments and scalability issues.
giants. While the ability to develop 
jd use signatures to detect attacks is a 
(tful and viable approach, there are 
portfalls to using this approach as 
^natures are developed in response to 
(w vulnerabilities or exploits that have 
#n posted or released. However for a 
taiature to be effective, it must be 
cfficiently unique to only alert on 
jalicious traffic and not infringe on 
did network traffic. The difficulty 
fcre is that exploit code can often be 
asily changed. It is common for an 
sploit tool to be released and then 
iave its defaults changed shortly 
jereafter by the hacker community.
btch-up. New signatures can only be 
tveloped once an attack has been 
fatified. Therefore between the 
ration of an attack and the deploy- 
nent of a signature to detect the attack, 
i window of opportunity exists for an 
iiruder to mount an attack with little to 
»chance of the attack being detected.
fdse positives. A common complaint is 
k amount of false positives an IDS 
snerates. Developing unique signa- 
res is a difficult task and often times 
IK vendors will err on the side of 
letting too often rather than not 
nough. This is analogous to the story 
f the boy who cried wolf. It is much 
lore difficult to pick out a valid 
illusion attempt if a signature also 
lots regularly on valid network 
ctivity. A difficult problem that arises 
how much can be filtered out without 
otentially missing an attack.
vise negatives. Detecting attacks for 
hich there are no known signatures. 
his leads to the concept of false 
Natives where an IDS does not 
inerate an alert when an intrusion is 
lually taking place. Simply put, if a 
gnature has not been written for a 
rtcular exploit, there is an extremely
good chance that the IDS will not 
detect it.
Data overload. Another aspect, which 
does not relate directly to misused 
detection but is extremely important is 
how much data can be analyzed 
effectively and efficiently. Depending 
on the intrusion detection tools de­ 
ployed by a company and its size, there 
is the possibility for logs to reach 
millions of records per day.
Difficulties in switched environments.
Network capture and analysis in a 
switched LAN environment usually 
means "tapping" the switch's lines by 
using a "mirror" port or deployment in 
other tapping configurations. In this 
approach, traffic is copied from one 
"source" port to another destination or 
"mirror" port. Mirroring a full duplex 
source port may cause packet loss as 
traffic on the full duplex source port 
exceeds the available bandwidth of the 
mirror port.
Scaling up:
In the last couple of years, there has 
been a significant increase in network 
traffic utilization. With this has come 
the introduction of Gigabit Ethernet 
technology to accommodate this 
increase in bandwidth - and thus the 
volume of traffic to be analyzed. The 
problem associated with this is that 
older IDS technologies that operate at 
lOmbps or lOOmbps band widths are 
overwhelmed with the increase in 
traffic volume. With Gigabit Ethernet, 
the older IDS technologies become 
seriously overloaded.
3.0 Future design directions 
and improvements
Current IDS products bring the ability 
to view network and system activity in 
real-time, identify unauthorized activity 
and provide a near-real-time automated 
response. IDS products also provide the 
ability to analyze today's activity in
view of yesterday's activity to identify 
larger trends and problems. It is 
reasonable to expect IDS technology to 
revolutionize computer security efforts, 
by allowing real-time operational 
capability in controlling unauthorized 
activity in corporate cyberspace. IDS 
technology does not directly address. =_ 
other security issues such as identifica­ 
tion/authentication, confidentiality, etc., 
although some of these technologies 
will be integrated with IDS in the near 
future.
Generally, expectations typically 
revolve around accuracy and the myth 
of the "silver bullet" (the latter is 
something that all security products 
have to face). Realistic expectations are 
that intrusion detection systems are 
discovery and detection tools that guide 
further investigation. Unrealistic 
expectations are that intrusion detection 
systems, like firewalls, will automati­ 
cally protect all users from all threats. 
The following are expectations of 
future IDS products.
1. An IDS deployment should have 
some operational procedure behind 
it to gather additional information 
and fine-tune the network and the 
process. A good IDS will automate 
as much of this process as possible. 
Many customers think that a given 
security product like an IDS will 
protect them from 100% of the 
"bad things." In a practical world, 
there are no absolutes, instead an 
IDS can significantly reduce the 
risk from network-based threats, 
but they are not perfect.
2. The IDS product should detect, in 
near real-time, any kinds of 
attempts to exploit known weak­ 
nesses, or to probe your internal 
network. They should also keep 
track of attempts to overload 
necessary resources. Along with 
this, they should perhaps sound an 
alarm, trigger some predefined 
action, and keep a good log for 
analysis.
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3. A reasonable expectation is to have 
such a system detect attacks 
against previously unknown 
vulnerabilities, detect slow attacks 5. 
by insiders, have built-in automatic 
protection for your network when 
an attack is detected, or to be 
operable in "hands-off mode.
4. Because of the uncertain nature of 
security policy and methods for 
detecting violations, any current or 
near-future system that is likely to 
be able to detect intrusions and 
misuse is also going to generate 
false alarms. Someone with 
enough knowledge of the environ­ 
ment and the nature of the ID 
system'to sift through alarms will 
be required to decide which ones 
are false alarms (mistakes, bugs, 
harmless curiosity), and which are 
real attacks.
Single-sensor IDS performance has 
been taken about as far as possible, 
with databases of attack signatures 
and methods to update these 
databases as the only areas of 
improvement.. The next big step is 
distributed intrusion detection, 
which takes the results from 
multiple sensors, deployed 
throughout the enterprise, and 
correlates them into a single "big 
picture" view of the network. 
Manual correlation is the only way 
to do this currently. . However 
there will be several "software 6. 
assist" programs marketed in the 
next 18-24 months, similar to what 
is currently happening in the 
firewall market. There will be 7. 
several products; all more or less 
interchangeable at their core, with 
differentiation based on the 
"assorted bells and whistles" 
bundled with the base. One area to 
pay close attention to is what the 
vendors do to take advantage of all 
these sensors deployed throughout 
the network, all with the ability to
report information back to a central 
location, (what interesting things 
are you talking about? slj) 
We expect that there will be an 
increase in IDS functionality in 
three (potentially conflicting) 
areas: deployment, 
commoditization, and sophistica­ 
tion of attack signature. Concern­ 
ing deployment, intrusion 
detection points will be available 
throughout the network environ­ 
ment: at the network level (on the 
firewall, on the switch, on the 
router), at the system level (on 
servers, on desktops), and at the 
application level (on the database 
or SAP server, for example). 
Concerning commoditization, 
given that there will be more and 
more detection points, they will 
become simpler to operate and 
more "appliance-like," so that they 
drop into the network infrastruc­ 
ture with no changes, i.e. a 
"security toaster." Concerning 
sophistication of attack signatures, 
the attack recognition logic will 
involve items such as behavioral 
profiles and deviations from that 
profile (as an example). There will 
be much more "intelligence" in 
determining what constitutes an 
attack or resource misuse. Inevita­ 
bly the total number of attacks will 
increase in concert with the 
increase in network speeds. 
We expect that future IDS products 
will merge the burglar alarm and 
expert-based into suites of network 
management tools. 
The next issue is the inclusion of 
automated reactions to certain 
kinds of detected problems into 
commercial products. This is 
beginning to emerge with other 
systems changing firewall/router 
rules, such as "active defenses"; 
the way detections and reactions 
are combined. This is likely to 
become more widespread over the 
next 2-3 years.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The current architecture of commer­ 
cially available IDS products is buftt 
primarily out of the perceived role of 
intrusion detection. It is equally true 
that due to the complexities in evolving 
a uniform IDS technology, the current 
implementation is far from achieving 
the desired intrusion detection goals. 
Thus, the architecture and complexities 
in the current IDS technologies have 
given rise to obvious operational and 
deployment difficulties. However, as a 
result of current research and develop­ 
ment efforts it is expected that the next 
generation of intrusion detection 
systems will not inherit the current 
pitfalls.
A robust future IDS product should be 
designed with the capabilities to 
generate alarms, display alarms, clear 
alarms, and provide context-sensitive 
on-line help. It will also have a data­ 
base mechanism and sophisticated 
built-in reporting for effective data 
management. These tools will allow a 
security management staff to analyze 
the data as desired. Ultimately when 
this is realized, IDS products will serve 
the IT Security Community more 
efficiently and cost effectively.
Finally, it is expected that the future 
IDS product will be a grocery shelf of 
choices that will fit a broad range of 
needs. It won't be a single product, but 
an integrated system of products from 
multiple vendors. It will include 
network-based sensors, host-based 
sensors, and a centralized anomaly 
detection system that analyzes logs sent 
to it by the sensors. The anomaly 
detection system will take predeter­ 
mined actions depending on the nature 
and severity of the detected threat.
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